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# BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

OF

# THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY

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COUNSELLOR OF THE CONSISTORY AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN BERLIN.

Translated from the Third Revised Edition

BY

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DUFFTOWN.

VOL. I.

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# PREFACE.

SINCE this book appeared for the second time, much thorough work has been done in the department of New Testament theology. It was therefore my duty, not only to make my readers acquainted in the proper place with all the works that bear upon the subject, but also to come to as thorough an understanding as possible with them. I hope that this time also I have succeeded in giving, throughout the whole book, not only my own conception of things, but also a picture of the various leading conceptions of them and of the principal points around which the scientific discussion of them turns. If, indeed, I have paid far more attention to some publications than to others, it is not any predilection whatever, far less their size, that has led me to do so, but the definiteness and importance of their results, as well as the solidity of the arguments with which these results are supported. It is absolutely impossible to come to an understanding with treatises which arrive at no clear, comprehensible result, or are destitute of any thorough argument. Where both are found, it is at once a pleasure and a gain to give a careful consideration even to opinions that are very different from one's own, and I trust that this time also such a comparison has contributed much to the more precise statement and complete establishment, especially exegetically, of my own view.

No change has been made in the plan of the book; the numbers of all the chapters and paragraphs remain the same. It has been a source of great inward satisfaction to me that, notwithstanding the most accurate renewed working out of every detail, I found nothing to alter in this respect. I, for my part, do not know how to represent the various systems

of doctrine more succinctly and lucidly. I have also satisfied myself once more, that of the material furnished by the New Testament for our science, nothing, not even that which is apparently most trivial, has been overlooked. In matters of detail, indeed, the expert will easily perceive that my continued exegetical labours, and the constant direct or indirect comparison with other views, have led to numerous improvements and changes, particularly in the portions that are more important dogmatically. If, notwithstanding these, and notwithstanding the comprehensive notice taken of the more recent literature of the subject, the size of the book has not increased, this is simply owing to the fact that brevity has been most carefully studied wherever it was possible to do so without prejudice to the question considered, and that all detailed discussions have been avoided which did not improve my own statement of the case, or referred to treatises which were of no abiding significance.

For the third time this book begins its career, and the fact that it may venture to do so renders it unnecessary for me to make the apologies with which I had to introduce it the first and second time. The number of those who have found in it a serviceable guide through the rich world of Scripture truth in its manifold forms has steadily increased, and, God willing, will henceforward increase. I believe that my statements of biblico-theological questions, and of the various forms under which they are conceived, are objective enough to be of value even to those who do not share my opinions in detail, and my presuppositions in points of importance. It may also be granted to the book to open up the way still further for a truly historical method of regarding Holy Scripture, and to support the conclusions which I have arrived at, on the ground of that method, with regard to the history of the New Testament age and its records. And although it cannot in every particular adduce the reasons in support of these conclusions, which I have elsewhere done abundantly with respect to the most of the points, yet it is sufficient to show that they have been arrived at in a scientific way, and that it is possible to carry them out in a scientific manner through the whole of the New Testament. I believe I have shown that I know how to appreciate every

objection to them that is supported by means of argument, and also that I know how to come to a thorough understanding with it.

It is now twenty-seven years since, in my inaugural academical discourse, I for the first time expressed my love for the science which this book is meant to serve, and thoroughly discussed the questions regarding its right conception and its methodical representation. I believe that since that time I have shown in earnest labour that this love was no mere ebullition of youthful enthusiasm; and that the same love still inspires me to-day is also shown by this book in its new form. May it then still continue to find friends and bring forth fruit, may it help to introduce men more and more profoundly into the full riches of the truth of Scripture, and bring its hidden treasures to the light.

Here also I would take the opportunity of expressing my heartiest thanks to my young friend, Albert Hirsch, student of theology in Berlin, who has most carefully verified all the quotations of Scripture and the registers, and has thus much furthered the use of the book.

B. WEISS.

BERLIN, *August* 1879.

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# BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § 1. *The Problem of the Science.*

THE biblical theology of the New Testament is the scientific representation of the religious ideas and doctrines which are contained in the New Testament. (*b*) It assumes that the specific historical significance and the normative character of the writings which are united in the New Testament have been proved by New Testament introduction and by dogmatics. (*c*) It has to represent the individually and historically conditioned manifoldness of the New Testament forms of teaching, forms whose unity lies in the historical saving facts of the revelation of God which has appeared in Christ. (*d*) It is distinguished from biblical dogmatics by this, that the latter seeks to give a universally valid systematic doctrinal expression to the truth which is recorded in Holy Scripture.

(*a*) The name, biblical theology, can denote, in the first place, that division of theological science which has to do specially with the Bible (cf. *e.g.* Rosenkranz, *Encyklopädie der theolog. Wissenschaften*, 2d ed. 1845, p. 115). In more recent times, however, it has been generally used as the designation of that discipline which has to do with the representation of the theology which is contained in the Bible. Naturally this representation must embrace the Old as well as the New Testament; but it follows from the correct definition of the nature and task of our discipline that it is only separately that these two can be dealt with. Here we have to do solely with the theology of the New Testament. By theology, as

we employ the name here, we are to understand, not the doctrine of God as such, but the totality of those ideas and doctrines which refer to the relation of man to God. Among these are to be included not merely religious ideas in the narrower sense, but, since even ethical questions are, throughout the New Testament, treated of from the religious point of view, the theology of the New Testament must exclude nothing which is taught in the New Testament regarding the natural or religious life of fellowship. Within the province of biblical theology there cannot be a distinction between dogmatics and ethics. It will have to bring within its sphere even the cosmological, anthropological, and psychological ideas of the writers of the New Testament, in so far as these are interwoven with their religious ideas. Inasmuch as our science has to do only with the objective representation of the religious ideas and doctrines which are to be found in the New Testament, excluding all subjective criticism, it is a purely historical discipline.

(*b*) The justification of the attempt to make the theological import of the writings which are united in the New Testament the subject of a separate scientific representation, is found in their specific significance. The theology of the New Testament cannot begin by proving this significance; it must take it for granted. It is only on the assumption that New Testament introduction has proved that these writings are the earliest and most original monuments of Christianity, *i.e.* in the first place, of the religious consciousness and life which have received their character from the manifestation of Christ, that we are justified in separating them from the monuments of the later and secondary forms of the Christian consciousness whose development is represented by the history of doctrines.[1]

[1] It is self-evident that we can speak here only of such a proof in regard to these writings on the whole. The possibility is not thereby excluded of doubts still remaining as to the right of individual writings of the New Testament to belong to these monuments; but these doubts do not, *per se*, hinder us from treating of these books also in the theology of the New Testament (cf. § 2, *b*). If, indeed, it were possible to prove that the majority of these books belong, as to their origin, to the post-apostolic age, it would be altogether unreasonable to treat of the contemporary non-canonical Christian writings apart from them, and so to make the latest of the New Testament writings the boundary line of the first period of the history of Christian doctrines.

But however desirable, from a practical point of view, the historical position and significance of these writings would make their separate treatment in a theological discipline appear, it would not be, as regards method, justifiable, unless they had at the same time, in virtue of their historical position and significance, a specific character which none of the other Christian writings possess. Such a character, of course, they could not have, if the development of the Christian religious consciousness and life had had a purely human beginning; because in that case, while its real nature could have been contained, after the manner of a germ, in its original monuments, it could only, according to the fundamental law of human development, have gradually unfolded itself more and more perfectly from imperfect rudiments. It is only on the assumption that the perfect revelation of God is given in the manifestation of Christ, *i.e.* in His person and His work, as it was commenced during His earthly life and continued after His exaltation, and that, in the oldest and most original monuments of the religious consciousness and life which that manifestation produced, there is secured a documentary attestation of that revelation of God as it ought to be understood and in its full saving value—an attestation which is normative for all time; it is only on this assumption that the representation of the religious ideas and doctrines which are found in these writings can be a special subject of theological science. The theology of the New Testament must assume that this normative character of the writings of the New Testament is proved by dogmatics, if it is not to surrender the right of being an independent discipline alongside of the history of doctrines. Still it lies in the nature of the case that it itself will represent, in their proper place, those ideas and doctrines of the writers of the New Testament upon which rests their assurance of the absolute trustworthiness and the specific significance of their attestation of the divine saving deeds which constitute the perfect revelation of God.

(*c*) It is acknowledged that the writings which are united in the New Testament are written by different authors and at different times. According to all analogy, therefore, a variety of religious ideas and doctrines is to be looked for in them. This could not, indeed, be the case if the revelation of God

in Christ consisted, as to its nature, in the supernatural communication of a sum of religious ideas and doctrines, whose correct transmission must also have been secured by an absolutely supernatural influence of the Spirit of God upon the writers of the New Testament. On this assumption the biblical theology of the New Testament would have nothing else to do than to collect those ideas and doctrines which are scattered, in a very inappropriate manner, in the heterogeneous writings of the New Testament, to arrange them systematically, and, since a certain variety unquestionably presents itself at the first look, to show their unbroken unity and conformity. The theology of the New Testament would, in that case, be no longer a purely historical, but a systematic discipline.[2] That assumption, however, has been substantially disproved by the results of biblical theology, and the whole of our representation will show how untenable it is. The revelation of God in Christ has been effected, not by the communication of certain ideas and doctrines, but by the historical fact of the manifestation of Christ upon earth, which has brought to the lost, sinful world a salvation whose God-given commencement has guaranteed its completion. The writings of the New Testament are certainly the authentic records of this fact; but this is far from excluding the possibility that this fact is apprehended and represented in them from different sides. This diversity is based, on the one hand, in the idiosyncrasy of the individuals or of the whole tendencies that found in Christ the full satisfaction of their various religious needs; on the other hand, in the progressive historical development upon which the salvation which has once appeared in the world must enter with a view to its complete realization in the world and in accordance with its general law of life. Accordingly, the religious consciousness and life which have been produced by the revelation in Christ must have assumed different forms in its different leading representatives, and at the different

[2] In such a case we should more naturally call this systematic discipline biblical dogmatics; and, where the Bible is regarded as the sole immediate source of a revealed system of doctrine, this must be at the same time immediately the dogmatics of the Church. From the old orthodox view of Scripture there is no more a biblical theology as distinguished from biblical (or Church) dogmatics, than, from the negative-critical view, there is a biblical theology as distinguished from the history of doctrines.

stages of its development. Now, since the religious ideas and doctrines which are found in the writings of the New Testament are only the immediate expression of this consciousness and life, biblical theology will have *a priori* to do with a manifoldness of religious ideas and doctrines, whose unity lies in the divine saving deeds in which they have their origin.[3]

(*d*) For the right understanding of the problem of biblical theology, it is of essential importance to distinguish it from biblical dogmatics. As the former is a historical, the latter is a systematic science; as the former has to do with the variety of biblical forms of teaching, the latter has to do with the unity of the truth which is recorded in these. Now it is certainly true that the books of the Bible are in the first place records of the revelation of God during the Old as well as the New Covenant, records of the manner in which this revelation was effected in a series of historical deeds; but in so far as the truth consists in the adequate knowledge of these facts and of their significance, it must allow itself to be expressed in a connected series of propositions which are capable of, and demand, a systematic connected arrangement. For the very reason that Holy Scripture does not present the truth in this sense in the form of a connected doctrinal system, but only allows it to be discovered from the manifoldness of the forms of the religious consciousness and life which are produced by divine revelation, there is need of a special discipline for this latter task.[4]

[3] Baur maintains, in his lectures on the theology of the New Testament (1864, p. 34), that there cannot be a diversity of doctrinal systems without there being possibly also antitheses and contradictions which destroy the unity of the whole. *In abstracto* this is true; but on the concrete presuppositions under which alone there is a theology of the New Testament (note *b*), it is false. If the writings of the New Testament are the normative records of the revelation of God in Christ, then there can be in them only "the pure, undiluted truth; and where there is truth, there must also be unity and harmony" (p. 33). But this unity lies, not in the form of teaching, but in the historical saving facts which, even when they are represented under various forms, are nevertheless always represented in a manner which corresponds with the design of their truthful, vivid conception. The "revelation character" of Scripture lies, not in an essentially uniform system of religious ideas and doctrines, in a "doctrine of revelation," but in the authentic attestation of the revelation of God which has appeared in Christ, *i.e.* in the attestation which secures its right and complete comprehension.

[4] Naturally, we can assign this task also to a concluding part of biblical theology, as I myself have done in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift* for 1852, p. 311;

Biblical dogmatics takes the results of biblical theology for granted, and works with them as its material. It examines the doctrines and ideas of the writers of the Bible which biblical theology brings out, to see how far they are capable of forming the universally valid expression of the many-sided knowledge of the revelation of God in Christ which the whole history of revelation has in view. Inasmuch as those doctrines which express the truth only from one side, or as they were individually conceived, are mutually supplementary; inasmuch as the doctrines which are still somewhat undeveloped find their stricter definition in those that are developed more fully; inasmuch as those ideas which the writers have simply brought over with them from their religious past, or which are owing to the passing influence of contemporary forces and impressions, without being necessarily conditioned or modified by the saving deeds which are testified to in Scripture, lose their significance, there arises out of the manifold forms of teaching a uniform type which has stripped off everything which is individual and temporal. It will only be necessary that biblical dogmatics make no given Church or philosophical system the criterion of its critical or systematizing operations; it must take as its rule only the essential significance of the facts of revelation which appears from the harmonizing statements of Scripture. That in this way, however, it will find a uniform type of doctrine, which proves itself by its methodical

but as regards method, it would be more correct to reserve it for a special discipline. For it is as certain that it is not a historical task, as that the biblical records of revelation, conformably with their historical origin and with the character that corresponds to their practical aims, are not designed to unfold the truth of salvation on all sides and in a systematic form, and that the doctrinal statements of their authors do not have their origin in a system of supernatural knowledge which has been communicated to them, and whose fragments we should have only to piece together again. It is much rather a scientific need which is essentially different from that of historical research, which urges us to connect together, in a constructive manner, the truths which are contained in Holy Scripture into the unity of a system. For a discipliné which performs this task, the customary term, dogmatics, would be as suitable as it would have been inappropriate for biblical theology in our sense. Only we must not take that term as implying a contrast to ethics, a contrast which is wrong in other respects (and which, according to note *a*, biblical theology already refuses to admit); but we must thereby think of a system of propositions, and here more particularly of that system which gives a connected expression to the truth which is recorded in Holy Scripture.

arrangement to be the complete expression of the truth of Scripture,—the pledge of this is the presupposition, which it shares in common with biblical theology, that the writings of the New Testament are the authentic records of the perfect revelation of God in Christ, which again, for its part, points back to the records of the preparatory revelation of God; for from this assumption it naturally follows that it must be possible to obtain an adequate knowledge of the truth from these writings.[5]

## § 2. *Division and Arrangement.*

The biblical theology of the New Testament has to give a separate representation of the doctrinal systems of the individual books of the New Testament, or of the authors by whom several of these are written. (*b*) It borrows the results of New Testament introduction regarding the date of composition and the authors of the separate books, with reservation of the decision which it itself can assist us in coming to as to individual,

[5] If Church symbolics describes the contents of the religious ideas and doctrines which are set forth in the symbols of a definite Church, and if Church dogmatics is the systematic representation of their teaching in its inner connection, then biblical dogmatics is related to biblical theology as Church dogmatics to Church symbolics. The dogmatics of a Church, however, which declares that Holy Scripture is the only rule of its teaching, will have to seek the justification of its system in the proof that it is, in all points, in agreement with biblical dogmatics, or is logically derived from it. The latter, accordingly, is still far from being the same as Church dogmatics; as the dogmatics of a definite Church, the latter will always have an individually and historically conditioned shape which is more in keeping with a particular biblical form of teaching, and does not exhaust the whole riches of the saving truth of the Bible; while, on the other hand, partly for the purpose of overcoming the oppositions with which the particular Church has had to contend in the course of its development, and partly for the satisfaction of a more developed striving after knowledge, Church dogmatics will follow up the truth of the Bible, on its various sides, into its ultimate grounds and its further consequences, whereas the writers of the New Testament had still no occasion to inquire into these. Naturally, we can also pursue the solution of the problem which we assign to biblical dogmatics, hand in hand with the representation of Church dogmatics, which must indeed be continually tested by means of the former; but it is self-evident that in doing so, the scheme of the latter obtains an influence over the connected arrangement of the truth of salvation as contained in the Bible, which, according to what has been said as to the relation of the two, cannot be conducive either to a complete or to an organic reproduction of it.

critically doubtful, questions. (*c*) It borrows from the history of the apostolic age, to which it itself affords the material for the representation of its inner development, the knowledge of the circumstances and tendencies of the time, in accordance with which it arranges the individual doctrinal systems. (*d*) There are, accordingly, four principal divisions under which the doctrinal systems of the New Testament writings are to be discussed.

(*a*) Since biblical theology has to represent the manifoldness of the forms of teaching which are found in the books of the New Testament (§ 1, *c*), it falls into a series of different doctrinal systems (*Lehrbegriffe*). By this common, although not very happy expression, we mean the representation of the religious ideas and doctrines which are contained in the writings of the same author.[1] We have, however, a number of New Testament books which stand altogether isolated as the only monuments of their authors' mode of teaching. If these are somewhat extensive, and if their principal contents are of a didactic nature, as *e.g.* the Epistle to the Hebrews, then one has, for the most part, nothing to object to the separate representation of their doctrinal system. So much the more frequently has it been maintained, that there is no justification for speaking of the doctrinal system of a few of the smaller books, particularly of those whose import is predominantly hortatory. But there would be ground for this objection only if we were to understand by its doctrinal system the whole import of the religious ideas and doctrines of its author (and certainly the name might lead us to understand this), since we cannot assume that every short writing, especially if it be also hortatory, afforded an occasion to the author of stating these in their full extent. But even in the case of those writers for whose doctrinal system we possess richer sources, we should err exceedingly if we believed that, with the sum of the ideas and doctrines which their writings afford, we were acquainted with the religious consciousness of their author in

[1] Where, as in the case of Paul's, these books have been written at very different times, and where, therefore, a historically conditioned diversity in his method of teaching can still be found even in them, the representation of the doctrinal system will also have to keep in view the stages of its development which are at all apparent.

its whole extent. Biblical theology, however, is far from making any such claim. It has only to bring out the religious ideas and doctrines which are to be found in the given New Testament records; and since every detail can be rightly understood only when it is looked at in the peculiar circle of ideas in which it occurs in the author who is being considered, it has the right and the duty of separately representing even the doctrinal systems of the smaller or isolated books. Where it may permit itself a deviation from this rule, will appear naturally in the course of the investigation.

(*b*) Biblical theology must not enter into detailed critical investigations regarding the origin of the books of the New Testament; it is only a historico-descriptive, not a historico-critical, science. It must therefore borrow from historico-critical introduction to the New Testament the results regarding the authors and dates of the separate books which it cannot do without, in order that it may be able to decide what books it has to regard as sources of a definite doctrinal system, and in what connection it has to exhibit the separate doctrinal systems. Where historical criticism is so greatly in doubt as to the authenticity of a book that it does not appear advisable to give a final decision regarding it, that book will nevertheless, even when considered in relation to the other books that bear the same name, belong to so different a time, and show so many peculiarities in its manner of teaching, that a special discussion of it appears expedient. The more impartially its manner of teaching, in all its peculiarity, is investigated, so much the more will the biblico-theological investigation be able to contribute its share to the satisfactory settlement of the historico-critical question. Even where criticism raises doubts as to the right of a book to belong at all to the monuments of the apostolic age (§ 1, *b*), the representation of its doctrinal contents and of its relation to the other forms of teaching of the apostolic age will essentially contribute to the settlement of the question whether these doubts are weighty enough to exclude this book from our canon.[2].

[2] It might appear advisable to borrow nothing at all from the province of New Testament introduction, since only a few of its results are above all doubt, and to regard the books of the New Testament simply as representatives of the tendencies which biblical theology independently brings out in them. But this

(*c*) Biblical theology must not arbitrarily arrange the several doctrinal systems which it represents, since the related doctrinal systems are, when rightly arranged, mutually illustrative. Since, however, the manifoldness of the New Testament forms of teaching is conditioned, partly by the individuality of the separate authors or of the tendencies to which they belong, and partly by the standpoint within the historical development of Christianity upon which they stand, neither the individual relationship nor the date of the several books alone can furnish the criterion for the arrangement of the several doctrinal systems. The more, however, that both these moments together are brought to bear upon the division of biblical theology, so much the more it appears that here also it must borrow from another discipline, viz. the history of the apostolic age. From this discipline it must assume as well known the individualities of the men to whom it is entitled to assign the several books, or of the tendencies in which it gives them a place. From it, it must also assume the knowledge of the peculiarities of the epochs to which it attributes the several books, and of the questions and controversies by which they were stirred.[3]

(*d*) The history of the apostolic age teaches that the two leading tendencies which determine its inner development are

procedure cannot be carried out without artificially ignoring results of historical criticism which are established for the impartial investigator, without depriving ourselves of the key which the historically known idiosyncrasy of individual apostolic men affords for the comprehension of their manner of teaching, and without, in many respects, losing the safe rule for the arrangement of the separate doctrinal systems. Lastly, it appears illogical to declare that it is altogether unjustifiable to borrow any such results; for, according to § 1, *b*, it is only by means of such a borrowing that biblical theology can justify itself as an independent discipline.

[3] Here also, it is true, nothing seems more natural than to adopt a different method, and to give biblical theology (which, indeed, professes also to be a historical discipline) itself the form of a history of the development of theology in the apostolic age, in so far as it can independently bring out such a development from its own sources. But apart from the circumstance that this inner history of the apostolic age can never be adequately represented without attention being paid to much which belongs to the outer history, and which must therefore be borrowed from some other quarter, no historical development can be described without historical criticism, and biblical theology is not a historico-critical, but a historico-descriptive discipline. According to note *a*, the history of the development of theology could not, in regard to many points, be satisfied with that which our monuments afford regarding the religious ideas and doctrines of

the original-apostolic and the Pauline. Biblical theology will therefore have, first of all, to represent the doctrinal systems of those monuments which owe their origin to the original-apostolic circle, and belong to the time which still lies on this side of the thoroughgoing activity of Paul, or the full development of his peculiar theology. By the grouping together of these in the first division, there comes out what is known to us of the original-apostolic type of doctrine previous to the time of Paul. Then, in the second division, there must follow the representation of Paulinism in the various stages of its development, including those literary monuments as to whose direct Pauline origin criticism still remains doubtful. The third division will represent the doctrinal systems of those books which belong, as to their fundamental type, to the original-apostolic tendency, but which are written at a time when the influence of Paulinism is already traceable, or at least conceivable. The grouping of these together will bring out what we know of the original-apostolic type of doctrine after the appearance of Paul. Since, lastly, in the latest period of the apostolic age one of the original-apostolic doctrinal systems has received its most individual shape in the theology of John, the fourth division will have to represent this by itself. What books are to be used as sources for the representation of the various divisions, and what influence the

their authors, or of the tendencies to which they belong; it must form that into a complete picture by means of historical combination, or by means of material drawn from other sources. On the other hand, such a history would find no room in its complete picture for many details which our sources afford us; whereas biblical theology has to refrain from every criticism as to what appears essential or non-essential; it has to represent, with equal carefulness, the whole contents of the religious ideas and doctrines. Biblical theology, accordingly, in so far as it investigates the literary monuments of the apostolic age as to their theological contents, will furnish the history of that age with the material for the representation of its inner development; but it cannot encroach upon the province of the latter science without passing over its own boundaries and endangering the solution of its own special problem. We find an instructive parallel in the recent attempts to give New Testament introduction the form of a literary history of the apostolic age, which likewise only drag foreign matter into the discipline, and hinder the complete solution of its own problem. New Testament introduction and biblical theology are auxiliary sciences; they have to furnish the material which is first turned to full account in other disciplines. It does not follow, however, that, there any more than here, this material must be heaped together in a chaotic fashion, since it bears in itself the rules of a systematic arrangement.

individuality of their author on the one hand, and the circumstances of the time on the other, have had upon the working out of their doctrinal systems,—these are points which the special introduction to the several divisions will have to consider. In what sense a representation of the teaching of Jesus is to be prefixed to these four leading divisions must be reserved for a special investigation.

### § 3. *Investigation of Sources.*

In ascertaining the ideas of the New Testament, we have, first of all, to fall back upon the Old Testament. In doing so, however, we must, of course, regard it in the manner in which it was conceived in the apostolic age. (*b*) How far the religious ideas of later Judaism, or the doctrines of Jewish theology, have influenced the formation of the ideas and doctrines of the New Testament, can be ascertained only after we have brought out the latter by means of biblical theology. (*c*) The principal task remains the ascertaining of these from the connections of thought of the sources themselves, a fundamental principle being that each writer can be explained only out of himself. (*d*) As a preliminary condition of this there is need of grammatico-historical exegesis, which, however, must continue in constant reciprocal action with biblical theology.

(*a*) In order to understand the several doctrines of the writers of the New Testament, the right determination of the ideas which they connect with the expressions which they employ is of paramount importance. We must neither, without more ado, import into these expressions dogmatic ideas which a later age has coined and designated with biblical expressions, nor make the philosophical idea which can somehow or other be attached to the philological analysis of an expression the criterion of the meaning which the author connects with it. As a historical science, biblical theology is referred only to the circle of religious ideas in which the writers of the New Testament stand historically, and in which they have grown up. Now, since the Old Testament is the principal source of this circle of ideas, it is mainly from it

that, in all doubtful cases, the meaning which they connect with their expressions is to be elucidated. In doing so, of course, we must not overlook the fact that, in the apostolic age, the Old Testament was by no means always read and understood in the sense in which it was originally written. We shall therefore have to be upon our guard against transferring the ideas which, according to the results of Old Testament theology, were connected with certain expressions in this or that epoch of Old Testament history, without more ado, to the analogous expressions of the New Testament. We must, from the first, remember (and in the course of our investigation this will be more particularly proved) that the writers of the New Testament read the Old Testament, so far as they had a particular knowledge of it, as a word of God which was equally sacred in all its parts, and which therefore contained only one doctrine, and that they gathered its meaning, not from the context, or the historical presuppositions, of each individual passage, but from the sense of it that seemed the most obvious. We shall not therefore have to measure the circle of ideas from which they start according to our exegetical and historico-critical way of conceiving the Old Testament. In going back upon it we shall have to keep by the simplest sense of the words, and, as far as possible, confine ourselves to these Old Testament passages, books, and ways of representing matters which can be expressly shown to be familiar to the writers of the New Testament. Lastly, however, we shall have to remember continually, that the Old Testament can only furnish the starting-point for the ascertaining of the ideas of the New Testament, and that the form and shape which they have in the several writers depend also upon many other moments.

(*b*) The writers of the New Testament are separated by centuries from the epoch whose religious ideas and doctrines we become acquainted with in the latest books of the Old Testament. That, during this interval, the religious consciousness of Judaism had gone through a peculiar development, which in many points and on various sides passed beyond the Old Testament circle of ideas, we learn from its literary monuments (cf. Bretschneider, *systematische Darstellung der Dogmatik und Moral der Apokryphischen Schriften des A. T.*, Leipzig 1805,

and the biblico-theological works of de Wette and v. Cölln; cf. § 6, *b*). But since these were far from attaining the same diffusion and universal authority as the books of the Old Testament, neither will the religious ideas and doctrines which are to be found in them have been the common property of the New Testament time to the same extent as those of the Old Testament. In this interval, also, falls the beginning development of a Jewish science of Scripture and of a Jewish theology, both in its Palestinian-rabbinical, and in its Alexandrian-philosophical form (cf. the *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte* of Hausrath, 2d ed., Heidelberg 1873–75, and Schürer, Leipzig 1874). But in proportion as the former stood nearer to the writers of the New Testament, it is the more difficult to bring out the extent of its development in the apostolic age from the sources which are partly late, and which mix up what is old with what is more recent (cf. Schoettgen, *horae hebraicae et talmudicae*, Dresden and Leipzig 1733, 1742; Gfrörer, *das Jahrhundert des Heils*, Stuttgart 1838; J. Langen, *das Judenthum in Palästina zur Zeit Christi*, Freiburg 1866); and in proportion as we become better acquainted with the latter (cf. Dähne, *geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie*, Halle 1834), it is the more uncertain, historically, how far the writers of the New Testament had come into contact with it. However certainly, therefore, the religious ideas of later Judaism, as well as the doctrines of Jewish theology, had an influence upon the forming of the religious consciousness as it is exhibited in the writings of the New Testament, our knowledge of the extent in which these ideas and doctrines lay within the field of vision of the writers of the New Testament is far from being precise enough to permit us to start from them in ascertaining that religious consciousness. It is only in the rarest cases that biblical theology will be able to make use of them with certainty for the purpose of elucidation. As for the rest, it will have to limit itself to this, viz. to bring out, as occasion arises, the agreement of the ideas and doctrines of the New Testament with the contemporary ideas which are known from other sources; and it will have to leave it to history to decide how far it is able, by means of other historical considerations, to show an influence of these ideas

upon the historical development of theology in the apostolic age.[1]

(*c*) In the great majority of cases, accordingly, we must give up the attempt of explaining the ideas of the New Testament by means of contemporary ideas. For such an explanation even the Old Testament can be regulative only as a starting-point, and that, too, only in the sense in which biblical theology shows it to have been conceived of on the part of the writers of the New Testament. In ascertaining these ideas, we are therefore limited mainly to the books of the New Testament which lie before us. The essential import of every idea will have to be ascertained from the heterogeneous context of all the passages in which it occurs, from its connection with other ideas which are already known, from the characteristic individuality of the authors, and their place in the history of the apostolic age. It follows that, in ascertaining the ideas of a book, we are referred, in the first place, exclusively to that book itself or to the books which belong to the same author. It is only when these are not sufficient, or when we wish to obtain a secondary elucidation of that which is already ascertained, that we are referred, in the second place, to the books which belong to a kindred tendency and to the same time, and, in the third place, to earlier books of the New Testament, especially if we can prove or assume that they were known to the author whose ideas we are investigating. On the other hand, the explanation

[1] It must be regarded as an unwarrantable claim which is made upon the theology of the New Testament, when it is demanded of it that it should set forth the genesis of the ideas and doctrines, which are found in the books of the New Testament, from the various moments which influenced their authors. In so far as these show themselves to be the product, on the one hand, of the revelation of God in Christ, as well as, on the other, of the individuality and time of the authors, biblical theology will certainly have always to refer also to these factors. But if it is only for the purpose of ascertaining these ideas that it goes back even upon the Old Testament, then it is for the critical activity of biblical dogmatics (§ 1, *d*) that their causal connection with the contemporary ideas which are independent of that revelation—a connection which may be brought to light by history—must first come into consideration. In opposition to those who deny a historical character and value to biblico-theological investigations as soon as they do not enter in detail into all their relations to the non-biblical contemporary ideas, the word of Baur is valid: "the teaching which these books contain is so limited in itself, that the knowledge of it can be drawn out of no other sources than these very books" (p. 30).

by means of one another of books which stand far apart, both as regards their date and the peculiarity of their writers, is altogether unjustifiable, and has caused only ambiguity and confusion in biblical theology. We can only altogether ignore the individuality of a Peter and a James if we measure them by means of the Pauline circle of ideas; we can only render it impossible for us to comprehend Paul and John, if we attempt to explain the one by means of the other. If even each idea receives its peculiar shape from the spiritual individuality of the several writers, then each doctrine can be understood in its full significance only if we learn to understand it in the connection in which it stands with the other doctrines of the same author. By means of this connection, doctrines of different authors, which appear very similar, may receive a very different colouring. Of course, biblical theology cannot on that account be satisfied with having found one proof passage for a doctrine; it must examine every passage in which it appears in the peculiar connection of thought in which it stands, in order that it may discover, as completely as possible, the threads by means of which it is connected with other ideas and doctrines. Not till this is done does it find out the series of ideas and the circles of thought from which it can obtain the complete picture of a writer's manner of teaching.

(*d*) Accordingly, a methodical exegesis, *i.e.* an exegesis which is carried on in accordance with the rules of grammatico-historical interpretation, is the most important auxiliary of biblical theology. No doubt biblical theology cannot always, without more ado, make use of the results of such an exegesis. The more exegesis teaches us to understand each book, in all its details, from its historical situation and the aim which that involves, so much the more will biblical theology often have first to divest the statements whose meaning exegesis has ascertained of that which is due to accidental circumstances, in order to come at the real contents of the idea or doctrine of the passage. On the other hand, biblical theology will have to go much more thoroughly into the analysis of the lines of thought and the associations of ideas, than the most careful exegesis requires for the understanding of a passage of the New Testament. Biblical theology, however,

can never begin its work until exegesis has explained its sources on all sides.[2] Now it is a fundamental hermeneutical principle of methodical exegesis not to explain the Scriptures by means of a dogmatic or philosophical system of doctrine, or by means of imaginary parallel passages whose similarity we first of all produce ourselves by arbitrarily explaining them by means of each other, but to explain each writer by means of himself, so that we may understand every individual word from out of the whole circle of ideas from which it is written. Such an exegesis, of course, requires the assistance of biblical theology, which alone can supply it with this complete picture of the circle of ideas, as it represents it in the doctrinal systems of the several writers. Thereby both disciplines enter into a relation of fruitful reciprocity, which opens up for each the prospect of an ever richer perfection, but, on that very account, hardly permits them to come also to a thoroughly satisfactory conclusion. Because of this reciprocal relation to exegesis, biblical theology is, in a special sense, a growing science.

## § 4. *Method of the Representation.*

The representation of the several doctrinal systems will have to start from the central point around which the doctrinal view of each individual writer moves, and from that point, following the lines of thought which are found in the writer himself, it will have to describe the whole circle of his ideas and doctrines. From this it will naturally appear—(*b*) at what points he has accepted, without independent investigation, ideas and doctrines which are more generally diffused, and (*c*) at what points he has peculiarly developed these, or reproduced them in new forms. (*d*) Lastly, there will come into view the unity of the revelation of salvation

[2] A representation of biblical theology cannot enter into detailed exegetical investigations without altogether losing its succinctness. In the use it makes of every individual passage it will let the view which it takes of it exegetically come out as clearly as possible, and in cases which are specially important and difficult it will state the leading reasons for that view. The justification of its exegetical views in opposition to others lies only so far in its province as it is demanded by the rejection of other opinions in biblico-theological questions.

which lies at the root of all these forms, in its ever-richer and deeper comprehension.

(*a*) The representation of the various doctrinal systems cannot enumerate the individual ideas and doctrines which have been ascertained from our sources, without a plan and in an accidental succession. Just as little, however, can it make the scheme of a traditional doctrinal system, or a new systematic scheme, however ingeniously conceived, the basis of its representation, since details are, *à priori*, put in a false light when they are placed in heterogeneous combinations. Where now, as in the case of Paul's, the doctrinal system has already, in the spirit of the apostle, attained an almost systematic shape, it is, of course, only necessary to search for that. But we can neither assume that all the writers of the New Testament have given their ideas and doctrines such a systematic shape, nor would the sources which we possess be sufficient for such a search in the case of the most of the other doctrinal systems. Since, however, we can succeed in ascertaining the separate ideas and doctrines only when we throughout follow the lines of thought and the connections of ideas of the writer, it will be possible in this way to find the central point around which move the principal lines of thought and circles of ideas of each. From this point, then, the representation will have to start; as far as possible, it will have to connect with this point everything else, just as it incidentally shows itself connected therewith in the spirit of the author, until at last the whole extent of his ideas and doctrines is described. Naturally this method cannot be carried out with mathematical certainty; much depends upon a happy intuition; and different ways may lead relatively equally well to the same goal. That certain leading points of view, under which we are wont to regard and classify the truths of salvation, will always be coming up, is unavoidable; in so far as they are involved in the nature of the case, these will have been regulative also for the lines of thought of the writers of the New Testament.

(*b*) Although the method which we have just described is alone able to give us an accurate and complete idea of the doctrinal system of each individual writer, it is not to be denied that it renders it difficult to give a succinct view of

their relation to the ideas and doctrines which are found throughout the New Testament, although it may be in different individual forms. Since the representation every time takes its peculiar course, the place in which the matter of detail comes to be discussed is generally a different one. But this misfortune, which is removed in great measure by means of references to the places in which the same subject was discussed in previous doctrinal systems, is far outweighed by this, that every detail is now considered only in the connection in which it actually occurs in the individual writer. It cannot occur that, in the interest of a scheme which has once been fixed, statements are extracted from him regarding questions upon which he nowhere actually enters; it will rather naturally appear from the connection in which each question is discussed, whether the writer has at all looked at it independently, and answered it in a fashion of his own, or whether he has only simply adopted and reproduced ideas and doctrines regarding it which were common to the tendency or time to which he belonged. It might, indeed, appear as if this could be attained still more simply, viz. by expressly representing the ideas and doctrines which are common to all, or which at least occur in many writers in the same way (especially the Old Testament presuppositions which are more or less common to all), apart from those which are peculiar to each, and it cannot be denied that this would simplify much, and render many wearisome repetitions unnecessary. But thereby the lively connection of the circle of thought in each individual writer would be broken up; that which is peculiar would be isolated, and, severed from its connection with the common basis, put in a false light, and the finer shade of meaning which that which is common often receives from its connection with that which is peculiar would be easily overlooked.[1]

(*c*) If, in the sense of note *a*, the central point has been correctly found, around which the doctrinal view of the individual writer moves, then those points in which his peculiarity is to be sought will naturally come into the full light. Where the question considered is not something which is quite new

[1] In respect of the primitive Christian anthropology we have allowed ourselves an exception to this rule (cf. § 27); but it is self-evident that the above-mentioned evils cannot occur here.

and altogether peculiar to a writer, this peculiarity may consist in this, that ideas and doctrines which are found elsewhere are more deeply and richly developed, or that they are reproduced in new forms. In order to bring this out, the representation must always keep in view the comparison of the later with the earlier doctrinal systems. This comparative activity must always go hand in hand with the positively expository. In doing so there is, of course, the danger of manufacturing differences in a hair-splitting fashion where there are really none, or at least making too much of them by neglecting what is common, as well as, on the other hand, of obliterating real differences by looking only at what is common, and overseeing that which is peculiar in the shape or development. Both dangers can be avoided only by making the representation of the particular doctrinal system, in its whole extent and in its inner economy, the leading point of view, with which the comparative activity is only connected. As soon as the latter is disconnected from the former, the temptation is natural to isolate individual, perhaps ingeniously conceived, points of view of the comparison, which nevertheless express the actual relation of the doctrinal systems only from one side, and to place other equally important sides in the shade.

(*d*) Biblical theology, as distinguished from biblical dogmatics, can represent no connected system of New Testament truth, because, according to § 1, *c*, it has to do with the manifoldness of the forms of teaching. As distinguished from the history of theology in the apostolic age (§ 2, *c*), it can present no progressive development of the religious ideas and doctrines. Doctrinal systems, which it has to represent as later, may preserve more undeveloped forms of the religious consciousness; various forms of the religious ideas and doctrines, although following one another in point of time, may exist alongside of one another with perfect justification. Nevertheless, in the representation of the theology of the New Testament, the unity which lies at the root of all the diversity of the modes of teaching will and must also come into view; and that not in consequence of a system which is imposed upon it, but in consequence of the inner necessity which lies in the matter represented. If this unity lies in the saving

fact of the perfect revelation of God in Christ, this revelation will be ever anew apprehended in the central point, around which every individual doctrinal view turns (note *a*), and looked at from ever new sides. If, in the course of the further development which starts from this point, that which is general is distinguished from that which is peculiar to each, that unity will, like the red thread, run through the representation of both, and be the guiding point of view for the comparative establishing of both. If, lastly, the arrangement of the several doctrinal systems is determined, not alone, it is true, but at least partly, by their succession in time, and if the development of the religious consciousness in time must, notwithstanding the declensions from the straight line which attach to all human development, nevertheless lead on the whole to an always more complete and deeper comprehension of the salvation which is given in Christ, then the representation of the biblical theology of the New Testament will be a continued proof that the Spirit which ruled in the apostolic Church, and secured the preservation in its purity of the saving revelation of God in Christ, was always guiding it more and more unto all truth.[1]

## § 5. *The Origin of the Science.*

So long as the theology of the Church was conscious, in a naive manner, of its unity with the theology of the Bible, no need was felt of a scientific representation of the latter. (*b*) The first impulse to such a representation was given by the separate discussion of the biblical proof passages, whether this was undertaken in the interest of the doctrine of the Church or in opposition to it. (*c*) This naturally led to the attempt to arrange, in an independent manner, the results so obtained alongside of the dogmatics of the Church, either as its support or as its corrective. (*d*) Gabler was the first who asserted the purely historical character of biblical theology, in the manner in which it has since his time been almost universally acknowledged in principle.

(*a*) In the course of the second century the Church was compelled to go back from the living tradition of the teaching of the apostles to the literary monuments of the apostolic age,

in order to show from them the reason and justification of its doctrine in opposition to that of the heretics, and since then the theology of the Church has professed to be essentially nothing else than a biblical theology. But neither was a methodical derivation of this theology from Scripture then attempted, nor, with the dominant unmethodical mode of interpretation, could such an attempt have succeeded; for it was very easy for that method to trace back new forms of doctrine, in the formation of which totally different moments had had an influence, in the most ingenuous manner, to Scripture. Moreover, the more tradition asserted itself, in principle, as a rule of doctrine alongside of Scripture, so much the more must the theology of the Church have deviated, in its further development, from that which is contained in the Bible. No doubt there were never awanting men who, in opposition to the dominant Church doctrine, pointed to the pure teaching of the word; but the Reformation first brought the difference between the doctrine of the Church and the Bible into clear consciousness, and demanded a renovation of theology in accordance with its formal principle, the sole authority of Holy Scripture. The first representations of evangelical theology professed to be nothing else than a reproduction of the teaching which is contained in Scripture. But although exegesis was very much furthered in the time of the Reformation, on the one hand, by the revival of classical studies, and, on the other, by the comprehension of the essential import of Scripture as a revelation which the Reformers had in consequence of their deep sense of their religious need, yet, in consequence of the dominant doctrine of inspiration, the principle of the *perspicuitas* of Holy Scripture, which is self-interpreting, could be understood only in the sense of an explanation of the separate parts by the *analogia fidei*. Just as certainly, moreover, as the believing consciousness of the Reformers was produced by the word, so certainly did it receive its form from the system of ideas which they had in common with Catholicism, or which was developed in their controversy with it; and by means of exegesis this form was carried back into Scripture. In consequence of this, the doctrine which was developed from Scripture was, no doubt, one that was

essentially purified by their going profoundly into the meaning of the New Testament, and corresponded in its inmost kernel with the teaching of Scripture; but it was not a doctrine that was methodically developed from it. The more the scholastic working out of this doctrine advanced, so much the further did it deviate, both formally and materially, from the peculiar form of the religious ideas and doctrines which are contained in the New Testament. Fully convinced of the scriptural character of the system of the Church, they treated its independent working out as of primary importance, its demonstration from Scripture as secondary; exegesis imported the formulated doctrines of the system into Scripture, instead of developing the teaching of Scripture out of itself independently, and thus made it more and more impossible for a consciousness of the difference between the theology of the Bible and that of the Church even arising.

(*b*) The first step by which they began again to separate the import of Scripture from dogmatics was an independent grouping together and an exegetico-dogmatic discussion of the so-called *dicta probantia*, which they had up to this time annexed, within dogmatics itself, to the several loci as proofs. (Cf. Sebastian Schmidt, *collegium biblicum*, Strassburg 1671, 3d ed. 1689; Joh. Hülsemann, *vindiciae S. S. per loca classica system. theolog.*, Leipzig 1679; Joh. Guil. Baier, *analysis et vindicatio illustrium Script. dictorum sinceram fidei doctrinam asserentium*, Altorf 1716; C. E. Weissmann, *institutiones theol. exeg. dogm.*, Tübingen 1739; F. G. Zickler, *ausführliche Erklärung der Beweissprüche der heiligen Schrift*, Jena 1753–65.) Here the representation of the doctrinal matter of the Bible is only a means, not an end; the arrangement is determined altogether by the dogmatic loci; the exegesis of the individual passages, which are torn from their context, has quite a dogmatic character. The case remained the same when Rationalism, which had broken with the theology of the Church, and would yet keep in harmony with Scripture, employed this form in order to master the dogmatics of the Church upon its own soil. The treatment of the teaching of Scripture was by no means freed thereby from the bondage of a system which was foreign to it; only the place of the Church system, which had, nevertheless, originally grown out-

of Scripture, was taken by a rationalistic system which had grown upon an altogether foreign soil, and in whose interest the collected proof passages were now misinterpreted or emptied of their real contents (cf. Teller, *topice sacrae scripturae*, Leipzig 1761; Semler, *historische und Kritische Sammlungen über die sogenannten Beweisstellen in der Dogmatik*, Halle 1764, 1768. Cf. *Exegetisches Handbuch für die biblischen Beweisstellen in der Dogmatik*, Halle 1795, 1802; Hufnagel, *Handbuch der biblischen Theologie*, Erlangen 1785, 1789).

(*c*) Pietism, with its living practical piety, had already deeply felt the difference between the formalism of the dominant Church system and the direct expression of the religious consciousness in the mode of teaching employed by Scripture, and had therefore attempted to represent the teaching of the Bible in a manner which was simpler, and more in keeping with the Bible itself, without breaking essentially with the doctrine of the Church. But these representations are meant rather for practical use, and are of no scientific importance (cf. A. F. Büsching, *epitome theologiae e solis literis sacris concinnatae*, Lemgo 1757; also his *Gedanken von der Beschaffenheit und dem Vorzuge der biblisch-dogmatischen Theologie vor der Scholastischen*, 1758). But in consequence of the criticism of the biblical arguments on the part of Rationalism, the feeling was aroused even on the orthodox side that the dogmatics of the Church was in need of new supports, and that it could obtain these only from an independent and connected representation of the teaching of Scripture, although this representation still borrowed from dogmatics its systematic form (cf. Storr, *doctrinae christ. e solis sacris libris repetitae pars theoretica*, Stuttgart 1793, 1807; translated into German, with additions, by C. Ch. Flatt, 1803, 1813). Zachariae allows that the doctrine of the Church agrees indeed as to its matter, but not as to its terminology and arrangement, with Holy Scripture, whose ideas and whole manner of thinking are in many respects quite different from ours. He will separately represent the teaching which is found in Scripture according to its biblical sense and the arguments which are drawn from Scripture in its support, and in the order which is implied in Scripture and the nature of the plan of salvation; he will then compare

this with the doctrine of the Church, in the hope that the latter will not be thereby invalidated, but only be represented in a new light. However, he also still confines himself substantially to the individual passages of the Bible; and in the manner in which its concrete representations become, in his hands, abstract ideas, the influence of rationalism is already very apparent (cf. *Biblische Theologie oder Untersuchung des biblischen Grundes der vornehmsten theologischen Lehren*, Göttingen and Leipzig 1772, 3d ed. by Vollborth, 1786). From the rationalistic side, K. F. Bahrdt (*Versuch eines biblischen Systems der Dogmatik*, Gotha and Leipzig 1769, 1770, 2d ed. 1784) attempted, by going back upon Scripture, to put a system of general truths founded on reason in the place of that of the Church. C. F. Ammon (*Entwurf einer reinen biblischen Theologie*, Erlangen 1792, 2d ed. under the title, *Biblische Theologie*, 1801, 1802) regards biblical theology as a pioneer and auxiliary of dogmatics, for which it has only to provide materials, without troubling itself about their connection. It arrives at these materials as the pure results (*i.e.* the results separated from all that is peculiar in the manner of statement) of those passages from which the propositions of biblical dogmatics are derived. But although he speaks, in the introduction, of peculiarities of the sacred writers, of stages of revelation, and of various types of doctrine, his work is little more than an arranged discussion of the several proof passages in the spirit of rationalism.

(*d*) So long as rationalism exerted itself to prove that its peculiar doctrines were contained in Scripture, it could no more attain to a real biblical theology than the science which stood upon the standpoint of orthodoxy. Now, however, Semler, in his treatises regarding a free investigation of the canon (Halle 1771–1775), had broken with the old Protestant dogma of inspiration, and had found, in all the canonical books, ideas which were purely human and conditioned by the time of the writer, alongside of eternal and divine truth. If we were thoroughly in earnest with this distinction, we could leave it to biblical theology to ascertain, in a perfectly unprejudiced manner, the religious ideas of the Bible, with everything individual, local, and temporal which has been

attached to them, and reserve to ourselves the right to declare the most meagre extract of general religious or moral truths to be the eternally valid kernel which dogmatics has to recognise and build up into a system. This step J. Ph. Gabler took in his epoch-making academical discourse, "de justo discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque finibus," Altdorf 1789 (reprinted in his minor theological writings, 1831, vol. ii.). Herewith the purely historical task of biblical theology was recognised, and it was demanded that we should have regard to the manifoldness of the biblical modes of teaching, a manifoldness which was conditioned by the individuality and time of the several authors. But this right conception of our discipline by no means depended upon the rationalistic assumptions in consequence of which it was gained. Wherever the conception of the character of Scripture as a revelation left room for the recognition of a human factor in the origin of the several books, a manifoldness of biblical forms of teaching could also be recognised; and wherever a unity was found lying at the root of this manifoldness, the most unqualified normative validity of Scripture could be reconciled with the free historical investigation of its forms of teaching. Accordingly, the conception of biblical theology which was gained by Gabler has, in principle, obtained an almost general acceptance in theological science (cf. Stein in Keil and Tzschirner's *Analekten*, vol. iii. 1, 1816; Schirmer, *die biblische Dogmatik in ihrer Stellung und in ihrem Verhältniss zum Ganzen der Theologie*, Breslau 1820; Schmid in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift*, 1838, 4; Schenkel in *Stud. u. Kritik.* 1852, 1; Weiss in the *deutsche Zeitschrift für christ. Wiss. u. christ. Leben*, 1852, Nos. 38, 39).

## § 6. *Earlier Works on Biblical Theology.*

The first attempt—that, viz., of Bauer—to carry out Gabler's conception of our science, was still too much under the influence of rationalistic dogmatism. (*b*) The works of de Wette, Rückert, and v. Cölln are far more scientific, although even in them justice is not done to its historical character either formally or materially. (*c*) In Baumgarten-Crusius,

however, the right point of view which had already been gained for the treating of biblical theology is again, for the most part, surrendered.

(*a*) According to G. L. Bauer, biblical theology should be "the development, pure and purged of all heterogeneous ideas, of the religious theory of the Jews previous to the time of Christ, and of Jesus and His apostles, according to the different ages and views of the sacred writers." Accordingly he had first of all to give a separate representation of the biblical theology of the Old (Leipzig 1796) and of the New Testament (1800–1802); and in the latter he had to distinguish the religious theory of the first three evangelists, of John, of the Apocalypse, of Peter and Paul.[1] But each of the doctrinal systems which are here represented separately for the first time is divided, according to the same dogmatic scheme, into Christology, theology, and anthropology; and since Bauer distinguishes throughout between the real view of Jesus and of His apostles and that wherein they accommodate themselves to the erroneous ideas of the people, a real historical comprehension of the several doctrinal systems (which, besides, stand alongside of each other in a far too isolated manner) is not to be gained from him. In fact, however, notwithstanding the definition of the science which is borrowed from Gabler, such is not his aim. Bauer will impartially investigate the records of the Christian religion in order to decide the great question whether Christianity is a rational and divine religion, and whether it deserves to become a universal religion. Since, however, he is convinced that only that which does not contradict the principles of experience and of sound reason (naturally in the rationalistic sense) can be universally valid truth, the rationalistic doctrine must, in an attack upon the system of the Church, ultimately be proved to be the real kernel of the teaching of the Bible, and everything else must be rejected as an accommodation to the ideas of the people.[2]

[1] Vol. v., which was to contain the Epistle to the Hebrews and James, was not published; the biblical ethics of the N. T. (Leipzig 1804) is discussed separately. Cf. also his *breviarium theol. biblicae*, 1803.

[2] Pölitz (*das Urchristenthum nach dem Geiste der sämmtlichen Neutestamentlichen Schriften entwickelt*, Danzig 1802), Cludius (*Uransichten des Christenthums*, Altona 1808), and Schwarz (*die Lehre des Evangeliums aus den*

(*b*) The works of W. M. L. de Wette (*Biblische Dogmatik des A. und N. T.*, Berlin 1813, 2d ed. 1830) and of Dan. v. Cölln (*Biblische Theologie*, edited by Dav. Schulz, Leipzig 1836) mark an essential advance. Both treat first of Hebraism and Judaism, then of the teaching of Jesus and His apostles, to which they prefix a historical section, and in which they distinguish a Jewish-Christian, a Pauline, and an Alexandrian tendency. Both, however, represent the teaching of the apostles in a connected system according to a thoroughly dogmatic scheme, so that those distinctions (which are also, according to v. Cölln, almost simply formal) are considered only in the case of particular doctrines. As, in this way, the historical method in the representation is still prejudiced by the systematic method, so neither in the conception of the task, at least in the case of de Wette, is the purely historical character of our discipline yet fully accepted. For although, according to p. 40, he purposes to give that which we call biblical theology, he nevertheless distinguishes, according to his philosophical idea of religion (§ 1–45), the purely religious elements which are found in the Old and New Testaments from those factors which he conceives to be heterogeneous, in order that he may thus obtain the material for his "biblical dogmatics," which represents Christianity in its relation to contemporary Judaism (§ 46–61). On the other hand, v. Cölln means to carry out the historical principle more strictly than has yet been done, and to represent the way of thinking which was characteristic of the several ages and teachers altogether independently of any Church system, and of any philosophical party interest. But although he has worked up the material of biblical theology more thoroughly

*Urkunden dargestellt*, Heidelberg 1808) have a similar standpoint. The work of Kaiser (*Biblische Theologie oder Judaismus und Christianismus nach der grammatisch-historischen Interpretationsmethode und nach einer freimüthigen Stellung in die kritisch-vergleichende Universalgeschichte der Religion und in die universale Religion*, Erlangen 1813, 1814) has little more than the name in common with our science. It gives a history of the several religious ideas, religious customs, and ethical principles, in the development of which Judaism and Christianity are interwoven. It does not give an independent connected representation of the religion of the Bible ; and here also the historical representation is not the ultimate aim ; for the guiding interest of the author is to extract everywhere from the husk of the ideas of the Bible the kernel of his universal religion.

than his predecessors, his distinction of a symbolical and an unsymbolical doctrine of religion is altogether foreign to the spirit of the writers of the New Testament, and his conception of biblical ideas and doctrines is often influenced by his own rationalistic views. In his Christian philosophy, Rückert (vol. ii.: *die Bibel d. h. systematische Darstellung der theologischen Ansichten des N. T.*, Leipzig 1825) has also reduced the teaching of the apostles to a system; but it is only incidentally that regard is had to the difference of the apostolic modes of teaching. Yet he no longer traces this difference back to the distinction between what is Jewish-Christian and what is Hellenistic, but to the individuality of the chief apostles.[3]

(*c*) The book of L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius (*Grundzüge der biblischen Theologie*, Jena 1828) marks a retrogression in the history of our science, considered as always realizing its idea more and more perfectly. No doubt the doctrines of the Old and New Testaments are kept apart historically; still they are always represented together in every individual point. A manifoldness of types of doctrine in the New Testament is not recognised, or, at least, it is reduced to a minimum of individual moods, and modes of expression and reasoning; different tendencies and a progressive development of the teaching of the New Testament are expressly denied. Yet the author professes to give a history of the development of the ideas and doctrines of the writers of the Bible regarding God and the destiny of man, and busies himself in the first general part with Judaism and Christianity in their nature and historical relations, as well as with the characteristics of their books and writers. The special part treats of the ideas of the kingdom of God and of the children of God as the fundamental ideas of both dispensations, but then discusses, according to a thoroughly dogmatic scheme, the doctrine of God, of man, and man's salvation. The representation contains much that is fine and ingenious in details, but is very unequal and aphoristical.

[3] Among smaller works, cf. also C. F. Böhme, *die Religion Jesu Christi aus ihren Urkunden*, Halle 1825; *Die Religion der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 1829. Matthäi, *der Religionsglaube der Apostel Jesu*, Göttingen 1826–1829. L. D. Cramer, *Vorlesungen über die biblische Theologie des N. T.*, edited by Naebe, Leipzig 1830.

## § 7. *The more recent Works.*

Inspired by Neander, Schmid has sought to develop the manifoldness of the New Testament types of doctrine from the religious individuality of the writers, and has found many followers. (*b*) From the other side, the labours of the Tübingen school have taught us to conceive the peculiarity of these types of doctrine rather from the point of view of the historical development of Christianity. (*c*) Inspired by that school, Ritschl and Reuss have represented the several doctrinal systems in connection with the history of the apostolic age; while Baur, in his theology of the New Testament, brings to the light all the advantages, but also all the defects, of this way of looking at the subject.

(*a*) A new impulse to the deeper conception and more thorough performance of the problem assigned to our science was given by Neander, who, in his "History of the Planting and Training of the Church by the Apostles" (Hamburg 1832, 4th ed. 1847 [translated in Bonn's Series]), represented the teaching of the apostles separately, viz. of Paul, of James, and of John (section ii. 6, p. 653–914 [E. Tr. vol. i. 414–vol. ii. 58]). With his deep comprehension of the peculiarity of the religious life in its various shapes and forms of expression, he had traced back the diversity of the types of doctrine to the individuality of the apostles, and had shown the living unity of the Christian spirit in the manifoldness of the human forms of conceiving it. Chr. Fr. Schmid, in his "Biblical Theology of the New Testament" (edited by Weizsäcker, Stuttgart 1853, 4th ed. by A. Heller, Gotha 1868 [translated in Clark's Series]), maintained this point of view in express opposition to de Wette and v. Cölln, who made the difference of the doctrinal systems of the apostles dependent rather upon historical influences which lie outside of Christianity. Starting from the fact that Christianity is the fulfilment of the old covenant, which consists of law and promise, and that it may be conceived either rather in its unity with that covenant, or rather in its contrast to it, he obtains a fourfold possibility of types of doctrine, which, according to him, has left its imprint in the four apostolic personalities. James represents Christianity as the fulfilled law,

Peter as the fulfilled promise, Paul in its contrast to the law, and John in its contrast to law and prophecy. Although this classification has found much acceptance, and has certainly led us in many points upon the right track, yet it cannot be denied that an *à priori* scheme is here applied to the individual manifoldness of the apostolic modes of teaching into which it could fit only in consequence of an extraordinary accident, or of a play of divine providence. In reality, however, it does not fit into it; for we cannot even speak of a contrast to the promise of the Old Testament; and even the slight modification which Schmid gives to this fourth form is by no means in congruity with the specific peculiarity of John. Moreover, Schmid assigns biblical theology by far too great a task when he describes it as the historico-genetic representation of Christianity as given in the canonical books of the New Testament, and accordingly, even before he comes to the teaching of the apostles, describes their life (ii. p. 7–69 [E. Tr. 273–322]) in far greater detail than had been done by de Wette and v. Cölln. His treatment of the several types of doctrine has apprehended many right points of view, and has made them the rule for the development of these types in detail, but it is still, both formally and materially, far too much dependent upon dogmatic categories, and is frequently deficient in completeness and sharpness in the conception of their peculiarity. In close dependence upon Neander and Schmid, H. Messner (*Lehre der Apostel*, Leipzig 1856) has treated of the several doctrinal systems (those of the smaller books, however, in greater detail than they), and has, with great care, sought to develop each of them in its inner connection, and to compare it with the others. G. B. Lechler (*das apostolische und das nachapostolische Zeitalter*, Stuttgart 1851, 2d ed. 1857) follows the same method, though far less thoroughly. He prefixes to the Pauline doctrinal system the representation of the preaching of the original apostles, and follows it up with the doctrines of James, Peter, and John in the shape which they assumed in the period after Paul (cf. also Jul. Köstlin, "uber die Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit der N. T. lehre," in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1857, 2; 1858, 1). The handbook of J. J. van Oosterzee (*die Theologie des N. T.*, Barmen 1869), which is far from independent, and very deficient in scientific definiteness,

discusses, besides the theology of Jesus Christ (according to the Synoptists, and according to John), the theology of the apostles as Petrine, Pauline, and Johannean. The representation of the Petrine, Pauline, and Johannean theology by Lutterbeck (*die Neutestamentlichen Lehrbegriffe*, Mainz 1852, ii. 4) shows how one could accommodate oneself to this way of looking at the New Testament even on the Roman Catholic side. The historical nature of this representation, however, is only apparent, as we may see from the arbitrary manner in which he determines the relation of these three to one another (cf. p. 139, specially p. 152–154).

(*b*) If, since Neander, the diversity of the New Testament types of doctrine was traced back rather to the religious individuality of the several writers, so now the other side also was brought into prominence, viz. the fact that this diversity was determined by the position of the individuals within the historical development of Christianity. The Tübingen school regarded this development as the gradual reconciliation of the original opposition between the Jewish-Christianity of the original apostles and the anti-Judaism of Paul. It had taught men to apprehend more exactly the questions which stirred the apostolic age, and therefore, also, their influence upon its theology; it had given them a sharper eye for the differences of the apostolic tendencies, since it conceived them as contradictions; and with a view to the establishing of its historical and critical *aperçus*, it had subjected the books of the New Testament to a much more thorough analysis of the whole of their theological peculiarity than had previously been done (cf. Plank, *Judenchristenthum und Urchristenthum;* Köstlin, "zur Geschichte des Urchristenthums," in the *theologische Jahrb.* 1847, 4; 1850, 2; Baur, *das Christenthum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, Tübingen 1853, 2d ed. 1860; Hilgenfeld, *das Urchristenthum in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklungsganges*, 1855). In consequence of the results of this school, a great number of the books of the New Testament were brought down to the second century, their specific significance in the sense of § 1, *b*, was destroyed, and thereby the theology of the New Testament was made a history of the doctrines of the apostolic and post-apostolic ages, in which many writings of the second century were

equally entitled to find a place alongside of those of the New Testament. From this point of view Schwegler has represented "The Post-apostolic Age in the Leading Moments of its Development" (*das nachapostolische Zeitalter in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung*, Tübingen 1846), in which he thoroughly discusses the doctrinal systems of the most important books of the New Testament. But even he who cannot adopt the results of these investigations will find in them a great stimulus for the sharper definition and the historical comprehension of the New Testament types of doctrine; especially as, in accordance with its conception of the nature and history of Christianity, the Tübingen historico-critical school, as distinguished from the older rationalism, which never altogether got rid of the inclination to prove that its doctrine founded upon reason was also the kernel of the teaching of the Bible, does not feel itself in any way bound to the oldest conceptions of it, and can therefore devote itself, with perfect impartiality, to the investigation of them.

(*c*) After attaining, from an equally free historico-critical point of view, to a fundamental and thoroughgoing opposition to the results of the Tübingen school, A. Ritschl has given, in his "Origin of the Old Catholic Church" (*Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, 2d ed., Bonn 1857), an excellent representation as well of the Pauline doctrine as of the manner of teaching of those books which represent Jewish-Christianity in the apostolic age. In his *Histoire de la théologie chrétienne au siècle apostolique* (Strasbourg 1852, 3d ed. 1864 [translated by Hodder & Stoughton]), Reuss treats of the whole material of our science from a point of view which is no doubt somewhat related to that of the Tübingen school, but which nevertheless modernizes and modifies its results in many respects. Notwithstanding his brilliant gift of exposition, however, the detailed investigation of the doctrinal systems, which are, moreover, always ingeniously apprehended and luminously developed, often interrupts the historical narrative as violently as the consideration of the moments which are of importance for the latter hampers the former (cf. § 2, *c*). After a representation of the history of Judaism, of the teaching of Jesus and the development of the apostolic Church, he discusses, first of all, the Jewish-Christian tendency and Paulinism.

Then follow the books of the mediating tendency, among which are counted not only the Epistle to the Hebrews, First Peter, and the historical books of the New Testament, but also the Epistles of Barnabas and Clemens, and finally the theology of John. It was not till after his death that Baur's lectures on the theology of the New Testament (*Vorlesungen über Neutestamentliche Theologie*, Leipzig 1864) appeared, in the form in which he had delivered them in the years 1852–60. Although he describes our science as that portion of historical theology which has to represent the teaching of Jesus as well as the doctrinal systems which rest upon it, *so far* as this can be done by means of the writings of the New Testament, there is, from his critical standpoint, which logically permits only such a representation as that of Schwegler, no justification in principle for this "so far." For him there really belong to the "teaching of the apostles" only the doctrinal systems of Paul and of the writer of the Apocalypse, which he treats of as the original antitheses within apostolic Christianity during the first period. The second period, which treats of the doctrinal systems of the Epistle to the Hebrews, of the (spurious) Pauline Epistles of the imprisonment, of James, Peter, and the historical books of the New Testament, and the third, which closes with the doctrinal system of the Pastoral Epistles and of the Gospel of John, no longer represent "the teaching of the apostles," but that of much later Christian writings, alongside of which the doctrinal systems of other contemporary writings could stand with equal justification. Apart from this, Baur has clearly recognised and carried out, with his usual ability, the task of searching out the "characteristic fundamental view" of each system of doctrine, and of developing from it "the whole import of the ideas which are related to one another in its natural connection," although his historico-critical assumptions regarding the historical development of Christianity and the origin of the books of the New Testament often, *à priori*, cause him to put "the individual conformation" of the several systems of doctrine in a false light. In general, however, it comes out clearly in his representation that the consideration of the doctrinal systems of the New Testament from the standpoint of theological development is not less one-sided than that which starts exclusively from

the religious individuality of the writers. For the point in question in these systems is not only as to the solution of religious philosophical problems, or the opposition and reconciliation of theological contradictions, but also as to peculiar forms of the religious life, forms which determine the several writers' manner of teaching; and the lively manifoldness of these cannot issue in mutually exclusive contradictions, for the very reason that it was the revelation of God in Christ which gave the teaching of the apostles its religious impulses. After our handbook had appeared in two editions (1868, 1873), there was published Dr. A. Immer's "Theology of the New Testament" (*Theologie des N. T.*, Bern 1877), substantially according to the scheme of the Tübingen school. After an introductory sketch of the Hebrew and Jewish religion, he represents the religion of Jesus, the Jewish-Christianity of the original apostles and the mother Church, Paulinism, the Jewish-Christianity of the time after Paul (James, Apoc.), the tendency which mediated between Paulinism and Jewish-Christianity (Luke, Peter), and that which had surmounted this opposition (John). Apart, however, from its historico-critical and dogmatic assumptions, the standpoint of the school is far from being clearly represented here. The discussion of the standpoint of the original apostles is exceedingly meagre; an anti-Pauline tendency in the Apocalypse is as far from being proved as a mediating tendency in the Epistles of Peter. In general, notwithstanding exact exegesis on the whole, and a diffuseness which is often very wearisome, a precise and concise expression is scarcely anywhere given to the several ideas and lines of thought. What is of little importance is discussed very diffusely; what is of decisive importance is often not discussed at all, often very briefly, still more frequently it is left in suspense or distorted. Besides, much exegetical, historical, and critical matter, which is remote from the rightly conceived task and method of biblical theology, is interwoven with the representation.

## § 8. *Auxiliary Labours.*

The attempts to represent a connected system of biblical doctrine are of assistance to biblical theology in proportion as

they enter into the reproduction of the lines of thought of the several writers. (*b*) It is still more directly assisted by the representation of particular doctrinal systems of the New Testament, or by dissertations on particular ideas and doctrines of these systems. (*c*) Dissertations on particular fundamental doctrines of theology also furnish much acceptable material in proportion as they enter, somewhat in detail, into the teaching of Scripture. (*d*) Lastly, the lexicography of the New Testament can also enter into the service of our science.

(*a*) The attempts to develop a system of biblical doctrine directly out of Scripture start from the assumption, which is confuted by biblical theology, that a uniform series of religious ideas and doctrines is to be found in all its parts. In this sense J. T. Beck (*die christliche Lehrwissenschaft nach den biblischen Urkunden*, Stuttgart 1841) has, without more ado, worked up the doctrinal material of the Old and New Testaments into a whole;[1] while J. Chr. K. v. Hofmann (*der Schriftbeweis*, Nördlingen 1852–55, 2d ed. 1857–59), although strongly opposed to every assumption of different biblical types of doctrine, establishes in its several parts the system ("*Lehrganze*") with which he commences in such a manner that he advances from the Old Testament to the New, and from the sayings of Jesus to those of His apostles. As here already he gives a closely connected consideration of the sections of Scripture which refer to each point of doctrine, so he has later, in his great work on the Bible (*die heilige Schrift neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht*, 7 vols., Nördlingen 1862–76), carried out his exceedingly original exegesis through almost all the Epistles of the New Testament. Although more inclined to the historical point of view, H. Ewald (*die Lehre der Bibel von Gott, oder die Theologie des alten und neuen Bundes*, 4 vols., Leipzig 1871–76) also finds already in the Old Testament "such a perfect picture of life in the true fear of God" (religion), that for the delineation of "the way to God through Christ and the Holy Spirit," which

[1] Only the first part has appeared, in which he begins with the doctrine of God, and then treats of the creation, fall, and reconciliation of the world as "the logic of Christian doctrine," or as "the truth which has been made known as wisdom in Christ." Cf. also Beck, *Einleitung in das System der christlichen Lehre*, Stuttgart 1838, 2d ed. 1870.

is to show that it is "only through Christ and the Holy Spirit that that way could now be securely trodden and passed over" (iii. p. 303), he needs only about 80 of the 1600 pages or so of his work which discusses, by way of introduction, the doctrine of the word of God, and then, in three principal parts, the doctrine of faith, the doctrine of life, and the doctrine of the kingdom. Although Sam. Lutz (*biblische Dogmatik*, edited by R. Rüetschi, Pforzheim 1847) rightly distinguishes his task from that of biblical theology, he nevertheless develops, in a professedly purely historical manner, and with frequent reference to the historical difference of the Old and New Testaments, a very artificially constructed system of the fundamental ideas of the religion of the Bible, ideas which are in his opinion essentially the same throughout, and then the conception of history, or the divine economy of revelation in history, which is connected with these ideas. G. L. Hahn (*Theologie des N. T.*, Leipzig 1864) also prefixes (in the first part, which has alone appeared) to his intended representation of the development of the religious-ethical views of the apostolic age, from which the formation of the several systems of doctrine can first be explained, the system of ideas which lies at the root of the whole of the New Testament, but in which not only the Old Testament fundamental presuppositions, but also God as "executor of an eternal decree with regard to the world" (§ 70–80), and the Son of God as well as the Spirit, both in their inner-trinitarian relation (§ 40–50) and in their relation to the world (§ 84–98), are already considered, so that in substance the ideas and doctrines of the New Testament are already discussed, only without reference to the peculiarities of the several writers. Although occupying the standpoint of the newer critical school, which usually contends most strenuously against the presupposition of a uniform doctrine of Scripture, Dr. A. E. Biedermann (*christliche Dogmatik*, Zurich 1869) nevertheless considers it possible, by means of the results of the purely historical science of biblical theology, to give a systematic expression in its inner connection to the original Christian believing consciousness which records itself in Scripture; he does so by bringing out the several moments of the whole system of faith contained in the Bible, both in the diversity of their individual forms as

they lie before us in Scripture, and in their development from the one to the other, and yet in such a manner that it is that which is common and uniform therein that appears as what is essential (p. 163). In the first division (the biblical presuppositions of the gospel of Jesus Christ), his representation of the teaching of Scripture (p. 163–302), which is distinguished by sharpness and clearness, naturally only incidentally takes account of the specialities of the biblical writers; while the second (the gospel of Jesus the Christ) is divided into the Christology of the Synoptists, of Paul and of John; and the third (the realization of Christian salvation in humanity), embracing soteriology and eschatology, for the most part points out in the several doctrines the course of development from the Old Testament to the theology of John. Following the example of C. J. Nitzsch (*System der christlichen Lehre*, Bonn 1829, 6th ed. 1853), R. Kübel attempts to represent "The Christian system of doctrine according to holy Scripture" (*das christliche Lehrsystem nach der heiligen Schrift*, Stuttgart 1873), expressly distinguishing his task from the historical or descriptive task of biblical theology. But although he also, in many doctrines, enters into the diversities of the several types of doctrine, yet the prevailing tendency is to obtain a system which is derived from the testimony of Scripture in its various forms,—a testimony which is full of life, and given in accordance with experience, and therefore in the form of intuition,—and developed in the form of discursive scientific knowledge (p. 9). In the second edition (1874, 75), Dr. K. F. A. Kahnis has very much abbreviated the biblico-dogmatic discussions which his "Lutheran Dogmatics" (*Lutherische Dogmatik*, Leipzig 1861) contained in vol. i. § 14, 15, and apportioned them among the various articles; on the other hand, the very precise summaries of biblical teaching which Dr. R. A. Lipsius (*Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*, Braunschweig 1876) prefixes to the several articles of doctrine often enter also into the development of the various types of doctrine within the New Testament.

(*b*) The independent representations of particular doctrinal systems form exceedingly valuable pioneers of our science, especially as they often furnish very careful comparisons of the system which is represented with the other systems of the

New Testament. Of such we have, for the Pauline doctrine, Meyer, 1801; Usteri, 1832–51; Dähne, 1835; Pfleiderer, 1873: for the Johannean, Frommann, 1839; Köstlin, 1843; Hilgenfeld, 1849; Weiss, 1862: for the Petrine, Weiss, 1855; we have also the doctrine of James (Schmidt, 1869), of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Riehm, 1858, 59), and of the Apocalypse (Gebhardt, 1873); but these cannot be considered more particularly till we come to the several systems. Individual ideas and doctrines of these systems have often been treated of separately. The writings relating to these will be cited in the course of our representation of them.

(*c*) From another side the treatises on particular articles of systematic theology furnish biblical theology with materials of various kinds, whether they rather represent the common fundamental view of the New Testament, or take more particular account of the ideas and doctrines of its several writers. They are, as it were, transverse sections through the whole of our discipline; and although they are always somewhat defective, inasmuch as no individual doctrine can be fully appreciated outside of the connection of the system in which it is found, yet they have their peculiar value in this, that the relationship of the various systems comes out more directly in a definite point than in the complete representation given by our discipline. As especially comprehensive, we must here mention the altogether new edition of his *Lehre von der Person Christi* (Basel 1856; cf. also his articles on the development of the New Testament doctrine of reconciliation, in the *Jahrb. für d. Theol.* 1857–59) by W. F. Gess (*Christi Person und Werk nach Christi Selbstzeugniss und der Zeugnissen der Apostel*, Basel 1870, 78, 79), which discusses not only all the sayings of Jesus which refer to this subject, in their historical order, but also those of the apostles according to the individual Epistles; in doing which, it is true, there is often a want of succinctness in stating the results. In the second volume of his "Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation" (Bonn 1874), containing the biblical material of the doctrine, A. Ritschl has gathered together and amplified his previous biblico-dogmatic labours (cf. *Jahrb. für d. Theol.* 1863, 2, 3, *de ira dei*, Bonn 1859). His exceedingly original conceptions of individual types of doctrine are often based upon a peculiar

view of the fundamental ideas of the Old Testament, to which he traces them back (cf. especially Diestel on the holiness and righteousness of God, in the *Jahrb. für d. Theol.* 1859, 1, 1860, 2; Teichmann, "die Opferbedeutung des Todes Jesu," *ibid.* 1878, 1). Lastly, there appeared *das Christusbild der Apostel und der nachapostolischen Zeit*, of Dr. Dan. Schenkel (Leipzig 1879), which interweaves into its historical division, which forms the foundation of all that follows, a comprehensive biblico-theological description of each of the apostolic and post-apostolic writings. Since it is now rather the dogmatic, now rather the exegetical, now rather the biblico-dogmatic, and now rather the biblico-theological point of view which is predominant in the other works that fall to be mentioned here, they are of very unequal value for our discipline. We cite the most important of them, without being able to claim completeness for our list. For Christology, cf. Kleuker (*Johannes, Petrus und Paulus als Christologen*, Riga 1785), Schumann (*Christus oder die Lehre des A. und N. T. von der Person des Erlösers*, Hamburg and Gotha 1852), Beyschlag (*die Christologie des N. T.*, Berlin 1866), Hasse (*das Leben des verklärten Erlösers im Himmel nach den eigenen Aussprüchen des Herrn*, Leipzig 1854), R. Ziemssen (*Christus der Herr*, Kiel 1867), also Zeller in the *Theologische Jahrbücher* for 1842, 1, cf. 1842, 3. Höfling (*das Sacrament der Taufe*, Erlangen 1846), A. Caspers (*der Taufbegriff des Neuen Testaments*, Bredstedt 1877), Scheibel (*das Abendmahl des Herrn*, Breslau 1823), David Schulz (*die christliche Lehre vom heiligen Abendmahl nach dem Grundtext des N. T.*, Leipzig 1824), Lindner (*die Lehre vom Abendmahl nach der Schrift*, Hamburg 1831), Kahnis (*die Lehre vom Abendmahl*, Leipzig 1851), Rückert (*das Abendmahl*, Leipzig 1856), treat of the sacraments. Biblical psychology has been recently discussed by J. T. Beck (*Umriss der biblischen Seelenlehre*, Stuttgart 1843, 3d ed. 1871), Delitzsch (*System der biblischen Psychologie*, Leipzig 1855, 2d ed. 1861 [translated in Clark's Series]), and H. H. Wendt (*die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch*, Gotha 1878). Cf. also J. Müller, *die christliche Lehre von der Sünde* (5th ed., Breslau 1867 [translated in Clark's Series]); Winzer, *de daemonologia in s. Ni Ti libris* (Wittenberg 1812); Lücke on the Lehre vom Teufel (*deutsche Zeitschr. f. christl.*

*Wissenschaft und christl. Leben*, 1851, Feb.); G. Roskoff, *Geschichte des Teufels* (Leipzig 1869). Eschatology has been discussed with special frequency by Weizel (*die urchristliche Unsterblichkeitslehre, Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, 3, 4; cf. the same author in the *Studien der Würtembergischen Geistlichkeit*, ix. 2, x. 1), Kern (*Beiträge zur Neutestamentlichen Eschatologie, Tübinger theol. Zeitschrift*, 1840, 3), Georgii (*über die eschatologischen Vorstellungen der N. T. Schriftsteller, theol. Jahrbücher*, 1845, 1), Zeller (*die Lehre des N. T. vom Zustande nach dem Tode, ibid.* 1847, 3), Schumann (*die Unsterblichkeitslehre des A. und N. T.*, Berlin 1847), Hofmann (*die Wiederkunft Christi und das Zeichen des Menschensohns am Himmel*, Leipzig 1850), Hebart (*die zweite sichtbare Zukunft Christi, eine Darstellung der gesammten biblischen Eschatologie in ihren Hauptmomenten*, Erlangen 1850), Güder (*die Lehre von der Erscheinung Christi unter den Todten in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Lehre von den letzten Dingen*, Bern 1853), Luthardt (*die Lehre von den letzten Dingen*, Leipzig 1861), H. Gerlach (*die letzten Dinge*, Berlin 1869); cf. also O. Zöckler, *de vi ac notione vocabuli* ἐλπίς *in novo test.*, Giessen 1856. Of books relating to particular articles of doctrine there should also be mentioned: Kahnis, *die Lehre vom heiligen Geiste* (Halle 1847); Schaf, *die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist* (Halle 1841); Fr. Hosseus, *de notionibus providentiae praedestinationisque* (Bonn 1868); Ed. Preuss, *die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott* (Berlin 1868); Tholuck, *das Heidenthum nach der heiligen Schrift* (Berlin 1853); Tholuck, *das A. T. im N. T.* (5th ed., Gotha 1861); Kähler, *das Gewissen* (I. 1: Alterthum und Neues Testament, Halle 1878).

(*d*) The lexicography of the New Testament cannot possibly avoid entering into biblico-theological investigations. Just as certainly as it has a purely philological side, so certainly it cannot, from that side, meet all the requirements of its task. For although it is mainly from the analogous *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament that a series of *termini technici*, which the doctrinal language of the New Testament has coined, must be explained, yet that usage, as well as the meaning which is commonly given to the words in profane Greek, has in many ways received a peculiar transformation from the Christian consciousness (cf. v. Zezschwitz, *Profangräcität und biblischer*

*Sprachgeist*, Leipzig 1859). But if a manifoldness of modes of representing things and of teaching is brought out in the writers of the New Testament, then neither will this transformation have been by any means the same throughout. Of New Testament lexicographers only Schirlitz (*griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zum N. T.*, Giessen 1851, 2d ed. 1858) has purposely set himself the task of looking, in the manner of biblical theology, at the ideas which are expressed in the several *terminis*. The *Dictionary of the N. T. for the purpose of explaining Christian Doctrine*, by Dr. W. A. Teller (5th ed., Berlin 1792), professed to be a real biblico-theological lexicon. But, apart from its shallow rationalistic standpoint, it is meant only for practical use, and makes no claim to be scientific. The composition of such a lexicon has recently been undertaken by H. Cremer (*biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der N. T. Grăcität*, Gotha 1866, 1868, 2d ed. 1872). No doubt it will always be difficult to explain, in a thorough manner, the significance of the *termini* of a doctrinal system outside of the connection of that system; but in proportion as this last aim is attained, such a dictionary will always be one of the most important auxiliaries of the biblical theology of the New Testament.[2]

[2] Where individual authors are cited in what follows, without mention being made of their works, their biblico-theological labours, which have been spoken of in the Introduction, or are still to be cited farther on, are everywhere meant.

# PART FIRST.

# THE TEACHING OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE EARLIEST TRADITION.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § 9. *The Life and Teaching of Jesus in their relation to Biblical Theology.*

It is neither methodically permissible nor conducive to the aim of our science to admit into it a historical representation of the life of Jesus. (*b*) It is not the life of Jesus *per se* in its historical course, but the conception of its religious significance upon which the earliest New Testament proclamation rests, that forms the starting-point of biblical theology. (*c*) This conception, however, was mainly conditioned by the teaching of Jesus, inasmuch as it gave the authentic explanation of the significance of His person and of His manifestation; and hence a representation of this teaching must form the preliminary section of biblical theology.

(*a*) It is natural to think that the starting-point of biblical theology must be a representation of the life of Jesus. If its aim is to represent the religious import of the ideas and doctrines of the New Testament writings, inasmuch as these are the authentic records of the revelation of God in Christ, then it appears that that series of facts must first of all be investigated in which that revelation has been accomplished, seeing that it is with them that the teaching of the apostles is

necessarily connected; and it is a representation of the life of Jesus which would have to bring out these facts.[1] But if we were to give such a representation, we should go far beyond the boundaries of our discipline. Even as regards method, the scientific representation of the life of Jesus demands investigations of a totally different kind. It presupposes a historico-critical examination of sources which is of a totally different nature from the method of biblical theology. The latter has only to inquire what are the ideas and doctrines of the writings that lie before us; the former inquires whether the accounts contained in these sources are trustworthy or not. But even as regards contents, every scientific representation (even the most sketchy) of the life of Jesus must contain an abundance of concrete details, and must consider a number of historical questions which, because they are closely connected with the purely human course of His development, or with its local and temporal conditions, are of no significance for the character of this life as a revelation, and therefore also of no significance for biblical theology. Above all, however, we must not, without more ado, identify the historical picture of the life of Jesus which we obtain scientifically from our sources with that from which the earliest proclamation of the gospel started. If the latter, inasmuch as it was drawn from the immediate perception of the public life of Jesus, was, on the one hand, far richer and more vivid than that which we can obtain from our sources, which offer but a limited selection of facts; yet, on the other hand, it is equally conceivable that, from what these communicate in consequence of later investigations or of individual reminiscences, we are able to discover other facts which were still awanting in the picture of the life

[1] In fact, G. L. Bauer has interwoven detailed investigations into historical questions connected with the life of Jesus into the first division of his representation of the doctrinal system of the Synoptists (vol. i.). In the "historico-critical introduction" which de Wette prefixes to the representation of the teaching of Jesus and the apostles, he gives a historical sketch of the life of Jesus (§ 207–224); and similarly von Cölln gives a representation of the "circumstances of the life of Jesus looked at from the religious standpoint" in the "general part" which stands before his representation of the teaching of Jesus (§ 132–138). In keeping with his conception of the task of biblical theology, Schmid, lastly, has, in the representation of the "Messianic age," commenced with the "life of Jesus" as the first division of the teaching of Jesus (i. p. 33–120 [E. Tr. p. 25–81]).

of Jesus as it shaped itself in the common tradition of the mother Church—a picture which was limited mainly to the public working and suffering of Jesus, and which was confined, even in regard to these, by certain points of view.[2] Accordingly, a scientific representation of the life of Jesus cannot possibly be the starting-point of biblical theology.

(*b*) No doubt it was the revelation of God which appeared in Christ, and which was accomplished in His person and in the salvation-bringing facts of His life, that was the generating impulse of the religious ideas and doctrines which biblical theology has to represent as the import of the earliest proclamation of the New Testament. But just as it is not these facts *per se*, but as conceived in their right significance, that constitute the perfect revelation of God, so the manner in which this revelation was conceived and employed didactically by the earliest witnesses cannot be understood from these facts *per se*, but only from the conception of them on the part of the first preachers of the gospel. It is not what the earliest writers of the New Testament knew of the facts of the life of Jesus, but what in these facts was regulative for their view of

[2] He who, *e.g.*, regards the supernatural conception of Jesus as a historical fact in consequence of the histories of His childhood which are contained in our Gospels (which are among the latest writings of the New Testament), must, nevertheless, not assume, without more ado, that it was known to the earliest tradition, and had therefore an influence upon the view of the earliest writers of the New Testament regarding the person of Jesus. And whoever looks upon the fourth Gospel as of apostolic origin, will find in it many reminiscences of which it is by no means evident that they had passed over into the earliest common tradition, and had therefore been operative in the earliest proclamation regarding Christ. Whoever, on the other hand, assumes, in consequence of historico-critical investigation, that the life of Jesus was altogether different from that which our sources with their "glorifying legendary adornment" represent it to have been, will have to allow that this result would not only be worthless, but actually misleading for biblical theology. For if our Gospels, which rest upon the earliest common tradition, already show such a distorted picture of the life of Jesus, it is very unlikely that the view of His life, from which the earliest writers of the New Testament started, was more in harmony with the state of the case which criticism is alleged to have brought to the light. And although, in accordance with § 1, *b*, we are convinced that our Gospels, as authentic records of the facts of revelation, can offer us no distorted and perturbed picture of the life of Jesus, yet, even when dealing with the earliest form of tradition, which is brought out by means of criticism, the scientific representation of that life will very often have to distinguish between the historical matter of fact and the idea of events and of the course of their development which has left its mark upon that tradition.

the significance of His person and manifestation, and therefore for the forming of their religious ideas and doctrines, that is important for biblical theology. It is not, however, derogatory to the substantial accuracy of their view of the religious significance of the life of Jesus, a significance which we must, according to § 1, *b*, undoubtedly presuppose, if all the facts of revelation were not yet known to them as such. And biblical theology must not inquire how we, in consequence of the complete testimony of the New Testament records, have to conceive the character of the facts of this life as a revelation, but only how it was conceived by the earliest preachers of the gospel, since it is only this conception that can have had a determining influence upon their religious ideas and doctrines. For just as certainly as it was only gradually and under the guidance of the Spirit that the salvation which was given in Christ was known more and more deeply and completely, so certainly it may be assumed that the knowledge of the religious significance of the primary facts of revelation has been always growing, and therefore that these facts are not yet appreciated in their fullest significance in the earlist proclamation.[3]

(*c*) If the perfect revelation of God has been accomplished in the manifestation of Jesus, it must also have made itself intelligible as such to the world. It lies in the nature of revelation that it cannot consist only in certain facts, but that it must also secure, from the first, the essentially correct conception of the significance of these facts; and, in the case of the revelation of God which has appeared in Christ, this can be

[3] From this, however, it is perfectly clear that a scientific representation of the life of Jesus cannot be made the basis of biblical theology. Suppose, *e.g.*, that we can actually show from the oldest Gospel what the historical moments were which made Jesus what He was, and how He, under the influence of these, has gradually developed His views and purposes during His public activity, yet the question always remains, whether the writers of the New Testament knew these assumed facts as such, and appreciated them in their significance for the conception of the person of Jesus. Or if we suppose, *e.g.*, that we must conceive the occurrence related in the Gospels as taking place at the baptism of Jesus to be a mere vision of the Baptist, it has plainly a totally different significance from what it would have if we conceived it to be an experience of Jesus. For biblical theology, however, that which is mainly of importance is not at all which of these conceptions is the historically correct one, but which of them was that of the writers of the New Testament, seeing that it alone could be regulative for their teaching.

effected only by the self-testimony of Jesus (in the widest extent) which accompanies His manifestation. It is, however, self-evident and a matter of history, that it is upon this self-testimony of Jesus that the conception of His manifestation in the earliest proclamation of the New Testament rests. We have already acknowledged (note *b*) that this conception cannot yet exhaust its full import as a revelation. The reason of this is twofold. In the first place, it is not to be expected that the whole riches of the self-testimony of Jesus has already passed over into the comprehension and the proclamation of the earliest witnesses; and, in the second place, Jesus, in His activity as a teacher (and therefore also in His self-testimony), was restrained, partly by the pedagogic regard to the inability of His hearers to comprehend the revelation which was making its first appearance in the world (cf. John xvi. 12), and partly by regard to the circumstance, which belongs to the history of salvation, that the facts of salvation were but tending towards their completion, and that therefore the full comprehension of their significance was still unattainable. From this it is already apparent how inadmissible it is to measure the truthfulness of the more fully developed apostolic teaching by its being already found in the teaching of Jesus. Moreover, the distinction of a doctrine of the apostles *regarding* Jesus, and of a teaching of Jesus, in the sense in which it has been often previously made, is altogether unhistorical. If the teaching of Jesus had been essentially a new doctrine of God or of morals, then the teaching of His apostles could not have turned round the significance of His person and manifestation to the extent in which it does. As to its essential kernel, the teaching of Jesus Himself was much rather nothing else than a doctrine of the significance of His person and manifestation, and must, in this respect, have laid the foundation for the original ideas of the writers of the New Testament regarding these.[4] The

[4] When such questions are discussed in the representations of the life of Jesus (note *a*) which are prefixed to His teaching, as His relation to the Baptist or to the parties in the nation, His aims and plan, the kingdom of God and the means of founding it, the Messianic idea and the attitude of Jesus to the Old Testament or to the expectation of the nation, the significance of His miracles and death, His prophecies, and the designation of His apostles,—these are all questions which are of decisive significance for the conception of His person and manifestation; but the most obvious answer was given to them in the sayings of

more we conceive the teaching of Jesus in this its historical significance, and therefore in its real character as a revelation, the more simply is the question answered as to the relation of biblical theology to the facts of His life. In so far, viz., as the teaching of Jesus points back to these facts in order to make their true significance known, or in so far as it assumes them for its own comprehension, they will also be taken into consideration by biblical theology, and will be presented to it by the tradition from which it draws the teaching of Jesus. Still it is only the teaching of Jesus that will form its starting-point; for it is in that teaching that the conception which the earliest preachers of the gospel had of the significance of Jesus and His manifestation is rooted; and it is therefore in it that there is given the foundation for the comprehension of their religious ideas and doctrines.

## § 10. *Sources for the Representation of the Teaching of Jesus.*

The biblico-theological representation of the teaching of Jesus has not to ask what He said, but what were the sayings of Jesus which the earliest tradition possessed, and in what form. (*b*) Accordingly the Johannean tradition is altogether excluded from the sources of this representation. (*c*) But even from the synoptic Gospels it is only by means of critical investigation into their origin and relation to one another that the actual substance of the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus can be brought out.

(*a*) Even the scientific representation of the life of Jesus has to occupy itself with His teaching; for His teaching not only formed a principal part of His activity, but also gives the most direct and certain answer to important questions relating to His historical position and significance. Hence it will have to ask which sayings of Jesus authenticate themselves to historical criticism, and what is the idea of the form and pur-

Jesus, and this answer must have been that which was mainly regulative for the conception of them by the apostolic age. All these questions belong therefore to the teaching of Jesus, nay, they form its real substance. Whatever other statements of a theological or anthropological import, or whatever other moral exhortations occur in the sayings of Jesus, we shall have first to see how far they convey anything that is peculiar to His teaching, and in what connection they stand with that its central point.

port of His teaching which is given by as complete a collection and consideration of these sayings as is possible. With biblical theology it is different. It only asks what are the sayings of Jesus with which the earliest writers of the New Testament were originally acquainted, and what is the conception of His teaching which comes out from the form in which they possessed these sayings. Whether the circle of these sayings gives a perfect idea of that which Jesus had said and taught, whether their oldest literary forms originate with the ear-witnesses themselves, and can therefore pass for authentic,—these are questions which are, in the first instance, of no importance for it. At any rate, the earliest tradition regarding the sayings of Jesus, the tradition from which the apostolic age drew, originated with the ear-witnesses; but just as certainly as the guarantee was given in the character of the teaching of Jesus as a revelation that His disciples had not misunderstood it in such a manner as to destroy its essential significance, so certainly we cannot assume, *à priori*, that everything which Jesus had said had remained in the memory of the first witnesses, and so had passed over into the circle of the earliest tradition, or that everything was conceived by all in its original meaning, and expressed in a manner which was in keeping with this meaning. Still it was only in the extent and conception of it which the earliest tradition represents, that the teaching of Jesus could influence the commencement of the doctrinal development of the New Testament. Whatever else Jesus had said, or whatever else may be discovered as to the meaning of His teaching, was as good as non-existent for the earliest writers of the New Testament. Accordingly, biblical theology cannot start from the teaching of Jesus *per se*, but only from the teaching of Jesus as it is represented in the earliest tradition.

(*b*) It is in accordance with this that we must answer the question as to the sources from which biblical theology has to draw its representation of the teaching of Jesus. For such a representation of His teaching as the life of Jesus demands, the employment of the Gospel of John (whether we regard it as directly apostolic or only make it depend upon independent apostolic tradition) is not only permissible, but altogether indispensable, although it certainly cannot claim an unqualified

authenticity for the discourses of Christ which it contains. But it is not to be used as a source for the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus. However many authentic sayings of Jesus, both as to import and form, are contained in it, however many sides of His teaching it lets us see in a new light or with greater clearness, yet the fact that it is in this, the latest Gospel, that we first hear of these sayings, and have light thrown upon these sides, shows that in the earliest tradition these sayings were awanting and these sides were in the background, and that they cannot, therefore, have contributed to determine the development of doctrine in the earlier books of the New Testament. And even though it were possible to show that a few of the sayings of Jesus which we owe first to the Johannean tradition had already become active in the earlier doctrinal types of the New Testament, yet that would not justify us in mixing up the so very peculiar sphere of thought, in which the discourses of Christ contained in this Gospel move, along with the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus, or in placing it along with the latter at the head of our representation. Even the consideration which is so frequently brought under our notice, the consideration, viz., that the Apostle John will not have kept to himself the sayings of Jesus which belong to his individual remembrance or conception until the time to which the writings which bear his name belong, cannot furnish us with an occasion to do so. It cannot do so, since the form of the earliest common tradition of the teaching of Jesus—a form which is so peculiarly different from these discourses—shows that these have had at least no sensible influence upon that tradition. Whether, therefore, it was not till later that richer reminiscences arose in the mind of the Evangelist John, and shed their peculiar light over much in the teaching of Jesus, or whether they have actually slumbered in him until, connected as they were with his own theological development, they received their peculiar stamp, still it is only in connection with the Johannean theology, which grew out of them and is therefore inseparably incorporated with them, that their treasures can be represented in a fruitful manner.[1]

[1] While G. L. Bauer already considered "the Christian theory of religion according to the three first Gospels" and "according to John" separately, in their

(*c*) The earliest tradition regarding the sayings of Jesus is found in the three synoptic Gospels. Certainly we must not overlook the fact that not only have we no manner of pledge, but that rather, having regard to the circumstances of their origin, we can only doubt that we still possess in these Gospels the full riches of the sayings of Jesus from which the earliest writers of the New Testament drew their views. But biblical theology possesses no other authorities for the representation of the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus, and must therefore adhere to these for its first section. On the other hand, seeing that our synoptic Gospels in their present form are probably of later origin than the most of the other books of the New Testament, it is possible that many sayings of Jesus have already been taken up into them, which were either altogether, or at least in their present shape, foreign to the earliest tradition, which the doctrinal development of the New Testament alone presupposes at its commencement. The fact that many sayings are testified to by two of them, or by all the three, while others are contained only in one, makes it natural to make a distinction in the material that is presented by them; and this is rendered still more natural when we observe that even in them the same saying often already occurs

representation of the teaching of Jesus de Wette and v. Cölln start from all the four Gospels. The former (§ 226) sets up the principle that, as regards the import of His teaching, the Gospel of John is to be used as the standard for criticism, while the form of delivery is retained more faithfully in the Synoptists; and the latter (§ 139) is of opinion that the Gospel of John makes it easier to ascertain the subjective view of the evangelist, and therefore to distinguish the real teaching as delivered by Jesus from the subjective form in which it is transmitted by His disciples. Without more ado, Schmid has represented the teaching of Jesus according to all the four Gospels (cf. § 3); and even Reuss has done so partially, although he also uses the discourses of Christ which are contained in the fourth Gospel as a source for the theology of John (cf. i. p. 156 [E. Tr. i. 133]). It is equally one-sided, of course, when Baur regards it as proved by recent criticism, that, because of its difference from the Synoptists and its quite peculiar system of doctrine, the Gospel of John cannot be used at all as an authority for the teaching of Jesus, but only for the manner in which the evangelist conceived it (p. 22). But even the manner in which v. Oosterzee first represents the theology of Jesus according to the synoptic Gospels (§ 10–16) and according to the Gospel of John (§ 17–22) separately, in order then to embrace them both in a higher unity (§ 23, 24), does not get over the inconvenience of making biblical theology place at its commencement a representation of the teaching of Jesus, the full appreciation of which at least cannot appear till its close.

in very different shapes and differently conceived. Accordingly, it is only by means of a careful criticism of sources that a separation of the earliest form of the tradition of the sayings of Jesus from the complete body of the synoptic tradition can be accomplished.[2] Of course the necessary investigation into the origin and relationship of the three synoptic Gospels cannot be carried on here; it belongs to historico-critical introduction. Biblical theology can only axiomatically accept its results as the basis for its representation.[3] It is only on the assumption, however, that these results justify us in gathering from the synoptic Gospels the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus, and show us the way to do so, that biblical theology can even attempt a representation of that teaching.

[2] Baur is quite consequent when, in accordance with his critical principle regarding the Gospels, he puts Luke, as a redaction of Matthew with a tendency, and Mark, as a redaction which neutralizes the contradictions of both, altogether aside, and holds exclusively by Matthew; although even in it not only is a universalistic redaction to be distinguished from a Jewish-Christian text (*Grundschrift*), but even in the latter the Judaism which assumed a more definite form after the death of Jesus must be distinguished from the original teaching of Jesus (cf. p. 23). But apart from the question as to the correctness of his assumption regarding the character and relationship of the synoptic Gospels, this whole process of separation ultimately leads the critic to the actual "principles and doctrines of Jesus" (p. 24, 25), with which, according to note *a*, biblical theology is not at first at all concerned. If the earliest apostolic tradition had already actually conceived the teaching of Jesus in the sense of a limited Judaism, then, for us, the history of the development of Christian doctrine would have commenced with the teaching of Jesus as so conceived. Moreover, that which is imagined as to an "original" teaching of Jesus, is only a historical conjecture without any firm support.

[3] It is very unfair to raise the objection against biblical theology, that it builds its representation of the teaching of Jesus upon arbitrary hypotheses regarding the Gospels. For, since universally recognised results are not yet gained upon this field, nothing remains but for the individual to start from those conclusions to which he has come, and upon which alone he can base his representation. Besides, the views which are developed in what follows are nothing less than new hypotheses. They only gather together the most approved results of previous investigation, and put them into the form of a complete picture. For their more particular proof, as well as to see how they stand related to other views, cf. Weiss, "zur Entstehungsgeschichte der synoptischen Evangelien" (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1861, p. 29–100, 646–753); "die Redestücke des apostolischen Matthäus" (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1864, p. 49-140); "die Erzählungsstücke des apostolischen Matthäus" (*ibid.* 1865, p. 319–376); *das Marcusevangelium und seine synoptischen Parallelen* (Berlin 1872); *das Matthäusevangelium und seine Lucasparallelen* (Halle 1876).

## § 11. *Critical Presuppositions for the Employment of the Three Synoptic Gospels.*

The Gospel of Mark, which is already used by the other two Synoptists, depends upon direct apostolic tradition. (*b*) There is also an apostolic writing which lies at the basis of all the three Gospels, a writing which had principally aimed at being a collection of the sayings of Jesus as they were circulating in the earliest common tradition. (*c*) Whatever other sources Luke has employed, are probably of equal value with one of these two principal sources. (*d*) So far as the manner in which these sources are used in our Gospels can be discovered, it begets the presumption that, both as to import and form, the earliest tradition can still be gathered from them with substantial accuracy.

(*a*) The assumption that our second Gospel is the oldest of the three Synoptists, and is used by the two others, made its appearance, it is true, very early (cf. G. Chr. Storr, *über den Zweck der evangelischen Geschichte und der Briefe Johannis*, Tübingen 1786, § 58–62), and found in Weisse (*Evangelische Geschichte*, Leipzig 1838) and Wilke (*der Urevangelist*, Dresden 1838) a defence which was exceedingly ingenious and perfectly conclusive in everything that was essential; but it is only since Ewald adopted it in his *Jahrbücher* (1848–49; cf. *die drei ersten Evangelien*, Göttingen 1850, 2d ed. 1871) that it has come into more and more general acceptance. The once almost dominant hypothesis of Owen and Griesbach, which made Mark the latest of our three evangelists, has recently been thoroughly defended only from the standpoint of the Tübingen "*Tendenzkritik*" (cf. Schwegler, *das nachapostolische Zeitalter*, Tübingen 1846; Baur, *kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien*, Tübingen 1847; Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, Leipzig 1864; Zeller, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1865, 3, 4; Keim, *Geschichte Jesu von Nazara*, Zürich 1867–72), and, within that school itself, it has been unweariedly combated, and with emphasis and success, by Hilgenfeld (who, however, adheres to the dependence of Mark upon Matthew) since 1850. The hypothesis that our second Gospel is only a redaction of the original Mark (*Urmarkus*),

which forms the basis of the other two Synoptists,—a redaction which, it is true, stands nearest that original Mark, both formally and materially (Holtzmann, *die synoptischen Evangelien*, Leipzig 1863; Weizsäcker, *Untersuchungen über die evangelische Geschichte*, Gotha 1864),—has been more and more given up again by the newest defenders of the Mark-hypothesis (cf. Meyer, *Commentary on Matthew*, Introd. § 4; Scholten, *das älteste Evangelium*, Elberfeld 1869; Volckmar, *die Evangelien oder Marcus und die Synopsis*, Leipzig 1870). Seeing that, according to a report of John the Presbyter, which is being more and more generally acknowledged to be trustworthy and to refer to our second Gospel (in Euseb. *hist. eccl.* iii. 39), the Gospel of Mark is derived from reminiscences of the oral narratives of the Apostle Peter (cf. Klostermann, *das Marcusevangelium*, Göttingen 1867; Grau, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des Neutestamentlichen Schriftthums*, Gütersloh 1871; and my *Marcusevangelium*, Introduction), the complete picture of the life and teaching of Jesus which it gives is the direct product of the living apostolic preaching, which was naturally very much richer than the traits of it which are contained in the Gospel, and it affords, especially in the discourses which are first written down in it, an abundance of material for the representation of the teaching of Jesus.

(*b*) The observation that our first and third Gospels are two writings which are altogether independent of one another is of the greatest consequence in the further investigation of the sources of our Gospels (cf. besides Weisse, Ewald, Holtzmann, Weizsäcker, also Ritschl, *theologische Jahrbücher*, 1851; Plitt, *de composit. evangl. synopt.*, Bonn 1860; Reuss, *Geschichte der heiligen Schriften N. T.*, 5th ed., Braunschweig 1874). From this it follows, viz., that wherever both Gospels show a literary relationship without the intervention of Mark, another source is used in common by both, but by each in a peculiar manner. In this source, most recognise the writing of the Apostle Matthew which is mentioned by Papias (in Euseb. *hist. eccl.* iii. 39), a writing which, it is true, consisted to a very great extent of discourses and sayings of the Lord, but which also, according to the result of that analysis, contained narrative portions (cf. my *Matthäusev.*, Introd.). In this writing we have to seek the richest treasure of direct apostolic tradition

of words of Jesus, and individual traits of His life, as they group themselves specially round leading sayings of His. As this writing has most faithfully reported the tradition which had become current in the earliest apostolic circle, so it has also had the most powerful influence, directly and indirectly, upon the later gospel literature. Our first Gospel, which has used it most faithfully and completely, and has worked it up, with the assistance of Mark, into a complete history of the life of Jesus, owes to it the name of Matthew, which it bears. We shall call it the "apostolic source;" the first Gospel we shall, according to custom, call Matthew. Luke has used it more freely and less completely; but yet he has retained much out of it which our Matthew has no longer known how to fit into the frame of his history which he has borrowed from Mark. It is mainly in consequence of the limitation of this writing to a mere collection of discourses or sayings that its use by our second Gospel has been denied. Mark has partly, by means of Petrine tradition, amplified its narrative portions, which are short and sketchy, but thrown off in lapidary style, so as to give them more colour and completeness; he has partly incorporated within his pragmatism individual sayings, and, less frequently, even longer portions of discourses, occasionally transforming them with considerable freedom. This explains why it is that, as compared with the first Gospel, which has often used the apostolic source with greater fidelity, and has even adhered to it where its redaction by Mark lay before him, our second Gospel often shows a secondary text, by means of which criticism has been so frequently led astray.[1]

[1] Where Matthew and Luke agree as to language, without the intervention of Mark, we have, accordingly, the very words of the apostolic source which was used by them. Where they differ from one another, the original form is to be restored, according to the critical principle, that that form is to be regarded as secondary, the motive of which is still recognisable. According to what has been said above, Matthew has, on the whole, the prejudice of originality in his favour. Wherever there appears to be an essential difference in the form, we cite the passage in which the form shows itself to be the most original; otherwise, we simply cite Matthew. In the case of sayings where it appeared to be specially important to show that they occurred in the apostolic source, or where the text does not appear to be preserved in an altogether original shape in either of them, we place the parallel passages of both Gospels alongside of one another. Where narrative portions, expressions, and discourses out of the apostolic source are

(*c*) As regards the longer discourses which are peculiar to Matthew, we may, even without checking them by means of Luke, consider it as very probable that they are taken from the apostolic source, and that, after deduction of the doctrinal peculiarities of the evangelist, they are rendered with substantial fidelity. Even individual expressions, which he alone has retained, may often be traced back, partly to this source, partly to an oral tradition which is of equal value. But since the earliest apostolic source certainly had no history of the birth, the passion, and the resurrection, everything which is peculiar to the first evangelist in regard to these is without the direct guarantee of apostolic tradition. While it cannot be shown in the case of Matthew that he has used any other written sources besides those mentioned in notes *a* and *b*, in the case of Luke this is exceedingly probable with regard to many narrative portions, and at least with regard to many parables. Now, since he expressly says in his introduction that he has followed the tradition of eye-witnesses, and appeals to previous works of an analogous nature (i. 1–3), his sources must either have been of direct apostolic origin, or they must have been drawn directly out of apostolic tradition; they are therefore either of equal value with the apostolic source or with that of Mark. Wherever, therefore, a use of such sources can be made probable by criticism, there even the sections which are peculiar to Luke prove exceedingly valuable sources for the earliest tradition of the discourses of Jesus.[2]

contained in all the three Gospels, the critical operation is, it is true, on the one hand, more complicated, because the form in Matthew as well as in Luke is often owing to that of Mark; but, on the other hand, the result is also often so much the more certain. We shall frequently have to be satisfied with the relatively most original form. But, on the one hand, that which is absolutely certain (and, seeing that Matthew and Luke are so frequently in substantially perfect agreement, there is not little that is so) affords a firm basis and a guiding rule for the criticism of that which remains; and, on the other, biblical theology may be satisfied with having brought out the relatively most original form which we have received of tradition relating to the teaching of Jesus (and also in regard to His life, so far as it comes under our notice, according to § 9, *c*). Where the Gospel of Mark is the original source, it is always cited without regard to the evangelists who use it. In such a case, these have no independent value.

[2] Since Luke, indeed, takes much greater liberty than Matthew in the use that he makes of the apostolic source, the portions containing discourses that are found in him alone, even where they are in all probability to be regarded as

(*d*) It is only the manner in which Matthew and Luke have used Mark that can be directly checked; but even the portions of the apostolic source containing discourses which have been used by both, independently of one another, are partially preserved with such agreement in language, that we can easily perceive its whole character, and can, accordingly, also show, for the most part with considerable certainty, where one or both have changed the original form. At least, we thus obtain a wide field upon which we can make observations as to how far the freedom of the evangelists in using their authorities went. And here the suspicion awakened by the Tübingen school, that they have substantially transformed their material in accordance with doctrinal tendencies and varying movements of the age, and have amplified it by altogether free compositions, is shown to be totally groundless (cf. even Biedermann, p. 223). The variations of the evangelists from their sources are explained, for by far the greatest part, by literary motives, by the endeavour to illustrate, to explain, to make the thought more emphatic, or to weave the sayings, which are contained in the earliest tradition in a disconnected form, into a definite connection, in which, it is true, their original meaning is occasionally altered. That which appeared apt to be taken in a wrong sense they have rather omitted than made unintelligible. Even where figurative utterances or parables are plainly applied and transformed in a manner contrary to their original meaning, their original reference is still, for the most part, apparent in some way or another. That which can be proved to be an addition of an evangelist so often shows, so far as we can still check it, the endeavour to attach itself in form and import to one of the older sources, that the same can be assumed with good reason of the

derived from the apostolic source or from a tradition which is of equal value, do not, at least as to their form, warrant the same certainty as the analogous sections in Matthew. Yet, even here, after deduction of whatever can be shown to be a doctrinal peculiarity of the evangelist, we may nevertheless count upon a substantially faithful tradition, especially where the original meaning still shines through the divergent explanation and application given to it by Luke. On the other hand, that which has been said of the history of the infancy, of the passion, and the resurrection, in Matthew, applies also to the similar sections in Luke.

comparatively few cases where such a check is no longer possible. The proof of this lies clearly before our eyes when we consider that which turns out to be a doctrinal peculiarity of our three Gospels as Gospels;[3] from that it will be easy to perceive how little occasion it gave to make a substantial change upon the oldest tradition.

## § 12. *Previous Works on this Subject.*

The earlier representations of the teaching of Jesus start from points of view which are too different from ours to be fruitful for the task that we have assigned ourselves. (*b*) The same applies, it is true, also to Schmid and Reuss; but they have, in many points at least, shown the way to represent the teaching of Jesus in its specific peculiarity. (*c*) Baur has attempted to reduce the teaching of Jesus to an altogether general ethico-religious principle. (*d*) Hence the task still remained to represent it from its historical central point, and in its inner connection.

(*a*) Although Bauer has this advantage over de Wette and v. Cölln, that he treats of the Synoptists apart from John, yet he agrees with them in treating of the teaching of Jesus according to the same scheme as the teaching of the apostles. In the first section ("Christology," cf. vol. i.) doctrinal and historical matters are mixed together in a vague manner; in the other two sections ("Theology" and "Anthropology," cf. vol. ii. § 7–42) he discusses the names of God, His existence, His unity and attributes, creation and providence, the origin, name, and communication of sin, etc., and, with special detail, the doctrine of immortality; whereas it is shown in § 9, *c*, that all this does not make us acquainted with the essential peculiarity of the teaching of Jesus, but rather places it, *à priori*, under a wrong point of view. In de Wette, some essentially cardinal points of the teaching of Jesus are already

[3] Having regard to the position of our Gospels in the history of the age, we cannot represent this till Part IV. section 4, where those synoptic expressions which I cannot reckon to the earliest tradition will also be discussed. Where such secondary traits of our Gospels, or passages, as to which a somewhat certain judgment can no longer be pronounced, are quoted by way of comparison, their use is nevertheless expressly distinguished from that of the real proof passages.

anticipated in the sketch of His life. After an introduction as to its "principle and its character," the "teaching of Jesus" Himself, like that of the apostles, discusses, first, the doctrine of revelation (§ 230–233), mainly according to expressions in John; secondly, the general doctrine of God, of angels and demons, and of man (§ 234–245), to which that which has been said of Bauer's two last sections substantially applies; and, finally, the doctrine of salvation (§ 246–254), in which the most that is said really belongs to the question. What has been said of de Wette applies, in substance, to v. Cölln, in whose representation the "unsymbolical doctrine of religion" (§ 141–153) really discusses the same questions as de Wette's second section, only that the doctrine of revelation appears here as the second division of the doctrine of man and his relation to God within revelation, while the "symbolical doctrine of the kingdom of Christ" (§ 154–168) first comes to the kernel of the preaching of Jesus.

(*b*) Although Schmid also discusses the teaching of Jesus according to the four Gospels, yet he consciously makes an attempt to represent it in conformity with an order of arrangement which is derived from itself, and not in conformity with current dogmatic formulæ (cf. p. 121, 125 [E. Tr. 90, 93]). In doing so, he starts, correctly, from the message of the salvation which has appeared (p. 122 [E. Tr. 90]); but when this message is, according to § 20, discussed under the following heads: the doctrine of the glorification of the Father in the Son (an idea which is formed altogether from discourses in John), of the redemption of men through the Son, and of the kingdom of God by means of which this glorification and redemption are realized, it is altogether out of keeping with that which is characteristic of the teaching of Jesus, to make the idea of the kingdom of God appear first at the close, instead of at the beginning,—a difficulty which Schmid has indeed felt, but which he has by no means got rid of (p. 124 [E. Tr. 92]). It is only in appearance, also, that the dogmatic scheme is forsaken; within the several divisions it frequently reappears in substance, and hence thoroughly dogmatic definitions of the nature of God (who is, according to p. 132 [E. Tr. 98], a "self-comprehending and

self-existent, but, at the same time, self-communicating life and being"), of the divine attributes, of the Trinity, of the different states of Christ, of the Church with its means of grace, etc., are ascribed to Jesus. Only the order of salvation is, here and there, treated of in an arrangement which is original, but by no means always lucid, or in keeping with the character of the teaching of Jesus. Reuss (i. p. 149–270 [E. Tr. i. 127–232]) ingeniously connects the development of the teaching of Jesus with Mark i. 15, and accordingly treats first of the relation of the gospel to the law; then there follow the sections: du royaume de dieu, de la conversion, de la perfection, de la foi, de la bonne nouvelle, with the latter of which there are connected the sections: de fils de l'homme et de dieu, de l'église and de l'avenir. This is the most successful attempt which has been made as yet to give a representation of the teaching of Jesus in so far as it has become the basis of the teaching of the apostles (cf. i. p. 158 [E. Tr. 134 f.]), although here also the intermixture of expressions from John is not to be approved of as regards method, and the arrangement is not everywhere in keeping with the design.

(*c*) The representation of the teaching of Jesus by Baur (p. 45–121) starts, it is true, from false critical postulates; but since it is in our Matthew that we also find the apostolic source preserved most completely, he, more than any of the other previous labourers in this department, treats of the same material from which we think of drawing our representation. Undoubtedly it is unhistorical in Baur to regard Jesus as the "founder of a new religion" (p. 45), for this is certainly not the point of view under which He, in His teaching, has placed His manifestation; and although Baur starts correctly from the relation in which Jesus puts His person and manifestation to the revelation of the Old Testament, he is forthwith one-sided in taking into account only His relation to the law, whereas it is with prophecy that the message regarding the kingdom of God, with which Jesus commences, finds its points of contact. Hence also he comes to the thoroughly erroneous conclusion, that the substantial kernel of Christianity is its ethical element, that the teaching of Jesus is not so much religion as ethics (p. 65); he conceives the

idea of the kingdom of God as that of a new ethico-religious fellowship, without any reference to the Messianic kingdom which was looked for in consequence of prophecy (p. 75); and where he does not get rid of the sayings of Jesus as to His person and work by means of the most arbitrary criticism (as in p. 86, 88, 99–105), he gives them an interpretation which empties them of meaning (p. 89–92), and strips them as far as possible of everything Messianic, in order that he may retain, in the name of Son, only the expression for the new principle of the religious consciousness, a principle which he finds in the idea of God as the Father (p. 115). There remain, therefore, as the sum of the teaching of Jesus, only "fundamental ideas and principles, maxims and precepts, as direct utterances of the religious consciousness" (p. 46). If, indeed, the development of the doctrine of the apostles is to issue in diametrically opposed tendencies, then the common root of these can only have been such an altogether general ethico-religious principle; but Baur has not even satisfactorily shown the connection with that principle of the doctrinal antitheses which he has discovered.

(*d*) The representation of the teaching of Jesus will have to begin with the message regarding the kingdom of God as the historical central point of His preaching (chap. i.). When we have once established the meaning of this message in its relation to Israel's past and to the consciousness of the present, it will then branch out, of itself, into these divisions: that the kingdom of God is present in the Messiah and His activity, that it is being realized in the company of the disciples, and that it is coming in its future completion. Everything else can be only the amplification of these outlines. With reference to the existence of the kingdom of God in the Messiah (§ 13), it will discuss the Messianic self-testimony (chap. ii.) and the Messianic activity (chap. iii.) of Jesus; with reference to the realization of the kingdom of God in the company of the disciples (§ 14), it will treat of that realization as consisting in the righteousness of the kingdom of God (chap. iv.), and of its empirical form in the Messianic Church (chap. v.); and, lastly, it will close with the Messianic consummation (chap. vi.; cf. § 15). The representation of the teaching of Jesus according to the Synoptists,

which is given in the work of v. Oosterzee (p. 44-79), which appeared almost at the same time as my Biblical Theology, follows this order most closely. It also starts with the kingdom of God and its founder, then treats of the King of kings and the subjects of the kingdom, and, finally, of salvation, the way of salvation, and its completion. Immer builds his representation of the "Religion of Jesus" (p. 50–177) upon a very unstable critical foundation as regards the synoptic Gospels, which he, *à priori*, assumes to be the only source (§ 44); and he also mixes up the historical point of view with the biblico-theological. His arrangement of the "leading ideas of Jesus" is simple and suited to the subject; but as he prefaces it with a section concerning the relation of Jesus to the Baptist, so he follows it up with a discussion as to His relation to Judaism, in which he can, naturally, only either repeat what he has already said, or state what ought to have been said much earlier, and concludes with a psychological explanation of the scene in Gethsemane and of the words on the cross. Cf. also the excellent article by H. Weiss: "die Grundzüge der Heilslehre Jesu bei den Synoptikern" (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1869, 1), and the, in many respects, valuable "Contributions to Biblical Theology" by C. Wittichen (Göttingen, 1865–72: die Idee Gottes als des Vaters, die Idee des Menschen, die Idee des Reiches Gottes).

## CHAPTER I.

### THE MESSAGE REGARDING THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

Cf. F. F. Fleck, *de regno divino*, Lips. 1829.

### § 13. *The Kingdom of God and the Messiah.*

The central point of the preaching of Jesus was the glad tidings that the kingdom of God was at hand, because the time was fulfilled in which its coming was expected. (*b*) Thereby Jesus attaches Himself to Old Testament prophecy, which had looked forward to the perfect realization of the dominion of God, and therewith of the fullest salvation, in Israel, in the Messianic time, as well as to the popular expectation which,

in consequence of prophecy, could conceive this completion of the theocracy only under the forms of the national commonwealth. (*c*) He exhibited in His activity the signs of the promised time of salvation which the last and greatest of the messengers of God must introduce. (*d*) He professed to be the promised and expected Messiah; only as such could He announce the advent of the kingdom of God.

(*a*) It is neither a piece of religious information nor an ethical demand, but a proclamation, that forms the historical central point of the teaching of Jesus (*κηρύσσειν*, Mark i. 14, 38, 39). According to the apostolic source, Jesus Himself, with a plain allusion to Isa. lxi. 1, characterizes His proclamation as a message of joy to the wretched (Matt. xi. 5 = Luke vii. 22: *πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται*).[1] With special frequency Mark makes Jesus describe His proclamation as a message of joy (chap. i. 15, viii. 35, x. 29, xiii. 10, xiv. 9: *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*). Its import appears from the apostolic source, according to which Jesus sent forth His disciples on their probationary mission with the message: *ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Luke x. 9 = Matt. x. 7); and it is with the same message that Mark makes Him appear upon the scene Himself (i. 15). What this kingdom of God is, is nowhere expressly said; the idea is regarded as one quite familiar to the people. In fact, no one in Israel, which was from the first to be a kingdom whose supreme Lord and King was Jehovah, could thereby understand anything else than a kingdom in which the will of God is fulfilled as perfectly upon earth as by the angels in heaven (Matt. vi. 10). The message regarding its nearness does not say that the kingdom is already there, but neither does it state that it will appear in a future, however near. It rather assumes that its coming was expected after the lapse of a (divinely) appointed time, and announces that this time has elapsed (Mark i. 15: *πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρός*), and that therefore the advent of the kingdom of God is immediately at hand.

[1] The *πτωχοί* (עֲנִיִּים) are neither to be conceived of as the literally poor in the narrower sense, nor as the spiritually poor in the religious sense; it is the whole nation which is meant in its national wretchedness, a wretchedness which, it is true, was for the theocratic nation at once of a spiritual and political nature.

(*b*) Jesus brings no new theology; the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is His God (Mark xii. 26). Thereby the revelation of God in the Old Testament is acknowledged. The central point, however, of this revelation was this, that in consequence of His covenant relation with Israel, God had made known His will to that people, and had attached the promise of the fullest salvation to its fulfilment. In the Israelitish theocracy, accordingly, the realization of that ideal of a kingdom of God (Matt. vi. 10) had always been striven after; as yet, however, it had not been attained; and the present, in which the nation sighed under the burden of national misery in consequence of its sins, was as far as possible from corresponding with the demands of God, or the picture of the future which prophecy had painted. The kingdom of God which was announced could therefore be only the realization of this ideal. Now the prophets, who spoke in the Holy Spirit (Mark xii. 36), had promised this realization in the Messianic time, and therefore the message regarding the fulfilment of the time stated that this promised Messianic time was come.[2] Naturally, prophecy assumes throughout that the completion of the theocracy, which is to commence at that time, will take place under the forms of the commonwealth of Israel, whether, as in the earlier prophets, it is conceived of as a restoration of the old splendour, and a supreme glorification of the Davidic kingdom, or as in Dan. vii. 13, 14, as the founding of an everlasting kingdom which makes an end of all the kingdoms of the world. Hereupon is based the hope which was then cherished, especially by the pious in Israel, of an everlasting kingdom of the promised Son of David (Luke i. 32, 33), of the restoration and completion of the theocracy, a preliminary condition of which is political emancipation (i. 68–75, xxiv. 21). In this sense the people greet in the Messiah the coming kingdom of His father David (Mark xi. 10), in this

[2] Accordingly, the kingdom of God which draws near in it is not a new religious-ethical fellowship to be instituted by Jesus (Baur, p. 75), but the completion of the Israelitish theocracy which was promised by the prophets. The vineyard of the theocracy which was committed to Israel (Matt. xxi. 33) becomes, in the future of salvation which dawns with the fulfilment of the time, the kingdom of God (ver. 43). We purposely refrain from using the name kingdom of heaven, because this term, which occurs only in the first Gospel, cannot have belonged to the apostolic source. Cf. § 138, *c*.

sense they expect the appearing of the kingdom of God (Mark xv. 43; Luke xvii. 20, xix. 11) or the restoration of the kingdom of Israel (Acts i. 6).[3] It was only in the sense of this expectation that the people could understand the message of Jesus regarding the kingdom of God. That which is new in it is, therefore, simply the proclamation of the joyful fact that the time is come in which the promised and expected completion of the theocracy is to commence. This was the form rendered necessary by the history of salvation, the form in which Jesus had to announce the revelation of God which was accomplished in His manifestation, and which laid the basis for the completion of salvation.

(*c*) According to the apostolic source, Jesus refers the Baptist, who inquires whether He is the expected one, to the fact that the signs of the Messianic time, which were foretold in Isa. xxxv. 5, 6, appear in His miracles of healing (Matt. xi. 3–5 = Luke vii. 19–22; cf. Matt. xvi. 2, 3 = Luke xii. 54–56).[4] In it also Jesus explains to the Pharisees, when He has shown them that it is in the power of God that He is able to cast out devils, how that with the overthrow of the Satanic powers the kingdom of God is come upon earth (Matt. xii. 28 = Luke xi. 20). Wherever the dominion of the powers that resist God is broken, there the dominion of God is established. If, however, it is in His activity that the realization of the kingdom of God begins, He is its expected founder; and therefore the Baptist should not be deterred from acknowledging Him as the expected one, although He has not commenced to set up the kingdom in the manner in

[3] Notwithstanding the investigations of Holtzmann (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1867, 3), I believe I must maintain that, at the time of Christ, the expectation of a personal Messiah in the form of the promised Son of David, was diffused among the people. It is perfectly true that this was by no means a direct offshoot of the old Messianic expectation of the time of the kings, but a product of the study of Scripture, which must, however, have necessarily become a part of the national consciousness through the activity of the scribes in the synagogue. Cf. Schürer, p. 565 ff.

[4] No more, of course, than in Isaiah, are these miracles conceived of as mere credentials of a divine mission; the restoration of those who are oppressed by the wretchedness of sickness appears rather as a symbol and prelude of the restoration which realizes all the promised salvation, of the restoration which must bring the completion of the theocracy to the nation which is sighing under the misery of the present, and which is therefore also proclaimed at the same time to the miserable in the glad tidings (xi. 5).

which the people expected (Matt. xi. 6). When He calls Himself a messenger of God (x. 40, xv. 24, xxi. 34, 37, xxii. 3, 4), He appears to rank Himself only in the category of the prophets, as He does expressly in Mark vi. 4. But since He declared that the time of prophecy has expired with John the Baptist (Matt. xi. 13 = Luke xvi. 16), who had pointed to the Messiah as the one coming after him (Matt. iii. 11), then He Himself could be only the last and greatest of the messengers of God, the one who was to bring about the completion of the theocracy. He had, indeed, in the same connection, declared the Baptist to be the messenger of God foretold in Mal. iii. 1, who was to prepare the way of the Messiah (Matt. xi. 10 = Luke vii. 27); He also called him His Elias (Mark ix. 12, 13, cf. Mal. iv. 5), and regarded him as the one upon the recognition of whom men's attitude to Himself depended (Mark xi. 28–33). With His appearing there has commenced a time of joy for His disciples, which (Mark ii. 19, 20) He compares with the joy of the companions of the bridegroom who have assembled to the marriage feast. Nevertheless, He has forbidden the demons who recognised Him as the Messiah (i. 25, 34, iii. 12), and even His disciples (viii. 30), to proclaim His Messiahship publicly. The proneness of the people to make Him the hero of the Messianic revolution in the sense of their expectation, which conceived political emancipation as a preliminary condition of the theocratic consummation, compelled Him to refrain from directly proclaiming His Messiahship.

(*d*) The more, however, the approaching catastrophe of His life relieved Jesus from all reserve, so much the more openly has He avowed His Messianic dignity. At Jericho He no longer refuses the popular invocation as the Son of David (Mark x. 47), and when He enters Jerusalem He allows Himself to be hailed as the Messianic King (xi. 8–10). Before the priests He declares Himself to be the corner-stone of the theocracy spoken of in Ps. cxviii. 22 (xii. 10, 11; cf. Matt. xxi. 44); before His disciples He declares Himself to be the Shepherd promised in Zech. xiii. 7 (Mark xiv. 27); and before the tribunal He solemnly avows His Messianic dignity (xiv. 62 and xv. 2). He has not, however, imported any new meaning into the Messianic idea (Baur, p. 93), and

wrested it to suit this meaning; he was convinced that He conceived and fulfilled the idea of the Messiah in the spirit of prophecy. Even His indirect claim of Messiahship (note *c*) leads throughout to the conclusion that He professed to be the Messiah promised by the prophets and expected by the people. He has pointed to the fact that everything which stands written of the Messiah must be accomplished in His fate (Mark xii. 10, 11, xiv. 21, 27, 49),[5] and that the disciples have found in Him what the prophets and pious men of the Old Testament longed to see (Matt. xiii. 17=Luke x. 24). However far He still came short of that which the popular expectation in its conception of prophecy (a conception which was in many ways so one-sided) connected mainly, and often exclusively, with the Messianic idea, and however far He also excelled even the richest picture of hope contained in the Old Testament, in the consciousness of His divine mission which called Him to be the founder of the consummation of the theocracy or kingdom of God, which was looked forward to by all prophecy, He could represent Himself as the one who was come to bring the Messianic time, *i.e.* the time of the promised completion of salvation. In His working in conformity with His vocation, the will of God, which aimed at the completion of the theocracy, began to be realized upon earth; in the Messiah as the founder of the *kingdom* of God, the kingdom was already in the midst of His people (Luke xvii. 21).

## § 14. *The Kingdom of God and the Disciples.*

The aim of the mission of the Messiah, the realization, viz., of the dominion of God in Israel, begins to be fulfilled when a company of disciples gathers around Jesus, in whose midst is the kingdom of God. (*b*) It is His activity in founding the kingdom which brings this fellowship into existence, and this activity does not consist in a violent interference on the part of God with the external destinies of the nation, but is of a spiritual nature. (*c*) Still, Jesus nowhere directly designates the fellowship of His adherents

[5] Regarding the employment of Old Testament prophecy on its formal side, see more particularly § 74.

as the kingdom of God; in them as well as in the whole nation, it rather requires an ever-increasing realization by means of a gradual development. (*d*) Not even in their fellowship can the kingdom of God be yet realized in an absolutely perfect manner, because the Messianic judgment does not precede the founding of the kingdom, but falls at the close of its development.

(*a*) Not only is the kingdom of God to come in the person of the Messiah, but the Messiah comes in order that the kingdom may also be realized in Israel. His activity, however, cannot fail to be successful, and therefore, in consequence of it, the kingdom of God must also exist somehow or other outside His person. Now, however, in Matt. v. 3, 10, and Mark x. 14, the possession of the kingdom of heaven is plainly described as something which is immediately bestowed upon those who are qualified for it, and in Mark x. 15 as something which can be received even in the present life, if sought for in the right manner. According to Matt. xxi. 31, there are some who already go into the kingdom of God; according to xi. 11 (=Luke vii. 28), there are some who are already therein. If, however, the least in the kingdom of God is greater than the greatest among them that are born of women, who still inquires after the expected one, and stands in danger of taking offence at Him who has come (xi. 3, 6), it follows that those who see in Jesus the expected one, and believe that with Him the kingdom of God has come, have the infinite advantage over the former of being already in the kingdom of God. Already they have part in this kingdom; in their fellowship it begins to be realized.

(*b*) In the parable of the field of various kinds of soil, Jesus represents His activity in founding the kingdom (Matt. xiii. 3–9). Since its success depends upon the condition of men's hearts, just as the success of the labour of the sower depends upon the condition of the field on which the seed falls, it follows that this activity is of a spiritual nature. The oldest Gospel makes it the preaching of the word (Mark iv. 14). The real point of the parable, however, does not lie in the description of the heterogeneous nature of the field. The mystery of the kingdom of God which the parable unveils—a mystery which, it is true, is

intelligible only to the susceptible hearers (iv. 11)—lies in this, that the founding of the kingdom of God does not take place in the manner in which the popular expectation assumed. According to that assumption, there must, first of all, be a political restoration of the theocracy, a restoration which is successfully accomplished by the employment of physical force; whereas the kingdom is realized only where the spiritual activity of the Messiah succeeds, and this success depends upon the condition of men's hearts, so that the true nature of the kingdom of God is independent of its realization in the forms of the national theocracy. It does not come in striking events which attract attention (*οὐκ ... μετὰ παρατηρήσεως, οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν· ἰδοὺ ὧδε ἢ ἐκεῖ*), as is evident from the circumstance that it is already in the midst of those who are still inquiring after its coming (Luke xvii. 20, 21). The striving after an immediate external dominion of the world Jesus regarded as a temptation of Satan (Matt. iv. 8–10).

(*c*) Jesus teaches even His adherents still to strive after the kingdom of God (Matt. vi. 33), to pray for its coming (vi. 10), and to surrender every other possession for this *summum bonum* (xiii. 44–46, xix. 12). Although it is therefore certainly existing in His adherents, it is as certainly not yet perfectly realized even in them; they are rather subjects of the kingdom of God only inasmuch as they strive to realize it, and are, in virtue of their faith in Him as the Messiah, convinced that this striving will attain its goal. In general, however, the kingdom of God, which is established so far as regards its vital germs, must grow with an inherent productiveness until the day comes which brings its completion. In this sense the oldest Gospel has already recast one of the parables of the apostolic source (Mark iv. 26–29). Its realization cannot be limited to the small circle of the present adherents of Jesus, for these have been chosen for the express purpose of bestowing upon others what they themselves possess (Mark iii. 14; Matt. x. 26 f.). The kingdom of God must spread over the whole nation, like the mustard seed which grows from small beginnings to a disproportionate greatness; it must permeate the whole national life as leaven permeates bread (Matt. xiii. 31–33). On both sides

it appears that the kingdom of God is not established upon earth in its true nature by means of the individual act of the expected founding of the kingdom, but by means of a gradual development. Although there is no indication in these parables that the kingdom will extend beyond the limits of Israel, yet, on the other hand, its development is described in such a manner as causes it to appear no longer dependent upon the conditions of the Israelitish national fellowship and its civil commonwealth.

(*d*) In the parables of the tares among the wheat and the fishes in the net (Matt. xiii. 24–30, 47 f.), Jesus shows that the sin which exists in the world mixes as a disturbing influence, not only during the development of the kingdom of God in the world, but even at its foundation, so that impure elements are always anew forcing their way into the circle in which the kingdom of God is being realized. Nevertheless, it is not only impossible, but also inadmissible, to keep these back, or to cast them out; not till the close of this development can the separation of the genuine members of the kingdom of God be undertaken; then, however, it will be effected. Herein also Jesus places Himself in the sharpest opposition to the popular expectation. Even the Baptist had announced that the separation of the unworthy members of the kingdom, or the Messianic judgment, would be the first business of the coming Messiah (iii. 10–12). In the conception, however, of the founding and development of the kingdom of God which is exhibited in notes *b* and *c*, it was naturally implied that the Messianic judgment must be delayed to the close of this development. When Ritschl (ii. p. 36 f.) opposes this view in consequence of such passages in John as iii. 18, v. 22, 27, 30, he overlooks the fact that, on the other hand, it is expressly confirmed by John iii. 17, xii. 47, viii. 15 (compare § 153 *c*, footnote 6).

### § 15. *The Kingdom of God in its Consummation.*

The gradual development of the kingdom of God, as well as the advent of the Messianic judgment at its close, points to a future in which its consummation first appears. (*b*) Herewith a solution of the contradiction between the

prophetic description and the present condition of the kingdom of God is rendered possible; but the realization of this possibility remains dependent upon the attitude of the people to the proclamation of Jesus regarding the kingdom. (*c*) For the present, it is only important that from this proclamation the true nature of the kingdom of God be apprehended; it is a kingdom which is being realized at every stage of its development, and has the pledge of its consummation in the manifestation of the Messiah.

(*a*) Although the kingdom of God is already existent in the person of the Messiah (§ 13), and is in the act of coming in the circle of His adherents (§ 14), it is nevertheless still future as to its perfect realization. Accordingly, even for the adherents of Jesus, entrance into the kingdom of God is still conceived of as dependent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions, and therefore as future (Matt. v. 20, xviii. 3); while the ultimate decision is expressly reserved for the Messianic judgment (Luke xiii. 24, 27; Matt. xxv. 34). Nay, this future entrance is even made dependent upon their right attitude to the present kingdom of God (Mark x. 15). It is to this future completion of the kingdom that Luke xii. 32 also refers.

(*b*) With the manifestation of the Messiah or the Messianic time, prophecy had always connected the idea of a future glorious form of the kingdom of Israel, in which all the promised salvation should be realized. If the former had appeared while the latter had not yet taken place, then, on the one hand, prophecy was fulfilled; on the other, it still waited for its fulfilment. If it lay, however, in the nature of the kingdom of God, that, from the time of its being founded, it should gradually develop to its completion, then on the way to this completion, that of the national theocracy might still take place in the manner in which the prophets had promised. Jesus has not said that this expectation will be fulfilled, but neither has He ever spoken against the popular expectation which was based upon the prophetic promise. Now in this form, now in that, all the prophets had made the fulfilment of their promises dependent upon the behaviour of the people. Whether and how far, therefore, the prophecy regarding the glory of the kingdom of Israel could be fulfilled, remained

dependent upon the issue of the Messianic activity of Jesus. This question could not be answered until this issue began to show itself in a more and more decisive manner, and even then it could not yet be answered definitively (cf. § 28, *d*; 42, *b*).

(*c*) Still it appeared as if prophecy had connected together the commencement and the completion of the future Messianic time of salvation in an inadmissible manner. But as soon as only the nature of the kingdom of God is rightly conceived (cf. Matt. vi. 10, for which see § 13, *a*), it is self-evident that it exists at every stage of its realization, inasmuch as at each stage the will of God, which aims at the completion of salvation, is being realized, and that, therefore, the promised future time of salvation has really commenced with the appearing of the Messiah. On the other hand, the pledge of the consummation of the kingdom of God is given with the manifestation of the promised Messiah, and in so far this consummation is always ideally present. For the very reason that the sending of the Messiah is a divine deed which bears in itself the certainty of its accomplishment, the whole future time of salvation is already ideally given with it in the present time of salvation. It has been thought that, to be philologically correct, we must always explain the *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* in the same manner, so as to make it refer to the future Messianic kingdom. But the point in question here is not the different meanings of a word, but that the idea expressed by this word is no mere ideal which waits a future realization, but an idea which is always being immediately realized for the very reason that it is certain of its fullest realization. It is this interpenetration of present and future, of ideal and reality; it is this certainty of its completion at every stage of the empirical realization of the kingdom of God, which has become an inalienable moment of the Christian consciousness in consequence of the teaching of Jesus.

# CHAPTER II.

## THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS TO HIMSELF AS THE MESSIAH.

Cf. L. Th. Schulze, *vom Menschensohn und vom Logos*, Gotha 1867; K. Fr. Nösgen, *Christus der Menschen- und Gottessohn*, Gotha 1869.

### § 16. *The Son of Man.*

Cf. Baur, Hilgenfeld, Holtzmann in *d. Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol.* 1860, 63, 65; Nebe, *über den Begriff des Namens, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρ.*, Herborn 1860.

Most frequently Jesus calls Himself the Son of man, for the very reason that this was not, at least, one of the current designations of the Messiah. (*b*) For His hearers it implied that He was not a son of man like all others, but that He was the Son of man who claimed to be known to all through that which was peculiar to Him. (*c*) Now, however, all His sayings regarding this Son of man point to His unique calling, whose duties, powers, and divinely-appointed destiny indirectly characterize it clearly enough as the Messianic. (*d*) Finally, however, Jesus has, by His use of the name in the prophecy of His return, pointed so clearly to Dan. vii. 13, that the tradition could not but understand by it the Son of man who was chosen for the Messianic calling.

(*a*) We have not here to consider the question whether he who comes, in Dan. vii. 13, with the clouds of heaven like a son of man, in order to be invested by Jehovah with dominion over the eternal kingdom, was conceived of by the prophet as a personified aggregate, or as an individual. If, in the time of Jesus, the expectation of a personal Messiah was so lively as the earliest tradition assumes throughout, then, at that time, the passage could be understood only of the Messiah. But Jesus could scarcely assume that this single passage was so well known that the people would, without more ado, understand by the Son of man him who is mentioned in Daniel; especially as in that passage the Messiah is not at all described as *the* Son of man, but only as coming like "a son of man." It would be different if we could take into account the explanations and amplifications which the passage in Daniel

has received in the Book of Enoch. But even if we granted the pre-Christian origin of the sections of the Book of Enoch which are in question, we should still be far from proving that its prophecies were so well known and familiar to Jesus and the circle in which he mainly worked, that an allusion to them could be assumed. A reference to Ps. viii. 4 (Schmid, i. p. 150 [E. Tr. 112]), however, is nowhere indicated, and would at first give no prejudice for the Messianic significance of the name. When it is assumed in John xii. 34 that the people identified the ideas of the anointed and of the Son of man, we must not overlook the fact that this took place at a time when there could no longer be any doubt as to the Messianic claim of Him who used this name as a designation of Himself. On the other hand, the form of the question of Jesus in Matt. xvi. 13 contains the correct reminiscence, that He did not regard this designation of Himself as a direct designation, which was generally intelligible as such, of His Messiahship. Not until Jesus Himself, by His use of this name, led them to remember Dan. vii. 13, could it be regarded as such. This, however, is quite in keeping with the manner in which Jesus, during the greater part of His activity, usually avoided the direct proclamation of His Messiahship, so that He might not encourage the hopes which were connected with the current Messianic names (§ 13, *c*).

(*b*) Our question is not in what sense Jesus, who, according to note *d*, has undoubtedly thought of the prophecy in Daniel, could adopt a name which, if that prophecy is applied to a personal Messiah, describes Him as a heavenly being who is invested with sovereignty over the kingdom of God, but how this designation of Himself must have been understood by the hearers for whose comprehension of it it was meant (against Immer, p. 106). These, however, could not possibly think of a man who regarded nothing human as foreign to Him (Baur, p. 81). For the genuine humanity of the man who stood before them, and, therefore, also the weakness that belonged to His human nature as such, and the fact that it was subject to suffering and death (Nösgen, p. 16),—these were points as to which they had no doubt; and neither the homelessness (Matt. viii. 20) nor the suffering which is claimed for the Son of man in Mark viii. 31 belongs to the common fate of man. Just as

little could His aversion to all asceticism (Matt. xi. 18, 19) awaken the idea of a "simple common man" in opposition to the national expectation of the earthly glory of the Messiah; nor does the reference to His service until death (Mark x. 45) depend upon His "human nature being, as such, subject to service and death." Neither, therefore, can the name indicate a "contrast between His lowliness and His greatness" (Immer, p. 108; cf. Schmid, p. 150 [E. Tr. 112]). Just as little, however, could they understand by it Him who realized the ideal of humanity (Neander, *Leben Jesu*, 4th ed. p. 154, 155 [E. Tr. 99]; cf. also Reuss, i. p. 230 [E. Tr. i. 198]) or the heavenly ideal man (Beyschlag, p. 26), since the philosophemes which could lead to this idea were altogether foreign, at least to the popular consciousness.[1] That which is peculiar in the expression *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, is not the article before the genitive, which could describe man according to his genus, but that before the nominative. It is now recognised that, without the addition of a pronoun, this cannot be taken as referring deictically to the person of the speaker. No doubt, however, it points to the fact that the expression means, not a son of man among others, but a definite Son of man, whose uniqueness required no explanation for His hearers. From this it follows, however, that this uniqueness is not to be sought in a higher divine nature, which constitutes the deepest essence of this Son of man (Schulze, p. 215; Gess, p. 212); for the idea of such a Son of man (even if we might seek it in Daniel so directly as Schulze does) was altogether foreign, at least to the popular consciousness. But, no doubt, every Israelite who believed in Scripture could, in consequence of prophecy, know of a Son of man who, because Jehovah

[1] Even if germs of the later idea of the heavenly ideal of humanity were already lying at the basis of the passage in Daniel, yet that idea was so far from being expressed that Beyschlag should not describe it as "the natural and generally understood meaning" (p. 17) of this name, a name which does not even occur as such in Daniel, and which, even according to him (p. 31), was not one of the popular names of the Messiah. Nor does the connection of Mark ii. 28 with ver. 27 (a connection, moreover, which does not belong to the earliest tradition) contain this idea; for it is not as the representative head of humanity that the Son of man has to decide regarding the Sabbath, which was instituted on man's account; but as He who brings about the perfect salvation of men, He teaches them to use, in the right manner, everything which has been ordained for man's salvation.

would bring about the completion of salvation through Him, had such a divine calling as no one had ever had, and as no one after Him could have.

(*c*) That it was thus that Jesus wished the name Son of man to be understood, appears clearly from the purport of all the sayings in which He used it. For it is plainly of a man who has been chosen by Jehovah to a unique calling that He speaks when He describes the calling for the fulfilment of which the Son of man has come (Mark x. 45; Luke xix. 10). It is upon this calling of His that the authority rests, which He claims for the Son of man, to forgive sins and to decide as to the fulfilment of the Sabbath law (Matt. ix. 6, xii. 8). Both, however, lead us beyond the prophetic calling to the Messianic (cf. § 22, *a*, 24). It is upon that which is required by His calling that there depends also the manner of life which was peculiar to Him, in accordance with which He wanders about homeless (viii. 20); and when He contrasts it, on the other side, with that of the Baptist (xi. 18, 19), it is plain from the context that it is His calling to come to His people with the completion of salvation, for He there declares that the last and greatest of the prophets is the messenger of God who, according to the Scriptures, was to prepare the way for Him that brings about that consummation (vv. 9–14).[2] Nor does the manner in which (xii. 32) the sin against the Son of man is estimated as the most grievous among those which are still pardonable presuppose a divine nature; it only presupposes a unique dignity which, according to ver. 28, can be owing only to His Messianic calling. When, however, a fate of suffering, which is divinely appointed

[2] When Jesus so applies Mal. iii. 1, in which Jehovah promises to come Himself to His people as judge and dispenser of salvation, that the preparer of the way goes before the (addressed) Messiah (Matt. xi. 10), He plainly interprets the passage in such a manner that it is the messenger of the covenant, named in the parallel clause, in whom Jehovah comes to His people. But to see in this an allusion to the divine nature of Jesus (Schulze, p. 49; Gess, p. 39) is mere dogmatism, since the idea which naturally results from the representative relationship, viz. that the sender comes himself in his ambassador, is common to the Old Testament as well as to the New (cf. Matt. x. 40). It is altogether in the same sense that the earliest tradition (Matt. iii. 3) already made Isa. xl. 3 refer to the Baptist, by putting the Messiah Himself in the place of Jehovah, for whom the voice of the preacher in the wilderness prepares the way (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 39, 40).

to the Son of man, is spoken of in Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 33, xiv. 41 (cf. Matt. xii. 40; Mark ix. 9), that only assumes what is stated expressly in Mark ix. 12, xiv. 21, viz. that that which the Son of man must endure in His calling was already written of in the Old Testament, *i.e.* that He is the Son of man promised by the prophets, and, therefore, the Messiah, just as, according to ix. 12, He follows the promised Elias.

(*d*) If Jesus had, by the manner in which He brought the name Son of man into connection with His unique calling, indirectly caused men to think of the Messiah of the prophecy of Daniel, when He spoke of the Son of man, He has at last proclaimed His return with an allusion to the Son of man in Dan. vii. 13, an allusion which was evident and, in consequence of the similarity of words, unmistakeable (Matt. xxiv. 30; Mark xiv. 62); and in the first passage, our first evangelist explains, undoubtedly correctly, the coming of a Son of man in the clouds of heaven, which is mentioned in the prophecy of Daniel as the signal of the commencement of the kingdom of the consummation, to be the sign of the final consummation which was foretold by Jesus (*τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ υἱοῦ τ. ἀνθρ.*). In keeping with this, the Son of man is often spoken of in the discourses relating to His return (Mark viii. 38; Matt. xxiv. 44; Luke xvii. 22, 24, 26, 30). The apostolic source, as well as the oldest Gospel, contains these discourses; and in the earliest tradition they must have been regulative for the comprehension of that designation of Himself. For the very reason, however, that it was in them that the key lay for this comprehension, the consideration of Dan. vii. 13 did not yet suggest to the earliest tradition the idea of Christ as a heavenly being, who has come down to the earth, seeing that these very discourses appeared to point to this, that it was not till His return that He would appear as the Son of man, as Daniel had beheld Him. As the history of the development of the doctrine of the apostles shows that it was from the fact of the exaltation of Jesus to divine glory that the knowledge of His eternal divine being started, so it lay in the nature of the self-testimony of Jesus as conditioned by the history of salvation (§ 9, *c*), that He could, doubtless, by the prophecy of His exaltation, point the way to this development, but that

he could not with clear words express the deepest mystery of His person before its completion, which first gave the key for its comprehension.

## § 17. *The Son of God.*

Jesus calls Himself the Son of God, and thereby denotes His unique personal relationship to God. (*b*) He thereby attaches Himself to the figurative language of the Old Testament, in which the name Son of God denotes the elect object of divine love, and therefore belongs to the Messiah in an eminent sense. (*c*) Because He is the elect object of divine love, Jesus also knows Himself to be entrusted with the highest, the Messianic, calling, and called to all its rights and honours.

(*a*) In the earliest tradition Jesus nowhere uses the name Son of God as interchangeable with that of Son of man, where He speaks of the position which He had among men in virtue of His calling, and of His duties and destinies which were conditioned thereby. On the other hand, He calls upon the Lord of heaven and earth (Matt. xi. 25, 26 = Luke x. 21), the Almighty (Mark xiv. 36), as His Father (cf. Luke xxiii. 34, 46); He speaks very frequently of God as His Father (Matt. vii. 21, x. 32, 33, xv. 13, xvi. 17, xviii. 19, 35, xxv. 34; Mark viii. 38). It is true He also teaches His followers to pray to God as their Father, and speaks of Him as their Father; still He never places His filial relationship on the same level with theirs, He never prays to our Father, or speaks of God as our Father. On the other hand, the apostolic source has preserved at least one saying where He calls Himself the Son simply in relation to the Father, in order, undoubtedly, to express a unique personal relationship to God (Matt. xi. 27 = Luke x. 22), only that this is not at all conceived of as a relationship of essence, but as a relationship of most inward intimacy with one another.[1] The oldest

[1] The question is not, whether or not "we believe that we can *understand* the reciprocity between Jesus and His Father, which is here expressed, without a fellowship of essence" (Kübel, p. 212, note), but whether such a fellowship is expressed in these words. These, however, speak of the calling of Jesus as the highest mediator of revelation, and expressly trace back His qualification for

Gospel likewise contains a saying in which Jesus expressly contrasts Himself simply as the Son with angels and men (Mark xiii. 32); but there also the point in question is not as to a consubstantiality of His essence with that of God, which lifts Him above all creatures, but as to the intimacy with the divine decrees which He could most naturally have, seeing that He was the Son.

(*b*) The application of the idea of Sonship to His unique personal relationship to God was suggested to Jesus by the Old Testament. Already it knew the idea of a heavenly family of God, in which the angels appear as the sons of God (Job xxxviii. 7; Ps. xxix. 1, lxxxix. 6). Upon the earth, however, Israel is the son of Jehovah (Ex. iv. 22; Hos. xi. 1; Isa. lxiii. 16; Jer. xxxi. 9, 20; Mal. i. 6) in virtue of its election (Deut. xiv. 1, 2). It may be doubted whether the fact that God has made (begotten) this people a people is anywhere expressly thought of as the explanation of this filial relationship; at least, the quite predominant application of this idea shows that it denotes the unique relationship of love into which Jehovah has entered with this people in consequence of its election. If we may assume, *à priori*, that the same idea lies,

that calling, *not* to His metaphysical essence, but to His unique, perfect knowledge of the Father; and the assertion that this already presupposes the consubstantiality of essence, is only a dogmatic axiom. To point to the ᾧ ἐὰν βούληται can be no proof whatever of this; for, according to the context, this depends simply upon the fact that the Father has delivered everything to the Son (the ἀποκρύπτειν as well as the ἀποκαλύπτειν, ver. 25) to be independently carried out by Him. But neither does the circumstance that no one knows the Son perfectly save the Father prove that Jesus will here assert of Himself a superhuman essence in the metaphysical sense. Of course it does not merely refer to the knowledge of His mission (Baur, p. 114), which every believer knows, or to the knowledge of His supernatural origin (Beyschlag, p. 60), which could not be concealed from His nearest relatives, but it refers to that which, in every case, only the Knower of hearts (Luke xvi. 15) can judge of perfectly, viz. to the ethical quality of His essence, which qualifies the Son, on the one side, to be the organ of the divine revelation of salvation, just as His perfect knowledge of God qualifies Him on the other. For it is only in it that God can have the pledge that, in His independent activity as a revealer, the Son will acquiesce voluntarily in the praiseworthy counsel of the Father (vv. 25, 26). When it is objected to this view that the knowledge which is thought of in the parallel clause cannot be limited to the ethical quality of the essence of God (cf. Gess, p. 42), the fact is overlooked that, even in the revealing activity for which the Father knows the Son to be qualified, the point in question is not as to disclosures regarding the metaphysical essence of God, but as to the revelation of His fatherly love to the members of the kingdom (cf. § 20).

throughout, at the base of this figurative transference of the human paternal relationship to God, the application of it to the angels shows that it is not the fatherly generation (Hofmann, ii. p. 68) that can be the *tertium comparationis*, while its application to Israel as a people shows that this cannot be found in the natural similarity of essence (Nösgen, p. 132). If this *tertium comparationis* is rather the natural relationship of love, which binds the father to the son, we can easily understand how the theocratic king, whom God has placed at the head of the nation, can be called His son in an eminent sense as the object of His love and fatherly care (2 Sam. vii. 14), not in order, thereby, to withdraw from the people anything of His fatherly love, of which it is assured in virtue of its sonship, but in order to communicate that fatherly love to it through him. Because Jehovah has chosen him for His son, He transfers to him the dominion through which He bestows all salvation upon the people (cf. Ps. ii. 7, 8). As the making of the elect nation to be His son can be easily thought of incidentally as a begetting, so can also the anointing of the king by which he is made king (Ps. ii. 7). From this, however, it does not naturally follow that, according to the view of the Old Testament, divine sonship depends upon the possession of His spirit (Nösgen, p. 146). As soon, now, as they saw in those Old Testament passages, that extol the ideal theocratic king as the son of God, a prophecy of the Messiah, this attribute of Son of God must have become, in the mouth of the people, the title of the Messiah, and it undoubtedly appears as such in our Gospels (Mark xiv. 61; cf. iii. 11, v. 7; Matt. iv. 3, 6, viii. 29, where it is found in the mouth of the demons who are doing homage, or of the flattering Satan).[2] Naturally, it

[2] The renewed attempts to dispute this by Schulze (p. 221 ff.) and Nösgen, the latter of whom even appeals to the Gentile centurion (Mark xv. 39, p. 149 ff.), are altogether abortive. Even Gess admits (p. 177) that, in the mouth of the high priest, the "Son of the Blessed" (Mark xiv. 61) is merely a title of the ὁ Χριστός, and the (plainly secondary) account given by Luke of this scene is so far from proving anything against this view, that there the question whether Jesus is the Christ (xxii. 66) is, after Jesus at first answers it evasively, expressly taken up again with οὖν in the form whether He is the Son of God (ver. 70). Just as certainly, however, as the demons in Mark iii. 11 will assert nothing else of Jesus than he who addresses Him in i. 24 as ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ Θεοῦ, so certainly is the Son of God nothing else than the consecrated one κατ' ἐξοχήν, *i.e.* the Messiah.

is not hereby said that this title passed for a mere meaningless one. The earliest tradition has already fully interpreted its meaning in the Old Testament sense, when, in the form that it gives to the heavenly voice which bears witness to Jesus as the Messiah on the occasion of His baptism and His transfiguration, it explains the name Son of God by making it describe Him as the object of divine love, upon whom the good pleasure of God rests (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5).

(*c*) It was only in the sense in which it was used in the Old Testament, and in which it was, consequently, familiar to His contemporaries, that Jesus could apply the name of Son to Himself. From this it appears that all the attempts to import into this self-designation the dogmatic idea of a generation out of God, or of a metaphysical consubstantiality of essence with Him, are simply unhistorical, however much they often claim to give a conception of the matter which is more in keeping with the language employed.[3] In particular, however, it was natural for Jesus to use this name, which was applied to the Messiah in the Old Testament, on those occasions when He referred to the rights and honours which appertained to Him who was chosen by Jehovah to the Messianic calling. In Matt. xi. 27, He already indicates that the independent

[3] We must not confuse with this question the totally different one, how Jesus Himself has arrived at the consciousness of His Sonship. If, according to Matt. xi. 27, He is aware that He is known to be the organ qualified, in virtue of the ethical quality of His essence, to be the mediator of salvation, this presupposes, in the first place, a consciousness of an ethical similarity of essence with God, a similarity which, according to a metaphorical application of the idea of Sonship which is common in the discourses of Jesus (cf. § 21), can also be described as divine Sonship. Starting from the consciousness of His ethical Sonship, He has arrived at His official consciousness; for only he who, in virtue of this ethical quality of his essence, perfectly realized the will of God in his person and in his life, could be called to realize this ideal also in the kingdom of God around him; and only he, upon whom the good pleasure of God rested in the fullest sense, could also be the highest object of His love and the elect object of His confidence. But just as in the case of those who become genuine children of God through Him (cf. § 21), this divine Sonship in the ethical sense will have its deeper ground in an original relationship of love on the part of God to Him, —a relationship which is established by the Father Himself. Whether this reaches back into eternity and depends upon an original relationship of essence on the part of the Son to the Father,—on this point the self-testimony of Jesus could give no disclosure, if it would not altogether transcend the intellectual horizon of those to whom it was addressed. The development of the doctrine of the apostles could first enter into these questions.

execution of the highest divine decrees was entrusted to Him as the Son, and in Mark xiii. 32, that the Son could claim an acquaintance with these decrees such as no other person could claim. In the parable, the Father sends the Son to the husbandmen, because He hopes that, in consequence of their reverence for the Son of the house, He will thus obtain that which He could not obtain through His servants (Matt. xxi. 37). Thus Jesus represents in the most striking manner the increased authority with which the Son appears as the last ambassador of God, the ambassador who is to bring about the completion of the theocracy which had not been attained by all the prophetic missions; and, in his allegorizing colouring of the parable, Mark rightly describes the Son as the peculiar object of His love (xii. 6), the maltreatment of whom must bring down the whole wrath of the Lord of the vineyard upon its keepers (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 387). When Jesus derives His freedom from the theocratic temple tax from His relationship as the Son (Matt. xvii. 25, 26), it is not His supernatural origin upon which He bases this claim (Beyschlag, p. 60), but His position of dignity in the theocracy, since it alone can decide as to His relation to the theocratic duties, a relation in which He makes even His chosen ones participate (ver. 27). If this position is still conceived of here as that of the king's son as contrasted with the subjects, in Mark xiv. 62 He, in answer to the question of the high priest, solemnly avows that He is the anointed King of Israel, and, in proof of the claim which He thereby makes of being the elect object of divine love, He points to the exaltation to divine power and glory which is awaiting the Son of man. Thus His divine Sonship is the deepest ground of the peculiar calling which is given Him as the Son of man, and of the dignity which already appertains and will one day appertain to Him; for only the elect object of divine love can be called to the highest calling.

### § 18. *The Anointed One.*

At His baptism Jesus has been anointed to be the Messiah by the Spirit, who qualifies Him for the activity that is in keeping with His calling. (*b*) His mighty deeds have

been given Him by God for the purpose of carrying out His Messianic calling; an omnipotence which He can employ arbitrarily He does not possess. (*c*) His higher knowledge, likewise, ministers to the accomplishing of the work which has been committed to Him; but it is not unlimited. (*d*) As the Messiah, He is the human bearer of a calling which exalts Him far above all the organs of the Old Testament theocracy, and gives Him, as contrasted with all men, a unique dignity.

(*a*) The very name of Messiah points to the anointing which consecrated the King of Israel to his calling (1 Sam. x. 1, xxiv. 7), and which must not be awanting in the case of the ideal King of the completed theocracy (Ps. ii. 2, xlv. 7). It continued to be the real technical designation of him who was looked for, in consequence of prophecy, to bring about that completion (Mark viii. 29, xiv. 61: ὁ Χριστός).[1] Although Luke alone expressly relates that Jesus applied to Himself that which is said in Isa. lxi. 1 as to one who is anointed with the Spirit of God (iv. 18, 21), it nevertheless appears even from the apostolic source, that He characterized His activity as that of the anointed one which is described there (Matt. xi. 5; cf. § 13, *a*). Undoubtedly, the apostolic tradition has conceived of the communication of the Spirit which was made on the occasion of His baptism in the Jordan (Matt. iii. 16 = Mark i. 10) as this anointing (cf. Acts x. 38). Although it is probable that, in the apostolic source, the descent of the Spirit was represented as being seen only by the Baptist (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 49), yet it is self-evident that that which was beheld by him was conceived of as an objective event.[2] The apostolic source already made Jesus be driven into the

[1] Most closely related to this designation are the expression: ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ (Mark i. 24), which likewise points to the consecration which is received by anointing (cf. John vi. 69), and the express designation as King of the Jews (Mark xv. 2, 9, 12, 18), which, in xv. 32, explains the name of anointed. Jesus Himself has used the name ὁ χριστός in this technical sense (Mark xii. 35, xiii. 21; Matt. xxiv. 5); whether, in the earliest tradition, He ever directly applied it to Himself, is to be doubted; for the form of Mark ix. 41 is at least secondary (cf. Matt. x. 42), and Matt. xxiii. 10 (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 487) is hardly original. He does so indirectly in Mark xiv. 62.

[2] The whole difficulty of a communication of the Spirit to Jesus at His baptism is removed when we remember that here, as in the whole of the New Testament (with the exception of Paulinism), the Spirit is already conceived of, not as the principle of a life which is pleasing to God, but as the principle of the

wilderness by the Spirit which was bestowed upon Him at His baptism (Matt. iv. 1), and traces back His expulsions of the devils to the Spirit of God (xii. 28). Thus the Spirit with which He was anointed on the occasion of His baptism shows Him what He has to do as the Messiah, and gives Him the power to accomplish it; for both His expulsions of the devils and His conflict with Satan in the wilderness belong equally essentially to His Messianic activity.

(*b*) According to § 13 *c*, Jesus Himself regards His healings of the sick (Matt. xi. 5; Luke xiii. 32) and His expulsions of the devils (Matt. xii. 28) as essential parts of His Messianic activity; He describes them as mighty works, whose impression He reckons so great, that they could have led Tyre and Sidon, as well as Sodom and Gomorrha, to repentance (Matt. xi. 21, 23). Already the apostolic source told not only of expulsions of demons which Jesus worked by His word of command (viii. 32), even in the case of absent persons (xv. 28), but also of other sick persons who were healed by His mere word (ix. 6, xii. 13), such as even the servant of the centurion, though he was at a distance (viii. 13). It makes others be healed by the laying on of His hand (viii. 3, ix. 29); but even in such cases it ascribes the healing, not at all to this external means, but to His will and power (viii. 3: *θέλω· καθαρίσθητι*; ix. 28: *πιστεύετε ὅτι δύναμαι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι*). But it also related other mighty deeds. At His word the sea became calm (viii. 26); He caused the damsel to arise from the bed of death (ix. 25), and fed the five thousand with a few loaves (xiv. 19, 20). The oldest Gospel is full of descriptions of His deeds of healing, which He performs in the same manner as is described in the apostolic source; and the detailed description of the procedure of Jesus, when He healed by the application of outward means, which occurs in the incidents that are peculiar to it (Mark vii. 32–35, viii. 22–25), is far from being written for the purpose of diminishing the wonderful character of these cures. The walking of

gifts of grace with which God equips His servants for the accomplishing of their calling. In this sense, even in the Old Testament, Moses (Num. xi. 17) and the prophets (2 Kings ii. 9, 15), the King of Israel (1 Sam. x. 6, 10; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2), and specially the Messiah (Isa. xi. 2, xlii. 1), receive the Spirit of Jehovah.

Jesus upon the sea (vi. 48 f.) and the cursing of the fig-tree (xi. 14, 20) are also peculiar to it. Although these mighty works are nowhere traced back to the Spirit of God so expressly as the expulsions of the devils (note *a*), yet neither are they conceived of as emanations of a divine omnipotence which is His own. They are works which God has done through Him, and for which He will have God thanked (v. 19). He beseeches them from God (vii. 34), and thanks God for the blessing bestowed upon Him (Matt. xiv. 19). The first temptation (Matt. iv. 3, 4) shows, not that He *must* not misuse, in arbitrary self-help, a power of working miracles which has been given Him; but that, notwithstanding His Messianic dignity, He *can* do no miracle without an express command of God. The saying which certainly belongs to the earliest tradition, although it is applied in xxvi. 53 in a peculiar combination, shows that Jesus is confident of the miraculous protection of God, if occasion required; but He must not arbitrarily summon it forth (iv. 5–7). Even in the second temptation, that which is spoken of is not a miracle of display which He *could*, but *must* not, perform; that which is spoken of is presumptuous trust in the miraculous help of God.

(*c*) As the Son who has been charged by the Father with the execution of His decrees, Jesus alone knows the Father and can reveal Him (Matt. xi. 27). His penetrating look which discerns the heart (Matt. ix. 4 = Luke v. 22; Matt. xii. 25 = Luke xi. 17; Mark xii. 15) is not conceived of as divine omniscience, seeing that, according to Luke vii. 39, it is expected of every prophet, and ministers to the unmasking of His opponents. Nor does it, by any means, exclude a marvelling (Matt. viii. 10; Mark vi. 6) and a possibility of being deceived (Mark xi. 13) on the part of Jesus. Jesus beholds, prophetically, the whole counsel of God regarding His life and the completion of His work. Like His mighty works, so neither is His word of prophecy expressly traced back to the Spirit with which He was equipped, but, after the analogy of Old Testament prophecy, it is certainly conceived of as an emanation of that Spirit. Therefore, His word of prophecy is, like the word of God in the Old Testament (Matt. v. 18), imperishable and inviolable (xxiv. 35). But even here that word does not presuppose divine omni-

science; the Son, rather, remains well aware of the limits of His knowledge (Mark xiii. 32, cf. xiv. 35, 36).

(*d*) The name Messiah points not only to a peculiar equipment, but also to a peculiar dignity. As the one who brings about the completion of the theocracy, Jesus stands far above all the organs and institutions which the theocracy previously possessed. He is exalted above the kings and prophets of the old covenant (Matt. xii. 41 f.). David has called the Messiah his Lord (Mark xii. 36, 37); the Messiah is greater than the temple, which forms the holiest central point of the Old Testament theocracy (Matt. xii. 6). In Him Jehovah Himself comes to His people (cf. Luke i. 17, 76); whoever therefore receives Him receives God Himself (Matt. x. 40, for which see § 16, *c*, footnote 2). It is nowhere a superhuman being to whom these statements point; but there is implied in them the claim of such a calling as no other man has, or can have. This applies, particularly, also to the sayings in which He makes the fate of men depend upon their attitude to His person. Blessed is he who is not offended in Him (Matt. xi. 6), who is persecuted (v. 11), and loses his life (x. 39) for His sake. Only he who confesses Him will stand before the judgment-seat of God (x. 32, 33); because the manifestations of brotherly love are shown to Him, they prove decisive in the judgment (xxv. 34–46). All the duties of piety must yield to men's duty to Him (viii. 22); they must love Him more than father and mother (x. 37). It is not implied in this that He is more than a man; it is implied, however, that He is the Messiah, in whom is present the kingdom of God and, therewith, the greatest blessing, and who can therefore, alone, secure to men participation in this *summum bonum*.[3] When, however, He is addressed by the people and by His followers as Lord (κύριε, Matt. viii. 2,

[3] The common objection to this view is based upon the consideration whether a mere man is qualified to be the bearer of such a calling. But when once Jesus is acknowledged to be the unique man, this question cannot be answered *à priori*; and although the later development of apostolic doctrine indirectly answers it in the negative by its testimony to the divine nature of Christ, yet it by no means follows that we are entitled to use the sayings of Jesus (who ascribes this very calling to the Son of man) regarding the dignity which is connected with this calling as arguments for His divine nature, the mystery of which He would thereby reveal to His hearers.

vii. 21), this is only the common way of showing reverence, and not yet the expression for this specific dignity.

## § 19. *The Son of David and the exalted Messiah.*

Neither has Jesus declined the Messianic predicate of the Son of David, a predicate for which the preliminary condition was not awanting in His case. (*b*) He has never controverted the expectation that He would be raised to royal power,—an expectation which was necessarily connected with this name, —seeing that its realization also remained dependent only upon the attitude of the people to Him. (*c*) But as the course of the development showed that His own people prepared for Him the suffering which was appointed to the Messiah in conformity with His calling, He has prophesied that it was through death and resurrection that He would be exalted to His position of royal dominion. (*d*) Then, however, He has thereby attained to full divine glory, in which He will yet reveal Himself on the occasion of His return.

(*a*) Apart from the pedigrees and the histories of the childhood, which do not belong to the earliest tradition, our sources for that tradition contain, it is true, no express statement regarding the Davidic extraction of Jesus; but neither do they contain the faintest reminiscence that His enemies asserted the want of such descent as an objection to His claim of the Messianic dignity.[1] Among the people He passed for the Son of David (Matt. ix. 27; Mark x. 47); and when Jesus allowed Himself to be called upon as such, this cannot be explained as the indulgence of a popular prejudice, seeing that the consequences which were connected with the

[1] Considering the onesidedness of the dominant Messianic expectation, which held altogether predominantly by the prophetic Messianic picture of the great Son of David, it was inconceivable that any one would allow His claim of Messiahship who regarded His Davidic descent as even doubtful or incapable of being proven; and considering the great stress which the Jews laid upon this point, the proof must have been given, if His extraction from the family of David had not been quite notorious. The silence of Jesus as to this point, which, were it only for the sake of removing possible stumbling-blocks, must have been thoroughly settled for all time, is the most eloquent acknowledgment that He Himself was convinced of His Davidic descent.

acceptance of such a title (note *b*) must necessarily have been fatal to Him. When He indicated that the idea of the scribes, who thought they could express the whole compass of the Messiah's dignity by insisting upon His descent from David, was far too meanly conceived, He proves this by their very inability to answer the question, *whence* He who is called to the Messianic dignity, which raised Him far above David as his Lord, is nevertheless a son of David (Mark xii. 35–37). He also was therefore convinced that, in conformity with prophecy, the Messiah must descend from David; but He indicates that it could not be this descent which gave Him His specific dignity, seeing that this dignity far surpassed that of a successor upon David's throne.[2]

(*b*) In calling upon Jesus as the Son of David, the expectation was implied that He would mount the throne of His father David (Mark xi. 10, cf. Luke i. 32 f.). Jesus has never controverted this expectation, which was directly suggested by prophecy. The words of Mark xii. 35–37 were no doubt well fitted to weaken the objections that could be raised against His Messiahship in consequence of His

[2] When attempts have recently been frequently made to find in these words of Jesus the intention of disputing altogether the idea of the Davidic descent of the Messiah, the circumstance has been overlooked that, in that case, He would only have brought out, by means of Ps. cx. 1, a contradiction within prophecy (which undoubtedly thinks elsewhere of the Messiah as a Son of David) instead of exposing an error of the scribes. Nor is the *impossibility* by any means evident of a descendant of David mounting higher than His great ancestor, and being greeted by the latter as his Lord because of the dignity which was lent Him. Only, in that case, of course, He cannot have attained this dignity *in virtue* of His extraction from David. But according to the most original form, that, viz., in Mark, the question discussed is not at all whether the Davidic extraction of the Messiah is compatible with His full dignity, but *whence* He must descend from David, seeing that this descent could not lend Him His specific dignity (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 405). It is plainly the parallel passages that have first found the salient point of the words of Jesus in the disclosure that the Messiah *cannot be merely* a Son of David, but that He must be also the Son of God. But even this form by no means leads to the consubstantiality of His essence with that of God (Nösgen, p. 159), or to His supernatural conception (Gess, p. 128), or even to His pre-existence (Beyschlag, p. 62; Schulze, p. 50), since the idea of Sonship cannot be taken as equivalent in both expressions; it only, in an obvious apologetic interest, deduces the divine Sonship of Jesus from His exaltation to divine power and glory in the sense of Mark xiv. 62 (cf. § 17, *c*), although it was not the person of Jesus, but only the Messiah as such, who was originally spoken of (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 481).

taking no steps for gaining the royal throne of His ancestor;[3] but they did not assert that His ascending the throne did not also belong to the fulfilment of Messianic prophecy, and that this could not, or must not, take place in the course of the development of His activity. Nor can the silence of Jesus as to the justification of this expectation be explained as an indulgence of a popular prejudice; the eradication of this prejudice, in a forbearing manner, would have been so much the more a duty, as this very expectation, when once it saw itself deceived, must have turned the people away from Him, and led them to espouse the cause of His enemies.[4] Just as little, however, as it could be determined, *à priori*, whether, and in how far, the prophecy of the glory of the kingdom of Israel would be fulfilled (§ 15, *b*), seeing that this depended upon the extent to which the present commonwealth still showed itself capable and disposed to become the bearer of the development of the kingdom of God, as little could it be determined, *à priori*, whether and in how far that prophetic picture of a king was still capable of being realized. At any rate, it was only Israel's fault if it was the returning Messiah whom its capital first greeted as its king (Matt. xxiii. 39 = Luke xiii. 35). Nor was Jesus without a right to the worldly kingdom of Israel; and the history of the temptation (Matt. iv. 8–10) shows that, in His estimation, this was a possession which He would only not grasp at by false means. It is true Jesus has declared Himself absolutely against the Jewish revolution, because the actually existing Roman dominion involves, according to divine right, the duty of subjection, a

[3] It was only when, starting from the purely political form of the Messianic idea, they found the principal note of Messiahship in the claim upon the royal throne which descent from David warranted, that this could be objected to Jesus. If, however, He would not, merely as a descendant of David, by any means have had the supreme dignity in which David already greeted the Messiah (cf. note *a*), then the absence of this note could not, in any way, form a decisive argument against His Messiahship.

[4] Here we see once more very clearly the historical impossibility of Jesus having conceived His calling as a founder of religion and reformer of the law only from the point of view of the Jewish idea of the Messiah, in order that His activity might be favourably regarded (Baur, p. 95). That Jesus accommodated Himself to a popular idea, and then, nevertheless, put Himself into continual conflict with the popular form of it, a conflict which must have ultimately delivered Him over, forsaken by the undeceived nation, to the deadly hatred of His enemies,—this remains a contradiction.

duty which could not at all come into collision with their duty to God (Mark xii. 14–17). If only Israel fulfilled the latter by receiving God's anointed, and allowing Him to bring about the consummation of the theocracy in the manner which was divinely appointed, then it remained God's concern to fulfil His promise, and, by an interposition of His omnipotence, to raise His elect one to the royal throne, in order that, through Him, He might also bestow all earthly blessings upon the nation. Only it remained, that, even when seated upon the throne of His father, the Messiah had not yet attained His supreme glory.

(*c*) Jesus indicates very early that He will be removed from His disciples by death (Mark ii. 20). But it was only when the knowledge of His Messiahship was secured in the case of His disciples, that He began, without reserve, to reveal to them the fate which was appointed to the Messiah in conformity with prophecy as more deeply conceived (viii. 32). As soon now as it was a matter of certainty that the leading authorities of the nation itself were preparing for Jesus the death which the divine decree appointed Him, a completion of the theocracy in the forms of the national commonwealth, and, therefore, an earthly ascension of the throne by the Messiah, could no longer be counted upon for the present. But the ultimate exaltation of God's anointed to royal glory could not be thereby hindered. The violent slaying of the Messiah could only furnish the occasion for God to glorify Him by His wonderful deliverance from Hades, and thus to give the nation the last and greatest token that He was His elect one (Matt. xii. 39, 40). In the circle of His disciples, also, Jesus always connected with the prophecy of His violent death the allusion to His resurrection after three days (Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 34).[5] This, however,

[5] By His resurrection, Jesus, it is true, does not understand a resuscitation to earthly life, but an exaltation to a state of existence which is raised above the conditions of earthly life (Mark xii. 25); but this exaltation is always conceived of as a resurrection, *i.e.* as a restoration of His corporeity, although in a form which is in keeping with the heavenly life (cf. even Biedermann, p. 232). That which is peculiar, however, is that Jesus is not, like other men, raised up at the last day, but after a very brief interval, which is proverbially (cf. Hos. vi. 2; Mark xv. 29; Luke xiii. 32) described by the μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, and that He will therefore continue in death for only a short time (Matt. xii. 40, cf. Luke

forms the transition to His heavenly exaltation, in which is now fulfilled that which was prophesied in Ps. cx. 1 of Jehovah's anointed. Henceforth the Son of man sits at God's right hand, *i.e.* He shares in the divine honour and sovereignty of the world. It is now that He has, for the first time, entered into the full sovereign dignity which was appointed the Messiah; but it is not the throne of His father David which He has ascended, it is the world-throne of His Father in heaven. Although the sin of His people rendered the former impossible, yet He has nevertheless herewith attained the ultimate end of His calling, which David already beheld when he called Him his Lord (Mark xii. 36).

(*d*) As partaker of the divine honour and sovereignty of the world, it is self-evident that Jesus is removed from the sphere of human and creaturely existence—He is a divine being. Not until the prophecy regarding the end of the way which God prepares for His elect one can the last veil which covers the mystery of His person be removed. In prospect of this future Jesus can promise His divine omnipresence to His disciples (Matt. xviii. 20). It is in this future that the prophecy of Daniel can be first perfectly fulfilled (Dan. vii. 13), —that prophecy in consequence of which the Son of man who has been entrusted with sovereignty over the completed kingdom of God now comes, as usually only Jehovah Himself, with the clouds of heaven (Mark xiv. 62). And He returns to the earth too, in order to discharge the divine function of judge of the world (Matt. xxv. 31), with great might and glory (xxiv. 30), which is described in Mark viii. 38 as the glory of His Father. He comes accompanied by the angels, the specific servants of Jehovah, who are now His servants (Mark viii. 38, cf. Matt. xxv. 31); He Himself now sends them forth to execute His commands (Matt. xxiv. 31), on which account the first evangelist now calls them *His* angels. It is by His relation to the angels that His position as regards

xxiv. 21). Neither in the prophecy of Jesus nor in the earliest tradition is the ascension to heaven conceived of as an epoch-making event, so far was the latter from representing it as an occurrence which was perceptible to the senses. The (rightly understood) resurrection qualifies Him, of itself, for the heavenly life.

the world is most naturally measured. Only a divine being can be exalted over the angels.[6]

# CHAPTER III.

## THE MESSIANIC ACTIVITY.

### § 20. *The new Revelation of God.*

As the Messiah, Jesus has, in the first place, to announce the dawn of the day of salvation, in which He is the mediator of a new revelation of God. (*b*) This new revelation of God is a revelation of His fatherly love, which is graciously manifested to the members of the kingdom in caring for and protecting their earthly life, as well as in hearing their prayers. (*c*) In the kingdom of God, accordingly, there is realized the filial relationship, which, in the theocracy of Israel, could be realized only imperfectly. (*d*) This revelation of God, however, is published not only by means of the word of Jesus—everything that He does is a living illustration of it.

(*a*) Jesus began His Messianic activity with the announcement that the time of the kingdom of God was come (§ 13). This message, however, presupposes a deed performed by God, in which He reveals Himself anew to His people; for the kingdom of God cannot come, unless Jehovah Himself comes to His people in the person of the promised Messiah, in order to bring about the completion of the theocracy, and, consequently, the fulfilment of all the promises. Inasmuch, now, as in the Messianic time there is attained the ultimate aim of the divine

[6] Naturally we need not seek a peculiar doctrine of angels in the sayings of Jesus. The angels are the inhabitants of the heavenly world in which the will of God is already done as perfectly as it is to be done in the perfected kingdom of God (Matt. vi. 10). Those who are raised up will be like the angels (Mark xii. 25), who are therefore conceived of as having a higher, heavenly kind of corporeity. They are God's servants, whose miraculous protection Jesus would not beseech in vain (Matt. xxvi. 53). As such they appear even in the earliest tradition, in order to reward the Messiah whose obedience has stood the test (iv. 11). They are higher beings than men, but the Son may already, in consequence of His unique relation to the Father, rank Himself above them (Mark xiii. 32, cf. § 17, *a*). Nevertheless it is the exalted Messiah who first *appears* as their Lord.

purposes of salvation with respect to His people, this is the last and highest revelation of God. And since it is by means of His Messiah that God brings about this time of salvation, the former is the mediator of that revelation of God, not only inasmuch as it is through Him that it is accomplished, but also inasmuch as it is to be made known, as a revelation, to the people; and He alone can be the mediator of it, because He by whom the divine decrees of salvation are accomplished must also have the most perfect insight into them, and is therefore able to reveal them as such to the people. From Matt. xi. 27, it is sufficiently clear that even according to the earliest tradition, Jesus represented His activity under this point of view: "no one knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal," *sc.* what He knoweth concerning the Father. On other occasions also Jesus describes His activity as a light which shines with such clearness that it does not stand in need of signs for any one who has eyes sound enough to see it (Luke xi. 33–36); light, however, is the symbol of revealing activity (cf. Mark iv. 21, where the further revelation which is to be communicated by the disciples of Jesus is compared to a lamp; Luke xvi. 8, where they themselves, as those who have been enlightened by revelation, are called the children of the light).

(*b*) Seeing that in the Messianic time God brings to His people all the salvation which they were led to expect at the completion of the theocracy, He reveals Himself in His highest love. In the symbolical mode of speech which was adopted by Jesus, the highest relation of human love is employed as an emblem of this revelation of the love of God (Matt. vii. 9–11), which, however, naturally finds its realization only in the kingdom of God which is founded by Jesus. It is by no means the relation in which God stands to all men (Baur, p. 116) which it is meant to represent in this way; it is the members of the kingdom, as whose Father in heaven Jesus designates God (vi. 1),[1] and whom He teaches to pray to God as their Father (ver. 9). In the earliest tradition all the

[1] From Mark xi. 25, Luke xi. 13, it is plain that this designation, which owes its origin to the fact that heaven is God's throne (Matt. v. 34, cf. Isa. lxvi. 1), was already found in the apostolic source. On the other hand, ὁ πατὴρ ὁ οὐράνιος appears to belong to the evangelist (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 45).

addresses in which this designation is found were distinctly characterized as addresses to the disciples, *i.e.* as addresses to the members of the kingdom (§ 14). In opposition to this assertion, Matt. v. 45 may be appealed to; but while here, no doubt, the indiscriminate goodness of God towards good and bad is held up as a pattern to the children of God, it is by no means declared that this is already the fatherly love which is to be manifested to the members of the kingdom. It is no doubt the God, who feeds the fowls of heaven and clothes the flowers of the field, to whom Jesus points them (vi. 25–30); but it is only as such as strive after the kingdom of God, *i.e.* only as members of the kingdom, that they can be certain that God knows and satisfies their needs, and thereby frees them from the anxiety of the Gentiles (vi. 31–33), and that He takes under His protection even that which is most insignificant in their life (x. 29, 30). He desires their prayers, but He promises also to the prayer of faith an assured answer (Matt. vii. 7–11 = Luke xi. 9–13; Mark xi. 23, 24 = Luke xvii. 6), provided it be very persevering and does not become faint (Luke xi. 5–8, xviii. 1–7). That the completion of salvation extends its blessings even over the whole of the earthly life is a fundamental thought of Old Testament prophecy, which the New Testament fulfilment nowhere denies. Even the members of the kingdom pray daily, full of trust, to the Father in heaven for their necessary daily bread (Matt. vi. 11).

(*c*) It is an erroneous assumption that the proclamation of God as the Father of the members of the kingdom involves a new representation of His nature. In the Old Testament also Israel is the son of God, as God is its father (§ 17, *b*); but, corresponding to the standpoint of the Old Testament revelation of God, it is only Israel as the theocratic people, whether this now is represented collectively as a whole or as a majority. The chosen people, as such, is assured of the fatherly love of God; but the salvation of the theocracy as a whole does not depend upon what befalls the individual, any more than the realization of the kingdom of God in each individual is involved in the realization of the theocracy in the people as a people. Accordingly the individual invocation of God as Father is still awanting in the Old Testament. Later the consciousness dawns that the pious members of the old covenant, in whom,

as its true members, the nature of the theocracy is realized, may, in a special sense, assure themselves of the fatherly love of God (Ps. ciii. 13, cf. Wisd. ii. 16, 18; Sir. xxiii. 1, 4, li. 14). If, however, it is in the Messianic time that the theocracy attains its completion, then it must also be in this time that the paternal relation of God to His people is first fully realized. And if this completion depends upon this, that in each individual the idea of the kingdom of God is realized, because the participation of the individual in the completed theocracy is dependent no longer upon his participation in the commonwealth as such, but upon the issue of the activity of Jesus in founding the kingdom (§ 14, *b*), then also each individual who belongs to the kingdom of God can call upon God as his Father.

(*d*) The Messianic activity of Jesus consists not only in His teaching, but also in His doing; in the latter also, therefore, the new revelation of God must be given. His doing, however, was pure benevolence, in it was revealed the fatherly love of God, who comes to His people in the Messianic time with the fulness even of earthly blessing. Accordingly, His healings of the sick are an essential part of His Messianic activity; the deliverance of the children of Abraham from their bodily evils (Luke xiii. 16) is His real calling (*cf.* Biedermann, p. 230). Wherever Jesus came, the sick were healed, the hungry fed, the threatening waves of the sea had to be still. Hence He could point to His miracles of healing as to the signs that the time of the expected salvation was come (Matt. xi. 5, *cf.* § 13, *c*); hence He bade His disciples accompany the preaching of the nearness of the kingdom of God with the same signs (x. 8).

## § 21. *Repentance.*

As the Messiah, Jesus has not only to announce the coming of the kingdom of God, He has also to found it, and for this the preaching of repentance is required. (*b*) But His word is not, on that account, merely a resumption of the prophetic preaching of repentance; it does not merely demand, it also promises, the indispensable renewal. (*c*) This is spontaneously effected by means of the vigorous working of His message

of salvation, and of the revelation of God which it contains. (*d*) Here, too, however, it is not only His word which works, but the whole of His life is a powerfully working example.

(*a*) It is the task of the Messiah to realize among the people the kingdom of God, in which God's will is done perfectly upon earth (Matt. vi. 10). In the theocracy, however, as it has been hitherto realized in Israel, the will of God has not been done. Jesus assumes it as self-evident that men are evil (Matt. vii. 11), and that they differ only in the degree of wickedness (Luke xiii. 2–5). It is only hypothetically that (Mark ii. 17; Luke xv. 7) He speaks of righteous men; those who, along with the prophets, are called righteous (Matt. x. 41, xiii. 17, xxiii. 29, 35), are the God-pleasing pious men of the old covenant, and those who are being persecuted for righteousness' sake (v. 10: ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, without the article) are the same as those who hunger after righteousness (ver. 6), since the existence of a righteousness is still far from involving the perfect righteousness. It is only comparatively that good and bad are spoken of (v. 45, xii. 35, xxii. 10). The call to repentance, therefore, with which Jesus makes His appearance (Mark i. 15: μετανοεῖτε), and with which He sends forth His disciples (vi. 12), is addressed to all without distinction. How far this call was the soul of His proclamation appears from the fact that unsusceptibility to His teaching is characterized as a want of readiness to repent (Matt. xi. 20, xii. 41, xxi. 32; Luke xiii. 3, 5). No doubt it is with reference to the most depraved classes of the people that Jesus says He is come to call sinners to Himself (Mark ii. 17); but He says it in such general terms that it is plain that He feels Himself to be the physician of sinners with respect to the whole of mankind, and it is from this very fact that He derives the right to call to Himself even the most depraved, who need Him most. Without repentance, however, sinners cannot participate in the kingdom of God.

(*b*) If the hearing of the word of Jesus is the one thing which is needful (Luke x. 42, cf. ver. 39), and if this hearing must always be accompanied with doing (Matt. vii. 24), then His preaching seems to have been nothing else than a renewed inculcation of the divine will; it seems to be like the preaching of the prophets, which also always began with the demand of

a general conversion and repentance. But recently the Baptist had appeared with such a demand, and had caused the solemnly-vowed repentance to be ratified by the symbolical act of submersion in the Jordan (Mark i. 4: *βάπτισμα μετανοίας*). Indeed, Jesus represents Himself (Matt. xxi. 37) as the last in the series of those who were sent by God to bring to the people and enforce upon them His demands. When, however, on the other hand, the Sermon on the Mount calls blessed the spiritually poor, those who are mourning because of their poverty, and those who are hungering after righteousness (Matt. v. 3, 4, 6), it is implied that Jesus comes, not, in the first place, to demand, but to bring something; and it is expressly promised them that they shall be filled with righteousness. Thus righteousness appears, not as something demanded, but as a gift, and it is as a gift that they have already been led to expect it by Messianic prophecy (Isa. lxi. 10, xlv. 24; Jer. xxxiii. 16). When Jesus (Matt. xi. 28) promises rest to those who are labouring under the burden of the law, this is not (with Baur, p. 115) to be referred to the pressure of the Pharisaic ordinances, as if He were to ease them of this pressure by putting the inner value of the moral disposition in the place of the external service of the law. In this way He would not ease them of their burden, but would render it more oppressive for every upright heart. Rest for souls is found only when the way is pointed out which leads to righteousness, *i.e.* to the fulfilling of the divine will.

(*c*) This apparent contradiction between the two sides of the proclamation of Jesus is resolved only by the fact that the new revelation of God, which is brought in the message concerning the kingdom of God, spontaneously works the repentance which Jesus demands. God does not demand that man should meet Him; He Himself meets man with graciousness, and thereby does the utmost that lies in His power to make man capable of the repentance, in which He has His greatest joy (Luke xv. 4–10). He does not make His revelation of salvation dependent upon the conversion of the people, as in the preaching of the prophets; He will work this conversion by the revelation of His grace. He comes in the person of the Messiah, and brings the time of

the completion of salvation. Whosoever now accepts the joyous message concerning the kingdom of God is a member of the kingdom; he knows himself to be a child of the heavenly Father; and with this knowledge there is implanted in him a totally new principle for his religious-moral life. The child *must* be like his Father (Matt. v. 45, 48); this is not the demand of a new law; it is, as it were, a necessity of nature within the province of the kingdom of God. The relation of sonship, which is constituted by God Himself, must also be realized, on the part of man, in the becoming bearing of the child. The member of the kingdom has not yet to *become* a child of God; he is a child of God, and *therefore* he cannot but always will to become so more and more in perfect moral likeness to Him.[1]

(*d*) Here, too, the Messianic activity of Jesus consists not only in His teaching, but also in His doing. What the children of God are yet more and more to become, that the Son of God already is in a perfect manner (cf. § 17, *c*, footnote 3). Accordingly, those are His nearest relatives who do the will of God as He Himself does it (Matt. xii. 50; see my *Marcus-evangelium*, p. 134). He is come to fulfil the law (v. 17); He yields Himself unreservedly to the will of God (Mark xiv. 36); in Him and in His life the will of God is always perfectly realized. It is no contradiction to this that He will have the predicate ἀγαθός reserved for God alone (Mark x. 18 = Matt. xix. 17), because man, without exception, can *become*

[1] This metaphorical application of the idea of sonship rests upon the fact that only like can originate from like, that the son cannot but resemble his father (cf. Matt. xxiii. 31). It lies also at the basis of the saying in Matt. v. 16 (which probably does not belong to the earliest tradition), according to which the light of the new revelation of God spontaneously streams forth from the good works, by means of which the members of the kingdom imitate, in their doing, the revelation of God's fatherly doing, to the glory of Him who has made Himself known to them in His Messiah. While, therefore, the repentance which is demanded by Jesus is worked by means of His proclamation of salvation, the Holy Spirit is not yet conceived of as the principle of this renewal. It is true the earliest tradition preserves the allusion of the Baptist to the baptism of the Spirit by the Messiah (Matt. iii. 11), but the only promise of the Spirit which is found in the words of Jesus relates specially to the equipment of His apostles for the defence of the gospel before the courts of justice (x. 20). When and how the prophetic promise of the general outpouring of the Spirit is to be fulfilled, and what this will bring to the members of the kingdom—on these points nothing is yet said.

good only by the progressive performance of his moral task. Even Jesus has still to prove His moral perfection in the battle of life with His temptations (Luke xxii. 28); not till the close will He be approved as the good, like the servants in Matt. xxv. 21, 23. At every step of this way, however, He corresponds to the ideal; for He has never in any way put Himself on a level with the sinners to whom He has come, considered simply as sinners. The whole of His moral bearing is, accordingly, exemplary in an absolute sense (Matt. xi. 29; Mark x. 45). In Him the child of God beholds the ideal of moral likeness to God realized every moment. It does not present itself to him as a legal demand, but it brings him the blessed assurance, that what, according to *c*, he *wills* to become, that he also *can* become in fellowship with Jesus. Thus, in following Him, to learn of Him, is an easy yoke and a light burden,—this is the way which leads to the rest of souls (Matt. xi. 28–30), to full satisfaction with righteousness (v. 6).

## § 22. *The Messianic Salvation.*

Along with the completion of the theocracy, Jesus, as the Messiah, also brings salvation to the members of the kingdom by means of the forgiveness of sins which was expected in consequence of prophecy. (*b*) A leading feature of the new revelation of God, which He brings, is the proclamation of the pardoning love of God, which is limited only by the blasphemy of the Spirit. (*c*) But the Messiah does not only proclaim the forgiveness of sins, by means of His atoning death He also secures it, and so establishes the new covenant of grace and forgiveness.

(*a*) The completion of salvation, which begins with the founding of the kingdom of God, has, for its obverse side, deliverance from the ruin to which the nation is exposed in consequence of sin. Lost sheep, Jesus calls the present generation of the theocratic nation (Matt. x. 6, xv. 24). He is come as the Son of man to save that which is lost (Luke xix. 10). If this is effected, on the one hand (as is shown by the story of Zaccheus, of which this saying forms the salient point), by sinners being led to repentance; yet, on the other hand, it is also necessary that the guilt of the past be

removed from them by the forgiveness of sins. Such a forgiveness they were led in many ways to anticipate in the Messianic time (Isa. xliii. 25, xliv. 22; Jer. xxxiii. 8; Zech. iii. 9, xiii. 1; Dan. ix. 24), and in consequence it was a leading feature of the Messianic expectation of the pious in Israel, who acknowledged their sins (Luke i. 77). Accordingly, Jesus promises the comfort of forgiveness to those who were mourning because of sin (Matt. v. 4). As the Son of man He claims power to proclaim upon earth the forgiveness of sins which God bestows in heaven (ix. 6, cf. ver. 2), and bequeaths this power to His Church (xviii. 18), in order thereby to ensure to it one of the most essential blessings of the kingdom of God (cf. Luke xxiv. 47).

(*b*) The proclamation of the forgiveness of sins is but one moment in the new revelation of God which Jesus brings. The parable in Luke xv. 11–32 shows how it is in keeping with the fatherly love of God to joyfully receive His penitent returning son (and according to § 20, 21, such an one is every member of the kingdom), and pardon him all his sins. Every one, however, stood in need of this forgiveness; the parable in Matt. xviii. 23–27 takes for granted, that to every member of the kingdom of God there has been remitted an infinite debt, and the prayer of the kingdom teaches them to pray for forgiveness in the same way as for daily bread (vi. 12). The present day of salvation, however, is the time when reconciliation with the creditor is still possible by means of the forgiveness which is proffered by the Messiah. It is necessary to use this time, before the judgment draws on, from which there is no escape (Luke xii. 58, 59). Every sin can still be forgiven, even the most heinous—the blasphemy of the Son of man. Only he who persistently denies the power of God which is more and more clearly manifesting itself in the works of the Son of man, and so blasphemes the Holy Ghost, has committed a sin which cannot be forgiven, because it is the sign of enduring obduracy (Matt. xii. 31, 32).[1]

[1] Like the new revelation of God in general (§ 21, *c*), neither can this side of it remain without a direct influence upon the life of the members of the kingdom. The debtor, to whom much is forgiven, will love the creditor most (Luke vii. 41–43); from the love which is shown to the Messiah it is evidenced that one has received through Him the great blessing of forgiveness of sins (vii. 47).

(*c*) Here also the Messianic activity of Jesus consists not only in His teaching, but also in His doing. No doubt, His death is a divine necessity, an element in the lot of suffering which was foreseen in prophecy, and appointed to the Son of man in conformity with His calling (§ 16, *c*); but He nevertheless surrenders His life in the free fulfilment of His calling, in order to complete the service which He came to render; and it is thereby that He procures the salvation which, by His proclamation of the forgiveness of sins, He led the members of the kingdom to anticipate (Mark x. 45). If, viz. in viii. 36 f., He asserts that no man, even although he should gain the whole world, possesses anything which would be of sufficient value in God's sight to redeem his soul (cf. Ps. xlix. 8–10), which (on account of sin) is forfeited to destruction, He here (x. 45) regards the fulfilment of His calling, which is accomplished in the surrender of His life, as a performance which is of such value in God's sight, that it avails as a ransom which He gives instead of the many who were not in a position to provide it themselves.[2] Hereby,

If the child of God must resemble his Father, this is especially true of the forgiving love which he shows to his enemies (Matt. v. 44 f.). Where the forgiveness which has been experienced does not produce the readiness to forgive the fellow-servant, which according to its nature it ought to produce, then that forgiveness can only be withdrawn (Matt. xviii. 28–35). If, accordingly, the members of the kingdom are always praying anew for the blessing of forgiveness, they are to remember that it is only as children of God who have allowed themselves to be induced, by the forgiveness they have already experienced, to forgive also their debtors that they can receive it (vi. 12: *ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν*). It is neither the ground nor the measure of the solicited forgiveness which this additional clause is meant to express; it states the presupposition under which alone the whole prayer can be offered up, because it is the prayer of the members of the kingdom, who have received the Messianic blessing of forgiveness, and are thereby moved to perform a similar act.

[2] The right understanding of this passage depends essentially upon our taking *ἀντί*, not along with *λύτρον*, but along with the whole clause (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 85). That the death of Jesus is equivalent in value to the death of the many, and in so far stands in its stead, is not stated here; and no more does the saying directly assert that He surrenders His life in order that they need not surrender theirs, and in so far redeems them. Nor is it directly stated from what it is that the ransom paid by Jesus in their stead redeems them; according to viii. 36 f., however, it is undoubtedly the fate of death to which they were exposed on account of sin; for to find this, with Ritschl, directly in *λύτρον*, by giving to it the meaning of a preservative against dying, in consequence of the Hebrew כֹּפֶר, appears to me at least very doubtful. That the soul of Jesus, as being guiltless, was not forfeited to death, and that thus He was specifically dis-

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then, there was given the solution of the enigma of His death, inasmuch as it was represented as the means of delivering the many (*i.e.* unquestionably all the members of the kingdom) from the destruction to which they must have been delivered over in death because of their sins.[3] It is true that the members of the kingdom are, from the very fact that they are in the kingdom of God, assured of the sin-pardoning grace of their Father; but if it was His life's work to establish the kingdom of God, and if that work reached its climax in the surrender of His life, then this surrender was necessary in order that the people might be placed in the new relation to God which it was to enjoy in His kingdom. It is only, accordingly, the positive expression of the same thought, when, on the occasion of the last Supper, Jesus calls His blood the blood of the covenant which was shed for many (xiv. 24). When He spoke thus, no Israelite could think of anything else than the new covenant (cf. Luke xxii. 20) of

tinguished from men (2d edition)—however certainly this idea is a presupposition of His saying (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 84), it is not brought out here, where it is only upon the positive completion of the service which was appropriate to His vocation that emphasis is laid.

[3] The less capable and disposed His disciples were to understand even the intimation of His death (Mark ix. 32), so much the less could Jesus enter more thoroughly into its significance with them. It is therefore already, on that account, unhistorical to be continually deducing from the circumstance that Jesus proclaimed the forgiveness of sins or taught men to pray for it, without making mention of His death as the means by which it was procured, the right to declare that His sayings regarding the saving significance of His death are spurious (Baur, p. 100–105), or, at least, to represent them as "thoughts of the moment," which stand in contradiction with His usual view (cf. Holsten, *zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, Rostock 1866, p. 177 ff.). It is quite true that the more the result of His activity manifested itself among His people, so much the more has Jesus regarded His death (and not merely His suffering) as the consequence that could be anticipated from the bearing of His people to God's ambassadors in the past (Matt. xxi. 39, xxiii. 37; Mark ix. 12, 13; Luke xiii. 33), and, therefore, as the divinely appointed destiny which devoted Him also to martyrdom (Mark x. 39; Luke xii. 50). But the distinction which is urged by Holsten between a historico-religious and a dogmatico-religious view of His death is a modern fiction without any historical support (cf. in refutation, Ritschl, ii. p. 48). For the consciousness of Jesus, which rested upon the Old Testament, no lot could be appointed the Messiah which did not stand in the closest connection with His calling. And even if up to the very last He could hope that the Father's power and wisdom were able to find other ways for the realization of His purposes of salvation (Mark xiv. 35 f.), it could still never be doubtful to Him, that, *if* His death was unavoidable, it must minister to the saving designs of His Messianic mission.

grace and forgiveness which God was to enter into with His people in the Messianic time (Jer. xxxi. 33, 34). But as the institution of the old covenant required a covenant-sacrifice, whose blood was sprinkled purifyingly (Heb. ix. 22) upon the people (Ex. xxiv. 8), so now also a covenant-sacrifice was required. Only the atoning blood of the covenant-sacrifice (cf. Lev. xvii. 11), shed, as is rightly explained in Matt. xxvi. 28, for the remission of sins, can purify the people, so that it may be capable of entering into the covenant fellowship with God, in which it can then be always certain of the pardoning love of its Father. If, however, the saying regarding the ransom lays emphasis on the God-pleasing performance of Jesus which secures the salvation of the members of the kingdom, then His violent (bloody) death appears here as a suffering which was appointed Him according to the counsel of God, because it was indispensable to the carrying out of His purposes of salvation.

## § 23. *The Victory over Satan.*

So long as the kingdom of God is not set up upon earth, Satan rules there; as the tempter to sin he has power over the kingdoms of the world. (*b*) In particular, by means of the unclean spirits he exerts his power over the sick who are possessed by them. (*c*) In opposition to this power, Jesus, in His Messianic activity, proves Himself the victor who makes an end of its dominion.

(*a*) In the apostolic source Jesus speaks of Satan and his kingdom (Matt. xii. 26 = Luke xi. 18), thereby thinking of a company of spirits who are in his service (ver. 28).[1] In the

[1] In the earliest tradition of the words of Jesus, Satan is called only *ὁ σατανᾶς* (cf. Mark viii. 33, iv. 15; Luke x. 18, xiii. 16, xxii. 31), and also in Matt. iv. 10. It is only in the narrative portion containing the history of the temptation, that he must already in the apostolic source have been called *ὁ διάβολος* (Matt. iv. 1, 5, 8, 11 = Luke iv. 2, 3, 6, 13); on the other hand, Matt. xiii. 39, xxv. 41, certainly belong to the evangelist; to him also belongs the designation of the devil as *ὁ πονηρός* (xiii. 19, 38), because in those passages which are taken out of the apostolic source (v. 37, vi. 13) we have to think of *τὸ πονηρόν* (see footnote 2). It cannot be made out with certainty whether, in the mouth of the people (x. 25, xii. 24, cf. Mark iii. 22), Beelzebub designated Satan himself or a distinct superior of the demons; from Matt. xii. 26, 27, it only follows that in him Jesus saw the same Satanic power active which was active in

history of the temptation he appears as the ruler of the world; for his offer of all the kingdoms of the world to Jesus (Matt. iv. 9) is correctly explained in Luke iv. 6 to mean that power over these kingdoms has been given to him, and that he can therefore transfer it to another. This can be conceived of only in one way, viz. that, in a world which is in the service of sin, he turns men's hearts according to his will. Although sin is by no means everywhere traced back to him as its ultimate cause,[2] yet the activity of Satan in tempting to sin is not excluded. Already the representation of the history of the temptation in the apostolic source, which is probably to be traced back to statements of Jesus Himself, made the temptations which met Him in the path of His vocation as Messiah be brought to bear upon Him by Satan himself (Matt. iv. 10), and He calls the temptations which await His disciples an attempt of Satan to sift them like wheat (Luke xxii. 31). In the human tempter He sees Satan himself (Mark viii. 33). In Luke xiii. 16 a case of bodily sickness is traced back to the working of Satan, even although in His mode of healing it He does not treat it as demoniacal (ver. 13).

(*b*) According to the apostolic source, Jesus shared the idea that certain sick persons were possessed by unclean spirits (Matt. xii. 43–45 = Luke xi. 24–26).[3] Although in these

the demons; for when, in v. 26, He says that Satan drives out Satan, and therefore himself, it is only that He may show, in the strongest way, the absurdity of their accusations against Him. There is no more need, however, on that account, to identify Beelzebub than there is to identify the demons with Satan himself; and Mark iii. 22, compared with ver. 30 and the reproach of Jesus in Matt. xi. 18, seems at least to favour the opinion that Beelzebub was conceived of as a demon and not as Satan himself.

[2] It is God who brings about and averts those situations in life which tempt to sin (Matt. vi. 13); and, in the immediate context, it can hardly be the devil from whose power men are delivered by God's assistance in temptation. There is as little ground for asserting that, in v. 37, it is meant to describe every emphasizing of simple agreement or disagreement, which is the fruit of untruthfulness or distrust, as being of devilish origin. One man becomes to another a stumbling-block, *i.e.* gives him occasion to sin (xviii. 6, 7); man even tempts himself, inasmuch as by reason of the weakness of the flesh, *i.e.* the sensuous nature of man, the willingness of the spirit to perform that which is good is rendered powerless (Mark xiv. 38).

[3] In this passage, as always in the oldest Gospel, they are called πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα; in Luke x. 20, simply πνεύματα. In the apostolic source, however, there already occurred also the expression δαιμόνια, as well in the discourses of

passages possession is made a parabolic type of sin, it is by no means to be explained as a figurative expression, but quite the contrary, as a reality of the natural life, from whose province the analogies of the higher life are borrowed in all the parables. According to ver. 43, the unclean spirits dwell in the desert (cf. Mark v. 10), and in ver. 45 the possibility is assumed of a possession by several spirits, such as occurs in Mark v. 9, a case of possession which was probably already described in the apostolic source as grievous (Matt. viii. 28; see my *Marcusevangelium*, p. 172). It appears that the possession of a human, or, at least, of an animal soul (viii. 31), is indispensable to them, and they shun the purely pneumatic form of existence, in which, in contrast to the angels (cf. § 19, *d*, footnote 6), they are conceived of as altogether incorporeal (cf. Luke x. 20: *πνεύματα*). Jesus heals those possessed by them, by commanding the spirits to come forth (Mark *i.* 25; Matt. viii. 32); He gives His disciples the same power (Matt. x. 8), and speaks of their success (Luke x. 20). He also expressly distinguishes these expulsions of the demons from His other cures of the sick (Luke xiii. 32), and if He seems (Matt. xii. 27) to put them on the same level with the cures of the Jewish exorcists, we must not overlook the irony which lies in the circumstance, that, from the standpoint of His opponents themselves, such a comparison was impracticable, seeing that their slanderous explanation of His cures proved that they did not dare to compare them to common Jewish exorcisms. In the demons, however, Jesus sees the Satanic power active (ver. 26).

(*c*) His Messianic activity is placed by Jesus, in the first place, not in relation to the purely spiritual activity of Satan as the tempter to sin, but to the power which he has in the possessed; probably, however, only because it is in the latter power alone that the former activity comes to the light in perceptible symptoms. In His disciples' expulsions of the demons He sees the headlong overthrow of the Satanic power (Luke x. 18); but it is He who has given them power to

Jesus (Matt. x. 8, xi. 18, xii. 27, 28; Luke xiii. 32) as in the narrative (Matt. ix. 33, 34=Luke xi. 14, 15), and also, it would seem, *δαίμονες* (Matt. viii. 31). Compare the expression *δαιμονίζεσθαι*, adopted by all the three evangelists, viii. 33, ix. 32, xv. 22.

fight so victoriously against His enemy (ver. 19). By the expulsion of the demons He Himself brings about the sovereignty of God upon earth (Matt. xii. 28, see § 13, *c*); but it is only because He has previously overcome Satan himself (ver. 29) that He can do so. As it is only he who has previously bound the strong one himself that plunders his palace, so also the Messiah must have previously conquered Satan, if by the expulsion of the demons He will deprive him of his organs among men. It is more than probable that the defeat of Satan, which is recorded in the history of the temptation, is here referred to, so that at the very beginning of His Messianic activity Jesus has broken the power of Satan upon earth. Inasmuch as the adversary of God did not succeed in leading into sin the Messiah who was to bring about the completion of the kingdom of God, this completion is secured. By following up His first victory, Jesus is always extending the sovereignty of God into the domain of Satan; and the demons, who, as spirits of a higher rank, recognise in Jesus the Messiah (Mark i. 34, iii. 11), know that He has come to destroy them (i. 24), and that they cannot escape this destruction and the torment into which it brings them, when the day of judgment (*i.e.* the appointed *καιρός*) dawns (Matt. viii. 29).[4]

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

### § 24. *Righteousness and the Law.*

Cf. Harnack, *Jesus der Christ oder der Erfüller des Gesetzes*, Elberfeld 1842; J. E. Meyer, *über das Verhältniss Jesu und seiner Jünger zum Gesetz*, Magdeburg 1853; Bleek, Lechler, B. Weiss *in den Theol. Stud.* 1853, 54, 58; E. Haupt, *die Alttestamentlichen Citate in den vier Evangelien*, Colberg 1871;

[4] In a discourse which is taken out of the apostolic source, it is said that eternal fire is prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt. xxv. 41). This designation of Satan and his spirits is not found elsewhere in the discourses of Jesus; nevertheless an allusion to their ultimate fate may have stood in the corresponding place.

W. Beyschlag, *Osterprogramm*, Halle 1875; Bassermann, *de loco Matth.* v. 17–20, Jenae 1876; H. Holtzmann, *Jahrb. f. protest. Theol.* 1877, 4; 1878, 1.

Righteousness, *i.e.* the perfect fulfilling of the will of God which is revealed in the law and the prophets, is an essential part of the kingdom of God which is to be founded by the Messiah. (*b*) The fulfilment of the law which was customarily taught and practised was a very imperfect one; Jesus first fulfilled it, and taught that it was to be fulfilled, according to the rule of the perfect will of God which was revealed by Him. (*c*) Jesus has nowhere drawn a distinction between a ceremonial and a moral law; His recognition of the law refers to it as a whole. (*d*) This does not mean, however, that Jesus has looked forward to a lasting continuance of the Israelitish ordinances relating to worship.

(*a*) If the will of God is to be done perfectly in the kingdom of God (Matt. vi. 10), then the characteristic quality of the members of the kingdom must be righteousness, *i.e.* the normal quality of life, that quality which corresponds to the will of God. It is therefore the wedding garment, without which no one can share in the completed kingdom of God (xxii. 11 ff., cf. v. 20); the striving after righteousness and after the kingdom of God (vi. 33, read: *τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ*) are most intimately connected, as are the promises of the kingdom of God and of satisfaction with righteousness (Matt. v. 3–6). It is only he who does the will of God that is related to the Messiah (xii. 50), and can enter the kingdom of God (vii. 21, 24). The will of God, however, is revealed in the law and the prophets (v. 17, vii. 12, xxii. 40), and this intentional collocation already shows that Jesus was as far from laying the chief stress, after the manner of the Pharisees, upon the fulfilment of the ceremonial precepts, as, on the other hand, from denying the divine origin of the Mosaic law. That the commandments of God are to be found in the law, He takes for granted as acknowledged, and self-evidently also for Himself (Mark x. 19; Luke x. 26). In so far as the scribes and Pharisees sit on Moses' seat, *i.e.* teach his law, He fully recognises their authority (Matt. xxiii. 2, 3). It is only the additions wherewith they amplify the law, and render it

more onerous (xxiii. 4), and that, too, not only arbitrarily (xv. 13), but often also in a sense which is directly contradictory to the law,—it is only these additions which He rejects, and it is in the interest of the divine law that He does so (Mark vii. 1–13). The law, however, in its Mosaic basis as well as in its prophetic development, is to continue in enduring force until the end of the world, or until each of its commandments is fulfilled, as He has come to fulfil them, —then, indeed, it will cease as law, but only in order that it may continue in its fulfilment (Matt. v. 17, 18=Luke xvi. 17). Yea, the significance of the individual in the kingdom of God depends upon whether or not he understands how to fulfil and to teach the whole law, including the least commandments (Matt. v. 19). The law is an organic whole; and only he who understands the significance of the individual commandment in its connection with the whole, understands the will of God which is revealed in the law.

(*b*) The manner in which the dominant school of exegesis taught the law to be understood, and in which Pharisaism taught it to be fulfilled, as well as the righteousness which was the consequence of these, was very far from corresponding to the will of God which it revealed (Matt. v. 20). It held exclusively by that side of the law, according to which it was appointed to regulate the legally organized, and nationally limited, commonwealth, which was infected with sin, and in which the theocracy should, first of all, be realized, from which side, therefore, the perfect will of God, which aimed at the completion of the theocracy in the kingdom of God, could not yet be exclusively expressed. Accordingly, Jesus does not merely contend against Pharisaic additions or interpretations; but neither will He complete or improve the law, He will only fulfil it, and teach it to be fulfilled, according to the rule of the perfect will of God, which is already contained in the law itself,—a rule, however, which, in conformity with the still imperfect stage of the development of the theocracy for which the law was given, has not yet, in all points, found, in its application to the concrete relations of the Israelitish national life, its adequate expression, *i.e.* an expression which answers to the perfect condition of the theocracy or the kingdom of God. This is the meaning of the exposition

which Christ gives to a series of commandments in the Sermon on the Mount (v. 21–47). The judicial law of the old covenant forbids murder and adultery, because it can only recognise and punish sins of deed; the perfect will of God, however, esteems anger, invective (which springs from anger), and the covetous look after another's wife, as already equally sinful and punishable. The judicial law of a commonwealth which is infected with sin, cannot do without divorce, oaths, and the right of retaliation, and only provides for their being legally administered. Divorce must be carried out in the legal forms; oaths are not to be broken; the right of retaliation must be exercised according to the rule of righteousness. But the perfect will of God declares marriage to be indissoluble (which Jesus expressly proves from the history of the primitive Mosaic times, Mark x. 2–9), and therefore that every re-marriage of divorced persons is adultery; it declares that oaths are a product of sin which ought to give place to the simple affirmation; and it demands that patient self-sacrificing love should be ready to renounce every claim it has to demand satisfaction when it has suffered injustice. In the national law of the old covenant, even the law of love has its limits in the divinely appointed exclusiveness of the Jewish nationality; but the perfect will of God demands a love which first proves itself to be truly unselfish in the love of enemies. With all this Jesus does not have in view a new legislation for the fellowship of His followers. In so far as sin is already overcome in it, it does not stand in need of such a new legislation; in so far as even in it there is still sin, it can no more endure it than the commonwealth of the Israelitish theocracy could endure the rule of the perfect will of God directly as its law. From the husk of the Old Testament law He unfolds its kernel; as the perfect will of God this remains the rule and the goal of men's striving after the righteousness of the kingdom of God; He not only teaches, but also practises its fulfilment (Matt. v. 17), and here also shows, in His life, that the ideal which is striven after in the kingdom of God is already realized (cf. § 21, *d*).

(*c*) If not even the least of the commandments in the law is to remain unfulfilled (Matt. v. 18), then the so-called ceremonial law cannot be excluded from this fulfilment. The conduct of

Jesus is thoroughly in keeping with this. To Him the temple is His Father's house (Matt. xxiii. 21, cf. Luke ii. 49), and as such it must not in any way be desecrated (Mark xi. 17). He goes up to Jerusalem to the feast of the Passover, and His disciples take it for granted that He will keep the legal Passover with them (Mark xiv. 12), and even according to the earliest tradition He has done so in due form. In the Sermon on the Mount it is taken for granted that His followers offer the usual sacrifices (Matt. v. 23, 24); He expressly directs the healed lepers to bring the offering which was commanded by Moses (Matt. viii. 4; Luke xvii. 14); He has not found fault with the most punctilious fulfilment of the law of tithes, but only demanded that the more important commandments be not kept in the background (Matt. xxiii. 23); and He has paid the temple tax in an ostensible manner (xvii. 27). Where His free observance of the Sabbath did not really correspond with the prevailing practice (Luke xiii. 15, xiv. 5), He has shown, by means of Old Testament analogies, that it was in keeping with the intention of the divine Lawgiver (Matt. xii. 3–5). As in the Sermon on the Mount in regard to other legal enactments, so (Matt. xii. 8) He attributes to Himself as the Son of man the right to explain the meaning of the Sabbath law, and therefore to teach its right fulfilment; and its strict observance on the part of His disciples is taken for granted in the apostolic source (xxiv. 20). Accordingly, Reuss is altogether mistaken when he still (i. p. 167 f. [E. Tr. i. 142 f.]) makes Jesus distinguish between a moral and a ritual law, and traces back His attitude towards the latter to accommodation. There is no doubt, however, that, in the spirit of the prophets, He has ranked merciful love above sacrifices (Matt. xii. 7; Mark xii. 33 f., cf. Hos. vi. 6), and that He has assigned a higher value to the duty of rendering compensation for wrong-doing than to the punctual observance of the ordinances relating to the worship of God (Matt. v. 24, cf. 1 Sam. xv. 22). He has indicated that all anxiety relating to external (Levitical) purification attains its object (the pleasing of God) only when it is preceded by purification from sin (Matt. xxiii. 26, cf. Isa. i. 15 f.). In particular, He has, with respect to the law of the Sabbath, plainly made the observance of the theocratic regulations

bearing upon life subordinate to moral duty in its absoluteness (Mark iii. 4); and when He reflects upon the fact that the former were instituted for the wellbeing of man (ii. 27), the purely ritual point of view is transcended, just as when, in the case of (voluntary) fasting, He only inquires whether it is in keeping with the inner disposition, He transcends the standpoint of an observance which is pleasing to God (ii. 19 f.). But to assume, with Beyschlag and others, that He in any way describes or treats of the legal regulations bearing upon life or ritual, whose divine origin He recognised, as defective in themselves, and no longer in keeping with His views, and that He has in principle ascribed to Himself authority to dispose of them with freedom, and has used this authority for the purpose of freeing His disciples from their yoke,—for one that *looks* at the matter from the historical point of view these assumptions are inconceivable, and cannot be made good.

(*d*) If the Messiah was greater than the temple (Matt. xii. 6), then in the Messianic order of things, *i.e.* in the completed theocracy, the temple could no longer retain the position and importance which it had in the Israelitish theocracy. With the fall of the temple prophesied in Mark xiii. 2, there was necessarily involved a complete change of the whole Old Testament form of religious worship. If the will of God was revealed in the Old Testament in the form of a regulation of worship suited to the still imperfect stage of the development of the theocracy, the fulfilment of the perfect will of God in the perfected theocracy or kingdom of God could no more remain bound to this for all time than to the form of the Israelitish judicial system (note *b*). It lay in the nature of the historical circumstances that Jesus could not give any more special intimations regarding the manner and time of this emancipation. In His promise, however, that He, in whom God Himself had come to His people, will always remain in the midst of His own (Matt. xviii. 20), there lay the germ of the knowledge that God would one day dwell among His people in a more perfect way than in the temple. If the sons of God as such (and not merely the Messiah) are, in principle, free from the temple tax (xvii. 26), then in the completed kingdom of God there must cease to be any need of a temple at all,

since no one is any longer bound to support it; while the original form of the statement in Mark xiv. 58, xv. 29 pointed in some way or other to the final realization of the idea of the temple in the kingdom of God founded by Jesus. If His blood, as atoning sacrificial blood, qualified His own for the fellowship of the new covenant (xiv. 24), then the atoning sacrifices of the old covenant must ultimately appear unnecessary, after their object was fully attained. When Jesus made the Levitical arrangement relating to purification an illustration of moral purity (vii. 15), that arrangement, it is true, was no more directly abolished thereby than any other natural arrangement which He made the parabolic figure of a higher; but it could lead to the development of the consciousness that the higher object of the former was attained in the realization of the latter. On the other hand, the parables in Mark ii. 21, 22 are spoken, not against fasting, but against an untimely and immature abandonment of the old forms.[1] In these parables the destruction of the old by means of the new is represented, not as that which must take place, according to an inner necessity (Baur, p. 59 f.), but (because not gradually brought about) as injudicious and ruinous for the new. Jesus was come not to destroy (Matt. v. 17), but to fulfil—this applies to *everything* which He did; and He can have aimed only at that destruction which was naturally involved in the true fulfilment (ver. 18).

## § 25. *The Greatest Commandment.*

The principle of the law is the demand of likeness to God, and in consequence of the new revelation of God this is confirmed and modified into the demand of love. (*b*) Accordingly, immediately alongside of love to God, to love one's neighbours is the greatest commandment. (*c*) The unselfishness which manifests itself in the love of enemies, and the readiness to

[1] This is plain from the context, according to which they are meant to justify, not the abstinence of His disciples from fasting, but the fasting (in accordance with custom) of the disciples of the Baptist whom Jesus had acknowledged, and whom they had purposely pushed to the front on the occasion when this question was raised (ver. 18; cf. my *Markusevang.* p. 97). By means of his addition in v. 39, Luke also has explained them in this sense; and Beyschlag (p. 21) has acknowledged the right reference, at least in regard to the first parable.

make sacrifices, which is shown in forgiving injuries, in meekness and peaceableness, are essential elements of love. (*d*) Neither the gentle nor the ministering love, however, can exist without humility, in which Jesus Himself has given the grandest example.

(*a*) It is certainly not without a purpose that Jesus causes His exposition of the law (Matt. v.) to reach its climax in a statement, which, in opposition to all moral atomism, brings to light the essential unity of all the divine commandments. But here also He was conscious that He was only explaining the meaning of the legislator from the standpoint of the full revelation of God which appeared in Himself. For even in the Old Testament the demand of likeness to God is the principle of the law: "ye shall be holy, for I am holy" (Lev. xi. 44). The revelation of God, which makes Him known, not only as the sovereign might, but also as the holy One, must always have the practical aim of influencing the character and life of man, so as to shape his life in conformity with the rule which is given in the holy character of God. In the new revelation of God, however, there is not only given a new motive for this demand of likeness to God, but this demand receives also a new import. If God is the Father of the members of the kingdom, then it is involved in their character as children, that they must become like to their Father (§ 21, *c*); and if His revelation as Father is essentially a revelation of His greatest love, then the demand of likeness to God is more strictly defined to mean that it is the task of the children of God to imitate the essential perfection of their Father in heaven, which consists in His all-embracing love (Matt. v. 48, cf. ver. 45).

(*b*) Jesus has not entered into the casuistical question, by what marks one could distinguish greater and lesser commandments (Matt. xxii. 36), because there lies at its basis the wrong assumption that, by means of some human refinement or other, one could make a distinction between the divine commandments which He, theoretically in v. 18, and practically in ver. 19, abolishes. When He describes the commandment in Deut. vi. 5 as the absolutely greatest, and therefore as the first (ver. 37 f.), He will thereby only disclose the intention of the lawgiver, since the commandment of love to God in

that passage appears plainly as an explanation of the first commandment in the Decalogue (cf. vi. 4 with v. 6, 7), and, according to the connection with ver. 6 ff., as a presupposition of every other fulfilment of the law. The inwardness and exclusiveness of this demand (ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου) cannot be expressed in stronger terms than it is expressed there.[1] That which is new in His answer consists, therefore, simply in this, that He places alongside of this commandment, and as of equal worth with it, a second commandment which refers to our behaviour towards men (ver. 39); a commandment, however, which has likewise already found in the Old Testament the expression of it which was adopted by Him (Lev. xix. 18), and, in the demand of compassionateness (Ps. xli. 1; Isa. lviii. 7–10), its richest and purest application.[2] But he also expressly assigns it as His reason for giving prominence to these two commandments, that all the demands of God, as they are proclaimed in the law and the prophets, are dependent upon one or other of these commandments, and are therefore either a demand of love to God or to our neighbour (ver. 40). In the same sense He, at the close of the Sermon on the Mount, sums up the demand of the whole law (so far as it teaches us our duty to our neighbours) in the commandment, to grant to our neighbour everything which we desire from him for ourselves, to recognise every individual as a subject with equal rights with ourselves, and to consider our own need as the measure of our duty to him (vii. 12). For, in the last resort, it is love which is man's greatest need; and whoever grants to every one the love which his own heart

[1] According to the earliest tradition, Jesus has not once thought it necessary to show how the revelation of the love of God as the Father has attached a new and powerful motive to this demand, and in general He keeps the commandment of love to God in the background, because, where that motive does not of itself work its fulfilment, even its demand would be of no avail. Cf. also the beautiful remarks of Ritschl, ii. p. 97.

[2] Hence Baur is altogether mistaken when he says (p. 48) that the teaching of Jesus is related to Mosaism as inner to outer, as disposition to activity. For the demand of love to God and to man Jesus has borrowed literally from the law; and when Baur says (p. 51) that the latter does indeed contain a demand upon the disposition, but does not make it the principal matter, the saying which is borrowed from the Old Testament in Mark vii. 6, and the repeated appeal of the Old Testament to the fact that God proves heart and reins (Ps. vii. 9, xvii. 3; Jer. xi. 20, xvii. 10), teach the very opposite.

desires and craves for has become like the Father in heaven, who only desires for Himself the love with which He Himself satisfies the need of every one without distinction (v. 45).

(*c*) It is only by the greatness of the sacrifice which it makes that the real character of love can be estimated (Mark xii. 41–44). A show of love, however, which counts upon a recompense, makes, in reality, no sacrifice whatever, and is therefore worthless (Matt. v. 46). In the apostolic source, the parable in Luke xiv. 12–14, which the evangelist has stripped of its parabolic character by placing it among Christ's tabletalk, can only have taught that that love alone is real which claims no recompense. To the question, who is the neighbour whom the law commands us to love, the parable of the compassionate Samaritan accordingly gives the answer: whoever requires our assistance, it is the duty of compassionateness to relieve his distress (Luke x. 29–35, cf. Matt. v. 7). But by making the application of the parable with the question, which of the three mentioned in it was neighbour to the needy one, He leaves to us the consideration that we must first *earn* the name of neighbour by such an unselfish manifestation of love as the Samaritan has shown to his enemy (vv. 36, 37). It is in such love to our enemies that our love becomes altogether similar to the all-embracing love of God (Matt. v. 44, 45). Compared with it, love to the members of the kingdom, who, as being children of God, are brethren to one another (vv. 22, 23, 24, and often), is something self-evident and nothing special (ver. 47). That, however, does not forbid Jesus from seeing in the compassion, which is shown to them as His brethren (xii. 50), a love which is shown to Himself (xxv. 35–40), and thereby making it the mark of the true, *i.e.* the morally approved divine sonship, which alone guarantees participation in the completed kingdom of God. As, lastly, the fatherly love of God reveals itself through the Messiah as forgiving love (§ 22, *b*), so also the forgiving love of the children of God, which is thereby produced, must know no limits, not only as regards the offences of brethren (xviii. 21, 22), but also as regards those of men in general (vi. 12), especially as forgiving love is the foundation of all love of enemies after the example of God (v. 44, 45). For this there is required the meekness (ver. 5) which is not

roused to wrath or invective by any offence of one's neighbour (ver. 22), but is always ready to endure something worse (ver. 39); and there is also required the peaceableness which is always the first to offer the hand of reconciliation (vv. 23, 24), and rather yields to the most unreasonable request than commences strife (vv. 40–42). To the peacemakers, however, there is promised the openly acknowledged completion of divine sonship (ver. 9).

(*d*) If the new revelation of God is given, not only in the preaching of Jesus, but also in His doing (§ 21, *d*), then the latter is as much an example as the character and government of God. Jesus points especially to His example in meekness and humility (Matt. xi. 29); for the former cannot exist without the latter. It is only an overestimate of self (Mark vii. 22: ὑπερηφανία) that makes us regard the offence of our neighbour as an unpardonable crime. Now, however, the parable in Luke xiv. 7–11 (and it is only in consequence of its insertion in the tabletalk that it also gives room for the misunderstanding that the matter in question is merely as to their pressing forward at table; while it is really only the material for the narrative of the parable that is borrowed from this Pharisaic fault (Matt. xxiii. 6)) teaches, as Christ's own explanation shows, that no one should value himself more highly than his neighbour; and in Mark ix. 36, 37, Jesus shows by His own example how no one should count himself too high to condescend in love to the very lowliest. No overestimate of self, however, is worse than the pride in his virtue of him who is high among men, because he makes a show of his righteousness. It is an abomination in the sight of God (Luke xvi. 15). This pride leads to the high-minded judging and reforming of others which overlooks one's own far greater faults and weaknesses (Matt. vii. 1–5); it leads to Pharisaic boasting before God, and to contempt for one's neighbour (Luke xviii. 10–14). The modest estimate of self, however, forbids also the striving after rank and titles which does prejudice to brotherly equality as well as to men's position with respect to God and Jesus (Matt. xxiii. 7–10), and the striving after dominion which is characteristic of the worldly life (xx. 25 = Luke xxii. 25). In the kingdom of God each one is to seek his greatness in service (Matt. xx. 26, 27 =

Luke xxii. 26), which is not possible without self-humiliation (Mark ix. 33–35). It is only in this way that one becomes ready for every loving deed. It is precisely in this humble service of love that Jesus has given the most perfect example (x. 45).

## § 26. *Righteousness as Disposition.*

It is necessary not only that the will of God be in general recognised and fulfilled, but also that this fulfilment be striven after as the highest good. (*b*) Every other aim must give place to this striving, even the noblest and dearest possessions must be sacrificed if they stand in its way. (*c*) All fulfilment of the divine will in detail is valueless, unless it proceeds from the fundamental disposition of this striving. (*d*) Accordingly, it is not the fulfilment of the divine will in detail, which always remains imperfect, but only that disposition that can be the criterion of the measure in which the members of the kingdom are well-pleasing to God.

(*a*) In the parables of the treasure and the pearl the kingdom is represented as the *summum bonum* (Matt. xiii. 44–46); and the essential reason why it is so, is because in it the fulfilment of the divine will or righteousness is realized (§ 24, *a*). It is righteousness, therefore, which is striven after in the kingdom of God (vi. 33). Now, however, this striving is a genuine striving only when it is exclusive, when righteousness is striven after, not only in a general way along with other blessings, but as the only true good, as the highest good, not in a relative, but in an absolute sense. Hence Jesus says: "no man can serve two masters" (Matt. vi. 24 = Luke xvi. 13). The service of God, which consists in such an exclusive striving after righteousness, must regard every other striving as hostile and obstructive to itself, and must be so regarded by it; what it demands is an exclusive devotion. He who strives not after *τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but after *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, is a Satan (Mark viii. 33). It is this service of God which is often represented as a working in God's vineyard (Matt. xx. 1–7, xxi. 28–30); in the kingdom of God there is no other work than this striving after righteousness; its results are the fruits which the Lord of the vineyard causes to be demanded of the husbandmen (xxi. 34, 43).

(*b*) The service of mammon stands opposed to the service of God (Matt. vi. 24). It is characteristic of earthly possessions that they claim the striving of man with the same exclusiveness which God demands for His kingdom; hence they are represented by the name מָמוֹנָא as a heathen idol. Such a service of mammon, however, is engaged in, not only in the gathering together of earthly treasures (vi. 19, 20), which stands opposed to the gathering together of treasures which are pleasing to God, viz. righteousness (Luke xii. 21), but also in the earthly carefulness which makes food and clothing the *summum bonum* (Matt. vi. 25–32). No doubt even riches can be used, with true wisdom, in the service of love, and therefore in the service of righteousness, *i.e.* with a view to the obtaining of the kingdom of God as the *summum bonum* (Luke xvi. 1–9); but, according to experience, riches, because it so easily draws away the heart from the highest interests, is one of the greatest obstacles in the way to the kingdom of God (Mark x. 23–25), as the parable in Luke xvi. 19–31 shows, and must therefore, if need be, be sacrificed with decisiveness (Mark x. 21). That which is true of riches is true, however, also of every other good. In Matt. v. 29, 30, the right eye and the right hand are undoubtedly symbols of the dearest and most indispensable goods, which, as soon as they hinder us in the only striving which is right, and therefore make us falter in the right way, must likewise be sacrificed. In this sense Jesus regards it as justifiable, if one abstains from marriage for the sake of the kingdom of God (xix. 10–12). The same applies also to the holiest family bonds, as soon as they are like to hinder us from recognising and striving after the *summum bonum* which has appeared in the Messiah (Matt. x. 37 = Luke xiv. 26); it applies even to our own life, when the striving after its maintenance hinders us in the highest endeavour (x. 39).[1]

(*c*) If the true fulfilment of the divine will consists in this

[1] That the kingdom of God is the *summum bonum* appears also from this, that, notwithstanding the apparent renunciations which it costs, man nevertheless really provides best even for his own wellbeing by striving after it. As the parable of the foolish rich man shows (Luke xii. 16–20), it is folly to seek to provide for the soul (as the bearer of the bodily life) by gathering together earthly treasures. For even although one has superabundance, his life nevertheless does not depend upon his possessions (ver. 15). His soul may be un-

exclusive endeavouring after righteousness, then no individual doing can, as such, ever be well-pleasing to God. Every performance of righteousness, such as that of which the Pharisees boasted on occasion of their almsgiving, their prayers and fasting, is worthless in God's sight, so long as it pursues the equally selfish and worldly aim of being seen and praised by men (Matt. vi. 1), because it is a fulfilling of the divine will, which, nevertheless, does not proceed from the striving after this fulfilment, and therefore from the right disposition, which has its seat in the heart. God, however, who sees even in secret (Matt. vi. 4, 6, 18), knows the hearts (Luke xvi. 15); therefore He inquires also how matters stand in this the inmost and most secret ground.[2] A people which honoureth Him with their lips, but whose heart is far from Him (Mark vii. 6, after Isa. xxix. 13), He cannot abide. How everything depends upon the heart, upon its fundamental disposition, cannot be more strongly expressed than in Matt. vi. 21. The exhortation to lay up treasures for ourselves in heaven is supported by the truth, that the heart always turns to the place where we have our treasure. Here it is plainly assumed as undoubted, that everything depends upon giving the heart the right bent, and that the bent of the heart towards heaven is the right one. In heaven, however, the will of God is done perfectly (Matt. vi. 10), and the bent of the heart thither is accordingly the disposition which strives after righteousness as the *summum bonum*.

(*d*) So long as the kingdom of God is still only tending towards its realization in the individual as well as in the

expectedly separated from him before he has enjoyed his goods (ver. 20), and, therewith, his bodily life, for which he has provided, has ceased. On the other hand, the possession of all goods can be of no avail to man when he loses his soul (as the bearer of the spiritual life), for there is no price with which he could redeem it (Mark viii. 36, 37). For this very reason the soul (as the bearer of the bodily life) must be sacrificed in order that (as the bearer of the spiritual life) it may be gained or saved (Matt. x. 39 = Mark viii. 35).

[2] Love to Him (Matt. xxii. 37), as well as forgiveness (xviii. 35), must be from the heart; it is necessary to be lowly in heart (xi. 29) and pure in heart (v. 8), and adultery in the heart is already adultery in the sight of God (ver. 28). Hence the commandment against anger (v. 22) and the lusts which come out of the heart (Mark vii. 21–23), against doubt which dwells in the heart (xi. 23), against evil words, which are expressions of the heart (Matt. xii. 33–35), and praying without the heart being interested (vi. 7); hence also the condemnation of the ὑπόκρισις of the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii. 27, 28).

nation (§ 14, *c*), the striving after righteousness will not yet attain its aim in every individual case, seeing that it is only when the kingdom of God is completed that the godless power of sin can be fully overcome. But if it is not the individual doing as such which is the object of the good pleasure of God, neither will God's judgment of the members of the kingdom proceed in accordance with the still imperfect issue of their striving, but in accordance with the purity and stedfastness of this striving in general. Wherever these exist, there has taken place the repentance which Jesus demanded (§ 21); for the natural bent of the human disposition is towards worldly and selfish ends. Wherever the place of these has been taken by the striving after the kingdom of God and His righteousness, there is constituted the likeness to God which the law demands (§ 25, *a*); for God reveals Himself in the time of salvation as the one who, with the setting up of the kingdom of God, will realize the ideal of righteousness upon earth, and the child of God, who has made this aim of the divine will his aim, has become like his Father.[3] Herein he only follows the example of the Son of God, whose whole life was devoted to this realization of the divine will, or the bringing about of the kingdom of God. And however imperfect the issue of his striving may still remain in the present life, with the manifestation of the Messiah there is guaranteed the eventual perfect realization of the kingdom of God in the individual as well as on the whole. It is only necessary that he belongs, and continues to belong, to the fellowship in which Jesus realizes the kingdom of God.

(APPENDIX.)

## § 27. *The Primitive-Christian Anthropology.*

The essential substance of the human body, that which distinguishes man from the immaterial spiritual beings, is flesh.

[3] Here also it appears how little need there was for a special commandment of love to God in the proclamation of Jesus regarding the kingdom (cf. § 25, *b*, footnote 1). The fundamental disposition of the members of the kingdom is only the form in which love to God necessarily appears; just as, on the other hand, it is only from love to God that a real striving after righteousness or a condition of being pleasing to God can proceed.

(*b*) The flesh of living man, however, is flesh possessed of a soul, and the soul has its seat in the blood. (*c*) The soul has originated in consequence of the divine breath of life which was breathed into the earthly material, and it is therefore also the bearer of the spiritual life in man which is independent of his corporeity. (*d*) The central organ within man is the heart, which is conceived of as the seat of the whole spiritual life in man.

(*a*) This is the most suitable place for explaining the anthropological and psychological ideas to which many of the sayings of Jesus which we have just considered point back. Since these ideas, however, seeing that they are directly borrowed from the Old Testament, are the same in the whole of the New Testament, even to the peculiar transformation which they have received in the Pauline system, we shall have here to take into account the whole of the writings of the New Testament, with the exception of those of Paul. The peculiar nature of man is most naturally measured by his difference from the other spiritual beings with whom he is embraced in Heb. xii. 9. As such the New Testament knows the unclean spirits (demons, or simply spirits, cf. § 23, *b*; Apoc. xvi. 13, 14), who also appear as fallen angels (Apoc. xii. 7, 9, cf. Jude ver. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 4), and the angels, who are, it is true, also called *πνεύματα* (Heb. i. 14), but who are nevertheless conceived of (Mark xii. 25) as clothed with a higher heavenly corporeity. On the other hand, the corporeity of man is formed out of earthly matter,—Scripture describes its specific substance as flesh (*σάρξ*); a spirit has not flesh and bones (Luke xxiv. 39). Hence the Old Testament כָּל־בָּשָׂר (Luke iii. 6; Acts ii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 24) describes man as to his fleshly nature, in accordance with which he is subjected to the perishableness of everything that is earthly (Matt. xxiv. 22), and needs the communication of a higher life (John xvii. 2). The days of the flesh are the days of the earthly life (Heb. v. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 2); the propagation which belongs only to the earthly course of the world (Mark xii. 25) depends upon the fleshly union in marriage (Mark x. 8, after Gen. ii. 24; John i. 13), as it is also aimed at in unchastity (Jude ver. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 10); our natural fathers are the fathers of our flesh (Heb. xii. 9); for that which is born of the flesh

is flesh (John iii. 6). The flesh constitutes that in man which is apprehensible externally (John viii. 15, cf. with vii. 24); it is exposed to external defilement (1 Pet. iii. 21; Jude ver. 8; Heb. ix. 13), just as such a defilement also proceeds from it (Jude ver. 23). The flesh is subject to death (1 Pet. iii. 18, iv. 6, cf. Heb. x. 20; John vi. 51, 53) and corruption (Acts ii. 31).

(*b*) The flesh of the living man is flesh possessed of a soul; the flesh from which the soul has departed is expressly described by the plural *σάρκες* (Jas. v. 3; Apoc. xvii. 16, xix. 18, 21), because it has still only the purely material elements of the *σάρξ*, which, however, have lost their organic connection (hence, probably, also Luke xxiv. 39). The soul is therefore, in the first place, the bearer of the bodily life, which is prolonged by nourishment (Matt. vi. 25; Luke xii. 19); for so long as the soul is in man he lives (Acts xx. 10; Apoc. viii. 9). Whoever endeavours to slay man aims at it (Matt. ii. 20); for in death it is taken away from man (Luke xii. 20), and is itself thereby lost (Matt. x. 39; Acts xxvii. 10, 22); for it requires the body for its own perfect life. Whoever, therefore, loves it, guards it from death (John xii. 25; Apoc. xii. 11; cf., on the other hand, Luke xiv. 26; Acts xx. 24); by being guarded against death it is saved (Mark iii. 4). In voluntary death the soul is laid down (John x. 11, 15, 17, 18, xiii. 37, 38, xv. 13; 1 John iii. 16) or surrendered (Mark x. 45; Acts xv. 26). According to the Old Testament view, however, the soul has its seat in the blood (Gen. ix. 4; Lev. xvii. 11), by which all living flesh is permeated, in which its life, as it were, pulsates. Hence, human nature, as distinguished from the divine (a distinction which comes out, first of all, in man's corporeity), can be described as *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* (Matt. xvi. 17), and the blood can be conceived of as the principle of the propagation of the bodily life (John i. 13, cf. Heb. ii. 14, where *αἷμα καὶ σάρξ* should be read). If the blood is shed (Matt. xxiii. 35; Mark xiv. 24; Acts xxii. 20; Apoc. xvi. 6), the soul departs; only in consequence of a violent death do flesh and blood appear severed (John vi. 53, 56). The soul of the flesh is the subject of every sensuous feeling (*i.e.* of every feeling which is owing to the body), Luke xii. 19; Apoc.

xviii. 14; through it, however, even the animated flesh itself becomes susceptible to sensuous impressions (Mark xiv. 38), capable of suffering (1 Pet. iv. 1), the subject of sensuous appetites (John i. 13) and lusts (1 Pet. ii. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 18; 1 John ii. 16). While, however, the flesh, as that which is purely material, is that which is common to men, the soul forms the central point of the life of the individual. Hence the Old Testament כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ (Acts ii. 43, iii. 23), hence the numbering of the individuals according to *ψυχαί* (Acts ii. 41, vii. 14, xxvii. 37; 1 Pet. iii. 20; Apoc. xviii. 13). Hence the psychical wisdom is the egoistic wisdom with which each one seeks to assert his own person (Jas. iii. 15), while, in the most inward fellowship of love, the different individualities fuse, as it were, into one soul (Acts iv. 32).

(*c*) According to Old Testament tradition, the soul owed its origin to the divine breath of life (cf. Apoc. xi. 11, xiii. 15) which was breathed into the earthly material (Gen. ii. 7). God has caused His spirit to make its abode in man (Jas. iv. 5); so man was made in His likeness (Jas. iii. 9, after Gen. i. 27), and God became the Father of spirits (Heb. xii. 9). If this spirit quits the body, man is dead (Matt. xxvii. 50; Luke xxiii. 46; Acts vii. 59; John xix. 30); if it returns, he becomes alive again (Luke viii. 55); without spirit, the body is dead (Jas. ii. 26). Hence *ἐκπνέειν* in Mark xv. 37 is altogether synonymous with *ἐκψύχειν* in Acts v. 5, 10, xii. 23. This *πνεῦμα*, however, is not only the principle of the bodily life in man, but (seeing it is derived from God) also of the higher spiritual life. It therefore forms the antithesis of the *σάρξ*, which is determined by sensuous impressions (Mark xiv. 38); growth in spirit is the antithesis of bodily growth (Luke i. 80, ii. 40), just as poverty in the province of the spiritual life forms the antithesis of literal poverty (Matt. v. 3). That which is not perceptible to the senses is perceived in the spirit (Mark ii. 8); Jesus sighs in the spirit when He does not wish to reveal His feelings (viii. 12); it is in the spirit that man rejoices (Luke i. 47, x. 21), and is provoked (Acts xvii. 16; John xi. 33). It is in the spirit that purposes are formed (Acts xix. 21, xx. 22); it is in the spirit that zeal dwells (Acts xviii. 25), as well as meekness (1 Pet. iii. 4). Now, since this *πνεῦμα* has begotten

the human soul, the latter also is not only the bearer of the bodily-sensuous life, but also of the higher spiritual life. It is the subject of every higher feeling (*i.e.* of every feeling which is not owing to the body), of rest (Matt. xi. 29) and anxiety (John x. 24, xii. 27, just like the *πνεῦμα* in xiii. 21), of joy (Luke i. 46, where *πνεῦμα* stands in the parallel clause) and sorrow (Luke ii. 35; Mark xiv. 34), of delight (Matt. xii. 18; Heb. x. 38) as well as of (spiritual) well-being (3 John 2), of love (Matt. xxii. 37) as well as of hate (Acts xiv. 2). As the bearer of the Christian life it is strengthened (Acts xiv. 22) and exhausted (Heb. xii. 3), it is endangered by the sensuous lusts (1 Pet. ii. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 8, 14), it is subverted by heresy (Acts xv. 24), it is guarded (1 Pet. ii. 25, iv. 19; Heb. xiii. 17) and purified (1 Pet. i. 22). For this very reason it does not die at death (Matt. x. 28), it is only separated from the body. The souls which are separated from the body (Apoc. vi. 9, xx. 4) are pure spiritual essences (*πνεύματα*, 1 Pet. iii. 19; Heb. xii. 23), they continue to exist *ἐν πνεύματι* (1 Pet. iii. 19, iv. 6). It is not till after the death of the body that their final fate is decided, whether they fall a prey to destruction and are therefore definitively lost (Matt. x. 28, 39; Mark viii. 36, 37), or whether they are delivered from destruction and therefore gained (Matt. x. 39; Luke xxi. 19; 1 Pet. i. 9; Jas. i. 21, v. 20; Heb. vi. 19, x. 39; John xii. 25). From this it follows that the nature of man is conceived of as dichotomous, and that all distinctions between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* in the sense of a trichotomy, such as Delitzsch especially has recently adopted, are arbitrary (cf. Biedermann, p. 193; Wendt, p. 47). The soul is just the *πνεῦμα* which has entered into man; in man the *πνεῦμα* becomes soul. It is only in this sense that even in Heb. iv. 12 the soul is distinguished from the *πνεῦμα* which constitutes it, in order to describe the inner life of man even in its ultimate grounds.

(*d*) The central organ within man is the heart. There is the central point of the circulation of the blood, and therefore also the real seat of the soul. If, now, the latter is the bearer of the spiritual life in man, the *καρδία* does not represent any particular side of the life of the soul; it is the seat of the whole spiritual life in general (1 Pet. iii. 4; Jas. v. 8; Heb.

xiii. 9). It is in the heart that thoughts dwell (Matt. ix. 4; Luke ii. 35, iii. 15, xxiv. 38); it is the seat of self-consciousness and of the consciousness of truth (Heb. x. 22; 1 John iii. 19–21; Jas. i. 26; Heb. iii. 10). Therefore it is the spiritual eye, which, illuminated by the light of the truth (2 Pet. i. 19), gives light to the whole man (Matt. vi. 22, 23). Where man does not accept the truth, the reason is to be found in the unsusceptibility of the heart (Matt. xiii. 15; Mark iii. 5, vi. 52, viii. 17; Luke xxi. 34; Acts vii. 51; Heb. iii. 8, 15; John xii. 40). In the heart that which is heard is understood (Matt. xiii. 15; Acts xvi. 14, xxviii. 27; John xii. 40), kept, and pondered (Matt. xiii. 19; Luke i. 66, ii. 19, 51, viii. 15, xxi. 14, cf. Heb. viii. 10, x. 16); in the heart doubt (Luke xxiv. 38) and unbelief (Luke xxiv. 25; Heb. iii. 12) have their root. It is also the seat of all feelings, joyous (Acts ii. 26, 46, xiv. 17; John xvi. 22) as well as painful (Acts ii. 37, vii. 54, xxi. 13; John xvi. 6, cf. xiv. 1, 27), of all inclinations and emotions (Matt. xxii. 37, after Deut. vi. 5; Luke i. 17, xxiv. 32; Acts iv. 32, vii. 39, xiii. 22; 1 Pet. i. 22; Jas. iii. 14), of all lusts (Mark vii. 21–23; Jas. v. 5; 2 Pet. ii. 14, cf. Jas. iv. 8; Acts xv. 9) and resolutions (Acts v. 3, 4, vii. 23, xi. 23; Apoc. xvii. 17, xviii. 7; John xiii. 2). That, however, which is in the heart is hidden (Luke xvi. 15; Acts i. 24, xv. 8; 1 Pet. iii. 4; Apoc. ii. 23), and cannot be perceived from without; it is only by that which proceeds from the heart that its nature *is* known, as the tree is known by the fruit (Matt. vii. 15–20, xii. 33–35). Therefore the disposition, as that which is purely *inward* and as contrasted with every expression by which it is perceived, has its seat in the heart (Luke i. 51; Heb. iv. 12, x. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 15; Acts viii. 21, 22).

## CHAPTER V.

### THE MESSIANIC CHURCH.

### § 28. *The Calling.*

The founding of the kingdom of God begins with the calling of the individuals by the Messiah. (*b*) The success of

this calling is conditioned by the nature of the hearts of the men whom it reaches, and depends upon the existence within them of susceptibility and longing for salvation. (*c*) While levity and worldliness make at least an enduring success impossible, selfishness, impenitence, and stupidity render the heart altogether unsusceptible. (*d*) Since the majority of the children of Israel—the nation which was first called—have rejected this calling, Jesus has already anticipated a calling of the Gentiles.

(*a*) The founding of the kingdom of God is effected by means of a spiritual activity of the Messiah, which must meet with success in the case of each individual who is to participate in the completed theocracy (§ 14, *b*). The first condition of this success is that the individual be reached by that activity, and in order that this may happen, a call is addressed to him (Mark ii. 17). As in Luke (v. 32), this call may be conceived of as a summons to repentance (§ 21); it is, however, also represented as a summons to work in God's vineyard (Matt. xx. 1–7), *i.e.* (according to § 26, *a*) to the striving after righteousness which is pleasing to God, which striving, of course, presupposes a thorough repentance. On the other hand, seeing that it is by means of this calling that the individual is to be led to participate in the kingdom of God, and seeing that the kingdom of God is the highest good, that which brings with it the fulfilment of all the promises and the full Messianic salvation, it can also be represented as the invitation to a feast with its joys (Luke xiv. 16= Matt. xxii. 2). Lastly, inasmuch as salvation is brought by the Messiah (§ 22), it can also be described as a seeking of the lost (Luke xix. 10, cf. the parables of the lost sheep and the lost coin, Luke xv. 3–10), or as a careful gathering together, which resembles the gathering of her chickens by the hen, that they may find protection and safety under her wings (Matt. xxiii. 37). Thus the calling is conceived of, sometimes as a designation to the fulfilling of a definite duty, sometimes as a designation to the highest salvation. In every case, however, the point in question is not, as in the Old Testament, the calling of the nation as a nation (cf. Isa. xlii. 6, xlviii. 12, 15), but of its individual members.

(*b*) In the parable which represents the varied success of the activity of Jesus in founding the kingdom, and therefore also of the calling (Matt. xiii. 3–9), the oldest Gospel correctly explains the good soil, which brings forth an hundred fold, as referring to the susceptible hearts (Mark iv. 20: *οἵτινες ἀκούουσιν τὸν λόγον καὶ παραδέχονται*). Wherein this susceptibility consists is stated more precisely in the four original beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 132–136), which specify the conditions of participating in the already present kingdom of God, and in its saving blessings. They pronounce the poor blessed, who mourn on account of their poverty in the province of the spiritual life (Matt. v. 3, 4), and yearn after righteousness (ver. 6). If the Messiah proclaims the message of the kingdom of God which has appeared, and in which righteousness is realized, it is natural that he alone can be susceptible to this message who feels his poverty in this respect, and therefore desires that it may be removed. It is the same striving after righteousness which shows itself, only in another manner, in the case of those who suffer themselves to be persecuted for the sake of righteousness (ver. 10), who therefore rather endure persecution than leave off striving after that which, even in its imperfect form (§ 21, *a*), is to them so great a good. It is true the invitation to the weary and heavy-laden (xi. 28) is not addressed, in the first instance at least, to the penitent; but the pressure of the law, of which it speaks (§ 21, *b*), is nevertheless felt only by those who continually perceive their incapacity to fulfil it, or the insufficiency of their fulfilment. Jesus sets up children as patterns of this lively susceptibility, which springs from the feeling of neediness (Mark x. 14, 15); and one can attain this feeling only when, looking away from everything which he thinks he already possesses, or is, or can effect, he feels his poverty, weakness, and insufficiency, and so, humbling himself, becomes like children, to whom the feeling of their neediness is natural (Matt. xviii. 3, 4). Accordingly it is also the simple (xi. 25) to whom the mystery of the kingdom of God is made known; on the other hand, the consciousness of one's own wisdom (*σοφοὶ καὶ συνετοί*) prevents the feeling of one's neediness from being awakened, and therefore it is

the penitent who obtain salvation, rather than the self-righteous (Luke xviii. 10–14).

(*c*) In the parable of the field of different kinds of soil, the chief hindrances which oppose the calling in men's hearts are plainly described as stupidity, levity, and worldliness (cf. my *Markusev.* p. 141). This parable shows that, under certain circumstances at least, levity and worldliness permit a kind of success to the calling, though not a success which is lasting. On the other hand, no effect is possible, if men resemble selfish children, who are always demanding that all the others dance as they pipe (Matt. xi. 16, 17 = Luke vii. 32). As soon as the call is not after their mind, they will not receive it; just as the wise and prudent reject it (ver. 25), because the counsel of divine wisdom does not correspond with the wisdom of which they are so proud. The case is the same wherever there is no previous disposition to obey the call to repentance (note *a*; Matt. xi. 20, xii. 41; Luke xiii. 3, 5). This, of course, may be owing to very different causes. It may be owing to the self-righteousness which thinks it needs no repentance (Luke xviii. 11, 12); it may, however, also be owing to the delight in a life of sin which one will not change. When Jesus complains of the impenitence of His contemporaries, the common reason was probably that worldliness, which would not be, at least permanently, roused out of its indifference to all higher interests. How this spirit has no sense for the call to the kingdom of God is shown by the parable in Luke xiv. 16–20, according to which the people despise this call on account of their worldly interests. This is already the stupidity which Jesus compares to the beaten way, upon which the seed finds no soil in which to take root (Matt. xiii. 4), or to the condition of the diseased eye which is unsusceptible to the light (Luke xi. 34, 35 = Matt. vi. 22, 23). This condition, in which every susceptibility is extinguished, Jesus describes also as death (Matt. viii. 22); and He describes in the same way the degradation into a life of sin, from which one is roused only when the need of repentance again becomes active (Luke xv. 24, 32).

(*d*) Jesus knew that He was sent exclusively to the children of Israel (Matt. xv. 24, cf. Luke xiii. 16, xix. 19); His whole proclamation of the kingdom of God, seeing that it attached

itself to Old Testament prophecy, could be meant only for the nation which had been prepared by that prophecy for the appearing of the Messiah. But since the calling was always addressed to individuals, and was by no means certain of success, it remained possible that the greater part of the nation which was appointed in the first instance to salvation would reject this call (cf. § 15, *b*). Such was indeed the case; the longer Jesus continued His activity, the more it became evident that the nation, on the whole, remained unsusceptible to the message of the kingdom of God in His sense. The calling of others must therefore have been looked forward to. In this sense the parable of the supper (Matt. xxii. 1–14 = Luke xiv. 16–24) has, already in the apostolic source, hinted at the eventual calling of the Gentiles instead of the first-called Jews (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 468 ff.); and if Matt. xxi. 43 formed, in the apostolic source, the application of the parable of the rebellious husbandmen (cf. my *Markusev.* p. 387), this parable also anticipates that the Gentiles, instead of the Jews, may be called to be the bearers of the theocracy, *i.e.* as completed in the Messianic time. In the apostolic source, however, the rejection of those who had originally belonged to the kingdom, and the participation of many Gentiles in the festival of the kingdom, are plainly threatened (Luke xiii. 28, 29 = Matt. viii. 11, 12); although nothing is said as to the manner in which they obtain this participation, or in which they are called (cf. also Luke iv. 25–27). It is only certain that the calling of them did not lie in the vocation and purpose of Jesus.[1]

## § 29. *Discipleship.*

He who is susceptible to the calling listens eagerly to the preaching of Jesus, and becomes His disciple. (*b*) In this discipleship he learns to confess Jesus as the Messiah. (*c*) Still, at first, faith appears only as trust in the miraculous power of

[1] On the other hand, the parable of the labourers in the vineyard does not refer to the calling of the Gentiles (Matt. xx. 1–7). In this parable the difference of the times at which the *individuals* are called, a difference which conditions the different length of their labours in the vineyard, only serves to bring out the different nature of their services.

Jesus to help, or as faith in His word. (*d*) If, in this way, the success of the calling appears to depend entirely upon the behaviour of man, it is nevertheless also regarded as a working of God, which is conditioned, however, by human susceptibility.

(*a*) Whoever has the right susceptibility (§ 28, *b*) will also bear himself in the right manner towards the calling which is addressed to him. If Jesus calls, he comes to Him (Matt. xi. 28; Luke xiv. 26), he hears His word (Matt. xiii. 9; Luke x. 42, cf. ver. 39), accepts it (Mark iv. 20), and keeps it (Luke xi. 28). It is a sign of such a susceptible hearing that he comes and inquires, when the meaning of the words of Jesus remains dark to him (Mark iv. 10, vii. 17). To such eager listeners Jesus opens up the mysteries of the kingdom of God, inasmuch as to them He explains the parables, which remain unintelligible to the unsusceptible people (iv. 11 f., 34). This hearing, however, awakens the desire for further hearing; they attach themselves to Jesus, and follow Him in His journeys (Mark viii. 34, x. 21; Luke ix. 61). Such as accompany Him more or less continually, the earliest tradition calls disciples of Jesus (Luke xiv. 27: *μαθηταί*). They submit themselves continually to His guidance and instruction; they take His yoke upon them, and learn not only from His word, but also from His example (Matt. xi. 29; for which see § 21, *d*).

(*b*) Discipleship involves at the same time a special relation to the person of Jesus. Since He professes to be a messenger of God, it is only he who receives Him as such that will hear and receive His word (Matt. x. 40: *ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος*). But since He declares Himself to be not merely a messenger of God in general, but the Messiah, His disciples must confess Him as such (x. 32). For His sake (v. 11, x. 39), or, more strictly, for His name's sake, inasmuch as they designate Him with the name that becomes Him in virtue of His vocation (x. 22, xix. 29), they must suffer persecution; in His name they will gather together as His disciples (xviii. 20). As such as see in Him the one that was looked for, and believe, in accordance with His message, that the kingdom of God has come with Him (xi. 11; see § 14, *a*), they are already in the kingdom. Still, in the oldest source, this relation to

His person is not yet called faith in Him.[1] It is first of all in the oldest Gospel that πιστεύειν is used simply of faith in the Messiahship of Jesus (Mark i. 15, ix. 42, xv. 32).

(*c*) In the earliest tradition it is primarily that trust in God, to which, according to § 20, *b*, the hearing of prayer is promised, which is called faith (πίστις, πιστεύειν. Matt. xvii. 20 = Luke xvii. 6 = Mark xi. 23 f., cf. ver. 22: πίστις Θεοῦ). In particular, it stands very frequently also for trust in the miraculous power of Jesus to help (Matt. viii. 10, ix. 2; Mark iv. 40); but in the last analysis this also is only a trust in God, a trust which rests on the belief that by means of His ambassador or the Messiah, God will grant healing, or otherwise deliver them from their needs. In this respect the story of the healing of the woman who had an issue of blood is specially characteristic: according to the oldest account (Matt. ix. 20–22), she was healed without the intervention of any power going forth from Jesus, after He has simply announced to her the cure which she has experienced in consequence of her faith. The deliverance, which here and elsewhere (Mark v. 23, x. 52, cf. iii. 4) is besought of Jesus and granted by Him, is naturally deliverance from bodily needs; but in so far as this deliverance was besought of Him as the one who was come as the promised Saviour and the restorer of the kingdom, this trust in His power to work miracles of healing must have already involved the belief that in Him the day of salvation or the kingdom of God was come. This faith, moreover, however dark and imperfect it might be,[2] Jesus had to demand as a condition of His working miracles (Matt. viii. 13, ix. 28, 29, xv. 28; Mark v. 36, ix. 19, 23, 24, cf. Mark vi. 5, 6); for the blessings of the kingdom of God, among which are also the miracles of healing

[1] In the only passage where it might appear to be so described (Matt. xviii. 6 = Mark ix. 42) there stood, as appears from Luke xvii. 2, only εἷς τῶν μικρῶν τούτων (cf. Matt. x. 42) as the designation of His disciples (cf. my *Markusev.* p. 322, note 2).

[2] Even where one, in a somewhat superstitious manner, seeks to work miracles by uttering the name of Jesus (*i.e.* His title, which describes His peculiar significance), without attaching himself to the wider circle of the disciples in order to hear and learn of Him, Jesus already sees the germ of discipleship, and will not allow its development to be injured by the intolerant prevention of such a doing (Mark ix. 38–40).

(§ 20, *d*), can be shared in only by the members of the kingdom. The idea of faith receives another application, when it denotes the trust with which one receives as true the word of another (Mark xiii. 21), especially if he trusts him as a messenger of God (Matt. xxi. 32; Mark xi. 31: ἐπιστεύσατε αὐτῷ, said of John the Baptist). Although the word occurs but seldom, it is self-evident that such a faith lies at the root of all right hearing and receiving of the word of Jesus.

(*d*) When Peter confessed Jesus to be the Messiah at a moment when the majority of the people regarded Him as only one of the forerunners of the Messiah, seeing that, in His working, He in many ways did not correspond with the national expectation, Jesus declares that it is not flesh and blood, but God Himself that has revealed this to him (Matt. xvi. 17). No doubt what is spoken of here is not the origin of faith in the Messiah in general, but the origin of the faith of the disciples, which had approved itself in trial, as distinguished from that of the people, which rested upon human authority or sensuous impressions, and had not stood the test; but still thereby the knowledge which determines them to continue in their relation to Jesus is traced back to an immediate operation of God. This is the case also in Matt. xi. 25 (= Luke x. 21), where it is the knowledge, in general, of the revelation of God which is brought by the Messiah that is spoken of (ver. 27; cf. also xi. 19, where the children of wisdom, *i.e.* those whose character is determined by divine wisdom, justify it, and therefore attain the knowledge of salvation). In this very place, however, it is clear that the consciousness, that man has to thank God alone for the knowledge which brings salvation, does not at all involve a divine predestination of individuals to salvation, as Ritschl (ii. p. 39) conceives it, but that it is only the natural arrangement, according to which the truth discovers itself to the simple, and not to those who are biassed by their own wisdom, which is here traced back to God, and hence that this divine working does not exclude its being conditioned by human susceptibility. For the reason why Jesus (xi. 25) thanks God for this arrangement is evidently this, that, if the case were different, a whole category of men would be excluded from the knowledge which brings salvation, seeing

that the simple cannot, of himself, become wise, while, by humbling himself (xviii. 4), the wise can become a simple man, who is capable of receiving that divine revelation. It is true that it is said, on the other hand, that the mystery of the kingdom of God is given to the people in parables, in order that they may not understand it and may not attain the knowledge that brings salvation (Mark iv. 11, 12). But here the undoubted allusion to Isa. vi. 9, 10 already shows that the point in question is simply as to the divine judgment which produces obduracy, in accordance with which those who will not hear ultimately come to this, that, in consequence of a holy arrangement of God, they can no longer hear; the people (as distinguished from the questioning disciples, cf. note *a*) are unsusceptible and are delivered over, not to a predetermined destruction, but to the punishment which they have themselves deserved (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 144, 145). Only in x. 27 does a divine operation really appear to be spoken of, which first produces the susceptibility that is absolutely awanting (because hindered by riches), and which is therefore altogether unconditioned. For if it is still more difficult for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God than for a camel to go through the eye of a needle (ver. 25), then, of course, it is absolutely impossible for human strength. But just as certainly as that comparison is only meant to bring out the greatest conceivable difficulty, so certainly is this impossibility only meant to assert, that without the operation of God in the calling, the latter could plainly have had no success here, but not that there was absolutely no point of contact whatever existing in the case of those in whom God, by His gracious working, makes possible that which is humanly speaking impossible.

## § 30. *The Elect.*

The participation of the individual in the kingdom of God, which commences with discipleship, does not attain its completion without making ever new and heavy demands upon the disciples. (*b*) By reason of sin, however, the development of disciple life is threatened with many disturbances, for the overcoming and avoidance of which there is need of prayer,

watchfulness, and fidelity. (*c*) Accordingly, the completion of salvation is not attained by all who have accepted the calling and become disciples. (*d*) The elect ones, however, who do attain it, may, even during the earthly development, be certain of this completion.

(*a*) As the kingdom of God is not completed with the appearing of Jesus, so neither does discipleship render complete the participation of the individual in that kingdom. It is true that in consequence of its inherent productive power, the kingdom of God will grow, not only on the whole (Mark iv. 26 ff., for which see § 14, *c*), but also in each individual; and since, according to § 21, *c*, the preaching of Jesus is the energizing principle of a new godlike life, it seems that righteousness or the kingdom of God must develop, spontaneously as it were, towards its completion, in the case of those who have once received the word of Jesus as His disciples. This process, however, is by no means one naturally necessary; it ever afresh demands, on man's part, a free acquiescence in the transformation of his whole life and character which is being effected in him. Inasmuch as this transformation is a continual annihilation of the natural bent of man's life, it demands a protracted self-denial (Mark viii. 34), and the readiness to make even the greatest sacrifices (Matt. v. 29 f.; see § 26, *b*). Inasmuch, however, as the kingdom of God, if it is being realized in the disciples, calls forth a hostile reaction of the still sinful human world (Matt. x. 17, 18, 21, 22, 28, 34–36),—such a reaction as it called forth against Jesus (vv. 24, 25) on the part of all who would not be with Him (xii. 30),—it demands that the disciple of Jesus take up his cross continually (x. 38), *i.e.* willingly submit to the affliction which grows out of the enmity of the world (cf. v. 10, 11) and continue therein with patience (x. 22). It is because of these demands, which the kingdom of God makes upon men in the course of its gradual realization in them, that the gate is so narrow which leads to its completion (Luke xiii. 24 = Matt. vii. 13, 14); and not every one who becomes a disciple of Jesus realizes the whole difficulty of his task, and considers whether he is fully resolved to submit to all its demands (Luke xiv. 28–33, cf. ix. 62).

(*b*) Since, during the development of the kingdom of God

in man, the power of sin is always reasserting itself (cf. Matt. xiii. 25 ff.), and temptation arising from the world necessarily comes in the way of the disciple (Luke xvii. 1 = Matt. xviii. 7), it cannot be but that the demands are not always fulfilled, which the process of the development of disciple life makes upon him. Not perfect righteousness, but the striving after it, is the mark of the members of the kingdom during its earthly development (§ 26, *d*). Conscious of his shortcomings, even the disciple of Jesus has always to pray for forgiveness of sins; and conscious of his inability to fulfil these demands, he has to pray also for preservation against temptation, and for deliverance from the power of evil (Matt. vi. 12, 13). As Jesus intercedes for His disciples because of the assaults of Satan (Luke xxii. 31, 32), so they, on account of the weakness of the flesh, are to pray that they do not fall into temptations, which will furnish them with an occasion to sin (Mark xiv. 38); for there is need of prayer in order that any help of God may be obtained (Mark ix. 29, xi. 24). The conservation of discipleship, accordingly, is no more possible without a divine operation than its commencement (§ 29, *d*); but here also there is required susceptibility to this divine operation, and this susceptibility is manifested in prayer, which shows that the disciple feels his own weakness and hopes to obtain divine help. But wherever this susceptibility is found, that divine helping grace will as certainly be granted as the member of the kingdom is certain that his prayers will be heard (cf. § 20, *b*). In Mark xiv. 38 watchfulness appears joined with prayer. As in this passage, this may be conceived of as the clearness of spirit and the prudence which keep the eye open to the dangers which menace them upon the path of disciple life; it may be conceived of, however, also as the spiritual preparedness, which, in view of the return of the Messiah, who comes to prove the demeanour of His disciples, seeks to hold itself always ready, or to put itself in a state of readiness, for that event (Matt. xxiv. 42–44, xxv. 1–13; Luke xii. 35–38). During His earthly life the bond of discipleship which attached them to the Messiah was sufficient to keep the disciples in the normal process of the development of the new life, and to guard them against temptation. For the time after His departure, however, this

can be effected only by watchfulness in the latter sense. To live continually in the clear consciousness of His return and in a state of constant readiness for it, is nothing else than to adhere faithfully to the bond of discipleship which unites the disciples to the exalted Messiah. Accordingly, in Matt. xxiv. 45–51, this is expressly described as fidelity. Above all, however, the parable of the talents (Matt. xxv. 14–30 = Luke xix. 11–27) shows that, in the kingdom of God, that which is of importance is not the task which has been laid upon the individual, or the result of its performance, but the fidelity shown in the administration of the goods entrusted to him (cf. Luke xvi. 10–12),—in this fidelity the disciple is to manifest the relation in which he stands to the Messiah as a disciple.

(*c*) Accordingly, it need not surprise us if all the disciples of Jesus do not attain the completion of this process of the Christian life. It may happen that one who has confessed Jesus may, through fear of man, deny Him again in a time of persecution (Matt. x. 28–33). Without the self-denial, however, which is necessary according to note *a*, discipleship becomes something altogether worthless (Luke xiv. 34 f.; cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 143). It may happen that one who confesses Him as his Lord nevertheless does not the will of God, inasmuch as he neither proves his discipleship to be real by obedience to His word (Matt. vii. 21, 24–27), nor manifests fidelity to Him in His service (xxv. 24–28, xxiv. 48–51), nor shows love to Him in loving the brethren (xxv. 42–45), and is therefore surprised by His unexpected return, and not found in the condition of the true disciples (xxv. 8–12). Whereas, in the normal course of the development of the Christian life, the disciple is always gaining more and more, he who does not use the gift he has received loses even that which he has possessed (Matt. xxv. 29 = Luke xix. 26); he who does not advance goes backwards, and ends in apostasy. In consequence of his relapse, however, such a man's last state is worse than the first (Matt. xii. 45). When the kingdom reaches its completion, he is without the wedding garment (xxii. 11–13, cf. v. 20), and remains shut out from this completion, not because he was still sinful, or because there was something awanting to his perfection, but because Jesus

does not recognise him as His disciple (xxv. 12), and that because he had never been or had not remained a genuine disciple (Luke ix. 62). It is only when it is manifest from one's demeanour that the forgiveness of sins which was granted him has not worked that which it necessarily works in the children of the kingdom (§ 22, *b*, footnote 1), that it is recalled (Matt. xviii. 32–35).

(*d*) In Matt. xxii. 14 it is said that only a few of the many who are called are chosen; and the parable, whose application this saying forms, shows not only that there are many called who refuse the calling, but also that of those who accept it, such as are not worthy of the completion of salvation must be rejected (note *c*). It follows that the ἐκλεκτοί are not such as have been chosen by God from all eternity unto salvation (Ritschl, ii. p. 39); they are such as are selected out of the number of the disciples as genuine disciples, and are therefore, through the divine judgment, counted worthy of the consummation of the kingdom of God. It is His selected disciples, whom Jesus will gather together in order that He may bring them into His kingdom (Matt. xxiv. 31); they are the blessed of God, for whom the kingdom (of the consummation) has been prepared since the foundation of the world (xxv. 34); and that not because they are predestinated for the kingdom, but because, according to the divine counsel, the kingdom is appointed only for the small flock of true disciples (Luke xii. 32). This does not forbid that, even during their earthly life, God knows these His elect ones, hears their prayers (xviii. 7), and on their account shortens the troubles of the last time (Matt. xxiv. 22).[1] The genuine

[1] In the apostolic source it was only the intercession of the elect that was thought of here; it delays the downfall of the whole nation in the last judgment, and makes it possible that a remnant may be saved (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 510). On the other hand, Mark (xiii. 20) already plainly thinks of the preservation of the elect, whose election he makes to depend upon a divine decree (οὓς ἐξελέξατο), from the ever-increasing danger of apostasy in the time of the last tribulations that are to try them, which danger is averted by the abridgment of their time of trial. Accordingly, he also already questions the possibility of a seduction of the elect (ver. 22: εἰ δυνατόν), because the faithfulness of God, which shortens the last time of trial on account of His purpose of election, will also preserve His elect from the danger of seduction, in order that they may not miss the goal for which He has appointed them (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 423 f.).

disciple of Jesus, however, knows that as such his name is written in heaven (Luke x. 20); he knows that he is appointed to be a member of the kingdom of God; and, accordingly, so long as he adheres closely to the bond of this discipleship, he can be certain of the completion of his salvation.

## § 31. *The Apostles and the Church.*

In order that His proclamation may continue its calling activity even after His death, Jesus has chosen and sent out the twelve apostles. (*b*) By means of them, Peter taking a prominent part in the work, the fellowship of His disciples was to be gathered together into a separate community. (*c*) As to an organization of this community, Jesus has determined nothing; but He has bequeathed to it authority to announce and deny forgiveness of sins. (*d*) He has constituted the congregation of the Messianic Church the heir of the grandest promises given to Israel.

(*a*) If the realization of the kingdom of God depended upon the calling reaching the individuals through the proclamation of Jesus, then provision had to be made that, even after His departure from the earth, this proclamation should still be continued, and for this purpose He has chosen and sent forth His apostles (Mark iii. 14: *ἵνα ἀποστέλλῃ αὐτοὺς κηρύσσειν*), upon whom He has also conferred the full dignity of ambassadors (Matt. x. 40: *ὁ δεχόμενος ὑμᾶς ἐμὲ δέχεται*).[1] Since the calling was addressed, in the first place, to the nation of the twelve tribes (§ 28, *d*), Jesus therefore chose twelve of them, with evident reference to the work for which they were appointed (cf. Matt. xix. 28 = Luke xxii. 30). From Matt. xxii. 8, 9 one could perhaps conclude, that if Israel definitively rejected the calling, then the same messengers were to turn to the Gentiles; but according to x. 18, Jesus

[1] That He Himself already designated them as messengers (*ἀπόστολοι*, Luke vi. 13, xi. 49; John xiii. 16) the earliest tradition is not aware. In the apostolic source He occasionally calls them *προφῆται, σοφοὶ καὶ γραμματεῖς* (Matt. xxiii. 34, cf. xiii. 52), no doubt because He purposely compares them with God's messengers in the past and their followers, the popular teachers of the present. According to the oldest Gospel, Peter and the sons of Zebedee stood the nearest of all the apostles to Jesus (Mark v. 37, ix. 2, xiv. 33), and after them came Andrew (xiii. 3, cf. i. 16, 19).

foretold to His disciples only that they were to stand before heathen tribunals, and that their apology there would indirectly be a testimony also to the Gentile nations.[2] As Jesus Himself had compared His activity in founding the kingdom to a draught of fishes (Matt. xiii. 47 f.), so He calls the two fishers from their previous vocation to a higher analogon of the same (Mark i. 17); for by means of the calling they gather men into the net of the kingdom of God. Under another image they are the labourers who, upon the field of the world, gather into the kingdom the harvest of God, which grows up out of the preaching of Jesus (Matt. ix. 37 f.). In the apostolic source, the saying regarding the keys of the kingdom of God (xvi. 19) probably also signified nothing else than the authorization of the apostles to proclaim the message, by means of which men are called into the kingdom.[3] In x. 27, also, this proclamation is spoken of as their duty; by means of it a divine necessity is accomplished (ver. 26), and therefore they must allow no fear of man to deter them from discharging it (ver. 28).

(*b*) The earliest tradition is not aware of anything that Jesus has ever done for the purpose of uniting His disciples,

[2] It is by Mark that this saying of the apostolic source is first made to mean that a direct proclamation of the gospel would reach all peoples before the end (Mark xiii. 10), and in this form it is then repeated in Matt. xxiv. 14 (see my *Marcusev.* p. 417). The formal charge to the eleven to be missionaries to the Gentiles (Matt. xxviii. 19)—a charge which is adopted also into the spurious appendix to Mark's Gospel (xvi. 15)—is, by the evangelist himself, expressly put into the mouth of the exalted Christ (ver. 18), who appears there to bid farewell to His disciples, and hence it can only express the consciousness of the Church that the direct mission to the Gentiles, to which the apostles were led by the further development of the history of salvation, lay in the will of Christ. That this saying, with the whole section of the Gospel in which it occurs, cannot be derived from the apostolic source, is, for our fundamental critical principle (cf. § 11, *c*), unquestionable. But even the later behaviour of the apostles, if it is not to be altogether incomprehensible, shows unmistakeably that the earliest tradition knew of no express charge of Jesus to the twelve, which referred to a mission among the Gentiles.

[3] This saying, which is applied by our evangelist to Peter, had, in the apostolic source, probably a wider application, like the saying which is immediately connected with it, and of which we can still prove this from Matt. xviii. 18 (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 394). The meaning of the metaphorical statement appears from xxiii. 13. For just as to shut the kingdom of God means to hinder men from entering into it, so the keys with which it is opened signify the means by which entrance into it is made possible for individuals.

in the wider sense, into a separate community. It follows, however, from the word of promise to Peter (Matt. xvi. 18), which undoubtedly belongs to the apostolic tradition (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 391 ff.), that He looked forward to this in the future. Here, for the first time, we meet the word ἐκκλησία, whose occurrence in the apostolic source is guaranteed by xviii. 17, and which, borrowed from the Old Testament designation of the separate congregation of the Israelitish national Church (קָהָל, Deut. xxiii. 2, 3, LXX.), designates the separate community of the disciples of Jesus. Already it involves the eventual renunciation of the hope of gaining the nation as such, when Jesus looks forward to the establishment of a special Church belonging to Him within the national Church which had been chosen by Jehovah (for the purpose of realizing the theocracy). Jesus compares it to a building, and as, in the parable in vii. 24 f., only *that* building can endure which is founded upon a rock, so He describes Peter as the rock which secures a durability to this building more stable than that of the invincible gates of Hades. In Peter He saw that one among the apostles whose activity would give the Church its greatest stability and consistency, and history shows that He was not deceived. Even Paul still counts him among the pillars of the mother Church (Gal. ii. 9). For this very reason He has not appointed any definite external regulations which should guarantee this consistency; He has left these to be settled by the organs, whom He had chosen, at the time when the question should arise as to the actual constitution of the Church. The earliest tradition possessed no express command of Jesus to perform the rite of baptism upon the disciples who should be gained by the preaching of the apostles;[4] but, as we shall see, history shows that, at the instigation of Peter, this was from the beginning thrown as a firm bond around the fellowship of the confessors of Jesus. No more did it possess an express command regarding the repetition of the breaking of bread

[4] That which has been said of the charge to send missions to the Gentiles (cf. footnote 2) naturally applies also to the command regarding baptism in Matt. xxviii. 19. This command, however, shows unambiguously, and in a way which is regulative for all time, that, under the guidance of the Spirit, the earliest Church had arrived at the consciousness, that in baptizing such disciples they were only fulfilling the will of their exalted Lord.

and the consecration of the cup, after the manner of Jesus at the last supper; but, as we shall see, history teaches that herein also the practice of the apostles has, from the first, recognised His intention, and found a bond of fellowship for His disciples.

(*c*) The earliest tradition knew so little of a definite organization which Jesus had given to this fellowship, that such words as Matt. xxiii. 8–10 and xx. 25–27 seem directly to preclude it. No definite position was even assigned to the apostles with regard to the Church which was gathered together by their preaching; and xvi. 18, when rightly interpreted (note *b*), cannot speak of a primacy of Peter in the sense of a special dignity. Jesus has, in anticipation, resisted the attempt to refuse admission within the earthly form of the kingdom of God to such as wished to be admitted,—whether it was attempted to keep out impure elements, or to cast out such as had crept in (xiii. 24–30, 47, 48, for which see § 14, *d*). Even in xviii. 15–18, according to its original connection (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 420), the intention of the discourse is by no means to give directions regarding church discipline, but to show how nothing should be left untried in order to lead the sinful brother to repentance, and so to gain him for the kingdom of God, to which he would otherwise be lost in consequence of his sin. If this attempt fails and his impenitence is accordingly brought out, then the Church has the duty of self-preservation, it has to exclude him, because of the danger of seduction, from their Christian fellowship, and that, too, in virtue of its right to loose sins (*i.e.* to declare them forgiven, cf. Isa. xl. 2, LXX.), or to bind them (*i.e.* to declare them unpardonable). The context makes every other explanation of the power of binding and loosing impossible; the Messianic Church is the legitimate heir of the power, which the Son of man claims to Himself, to forgive sins upon earth (ix. 6), and which He must bequeath to His Church, if she is to remain in possession of one of the essential blessings of the Messianic time, the immediate assurance, viz., of the forgiveness of sins (§ 22, *a*). The converse of this right, however, is, self-evidently, the right to deny forgiveness to the impenitent; and wherever this is denied, that very fact brings out that one no longer belongs

to the circle of the children of God, who alone possess forgiveness of sins, or to the Christian brotherhood which rests upon this divine sonship.[5]

(*d*) The promise in Matt. xviii. 19 f. refers to the ἐκκλησία in the original sense, *i.e.* to the separate congregation of the confessors of Jesus as such; for that two or three are spoken of, is only meant to indicate that this promise belongs to the congregation without any regard to the greatness or smallness of its numbers. As, however, Jehovah has promised to be in the midst of Israel in the Messianic time (Joel ii. 27), so will the (exalted) Messiah be in the midst of His Church; and as once the sanctuary of Israel had been the holy place, where Jehovah would come to His people, to bless them (Ex. xx. 24), so Jesus consecrates the congregation of the Messianic Church as the place of blessing, where He will be near with His gracious presence which secures the hearing of prayer. In the Messianic time the hearing of prayer is no longer confined to one holy place, as it had once been to the temple (Luke i. 10); for, along with the forgiveness of sins, the hearing of prayer is one of the Messianic blessings of salvation which is given, immediately and perpetually, with the new revelation of God in the Messiah (§ 20, *b*); and wherever the Church is found gathered in spirit around its Messiah, there is also this blessing, which is continually secured to her through Him. Herein it only appears afresh, that the Church of the disciples and its successor is the earthly realization of the kingdom of God (§ 14), and that the latter is nothing else than the promised completion of the theocracy (§ 13, *b*).

[5] In the apostolic source the whole discourse in which these sayings occur was a discourse to the μαθηταί, *i.e.* to the disciples in the wider sense (cf. Luke xvii. 1-4). This authority, accordingly, must not be claimed either for the apostles, or, with Matt. xvi. 19, specially for Peter (cf. footnote 3).

# CHAPTER VI.

## THE MESSIANIC CONSUMMATION.

### § 32. *The Doctrine of Recompense.*

Cf. B. Weiss, "die Lehre Christi vom Lohn" (*Deutsche Zeitschr. f. christl. Wiss. und christl. Leben*, 1853, 40–42).

Inasmuch as, with the discipleship of Jesus, definite services are undertaken, the relation of the members of the kingdom to God is a relation of servitude which is entered into with a view to a definite reward. (*b*) This reward is, on the one hand, equivalent to the service; on the other hand, it is the same to all. (*c*) It consists in the heavenly completion of the kingdom of God, the certainty of which is to furnish the always powerful impulse for the necessary services of the disciple. (*d*) The punishment must, likewise, be one which is equivalent to the guilt; and since there is, in the last analysis, but one offence, there is also but one punishment for it.

(*a*) In the normal process of the development of the Christian life, the likeness of His children to God would unfold itself spontaneously, as soon as God is recognised as their Father (§ 21, *c*). Since, however, this process of development is not accomplished without the free fulfilment of the demands which are made upon the disciples of Jesus (§ 30, *a*), there appears even within the kingdom of God a relation between God and the members of the kingdom which is altogether similar to that which was found in the original form of the theocracy. God (or the Messiah in His name) demands the fulfilment of everything which conditions the normal course of that process, and it is the unqualified duty of the members of the kingdom, as His servants, to obey Him. The δουλεύειν τῷ Θεῷ (Matt. vi. 24) in the exclusive sense (§ 26, *a*) is the characteristic righteousness of the members of the kingdom, who are frequently represented in the parables as the δοῦλοι of God (Matt. xviii. 23; Luke xvii. 17) or His Messiah (Matt. xxiv. 45, xxv. 14), like the members of the Israelitish theocracy (xxi. 33 ff.). It is not, however, the original relation of man to God which is copied in this

relation of servitude; but as the latter rests, in the Old Testament, upon the covenant between Jehovah and His people, so here also it is such a relation as comes into existence in consequence of the calling of God and the free acquiescence in that calling on the part of man. It is the disciples of Jesus who have become His δοῦλοι (x. 24 f.), who have received His goods (xxv. 14 f.) and gifts, and among these especially the gift of forgiveness of sin (xviii. 23–27). Accordingly, in xx. 1–7, this relation is expressly conceived of as a relation which is regulated by contract,[1] and therefore involves the idea of a reward, and that not only where, as in this parable, a special arrangement is made as to the reward by a mutual free agreement, but even where it is only the daily maintenance which belongs to the servant which is looked upon as the reward of his labour (x. 10). Even in the parable in Luke xvii. 7–10 this reward is assumed as self-evident (ver. 8), and it is only denied that the servant can claim for his obligatory service a recompense which far exceeds it. As the servants of God in the Israelitish theocracy were entitled, by reason of their covenant relationship, to look for the fulfilment of the promise as a reward for their fulfilment of their covenant obligations, so the disciple of Jesus is entitled to look for the completion of salvation as a reward for the fulfilment of the demands which are made upon him in virtue of his being a disciple.[2]

(*b*) The fundamental law of every relation of reward is the equivalence of the reward and the service. In order that this equivalence may come out in the clearest manner possible, it is promised the confessor of Jesus that Jesus will confess him as His (genuine) disciple (Matt. x. 32), or the promised reward is otherwise described in analogy with the service which is demanded (cf. v. 7, vi. 14, xxv. 29). In the parable in Luke xii. 37 this is expressed in a manner which is almost paradoxical; the reward is exactly the same as the service,

[1] This relation of servitude, moreover, forms no opposition whatever to the filial relation which is constituted by the new revelation of God (§ 20, *b*). Even the son has to serve his father (Luke xv. 29), and, if need be, he has to work in the vineyard, like the day-labourer (Matt. xxi. 28 compared with xx. 4).

[2] Reuss is, accordingly, quite mistaken, when he still (i. p. 203 [E. Tr. i. 174 f.]) makes the idea of reward in the discourses of Jesus refer to the reward which the good deed finds in itself.

the lord serves the servant as the servant had previously served his lord. Now, since, according to § 30, *a*, the service of the disciple consists essentially in self-surrender and self-sacrifice, this equivalence can also be so represented as to mean that they receive again what they have given up (Matt. x. 39, cf. Mark x. 30), or obtain what they have been without (Luke xiv. 11, cf. Matt. v. 5, where the meek are the very ones who have no thought of obtaining dominion). Nevertheless, this equivalence is not to be so conceived of as if it were a quantitative weighing of the reward according to the measure of the service, which is spoken of; for the reward is a great one (Matt. v. 12, 46), it is manifold (xix. 29, cf. Luke vi. 38), and altogether disproportionate to the service. He who receives a prophet, a pious man, or a disciple of Jesus *as such*, obtains the reward of him whom he has received, although he has not rendered such a service as he, but has only, by receiving him, shown his good pleasure in his service (Matt. x. 41, 42). He who has been faithful over a few things is set over many things (xxv. 21–23, xxiv. 46, 47). Lastly, the parable in xx. 1–16 teaches expressly that, notwithstanding the greatest quantitative difference in the service (a difference which is conditioned by the different time of the calling, or, according to xxv. 15, by the task which is assigned each one according to his several ability), the reward in the kingdom of God is the same to all, that the last are made equal to the first, and *vice versa*.[3]

(*c*) These two apparently contradictory statements regarding the reward in the kingdom of God (note *b*) find their point of union in this, that that equivalence is to be conceived of as qualitative; the reward is nothing foreign to the service. It consists, viz. for every individual, in participation in the

[3] Matt. v. 19 does not stand in contradiction with this; for it is only the significance of the individual in the kingdom of God in this world which is spoken of there; nor do Matt. xix. 28 and Mark x. 40, where the question is as to the position and significance of the individual in the completed kingdom of God, but not as to the bestowal of reward. Indeed, Jesus says expressly in Mark x. 40, that He cannot dispose of the former as of the latter, seeing that it depends upon the God-given bent of one's nature and the designation which that implies, in saying which, of course, there is assumed the fulfilment of the special task which these involve (ver. 38), which fulfilment remains throughout the condition of participation in the completed kingdom of God.

completed kingdom of God in heaven; there, where the heavenly Father has His dwelling, the will of God is already done in a perfect manner (vi. 10), there alone can be also the place of the completed kingdom of God. Since this consummation is guaranteed in the manifestation of the Messiah, the reward is immediately adjudged to the members of the kingdom; but, meanwhile, it remains deposited in heaven (v. 12, 46, vi. 1) as a heavenly treasure (vi. 20; Mark x. 21), which they cannot receive till the future. Now, since every service and sacrifice which is demanded of the disciples of Jesus is, in the long run, nothing else than a proof of their striving after the completed kingdom of God (Matt. vi. 33; see § 26), so the reward is nothing else than the attainment of that which was striven after in the service, with which, on the one hand, it must be as homogeneous as, on the other hand, it surpasses it as far as the consummation surpasses every present realization. There is not, however, a stronger impulse for the striving after this kingdom than the assurance that its end will be reached at last; in this sense the expectation of the heavenly reward remains the motive for every service of the members of the kingdom. Every other motive destroys the value of such service; he who seeks his reward in the approbation of men (Matt. vi. 1, 2, 5, 16), or in requital from them (v. 46; Luke xiv. 12–14), has had his reward, and has no higher reward to expect. The hope of the heavenly reward is at all times to give the heart the right bent towards heaven (Matt. vi. 21), and towards the ideal of the striving of the members of the kingdom which is already realized there (cf. § 26, *c*).

(*d*) Like the bestowal of reward, the fear of punishment can also become the motive of service (Matt. x. 28), since the latter is only the reverse side of the former. Accordingly, the fundamental law of the equivalence of guilt and punishment applies here also. Here also, with what measure a man has measured it is measured to him, he who judges is judged (vii. 1, 2), he who denies is denied (x. 33), he who does not forgive does not obtain forgiveness (xviii. 35). Here, too, of course, the greatness of the guilt is not to be measured quantitatively; it depends upon the greatness of the motive (xii. 41, 42, xi. 22, 24), and of the ability (Luke xii. 47, 48),

which the individual had to avoid the sin and do the will of God. Here, too, the punishment can be, at last, only one and the same, viz. exclusion from the completed kingdom of God (Matt. viii. 12, xxii. 13, xxiv. 40, 41, xxv. 12),[4] to which every one is condemned who cannot be acknowledged as righteous in the day of judgment (xii. 36, 37). When, in this passage, the final decision is made dependent upon men's words, it is plain from the context that words, whose importance is so often overlooked, are regarded as the specific expression of the disposition (vv. 33–35, cf. v. 22). The fundamental disposition, however, which is demanded of the disciple, is the striving after the kingdom of God and His righteousness (§ 26). It is not a deficiency in respect of any particular individual works which makes justification impossible and condemnation necessary, but the absence of the tokens of genuine discipleship, apostasy from the Messiah in its many forms (§ 30, *c*); it is only because the Messiah recognises, in the deeds of brotherly love, the attitude which men assume towards His person, that these are decisive in the judgment (xxv. 31–46). He who has not striven after the kingdom of God as a true disciple of Jesus cannot reach that kingdom.

## § 33. *The Return of the Messiah, and the Judgment.*

According to the earliest tradition, Jesus has represented His return as an event which was to be looked for during the current generation, although the point of time within that period remained indeterminable. (*b*) As foretokens of His return He has named the grievous throes of the time in general, and the judgment which was to fall upon Israel in particular. (*c*) With His return, however, there commences the destruction of the world, which sweeps away the impenitent world; from

[4] This does not make it impossible to regard present evils as a punishment, just as the future bestowal of rewards does not exclude a recompense in this present world (Mark x. 30). This is taken for granted in Matt. ix. 2, where the removal of the punishment follows expressly upon the removal of the guilt; but from this very fact it is plain that this punishment was not a final one. In Luke xiii. 1-5, on the other hand, we are expressly warned against concluding from the degree of the evil to the degree of the guilt; while the threatening of a similar punishment is only used as a motive to impel them to fulfil the divine demand.

this final judgment only the elect are saved, and they are then separated from the spurious members of the Church of the disciples.

(*a*) As the founding of the kingdom of God demanded the divine deed of the sending of His Messiah, so neither can its expected consummation be brought about without a new interposition of God, and that likewise by means of the Messiah. Accordingly, the Messiah, who is exalted to God's right hand (§ 19, *c*), must return.[1] God has reserved it to Himself alone to determine the day and the hour of this return (Mark xiii. 32). But since prophecy had always announced the completion of salvation as standing in immediate connection with the commencement of the time of salvation, and the latter had already come with the Messiah, the return of the Messiah which was to bring about that completion could not but be looked for as very near at hand. At the close of the great discourse regarding His return Jesus says expressly, that the present generation will yet witness the events of which He prophesies (Matt. xxiv. 34); and according to Mark ix. 1 not all, it is true, but yet at least some of His hearers, will yet see the coming completion of the kingdom of God. The most of His discourses, however, regarding His return, and, in particular, the exhortations to watchfulness, indirectly assume that those who are addressed will live to meet Him on that occasion.[2]

[1] The attempt of W. Weiffenbach (*Quae Jesu in regno coelesti dignitas sit*, Gissae 1868; *Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu*, Leipzig 1873), to reduce the prophecy of Jesus regarding His return to the promise of His reappearance after the resurrection, presupposes a rejection of its most essential moments which depends upon an arbitrary criticism, and is based upon the fact that that prophecy appears first of all in connection with the prophecy of His death and resurrection, a fact which proves nothing, since His removal from the earth is the self-evident presupposition of His return. Compare against this view B. Pünjer (*die Wiederkunftsreden Jesu*, *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1878, 2), who, it is true, for his part, also finds an (unreconciled) contradiction between the prophecy of His return and His presentiment of death, in consequence of his denying that the death of Jesus, which was, it is alleged, only humanly necessary for Him, had any bearing upon His Messianic calling (cf. on the other hand, § 22, *c*), and ignoring His foresight of His resurrection and exaltation. And yet Luke xvii. 25 shows expressly, how it is His rejection by the present generation that makes it necessary for Jesus to speak of a *future* day of the Son of man (cf. my *Matthäusev.* p. 406).

[2] This does not by any means, as is frequently asserted, stand in contradiction with Mark xiii. 32, for the time of the current generation presented a very considerable margin for the determining of the day and hour. Nor do the

This did not exclude the possibility that there might also be an unexpected long delay (Matt. xxiv. 48, xxv. 5; Mark xiii. 35 = Luke xii. 38); but even although the judge appeared to delay, the judgment was nevertheless soon to commence (Luke xviii. 2–8). It is mere critical arbitrariness to regard all such statements simply as a later expression of disappointed expectations. Jesus has warned them not to be deceived by false Messiahs (Matt. xxiv. 5), whose way, according to Mark xiii. 21 f., false prophets will prepare by signs and wonders; He has warned them not to be led astray by premature announcements of His return, since it will everywhere manifest itself visibly and unmistakeably, like the lightning which comes down from heaven (Luke xvii. 23, 24, 37 = Matt. xxiv. 26–28); He has warned them not to take the heralds of the end for the end itself (xxiv. 6–8). This end will come suddenly and unexpectedly, like a thief in the night (xxiv. 43, 44, xxv. 13).

(*b*) Although the consummation of all things is not brought about in the natural way of historical development, it is nevertheless a condition of its commencement, that the time has become ripe for it. As the Messiah could not appear upon the scene until the time was fulfilled (Mark i. 15), so, according to the divinely appointed course of the historical development, certain events must have taken place before He returns;

parables in Matt. xiii. 31-33 (which, moreover, by no means anticipate a conversion and transformation of the whole world (cf. § 14, *c*), an anticipation which, according to § 28, *d*, and 31, *a*, is historically inconceivable) say anything as to the time which must still elapse till the consummation; they only contrast the divinely purposed comprehensive goal of the development of the kingdom of God with its small beginnings. For this very reason they cannot prove anything against the view that that goal is to be reached, not by way of a purely historical development, but by means of a new divine deed. That Jesus, however, represented His return as an event which was to be looked for during the current generation, is proved undoubtedly by the universal and, notwithstanding many disappointments, firmly cherished hope of the apostolic age; and, considering His attachment to Old Testament prophecy, we could not expect it to be otherwise (see above). Those, however, who speak of an "error" on the part of Jesus, which in that case would have to be assumed, altogether misconceive the nature of biblical prophecy, which, so far as regards its fulfilment, always remains dependent on the historical development. In this development, however, the voluntary behaviour of man forms an essential factor, in conformity with which the Father, who guides this development, alone determines the time and the hour, under certain circumstances even transcending the limits originally set by Himself and announced by prophecy (Mark xiii. 32).

and from these, as its foretokens, men can then discern the nearness of the divinely appointed moment of the consummation. Upon this fundamental thought of apocalyptic prophecy rests also the prophecy of Jesus regarding His return. As painful pangs precede the hour of birth, so neither can the consummation come until after grievous times have befallen the world. Jesus had spoken of great wars between nations and kingdoms, famine, pestilence, and earthquakes as the commencement of these pangs (Matt. xxiv. 6–8). Since, however, the judgment comes at the same time as the consummation of all things, it is above all necessary that the world has first become ripe for judgment by making full the measure of its guilt. In the historical situation of the time of Jesus this greatest development of sin could present itself only within the province of the nation which had rejected its Messiah; by their behaviour towards the messengers of Jesus the blood-stained hierarchy had first to make full the measure of their fathers, before the final judgment which was already threatened them in Mark xii. 9 could fall upon them and the nation (Matt. xxiii. 32–36). The occasion of this had to be furnished by the appearing of false Messiahs (note *a*), since these could work only in a way which would humour the hope of a worldly Messiah. If these succeeded in leading the people astray (xxiv. 5), then the outbreak of the Jewish war of revolution was unavoidable. As soon, however, as, in consequence of this, the abomination of desolation stood upon holy soil, *i.e.* when the armies of the Gentiles appeared in the land of Judea, there was no more any deliverance for the people; Jesus could only exhort the believers among them to most rapid flight (xxiv. 15–20). Then there would come upon the God-forsaken people such a tribulation as had never been before (ver. 21); and since, with this, the last great judgment of God already began,[3] the day of the return must

[3] That great judgments must fall upon Israel before the time of salvation comes, had also been proclaimed often enough by the prophets. In Luke xiii. 3, 5 Jesus has also already threatened the nation, in the event of its impenitence, with this, the last and greatest of them all; in the parable of the fig-tree He has deferred it still for a short time (vv. 6–9); and at last, in a terror-striking symbolical action, He has foretold it to the nation, which had all the appearance of zeal for God and His law, but which, nevertheless, when Jesus sought the fruits of such zeal, could not produce them (Mark xi. 12–14, cf. Luke xix.

now immediately appear (ver. 29); its coming they can as certainly perceive from these foretokens as they can perceive the coming of summer from the fact that the fig-tree is becoming green (vv. 32, 33).[4]

(*c*) The day of the return, viz., is that great day of universal judgment which is looked forward to by prophecy (ἡ ἡμέρα κρίσεως, Matt. xi. 22, xii. 36). Accordingly, it dawns with the appearing of the signs in heaven, which, in the prophets, so often announce the coming of the great day of the Lord (Matt. xxiv. 49, cf. Joel ii. 10, 30, 31, iii. 15; Isa. xiii. 10, 13; Jer. iv. 23, 24; Ezek. xxxii. 7, 8; Hagg. ii. 6; Mark viii. 11; for which see my *Markusev.* p. 270), and with which the destruction of the world has inevitably come. It is this which carries away the world which is living on in carnal security, as the flood once carried men away in the time of Noah (Matt. xxiv. 37–39 = Luke xvii. 26, 27),[5] and makes an end at once of everything that is sinful (xvii. 37). It is only His elect

41–44). In this judgment the blood of all the slain righteous ones was to come upon the genuine sons of the murderers of the prophets (Matt. xxiii. 35, 36); in it the temple should be destroyed, so that no stone would remain standing upon another (Mark xiii. 2, cf. § 24 *d*); in it must naturally be destroyed also the holy city, from which God had withdrawn His gracious presence (Matt. xxiii. 38). But the earliest tradition did not possess any direct prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem.

[4] It is this so very natural historical combination—a combination which manifestly lies at the root of all later combinations, and, by its simplicity, plainly betrays itself as the original one—which has recently been found so peculiarly offensive as being "a Jewish apocalyptic and calculation of the future," and which it is sought to remove from the eschatological discourse of Jesus by ascribing it to a "small Jewish or Jewish-Christian apocalypse," which the evangelists have interwoven with that discourse (cf. the different constructions of it in Weiffenbach and Pünjer). But it has been shown in my *Matthäus- und Markusev.*, how the substance of the eschatological discourse, as it stood in the apostolic source, can still be clearly pointed out in Mark xiii. and Matt. xxiv., and from this it follows, that that very combination of the return with the tribulation which was to fall upon Judea formed its most original kernel.

[5] It follows from this, that when Jesus returns, the great mass of men has not yet by any means become disciples. It is rather the case that only a few find the narrow way (Matt. vii. 14, xxii. 14; Luke xii. 32), and often those who are most closely connected in life are separated by the judgment (Matt. xxiv. 40, 41). In other places also men on the whole are generally contrasted with the disciples (Matt. v. 16, 19, x. 32, 33; Mark i. 17), they are thought of as sinful (Matt. xii. 31, 36; Mark vii. 21, viii. 33; Luke xiii. 4), nay, even as hostile to Christ (Mark ix. 31) and the disciples (Matt x. 17; Luke vi. 22, 26). The second discourse of the apostolic source relating to the Parousia shows how, at His second coming, the Messiah will find men as little prepared for His judgment

ones that Jesus causes to be gathered around Him by the angels (Matt. xxiv. 31) from the four ends of the earth (cf. viii. 11, 12), for the purpose of taking them to Himself, and thus saving them from destruction (Luke xvii. 34, 35). But since it is only the elect that are saved (§ 30), the Messianic judgment brings also the sifting of the members of the Church of the disciples, which, according to § 14 *d*, was deferred to the end of the development, and which can also be so represented as if the unworthy members are cast out before the commencement of the completion of salvation (Matt. xiii. 30, 48, xxii. 11–13),[6] because Jesus does not recognise them as His true disciples (xxv. 10–12; Luke xiii. 25). And since this great day of judgment is the day of Jehovah Himself, it is also represented as if the testimony, which the Messiah bears before the throne of God as to the attitude of the individuals towards Himself, decides their fate in the judgment (Matt. x. 32, 33).[7]

## § 34. *The Consummation of all things.*

The return of the Messiah brings also the completion of the kingdom of God, which completion is conceived of, however, not as earthly, but as heavenly. (*b*) In the completed kingdom of God there commences eternal life in the seeing of God.

as, on the occasion of His first gracious coming, He found a reception from Israel (Luke xvii. 25 ff., for which see my *Matthäusev.* p. 519). From this it appears afresh, that the interpretation of the parables of Matt. xiii. 31-33, which was rejected in footnote 2, cannot lie in the mind of Jesus.

[6] It is certain that, in the apostolic source, the instructive representation in Matt. xxv. 31–46, which the first evangelist has conceived as a description of the judgment of the world (ver. 32), referred to this separation of the genuine and the spurious members of the Church. For Jesus looks upon all those who are gathered before Him as His brethren (vv. 40, 45); and this is conceivable only if they were by confession His disciples. But although a separation into two parts is expressly made here, and sentence is pronounced upon each part, it is nevertheless certainly not the intention of this discourse to give a description of the procedure at the judgment (since such expressions as we find in vv. 37–39, ver. 44, would have been rendered impossible had it been intended to give such information), but to give a vivid idea of the decisive value of brotherly love.

[7] In accordance with this we can understand how, in the parables of the apostolic source, it can be now God Himself (Matt. xviii. 32, xx. 8, xxii. 11; Luke xviii. 7), now His Messiah (Matt. xiii. 30, xxiv. 50, xxv. 12, 19), who comes in judgment; just as, probably even in the apostolic source (Matt. xxv. 31), even the Son of man was to sit upon the throne as the judge of the world.

(*c*) From this life the damned are excluded, and therewith their souls are delivered over to final destruction. (*d*) This, however, is felt in hell as the most dreadful eternal misery.

(*a*) As appears from the connection of Mark viii. 38 and ix. 1, the kingdom of God comes along with the returning Messiah, and that, too, *ἐν δυνάμει*, which can only mean that then the sovereignty of God attains the full development of its power, and therefore the kingdom of God its completion. From the very beginning the message regarding the kingdom of God points to this completion (§ 15); it is only into the completed kingdom of God that the elect who are gathered around the returning Messiah can be received along with Him (Matt. xxiv. 31; Luke xvii. 34 f., for which see § 33, *c*). For only those who are found approved can at last enter into the kingdom of God (Matt. v. 20, vii. 21, xviii. 3) or possess it (xxv. 34: *κληρονομεῖν*). If in this latter expression there already lies an echo of the earliest promise which was given to the people of Israel, the promise, viz., of the possession of the promised land (Lev. xx. 24), in Matt. v. 5 the possession of the land (Ps. xxxvii. 11) is expressly a symbolical expression for the full possession of salvation, which can be conceived of as a possession of the land of promise, *i.e.* of the kingdom of God in its completion.[1] That the ultimate completion of the kingdom of God is conceived of as heavenly, follows already from the fact that the reward, which consists in participation in that kingdom, is conceived of as one that is deposited in heaven (§ 32, *c*). No doubt, we could also think merely of the kingdom of God which is prepared from the foundation of the world (Matt. xxv. 34), and therefore of the kingdom of God in the divine decree, so that its coming (Mark ix. 1)

[1] Taken in its literal sense,—a sense which is also in keeping with the passage in the Psalm,—the expression would assert that, after the extirpation of all the godless, the pious in Israel would attain to exclusive sovereignty in Palestine, *i.e.* that the kingdom of God would be realized in the forms of the national theocracy. If this, however, were its meaning, it would not be the absolute completion that is promised here, but such an earthly realization of the kingdom of God in Israel as all the prophets have hoped for, but which remained dependent upon the behaviour of the people (cf. § 15, *b*, 19, *b*). There is no clearer proof of the essential faithfulness of the tradition of the eschatological discourses of Jesus than the manner in which an earthly realization of the kingdom of God in the forms of the national theocracy is neither distinctly promised nor categorically excluded.

would be only a descent upon the earth for its realization in the chiliastic sense. But the hope of an earthly kingdom, which the returning Messiah founds, is not only foreign to the eschatological discourses of Jesus, but is even excluded by them. For an essential requisite of such a kingdom is the resurrection of the righteous to earthly life, whereas, in Mark xii. 24 ff., Jesus expressly opposes the idea of such a resurrection, even in the case of the patriarchs, as being a limitation of the creative power of God.[2] Moreover, Jesus has always connected His return only with the absolute consummation of all things (cf. Biedermann, p. 294), and never with an earthly realization of the kingdom of God.[3] If, in Matt. v. 18, xxiv. 35, a passing away of heaven and earth is looked forward to, then the signs in heaven described in xxiv. 29, with which His return commences (§ 33, *c*), can only be understood literally, in which case they already involve the commencement of this catastrophe, so that the returning Messiah no longer finds the earth in its present condition. What takes its place is, indeed, nowhere said; but if the kingdom of God is

[2] On this account we may not appeal to the banquet with the patriarchs (Matt viii. 11 = Luke xiii. 28), or to the table of the Messiah (Luke xxii. 30); the use that is made of this latter idea in the parable of the supper (Luke xiv. 16 = Matt. xxii. 2) rather shows that it is only a symbolical expression of the blessedness of the completed kingdom of God. This applies also to the new wine which, according to Mark xiv. 25, Jesus will drink in the kingdom of God, and which Luke (xxii. 16) correctly explains as referring to a higher fulfilment of the Passover in the festival of completed redemption. Although Jesus does not by any means refuse, *à priori*, the request for the two places of honour at His right hand and His left (Mark x. 37), it only follows that the completed kingdom is conceived of as an organized fellowship, in which each one finds his position and significance according to his endowments (cf. § 32, *b*, footnote 3). Similarly, in Matt. xix. 28 = Luke xxii. 30, the position of the twelve apostles is preserved in the completed kingdom of God, inasmuch as they have the greatest share in the dignity of the returning Messiah, just as they have been the nearest Him during His earthly activity; but their judging the twelve tribes is probably only the reverse side of their being sent to the twelve tribes (§ 31, *a*), which are exposed to the judgment just because of the offer of salvation which was made them through the apostles.

[3] Even in Matt. xxiii. 39 (= Luke xiii. 35) the possibility is looked forward to, it is true, that His nation would be prepared to greet Him on His return as the Messiah, however improbable this appears in Luke xviii. 8. But even there it is only promised them that, in that case, they would see Him once more, because they would then be delivered by Him from the last judgment (Matt. xxiv. 21 f.). There is no word whatever of a restoration of the kingdom of Israel.

perfectly realized in the new world, at least the contrast between earth and heaven (vi. 10) is abolished in that new world, and therefore we cannot speak any longer of a contrast between an earthly and a heavenly completion.

(*b*) The idea of entering into the kingdom of God is synonymous with that of entering into life (cf. Matt. xix. 23, 24 with ver. 17; Mark ix. 47 with vv. 43, 45), just as entering into eternal life (Matt. xxv. 46) is synonymous with the possession of the kingdom of God (ver. 34). In Mark x. 17 (cf. Luke x. 25), also, the expected inheritance, which is usually the kingdom of God (note *a*), is described as eternal life. If, however, in the kingdom of God they attain *eternal* life, it is already evident that the latter is not conceived of as earthly. Jesus, accordingly, also describes the life of the risen as a life which is similar to that of the angels,—a life which belongs to the heavenly world, and is raised above the conditions of earthly life (Mark xii. 25),—a life, however, which is still conceived of as being in a corresponding corporeity, because, otherwise, there could be no mention made of a resurrection. Like the Scriptures generally, Jesus also knows of no real life without a corporeity, for He argues for the resurrection from the life of the patriarchs which is assumed from Ex. iii. 6 (ver. 26 f.).[4] If, lastly, those who are made perfect see God (Matt. v. 8), it is evident also from this, that in the completed kingdom of God the contrast between heaven and earth is abolished, and God makes His abode immediately in the midst of His sons (ver. 9).

(*c*) It is the Messianic judgment which first awards eternal punishment, which forms the antithesis of eternal life (Matt. xxv. 46). In this antithesis it is indicated that this punishment consists in the withdrawal of eternal life, and that this withdrawal is identical with destruction; for the narrow way,

[4] The reason why the resurrection is never mentioned elsewhere is because Jesus hopes that the majority of the present generation will be still alive when He returns (§ 33, *a*). Still, the patriarchs (Matt. viii. 11) and those who have been slain in times of persecution (x. 21, 39) must rise, if they are to participate in the blessedness of the completed kingdom of God. Even the deliverance of the elect from the impending destruction of the world (§ 33, *c*), which nevertheless destroys their corporeity and the conditions of their bodily life, can only be so conceived of as that they are immediately qualified for the heavenly life by their being clothed with a new corporeity.

which leads to life, stands contrasted with the way which leads to destruction (vii. 13 : ἀπώλεια). This destruction is thought of, in the first place, as physical death, and that, too, as a violent, unnatural death, in which the judgment of God against sin is carried out.[5] The death of the body, it is true, only separates the soul from the body, without deciding its final fate; for, in the first place, it only delivers the soul over to Hades (Scheol), in which, no doubt, there is already found a retribution, but not the final one.[6] If, however, at the advent of the great day of judgment, which concludes the development of the world, men are swept away by (bodily) death, then they are delivered over to a fate which cannot be changed. Destruction comes, therefore, more particularly upon the souls which are separated from the body (in the day of judgment); according to Matt. x. 28, it is not the destruction of the body, but that of the soul, which is to be feared (cf. x. 39; Mark viii. 36, 37). If, however, the elect are saved from this destruction (Matt. x. 22; Mark x. 26, xiii. 20; cf. Luke xiii. 23) by their souls receiving such a heavenly corporeity as is suited for eternal life in the completed kingdom of God

[5] The verb which lies at the root of this word denotes, in the first place, every violent putting to death in general (Matt. xxi. 41, xxii. 7, cf. ii. 13, xxvi. 52, xxvii. 20), or every sudden, unnatural end (Luke xiii. 3, 5 ; Mark iv. 38). Such an end, however, is already, *per se*, a judgment of God, and therefore the judgment which is to come upon the impenitent nation can be described as a destruction in this sense (Luke xiii. 3, 5, cf. ver. 9), more especially as Christ was probably thinking mainly of a destruction at the hand of enemies (Matt. xxiv. 15–22). So, too, with the judgment of the world, which is living on in carnal security,—a judgment which is compared with the sudden perishing of men in the flood (Luke xvii. 27, cf. ver. 29).

[6] In the earliest tradition mention is made of Hades in Matt. xvi. 18, where its gates serve as a popular description of that which is most invincible, because the kingdom of the dead lets out no one whom it has once devoured, and in Matt. xi. 23, where it is meant to denote that which is deepest of all, in contrast to heaven, as that which is highest of all. It is only in the parable in Luke xvi. 19–31 that there comes out the idea of the different fate of souls in Scheol. The rich man and Lazarus find themselves in Hades (ver. 23), the former, however, in a place of torment, where he is racked in great heat by burning thirst (vv. 24, 28); while the latter rests in Abraham's bosom, and enjoys a blessedness which makes him forget all the sorrows of earth (vv. 22 f., 25). Their abodes are separated by an impassable gulf (ver. 26). In Luke xxiii. 43 the abode of the pious in Hades is called Paradise; that the thief is to meet Jesus there is the token that he has found grace. Even in Scheol, therefore, there commences a retribution for the soul,—a retribution, however, which does not exclude an ultimate decision as to its final fate.

(note *b*), then the destruction of souls can only consist in this, that after the advent of the final decision has deprived them of any prospect of even a future resurrection, they remain for ever in the incorporeal and therefore shadowy condition in which bodily death has placed them. The continued existence of the soul in this condition, which, feared even as a transition state, involves the greatest wretchedness when regarded as final, implies eternal punishment, and hence it can be described by the same word as the separation of the soul from the body by a violent death, because the latter, if it befalls the soul on the day of the final decision, or is not abolished on that day, also condemns it to eternal continuance in death.

(*d*) According to a common mode of expression, those who are excluded from the kingdom of God in its heavenly completion, find themselves in hell (Mark ix. 47: γεέννα).[7] Although this is called hell-fire (Matt. v. 22), sensuous torments are by no means thought of; for this would assume a resurrection of the godless, whereas such a resurrection, at least of the kind which is described in Mark xii. 25, is plainly looked forward to only for the pious.[8] Fire is rather only a symbol of the divine judgment of wrath (cf. Matt. iii. 11), the terrors of which are made vivid by this image; for the end of sinners is more dreadful than the most dreadful death (Matt. xviii. 6 = Luke xvii. 2). If an actual fire were to be thought of, it would be a strange contradiction, if, on the other hand, those

[7] The name of a valley lying to the south of Jerusalem, where the idolatrous Israelites had formerly offered their children to Moloch (Jer. vii. 31: גֵּיא בֶן־הִנֹּם, cf. 2 Kings xxiii. 10), and where also the judgment of God because of this abomination was to fall upon them (Jer. vii. 32, 33). In this form it became the designation of the place where eternal destruction was to come upon those who were condemned in the last judgment (Matt. x. 28), and hence this judgment is called ἡ κρίσις τῆς γεέννης (xxiii. 33, cf. ver. 15).

[8] Even from Matt. v. 29, 30 and x. 28 we cannot infer that the godless will be raised up, in order that they may suffer the punishment of hell in the body which is restored to them. These expressions are rather sufficiently explained by the fact that the final judgment, which is to be held at the return of the Messiah, will fall upon the present generation even during its lifetime (§ 33, *a*). No doubt, the sinners of the past ages are also to receive their final sentence in the Messianic judgment (Matt. xi. 22, 24 = Luke x. 12, 14); but since their souls are in Scheol, and it is the fate of souls which is in question at this final decision (note *c*), a resurrection of these does not by any means follow

who are excluded from the kingdom of God are cast out into the darkness (Matt. viii. 12). But even this darkness is only a symbol of evil and terrors, a symbol which was common in consequence of the figurative language of the Old Testament (cf. Job xxx. 26; Isa. v. 20, viii. 22, ix. 2, l. 10). No doubt, however, it is implied in both these images that the damned are delivered up to a fate to whose terrors they are by no means unsusceptible, a fate which they feel, rather, with weeping and gnashing of teeth (Luke xiii. 28). The disembodied soul, however, can very easily be conceived of as the subject of this feeling, just as the demons (who, according to § 23, *b*, are incorporeal) also fear this torment (Matt. viii. 29), and even the dead in Scheol feel woe and blessedness (footnote 6). The destruction of the soul, accordingly, cannot be thought of as complete annihilation; for, in that case, it would not be *better* for the damned if they had never been born (Mark xiv. 21). Even the fire of hell does not point to such an annihilation; for, apart from the fact that it cannot be conceived of as material, the very idea of eternal fire (Matt. xxv. 41; Mark ix. 43, 48) shows that it does not consume the objects of punishment, because, if so, it would cease to burn for them. The eternity of the punishment in hell, in this sense, is the necessary correlate of the idea that the decision in the Messianic judgment is a final one. In other ways, also, it is undoubtedly a logical consequence of the teaching of Jesus. Where there is a sin which can never be forgiven (Matt. xii. 32, for which see § 22, *b*), there must also be an eternal punishment (xxv. 46)

# PART SECOND.

## THE ORIGINAL-APOSTOLIC TYPE OF DOCTRINE PREVIOUS TO THE TIME OF PAUL.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### § 35. *The Discourses of the Acts of the Apostles.*

THE earliest records of apostolic preaching, from which we become acquainted with the religious ideas and doctrines of the original apostles, are the discourses (mainly Petrine) in that portion of the Acts of the Apostles which treats of the history of the mother Church. (*b*) It is only on the well-grounded presupposition that these discourses, as well as the characteristics of the life of the mother Church which we find here, are taken from a trustworthy literary source, and reported with substantial fidelity, that we can regard them as such records. (*c*) An independent representation of the biblico-theological material which is thus obtained is justifiable, although given in a different sense and to a different extent than it has been given by Lechler.

(*a*) Besides the great Pentecostal sermon of the Apostle Peter (ii. 14–36, 38–40), the Acts of the Apostles contains a sermon of his delivered in the temple to the people (iii. 12–26), and also a missionary sermon delivered in the house of Cornelius (x. 34–43). Since all three have the expressed purpose of leading the hearers to believe in Jesus, they are peculiarly fitted to make us acquainted with the sum of the earliest apostolic preaching. But even in the shorter apologies before the Sanhedrim (iv. 8–12, 19, 20, v. 29–32) the standpoint

of the apostles, who believed in the Messiah, in opposition to the hierarchy, which was hostile to Him, receives a very characteristic expression. Although, in the second of these, the apostles in general are introduced as speaking, Peter, who usually takes the lead in word and in deed, is nevertheless naturally to be thought of as the real speaker; and so likewise in the prayers of the Church (i. 24, 25, iv. 24–30), in the second of which the religious consciousness of the mother Church, as it is coloured by the impression which the first persecution made upon it, expresses itself very characteristically. There have also to be added the discourse in which Peter suggests the choice of a twelfth apostle to succeed Judas (i. 16–22), and the transactions of the so-called apostolic council regarding the Gentiles (xv. 7–29). If up to this time Peter has been the only speaker, so that, taken strictly, it is mainly his system of doctrine which is treated of, we now hear James also, the brother of the Lord, giving his opinion (vv. 13–21). Lastly, the Acts of the Apostles also reports a detailed apology of the Hellenist Stephen (vii. 2–53), who does not, indeed, belong to the circle of the original apostles, but has nevertheless learned in this circle the opinions which he defends. There is therefore no reason whatever for treating of this discourse independently, as Lechler (p. 30–33) and, still more decidedly, Messner (p. 170–175) have done. The discourse is of special importance, inasmuch as it refers, apologetically and polemically, to the first conflict that the preaching of the gospel had with the national attachment to the law of the fathers.

(*b*) If, as the Tübingen school assumes, the Acts of the Apostles is a writing with a tendency, a writing which intentionally puts into the mouth of Peter discourses which have a Pauline colouring, and *vice versa* (cf. especially Zeller, *die Apostelgeschichte*, Stuttgart 1854), it is only as sources for the peculiarly modified Paulinism of the author that we can regard any of its discourses (cf. Baur, p. 331–338). At least it necessarily leads to critical arbitrariness, when Immer, p. 190, declares that these discourses are, as regards their form, compositions of the author, and then, nevertheless, construes from their "historical basis" the circle of ideas of the original apostles and the mother Church (p. 177–205), in

which, indeed, he even includes matter which is so foreign as the history of the early years of Jesus which is contained in the two latest synoptic Gospels. Of course these discourses, which the author has certainly not heard, and which, from the nature of the case, could not well be transmitted by oral tradition, could be only free compositions, if, in his first part, he had really used no kind of literary sources, but had simply related them according to oral tradition, however trustworthy. When, however, we consider the analogy of his Gospel, which goes back almost entirely upon written sources, this is exceedingly unlikely; nor is it by any means demanded by the literary character of the book, which is besides very unequal, since that which can really be shown to belong to Luke himself is sufficiently explained by the fact that, as in the Gospel, he has freely worked up his sources. We shall therefore assume with the majority of critics, that the basis of the first part is a narrative in which a member of the mother Church gave an account, as an eye and ear witness, chiefly of the deeds and discourses of Peter,[1] and in fact there are not awanting numerous marks by means of which we can still in many places critically distinguish Luke's redaction from the source which he employed. Since, however, after the analogy of his Gospel, the author has neither made a full use of the latter, nor has used it without additions and transpositions of his own, it would be altogether vain to attempt to restore it in its completeness. It is to this source also that we owe the numerous characteristic features of the life of the mother Church which the first part of the Acts of the Apostles contains, and which are even by themselves significant of its religious life, and of the ideas which were prevalent in it. Besides these longer discourses, there have been preserved, probably also from it, many other authentic words of Peter (v. 3, 4, 9, viii. 20–23), which are well entitled to be taken into account; while others,

[1] The question may be commended to the consideration of lovers of hypotheses, whether the Gospel of Mark, which, as is well known, ends, imperfectly in a certain sense, with xvi. 8, could not have had its second part in this narrative, just as the Gospel of Luke, which uses Mark's, has its second part in the Acts of the Apostles. The relation of such a special feature as we find in xii. 12–17, which would be at least very surprising in any distant reporter, and in the beginning of which the name of Mark appears for the first time, would give considerable support to such an assumption.

such as vi. 2–4, xi. 4–18, rather awaken the suspicion that they have been put into the mouth of the speakers by Luke himself. But even the discourses which are taken from this source Luke will not throughout have adopted literally, so that here also criticism retains the right of deducting whatever betrays itself as belonging specifically to him, whether in expression or in peculiarity of doctrine. Considering, however, the manner in which the author has in his Gospel reproduced the words of Jesus from the sources which he possessed, we may reasonably assume that these discourses are reported with substantial fidelity.

(*c*) It is seldom that the discourses of the Acts of the Apostles have received in biblical theology the consideration which their significance deserves. Most frequently they are considered only as secondary sources for the representation of the doctrine of Peter (cf. Bauer, iii. p. 183; Schmid, ii. p. 153 [E. Tr. 376]; Messner, p. 109), or, as by Reuss (i. Book 4), for the characterization of the *théologie judéo-chrétienne* in general. Lechler is the first who has given an independent representation of the original preaching of the apostles which they contain (p. 15–30).[2] That which makes a separate representation of the views which these discourses contain desirable is, apart from the circumstance that they certainly form the earliest records of the religious ideas and doctrines of the apostolic age, not so much this, that, compared with the First Epistle of Peter, they contain a peculiar system of doctrine, but rather that they bring before us a special aspect of the preaching of the apostles, viz. its ingathering and apologetic aspect, and allow us also to obtain a glimpse into the religious life of the mother Church, and into the questions which stirred it in the earliest age; while that Epistle, being addressed to Churches which, partly at least, are living

[2] When, however, he excludes the transactions of the apostolic council from his representation, because these belong to the Pauline period, we must not overlook the fact that the independent missionary activity of Paul and his literary activity, so far as we are acquainted with it, and therefore also the type of doctrine which we meet in his Epistles, belong to the time after the apostolic council. He has further tried to point out in these discourses a still undeveloped stage of the doctrine of Peter (p. 192–194); but we are the less able to find this in them, as, in our opinion, the First Epistle of Peter likewise belongs to this first period of the doctrinal development of the original apostles.

under very different circumstances, naturally exhibits another aspect of their preaching as well as other aspects of the life of the Christian Church. From this point of view there is still much which biblical theology will have to take into account, which Lechler has omitted to notice in his representation (cf. also Gess, ii. 1–19).

## § 36. *The First Epistle of Peter.*

The principal source for the Petrine system of doctrine, at least in the form of its development which belongs to the time prior to Paul, is the first Epistle which has come down to us in his name, and which, in that case, of course, cannot be regarded as an echo of Pauline Epistles. (*b*) The peculiarities of the system which is contained in this source are its Jewish-Christian character, its predominant tendency to direct attention to Christian hope, and the directness of its attachment to the life and sayings of Jesus. (*c*) In the previous representations of this system of doctrine these peculiarities have not yet, in many respects, received due recognition.

(*a*) According to its address, the First Epistle of Peter is written to the believers of the dispersion in Asia Minor, and therefore to Jewish-Christian Churches. Now, since, in consequence of the activity of Paul which was unfolded from Ephesus during his stay there for almost three years, the Church in Asia Minor became an essentially Gentile-Christian one, our Epistle, which knows only of essentially Jewish-Christian Churches there, belongs to an earlier period. Although it is written also to Galatian Churches, it knows nothing as yet of their being disquieted by the question as to the validity of the law. Its expressed purpose is hortatory; its exhortation, however, receives its colouring from the circumstances of the young Churches, in an essentially heathen neighbourhood, to which it is addressed. They have already experienced the hostility of the world which was foretold by Jesus, viz. Gentile calumniation and Jewish slander on account of the name of Christ. It was now important to refute this slinking calumniation by the unfolding of the Christian life of virtue in that very condition of suffering, to show that the reproach which the Church bore was really only the reproach of Christ. But

the exhortation is based throughout upon the saving facts of Christianity. Naturally, these had already been proclaimed to the readers, but by those who were not apostles (i. 12); and because the strongest motive of Christian exhortation is found in the certainty of these facts, the Epistle unites with its hortatory aim the other aim of establishing its readers, by means of its apostolic testimony, in the truth of the proclamation which had reached them (v. 12). According to what has been said above, this proclamation is not that of Paul, which the author neither refers to nor knows in its written documents, even if Paul should have already written his Epistles to the Thessalonians. This second aim of the Epistle, however, causes it to unfold the testimony of the apostle to the saving facts of Christianity to an extent which makes it a most valuable record of the Petrine system of doctrine (cf. my article, "die petrinische Frage," *Stud. und Kritik.* 1865, p. 619–657, and also 1873, p. 539 ff.). According to the common opinion, it is true, the Epistle is addressed to the Pauline Churches of Asia Minor, which were predominantly Gentile-Christian. It is thought that numerous reminiscences even of the later of the Epistles of Paul are found in it, and it is said to have been composed during the last period of the life of Paul, or even after his death. Starting with this view, we could no longer place the doctrine of our Epistle before that of Paul, as Schmid and Messner still do; we could regard it only as a monument of the teaching of the original apostles as it was modified after the appearance of Paul, and in many respects under his influence; from which point of view Lechler then tries to discover artificial distinctions between the doctrine of our Epistle and that of the discourses in the Acts of the Apostles (§ 35, *c*). The recognition of the incorrectness of this way of regarding our Epistle is the indispensable condition of its right use in biblical theology.

(*b*) Peter is one of the apostles called by Jesus Himself, who, without violently breaking with their past, had gradually ripened, in personal intercourse with Jesus, to the comprehension of the salvation which appeared in Him. As Jesus had represented Himself as the bringer of the salvation which was promised and expected in and for Israel, so Peter also conceives the salvation which had appeared in Him as the

realization of that which was striven after and promised in the Old Testament; his view of it is still conditioned throughout by Old Testament ideas; and even where there is no express occasion, as, *e.g.*, the need of proof, he still, throughout, usually attaches himself to the sayings and images, the institutions and narratives of the Old Testament. His activity as an apostle to the Jews, for which this tendency specially qualified him, on the other hand confirms him in it, and teaches him to see in the Church of believers out of Israel the commencing realization of the completion of the theocracy which was brought by Jesus. It is this which we call his Jewish-Christian tendency. But the individuality of the apostle also determines the peculiarity of his system. Peter was of an impetuous disposition; his resolution promptly taken, we see him, in the Gospels as well as in the Acts of the Apostles, everywhere taking the lead of the disciples both in word and in deed; his excellences as well as his failings had their root in this natural impetuosity of his. This peculiarity, however, must have led him from the first to look away, with his striving and longing, beyond the present, to the promised future of salvation; even during his previous life it must have made him embrace the Messianic hopes of his people with an ardent longing, it must have led him rapidly to Christ; but it must also have made it hard enough for him to accommodate himself to the somewhat tedious way, which the latter pointed out as the way to the goal of the expected consummation. The transfiguration (*Verklärung*) of this natural individuality begot in him the energy of Christian hope, with which we see him conceiving the ultimate goal of the consummation which has appeared in Christ, and in the light of which we see him regarding the whole Christian life. Thus he has become, in a pre-eminent sense, the apostle of hope. Lastly, there still comes out directly in him, as a personal disciple of Jesus, the influence which the living perception of the earthly life of Jesus, and, partly, individual significant words, and, partly, His whole manner of teaching have upon the peculiarity of his doctrine. For the very reason that his predominantly practical nature was not adapted for deeper, searching speculation, for analysing reflection, or for penetrating contemplation, his statements

regarding Jesus and His work are still the direct expression of the opinions which he arrived at from the manifestation of Jesus as regarded in the light of the Old Testament and His own teaching.

(*c*) Bauer (iii. p. 182–266) had already given a special representation of "the theory of Peter as to the Christian religion." On the other hand, de Wette finds in our Epistle a representative of the Jewish-Christian as well as of the Hellenistic tendency (p. 203); and v. Cölln regards it, indeed, as belonging to the Palestinian type of doctrine (p. 197), but does not give a special representation of its teaching. Lutterbeck does not represent the Petrine type of doctrine according to our Epistle, in which he finds almost nothing but verbal quotations from the doctrine of Paul, so that the representation of its doctrine would be only an anticipation of that of Paul (p. 178). In this we have only an expression, in a very characteristic way, of the necessary consequence of the prevailing mode of regarding our Epistle (note *a*). Schmid was the first to give a thorough representation of the doctrine of Peter (ii. 154–210 [E. Tr. 374–417]), and Messner has substantially followed him (p. 107–153). By these it is reckoned among those types of doctrine which exhibit the Gospel in its unity with the Old Testament, and it is stated to be its more special peculiarity that it regards the Gospel as the fulfilment of Old Testament promise (cf. Schmid, ii. p. 91 [E. Tr. 335]; Messner, p. 59); yet Peter is far from regarding the salvation which has appeared in Jesus merely as the fulfilment of promise; he regards it also, nay, predominantly, as a pledge of the promise which is still unfulfilled, as a ground of hope in the still approaching completion of salvation.[1] On the presupposition of its genuineness Mayerhoff (*Einl. in d. petrinischen Schriften*, Hamburg 1835) found in the Epistle a (natural rather than conscious)

[1] When Lechler, however, in his representation of the doctrine of Peter (p. 173–191), sets forth "the union of suffering and glory in the case of Christ as well as in that of the Christians" (p. 175) as the fundamental thought of our Epistle, nothing decisive is thereby said as to the peculiarity of its method of teaching, since he himself allows that this idea is closely connected with its leading practical aim (p. 176); and the same objection applies to the statement of Kahnis (i. p. 523) that "sanctification as the preparation for blessedness" is the *summa* of Peter's preaching

mediating standpoint (p. 103 ff.), and Reuss (ii. p. 291–305 [E. Tr. ii. 262–275]) discovers an intentional combination of doctrinal elements which belong to Paul and James respectively (p. 294 [E. Tr. 264]), an intentional silence regarding the controversy as to the law, a retaining of Pauline formulæ, which, however, along with their basis (the mysticism of Paul and his doctrine of justification), lose also their peculiar significance, while the Jewish-Christian basis of its theology is also very apparent (p. 307 [E. Tr. 271]). The Tübingen school, which holds it to be spurious, regards our Epistle as a monument of a later phase of Paulinism, either inasmuch as it seeks to reconcile the separate tendencies by means of a representation of the doctrine of Paul which has received a somewhat Petrine colouring (Schwegler, ii. p. 2–29; cf. Baur, p. 287–289), or inasmuch as it shows a standpoint which has already got rid of these contradictions, and forms the point of transition to Catholicism (Köstlin in his *Joh. Lehrbegriff*, p. 472–481; Pfleiderer in his *Paulinismus*, p. 417–431 [E. Tr. ii. 148–162]). On the other hand, Immer (p. 473–488) seeks in it a reconciliation from the Jewish-Christian standpoint, without, indeed, even making an attempt to show this from the peculiarity of its system of doctrine. In many respects these works have done much to assist us in placing more clearly in the light that which is peculiar in the teaching of our Epistle as distinguished from those of Paul. But if the whole foundation is made to be Pauline, and yet the specifically Pauline stamp is effaced from every fundamental Pauline idea (cf. *e.g.* Baur, p. 287), it is natural to suspect that these fundamental Pauline ideas have, first of all, been interpreted into the Epistle by explaining it in accordance with imaginary Pauline parallels. In fact it has been shown in my "*Pet. Lehrbegriff*" (Berlin 1855), represented according to the three points of view mentioned in note *b*, that the series of ideas contained in our Epistle not only do not require Paulinism for their explanation, but set forth a much simpler and more elementary type of doctrine (cf. also Ritschl, p. 116–120, ii. p. 317; Schenkel, § 12, 41 f.). Following entirely the plan of that work (Peter, the apostle of Jesus Christ—the apostle of the circumcision—the apostle of hope), v. Oosterzee gives an exposition of the theology of

Peter (§ 26–29); while L. Morich (*des heiligen Apostels Petrus Leben und Lehre*, Braunschweig 1874), making use of this Epistle and the discourses in the Acts, treats, in a very dogmatic manner, of the teaching of Peter in its "historico-dogmatico-confessional, legal-ethical, and prophetical elements" (p. 147–235).

## § 37. *The Epistle of James.*

A third source for the doctrinal system of the original apostles in its earliest form is the Epistle of James, on the assumption that it neither opposes the teaching of Paul, nor even knows it. (*b*) Besides its general Jewish-Christian character, the peculiarity of its system of doctrine is conditioned partly by its predominant legal tendency, and partly by the immediateness of its attachment to the traditional sayings of Jesus. (*c*) The system of our Epistle, which has been generally represented with a prevailing regard to the teaching of Paul, is still in need of an exposition which looks away from the latter, and does full justice to its own peculiarity.

(*a*) Our Epistle is written by the real brother of the Lord, by James, the son of Mary and Joseph. It was not probably till after the resurrection of Jesus that he became a believer; but in consequence of the position which he assumed at the head of the mother Church in Jerusalem after the flight of Peter (Acts xii. 17), he gained an almost apostolic authority in the early Church, especially in the Jewish-Christian portion of it. His Epistle, which is addressed to the Jews of the dispersion in general, naturally turns, since he speaks to them as the servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ, mainly to those among them who believed in the Messiah. Judging, however, from the circumstances which he keeps specially in view, these still lived in the closest intercourse with their unbelieving fellow-countrymen. They still stood in the fellowship of the synagogue with these in a manner which points to the earliest times of Christianity. Belonging to the lower orders, and, besides, being oppressed and despised by the avaricious rich who were proud of their wealth, they had now also to endure the whole hatred of these, as the sectarian confessors of the condemned Nazarene. They them-

selves, however, not free from a secret love of the world, envied their fellow-countrymen who were in better circumstances, and now sought to distinguish themselves in their eyes as teachers of the truth and as preachers of repentance; in doing which, however, notwithstanding all their pretended zeal for the conversion of others, they often only gave the reins to their natural inclination. This peculiar situation gives the exhortation of this hortatory writing its distinct colouring. It was necessary to manifest the new faith, not in fluent discourses, in uncharitable zeal and controversy, but in the doing of the word which they had heard, and in patience. It is true, a writing with so distinctly limited an aim ought not to be regarded as the programme of a system of doctrine; but this very situation gives occasion to the author to state, in various ways, that which, according to him, constitutes the nature of Christianity, in such a characteristic manner that the peculiarities of his theology come out clearly enough. If, indeed, we find in it an attack upon certain misunderstandings or abuses of the teaching of Paul, or if we make it even presuppose controversies regarding that teaching (cf. Reuss, i. 488 [E. Tr. i. 423]), we are no longer justified in treating of its teaching, with Schmid (cf. ii. p. 98, 132 [E. Tr. 338]), as the first of the apostolic systems of doctrine; in that case it must rather be regarded, with Lechler and others, as a monument of their teaching in the form which it assumed after the appearance of Paul. But neither the whole character of the Epistle, which contends, in a purely practical interest, not against errors of doctrine, but against errors of life, nor the historical situation of its purely Jewish-Christian readers makes a direct or indirect reference to the teaching of Paul at all likely; while the correct determination of the date of our Epistle altogether forbids it. A closer examination of the discussions, in which it has been sought to find that reference, shows that the author deals with ideas which are totally different from those of Paul, and that the manner in which he takes for granted the propositions which he employs for the support of his practical exhortations, and proves them by means of Old Testament examples, betrays, most naively, his complete ignorance of the theses of Paul which appear to be so con-

tradictory to his, as well as of the use that Paul makes of the same examples. (Cf. my article, "James and Paul," in the *deutsche Zeitsch. für christl. Wissenschaft und christl. Leben*, 1854, Nos. 51, 52.) The Epistle, accordingly, also belongs to the time prior to Paul, and at least stands next to the First Epistle of Peter both as regards time and contents.[1]

(*b*) Although it was not under the guidance of Jesus that James had attained to faith, yet neither in his case had conversion to belief in the Messiah caused a break with his Old Testament piety, a piety which was so highly prized in this "just" one even by the unbelieving Jews. The Jewish-Christian type is stamped upon his Epistle, as well as upon the First Epistle of Peter; nay, his whole manner of writing is plainly modelled upon that of the prophets and the Proverbs of the Old Testament. In conformity, however, with his whole individuality, the leading tendency of his striving, even during his previous life, had been directed, not so much to the fulfilment of Israel's promise, as to the fulfilment of the will of God which was revealed in the law, although, it is true, he had never conceived this fulfilment after the manner of the Pharisees. If he also, therefore, found in Christ the completion of the salvation which was given to his people, he must have beheld this completion specially in the perfect revelation of the will of God and in the power which was given to enable them to fulfil it perfectly. Although he also had seen the earthly life of Jesus, yet the circumstance that he then remained apart from the circle of the disciples hinders the image of Jesus, in the prime of life, from having such an influence upon his manner of teaching as it had in the case of Peter. It is the image of the exalted Lord, who appeared to him also (1 Cor. xv. 7), which alone floats before his believing adoration. On the other hand, like Peter, he also often attaches himself directly to the sayings of Jesus, only these

[1] Whether it is earlier or later than the latter depends upon the view which one forms, from the comparison of the undoubtedly parallel passages in the two Epistles, on the question, upon which side the dependence is. For biblical theology the result is of small importance, since, at any rate, the inner relationship between the discourses in the Acts of the Apostles and the First Epistle of Peter makes it desirable not to treat of the Epistle of James among the documents of this period till the third place.

are drawn, not from his own independent recollection, but from apostolic tradition.

(*c*) Since Luther took offence at the contradiction between the doctrine of justification which is contained in our Epistle and that of Paul, its teaching has frequently been thoroughly investigated, but most generally with a too exclusive reference to the controversy as to whether such a contradiction exists, and as to whether regard is had in our Epistle to the Pauline thesis. Even in Neander, who denies any polemical reference to Paul, the whole exposition of the teaching of James turns round its comparison with that of Paul (ii. p. 858–873 [E. Tr. ii. 15–27]). Although Schmid § 56–59) and Messner (p. 77–98) correctly recognise the peculiarity of our system of doctrine, according to which the side of it which is turned towards the Old Testament attaches itself to the law, yet, in the former, this point of view altogether loses its fundamental importance, inasmuch as, starting from the doctrine of justification, he shows how not only all its other doctrines, but even its conception of Christianity as the perfect law is closely connected with that doctrine; while the latter starts, it is true, from the latter point of view, but makes the whole of his representation culminate in the doctrine of justification, which has by no means such a predominant importance in the system of our Epistle. On the other hand, Lechler and Reuss, in order that they may compare it with the teaching of Paul, separate the doctrine of justification altogether from their representation of the rest of the teaching of James, which the former (p. 163–170) connects with the thought (which is certainly not a central one) that the Christian life must be a whole, while, in the latter (cf. the *théologie judéo-chrétienne*, cap. 8), it amounts to a combination of Christian morality with Jewish eschatology (p. 485 [E. Tr. 421]). Lutterbeck's opinion (ii. p. 170–176, cf. p. 53), that our Epistle was written at the desire of Paul to the churches of Asia Minor, for the purpose of confirming to them the whole of his teaching, not only makes any historical, but also any biblico-theological comprehension of it impossible. The Tübingen school, on the other hand, sees in our Epistle a monument of the Ebionitic attack upon the Pauline doctrine of justification; an attack which, indeed,

according to Schwegler (i. p. 413–448), sought, in an irenical manner, to reconcile the opposite ways of thinking upon the soil of Jewish-Christianity; while, according to Baur's representation (p. 277–287), the Epistle directly attacks the central point of the teaching of Paul (cf. Schenkel, § 23; Immer, p. 426–442, who, however, confines himself almost exclusively to the fundamental ethical thoughts, and sets aside everything which is peculiarly Christian as being of little importance in the eyes of the author). If we would deny this, it must be shown that Paul and the author of the Epistle of James connect a totally different meaning with the three leading terms which are in question in the doctrine of justification. This I believe I have shown in the article referred to in note *a*; and upon this is based the attempt which is made here to represent the teaching of our Epistle in its peculiar connection and without the reference to the ideas of Paul which has so often led astray (cf. also Ritschl, p. 109–116, ii. p. 317; Gess, ii. 19–28, and the excellent article of Beyschlag, "der Jacobusbrief als urchristliches Geschichtsdenkmal," *Stud. und Krit.* 1874, 1). That which v. Oosterzee (p. 150–152) presents regarding James is very meagre. W. G. Schmidt (*der Lehrgehalt des Jacobusbrief*, Leipzig 1869) forsakes the only correct and fruitful historical conception of the Epistle, and places it in the time after Paul; while doing so, it is true, he seeks to minimise the difference with Paul as far as possible, and excludes every real theological controversy. He discusses very thoroughly, first, the soteriological presuppositions, then sin, the new birth (faith and works), justification, and the Christian life.

# SECTION I.

## THE DISCOURSES OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE PROCLAMATION OF THE MESSIAH AND THE MESSIANIC TIME.

### § 38. *The Fulfilment of Prophecy in the earthly Life of Jesus.*

The preaching of the apostles commences with the proclamation of the Messiahship of Jesus. (*b*) Even in His earthly life He had been the promised prophet like Moses, whom God Himself had accredited by wonders and signs, and the anointed servant of God of whom the prophets had spoken. (*c*) According to prophecy even His shameful end had been foreordained by God. (*d*) But in the earliest preaching the positive proof of His Messiahship, which could be deduced from that fact, as well as the saving significance of His death, had still to be kept in the background.

(*a*) Like Jesus Himself, His apostles commence, not with a religious doctrine or an ethical demand, but with the proclamation of a fact. They had, indeed, been appointed by Jesus for the express purpose of continuing His proclamation. But if Jesus had commenced with the announcement that, with the coming of the promised time of salvation the kingdom of God was come, and had at first only indirectly testified of Himself as the Messiah, in whom it was come (§ 13), this relation was now reversed. It is true the apostles also proclaim that theirs are the days of which all the prophets have spoken (iii. 24), and therefore that the Messianic time has commenced. But since, as yet, all the salvation which that time was to bring was by no means realized, they commence, in the first instance, with that point in which prophecy was already fulfilled, with the manifestation, viz., of the promised Messiah in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It would, of course, have been an altogether hopeless undertaking to have attempted to persuade the people that the Rabbi of Nazareth,

who had lived and taught among them, and who had made Himself famous by the cures which He had wrought, was the promised and expected Messiah. Such a manifestation by no means corresponded with the idea which the national expectation had, in consequence of prophecy, formed to itself of the Messiah. Jesus Himself, however, had never spoken against this image of the Messiah; nor had He ever imported into the prevalent Messianic idea a meaning which was foreign to it. He had only opposed their purely political conception of Messiahship as being still too meanly apprehended, and had reserved to the future His exaltation to full Messianic dignity. Indeed, even the Messianic confession of the disciples could not, during His earthly life, have the meaning that Jesus was already, in a perfect manner, that which the name of Messiah declares; it rather only declared, by anticipation, that this Jesus was destined to be the Messiah, that no other one was to be looked for to bring about the Messianic consummation (cf. Luke xxiv. 19, 21) than He, in whom its realization had already commenced. In the firm assurance of an ultimate exaltation of Jesus to full Messianic dignity they had learned, though not without a hard struggle, to surmount everything which, in His earthly manifestation, contradicted their Messianic expectations. It was impossible, therefore, that they could now expect the people to see something in the earthly manifestation of Jesus which they had never seen therein themselves.

(*b*) Nevertheless, even during His earthly life it must have come to the light that Jesus was the organ which prophecy had looked forward to for the bringing about of the Messianic consummation. It was necessary, therefore, to search in prophecy for such features as, apart from the image of the Messianic King, pointed to such a supreme and final organ whereby God would reveal Himself and communicate His salvation to the people, and to show that these were found in Jesus. Jesus Himself, however, had represented Himself as the last and greatest in the series of God's messengers (§ 13, *c*); and, according to Messianic interpretation, nothing else was asserted in the prophecy regarding the prophet like Moses, whom God was one day to raise up to His people out of their midst (Deut. xviii. 15). That the national expectation had

also kept this prophecy in view, however varying might be the application which it gave it, is known from John i. 21, vi. 14, vii. 40 (cf. Acts vii. 37). Peter proclaims Jesus to be this prophet (iii. 22); as such He, like Moses in days of old (vii. 36), had been accredited on God's part by mighty works and wonders and signs which God had done by Him in the midst of the people (ii. 22), specially by the casting out of devils, which proved that God was with Him, *i.e.* that God stood on the side of His messenger with His miraculous help (x. 38). And as Jesus expressly traced back these last to the Spirit of God, so Peter sees in them the proof that Jesus of Nazareth had been anointed by God with the Holy Ghost (x. 38). Already the earliest tradition related such an anointing on the occasion of His baptism in the Jordan (Mark i. 10). Prophecy, however, knew of a servant of God who was anointed with the Spirit of God (Isa. xlii. 1, lxi. 1), through whom God was to bring to the people the glad tidings of the commencement of the Messianic time (lii. 7). This joyous message of salvation God had sent to His people through Jesus (Acts x. 36); Jesus was therefore this anointed servant of God (iv. 27, cf. iii. 13, 26); for that *παῖς Θεοῦ* here denotes not the Son of God (cf. even Morich, S. 149), but the עֶבֶד יהוה, appears from iv. 25, where David is so named. Through the anointing with the Holy Ghost this servant has become the holy servant of God (iv. 27, 30), or the Holy One of God *κατ' ἐξοχήν* (ii. 27: *ὁ ὅσιός σου*) of whom Ps. xvi. 10 spoke. In this idea, however, of a peculiar appropriation and consecration to God there was involved the idea of freedom from sinful pollution; for, according to the view of the Old Testament, nothing impure can be consecrated to God. It is true that in the designation of Jesus as the Holy and Righteous One (iii. 14) there lies, in the first place, only the contrast to the treatment as a delinquent which He received at the hands of the authorities; but prophecy also had characterized the servant of God simply as the Righteous One (Isa. liii. 11), and since His whole life was an exhibition of this spotless righteousness which corresponded to the will of God, they could see in Him only the coming of the Righteous One (vii. 52) which the prophets had before announced (cf. xxii. 14).

(*c*) Still it was certainly a violent demand that was made upon the people, when they were asked to believe that a delinquent who had been condemned by the spiritual authorities, who had been executed by the Gentile civil power, and who had died upon the tree (v. 30, x. 39), *i.e.* upon the cross, was the Messiah. However much His life might favour this belief, this end of His remained an apparently unsurmountable obstacle (*σκάνδαλον*, cf. 1 Cor. i. 23). Although, in consequence of Isa. liii., even the idea of a suffering Messiah might not be altogether unfamiliar to a profounder view of prophecy (Luke ii. 34 f.; John i. 29), yet this was certainly not the form in which they conceived its fulfilment to be possible. It was necessary, therefore, to show that even this end had been already looked forward to by prophecy. Now, however, Jesus Himself had referred to the fact that, according to Ps. cxviii. 22, God would make the stone which was rejected by the builders of the theocracy, *i.e.* by the present hierarchical authority, the corner-stone of the completed theocracy, *i.e.* the Messiah (Mark xii. 10); and when standing before the priests, Peter appeals to the fact that this has happened in the case of Jesus (iv. 11). Ps. ii. 2 had already foretold a rebellion of the princes of this world against the Lord's anointed (iv. 25–28). Nay, the divine decree referred even to the shameful manner in which Jesus was delivered into the hands of His enemies by one of His disciples; for in Ps. lxix. 25, cix. 8 Peter found the fate of the betrayer already foretold (i. 16, 20). If God, however, had by the mouth of all His prophets foreshown the suffering of His Messiah exactly as it had taken place (iii. 18), then that which had happened was no judgment of God which testified against Jesus; He had not fallen helplessly into the hands of His enemies; but everything was foreordained by God's power and counsel (iv. 28), everything had taken place in accordance with His determinate counsel and foreknowledge (ii. 23).

(*d*) When once they had come, apologetically, to an understanding regarding the death of Jesus, it could also be used as a positive testimony to His Messiahship. For concerning that Messianic servant of God (note *b*) Isaiah had prophesied that He was to be led as a lamb to the slaughter (liii. 7, 8); and the circumstance that this fate also had been fulfilled in

the case of Jesus (Acts viii. 34 f.) could only prove still more decisively that He was really that servant of God. Jesus Himself had repeatedly pointed to the fact that death and suffering, in the manner in which they befell Him, were part of the destiny of life which was appointed to the Messiah in virtue of His calling (§ 16, *c*). But the idea of the suffering Messiah had become far too strange to the people, at least, for them to be able to make a greater use of this positive argument. Herein is to be found also the reason why, in this elementary proclamation, the saving significance of the death of Jesus had still to be kept in the background, although it was distinctly expressed in sayings of Jesus (§ 22, *c*) which, as we shall see, the original apostles had understood; for that significance could be rightly appreciated only on the presupposition of the Messiahship of Jesus, which had still to be established. It is therefore unwarrantable in Lechler (p. 19) to deny to Peter, during this period, the knowledge of this significance. Much rather, if the death of the Messiah took place in consequence of a divine decree, it must also have had its significance for the Messianic activity of Jesus (cf. § 22, *c*, footnote 3); and in the connection of iii. 18 f. there lies plainly enough, for the consciousness of the speaker, the presupposition that through the fulfilment of the prophecy concerning the suffering of the Messiah, God has done His part to provide for the people the Messianic forgiveness of sins, for the appropriation of which they have now only to do that which is required of them.

## § 39. *The exalted Messiah.*

The decisive proof of the Messiahship of Jesus was furnished by His resurrection on the third day, which the apostles proclaimed as His chosen witnesses. (*b*) In consequence, however, of the promise of Jesus and the outpouring of the Spirit, they could also proclaim His exaltation to the right hand of God. (*c*) Through this exaltation God had invested Jesus with the full sovereignty which was appropriate to the Messiah, a sovereignty which, far surpassing as it did the national expectation, now made Him appear a divine being. (*d*) But not until He was sent once more from heaven could

He appear to the nation as the Messianic finisher and judge.

(*a*) Now, however, it was a fact that God had raised up the slain Jesus; and Peter does not fail to contrast this fact repeatedly, and in the most striking manner, with His shameful death (iii. 15, iv. 10, v. 30). Nor had He been raised up only as all hoped to be raised up; but, as a plain proof that His death was different from that of other men, He had already been raised up on the third day (x. 40). This fact is, accordingly, the real central point of the apostolic testimony (ii. 32, iii. 15); for it was not to the whole nation, but only to the chosen witnesses, that God had caused the risen One to make Himself manifest (x. 41), and whom He had thus made the witnesses of His resurrection (i. 22). Thereby, however, there fell, in the first place, a new light upon the Messiahship of Jesus. In Ps. xvi. 10 David had said that God would not allow His Holy One to see corruption, and would not leave His soul in Hades. This David could not have said concerning himself, seeing that he was dead and buried, and therefore his flesh had fallen a prey to corruption. Accordingly, in that passage he could only be speaking as a prophet of the descendant who, according to 2 Sam. vii. 12 (cf. Ps. lxxxix. 4), was promised to him. It was of this latter one, therefore, that it had been said beforehand that he would not continue in death. This is the manner in which Peter himself (ii. 25–31) justifies the application of this passage to the resurrection of the Messiah (ver. 31: ἐλάλησεν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ).[1] And now, if, according to the testimony of the apostles, Jesus had been raised up by God (ver. 32), this had happened because, according to this prophecy, it was not possible that He could be holden by

[1] According to this passage, therefore, the resurrection consists in this, that the soul, which was put into Hades after its separation from the body, is again removed from it, that the painful death-state of the (disembodied) soul is put an end to by its being again clothed with the body. That even the flesh is not decomposed in corruption, but, so we must assume, is immediately changed into a substance suited to the heavenly life, is a prerogative of the Messiah, who is raised up, not at the last day, but already on the third, *i.e.* before corruption had commenced (cf. John xi. 39). Incidentally we further learn from this passage that Peter not only takes for granted the Davidic descent of Jesus *per se*, but also that this was known to all the people and universally acknowledged (cf. § 19, *a*).

death, *i.e.* because He was the Messiah of whom it prophesied (ver. 24). For in vv. 25–31 the οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν of ver. 24 is established, not by reflecting upon a vital principle which inhered in Him because of His nature (Schmid, ii. 167, 169 [E. Tr. 387 f.]), or upon His Messianic dignity *per se* (Baur, p. 307), but by referring to the passage in the Psalm whose Messianic application was justified.

(*b*) The risen One, however, had also been exalted to God's right hand, and that, likewise, because David had already foretold the exaltation of the Messiah to God's right hand (ii. 33–35), as Peter shows from Ps. cx. 1—a passage which had been applied to the Messiah by Jesus Himself. That this exaltation has taken place must have been a matter of certainty to the apostles in consequence of the prophecy of Jesus (§ 19), and, in so far, they could already bear witness also to this fact (v. 31).[2] When in v. 32, however, the fact of the communication of the Spirit is also mentioned as a testimony to this exaltation, this is to be understood, in accordance with ii. 33, to mean that it is only as the One who is exalted to God's right hand that Jesus could receive authority to bestow the gift of the Spirit—a gift which God had promised to give in the Messianic time, and which believers were conscious of having received through the mediation of Jesus.[3]

(*c*) Through His exaltation to participation in divine glory and in the government of the world, a participation which is denoted by sitting at God's right hand (§ 19, *c*), Jesus has now first entered upon the specific Messianic dignity. Although it was evidenced in His earthly life, as well as in His death and resurrection, that Jesus of Nazareth was the

[2] The assumption of a visible ascension to heaven, of which the earliest tradition knew nothing, is no more involved in this by itself than in the ἀναλημφθῆναι of i. 22 and the ἀναβῆναι εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς of ii. 34 (which must indeed necessarily take place, if the heaven was to receive Him who walked upon earth (iii. 21)), even though Luke may already have so taken it.

[3] It is only in ii. 33, where a specific Messianic authority is ascribed to the exalted Jesus (cf. Matt. iii. 11), that God is called His Father, a circumstance which is all the more significant, seeing that in these discourses He never appears as the Father of believers. But because there is already involved in this the idea of Christ's Sonship, and that, too, in the sense of election to the calling of Messiah (§ 17), we must not, with Lechler (p. 18), lay any special weight upon the absence of the name of Son.

person foreseen by Messianic prophecy as the One through whom God would accomplish the completion of salvation, yet royal dominion was too essential a feature of the prophetic picture of the Messiah, that the latter could be regarded as perfectly fulfilled, so long as that feature was not yet realized. Now, however, the whole house of Israel could know assuredly that God has made the crucified Jesus Lord and Messiah (ii. 36). It is true, the Son of David, whom God Himself had anointed (§ 38, *b*), had not ascended the throne of His father David, as the national expectation hoped; but this was only in order that He might exchange it for the throne of the world, that instead of being the King of Israel He might become the Lord of all (x. 36). It is now that He has first become the corner-stone of the completed theocracy (iv. 11), the Captain, to which position God has exalted Him (v. 31). But He is designated not only the Lord of the theocracy or of believers, but also simply the Lord (ii. 36, xi. 23, 24; cf. ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς: i. 21, iv. 33, xi. 20, xv. 11), as only Jehovah Himself is named. For, following the example of the LXX., here also the Old Testament name of God is rendered in quotations by ὁ κύριος (ii. 20, 25, 34, iv. 26, and frequently), and God is designated simply ὁ κύριος (i. 24, iii. 19, iv. 29, cf. ii. 39). If now Jesus has become the κύριος in the same comprehensive sense, then a saying, which treats of the κύριος-Jehovah, may also be applied without more ado to the κύριος-Jesus, and that, too, a saying which speaks of the invocation of God (ii. 20, 21, cf. vii. 59, 60). The Messiah who is exalted to this κυριότης must, of course, be a divine being (cf. § 19, *d*), although, for the earliest proclamation, this conclusion gave no occasion for the consideration of the question, in how far such an exaltation was rooted in the original nature of His person.

(*d*) If it is after His exaltation from the earth that Jesus has first entered upon His full Messianic dignity, it follows, of course, that His earthly life was not yet the manifestation of the Messiah which prophecy had looked forward to, the manifestation which was to bring about the ultimate consummation (§ 38, *a*). He must be sent once more, as He was sent the first time (iii. 26). Without referring to the prophecy of Jesus, it is assumed in iii. 20 as self-evident, that a

time will come when God will send this Jesus as the Messiah appointed for the nation (read: τὸν . . . Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν), when He comes forth, therefore, in conformity with prophecy, in His full Messianic glory, to bring to the people the times of the Messianic consummation (ver. 19). Thus, even the Jesus who is enthroned and ruling in heaven (ver. 21) is not yet in a perfect manner that which the Messiah is to be to the people; but that no other one than this Jesus will one day come as the Messiah, and that, too, not only as the accomplisher, but also as the judge of the world ordained of God (x. 42)—it is this that the proclamation of His Messiahship is meant to prove.

## § 40. *The Coming of the Messianic Time.*

With the appearance of the Messiah there has commenced the Messianic end of the times, which already bestows essential Messianic saving blessings. (*b*) As a condition of participating in these the apostolic message at once demands and works repentance. (*c*) This manifests itself, first of all, in the believing acceptance of this message, and in the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah. (*d*) As the immediate sequel, however, of this end of the times which has already commenced, the Messianic judgment is to be looked for, from which only the Messiah can deliver all who call upon His name.

(*a*) Although the Messiah had not yet brought the completion of salvation, yet there could be no doubt that with His appearance there had commenced the Messianic time to which all the prophets had pointed (iii. 24), as the last days (ἔσχαται ἡμέραι, as translation of the Old Testament אַחֲרִית הַיָּמִים; cf. Gen. xlix. 1; Mic. iv. 1; Isa. ii. 2), in which all the decrees of Jehovah must be accomplished. In ii. 17 Peter expressly inserts this *term. techn.* of Messianic prophecy into the prophecy of Joel, whose fulfilment he there points out, in order to show that with this fulfilment at least the Messianic end of the times had come. If, however, that is the case, then with it essential blessings of salvation must also already be given. Now, as such a blessing, the prophecy in Joel ii. 28 f. names a universal pouring out of the Spirit; this has taken place on the day of Pentecost (ii. 16 ff.), and

is ever repeated afresh in the case of those who believe in the Messiah (ii. 38). The Baptist had already stated that the Messiah would baptize with the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 11), and the disciples of Jesus are conscious of having received this gift through their exalted Lord (ii. 33).[1] The other essentially Messianic blessing of salvation (§ 22, *a*) is the forgiveness of sins which was promised by all the prophets for the Messianic time, and which, like the communication of the Spirit, is also secured through the mediation of the Messiah (*διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*, x. 43); this can now be offered to every one on the occasion of his entrance into His Church (ii. 38, iii. 19, v. 31), in consequence of the authority which was bestowed upon it by Jesus (§ 31, *c*). Even the miracles of healing, in which the manifestation of Jesus proved itself to be a revelation of Jehovah, who had come in the time of salvation with help and blessing to His people (§ 20, *d*), repeat themselves within the Church (ii. 43, v. 12, vi. 8, viii. 6, 7, 13). Only, in order to glorify His Messiah (iv. 10), God now works them, in answer to the prayer of the disciples (cf. ix. 40, xxviii. 8), through the name of Jesus (iv. 30); *i.e.*, on the occasion of miracles, the name of Jesus, which denotes His Messianic dignity, must be called upon (iii. 6, cf. xvi. 18), and thus it is brought out, that it is only in consequence of the manifestation of the Messiah that this grace of God is bestowed upon the Church. Indeed, the very name of Jesus may be conceived of as that which works the cure (iii. 16), or Jesus Himself may be regarded as continuing His healing activity by the hands of His disciples (ix. 34).

[1] Just as in the prophecy of Joel, the Spirit appears here also as the principle of supernatural gifts of grace (cf. § 18, *a*, footnote 2); for in the speaking with tongues (ii. 4, x. 46, cf. viii. 18), in prophesying (xix. 6, cf. i. 16), and in seeing visions (vii. 55), the communication of the Spirit forthwith reveals itself in visible and audible phenomena; the Spirit works the wisdom and the power with which the disciples bear witness to the truth (vi. 3, 10, vii. 51). It is true these gifts of the Spirit are by no means regarded merely as "wonderful phenomena," but as the equipment of the servants of God for the work that is laid upon them (ii. 18); but nowhere does the Spirit appear as the principle of the new moral life. Nor is the Spirit conceived of as personal, but as a gift of God (ii. 38, v. 32, viii. 20, cf. x. 45, xi. 17); and when an appeal is made to v. 32 in order to prove the contrary, the circumstance is overlooked that there it is not the Spirit itself, but the fact of the communication of the Spirit (cf. § 39, *b*) that testifies to the exaltation of Jesus.

(*b*) Participation in these blessings is attached, however, to certain conditions. As Jesus Himself was sent by God to turn away His fellow-countrymen from their previous iniquities, and so to make them sharers in the Messianic blessings (iii. 26), so His apostles demand repentance (ii. 38, viii. 22) and the consequent change in men's moral walk, and make this the condition of their obtaining the forgiveness of sins (iii. 19, v. 31, viii. 22). This demand is grounded, however, not only upon the general assumption of human sinfulness, but also, under the special circumstances of the earliest apostolic preaching, upon the grievous sin which the people had committed, in that, through the choice of Barabbas, they had made themselves guilty of the denial of Jesus and sharers in the guilt of His death (iii. 13–15). But as the proclamation of Jesus not only demanded repentance, but also effectively called it into existence (§ 21, *c*), so also the preaching of the apostles. God has exalted Jesus to His right hand in order that every one, who is willing to see, may now know that He was God's chosen Messiah, and that, consequently, His death was a grievous sin, and so may be led to repentance. If, in this sense, God has, by the exaltation of Jesus, given the people the strongest motive for repentance (v. 31, cf. xi. 18), then the proclamation of His exaltation by the apostles must vigorously work this repentance. Through repentance those who participate in the Messianic salvation become a fellowship of true servants of God (iv. 29, ii. 18, cf. § 32, *a*), a fellowship which walks in the fear of the Lord (ix. 31).

(*c*) It is only the first and most obvious evidence of this repentance, if those who rejected the message of God which was addressed to them through Jesus now accept the proclamation of God's new messengers. The apostles, namely, are the witnesses chosen of God; they have received, through Jesus, His command to preach unto the people (x. 41, 42); and, in the execution of this command, they are obedient to God alone (iv. 19, v. 29). As regards them, it is self-evident that the obedience which God demands consists in this, that men receive their message, in which a word of God Himself (iv. 29) is addressed to the people, as true (cf. ii. 41, viii. 14); and, accordingly, this obedience appears in v. 32 as a condition of the communication of the Spirit. Standing as it does

in connection with the hearing of the word, believing, in xv. 7 (cf. ver. 9), can denote only this trustful acceptance of the message (§ 29, *c*),—it can only mean that one believes him who brings the joyous message of the name of Jesus as the Messiah (viii. 12).[2] In such a case the consequence will be, that they now call Jesus, whom the people once rejected, their Lord and Master, because they have known assuredly from the apostolic message that God has made Him this (ii. 36). They must call upon Jesus who is thus confessed to be the Messiah (ver. 21); through this name, which they must then, naturally, confess, they receive the forgiveness of sins (x. 43); for this name's sake they must suffer dishonour and sacrifice their life (v. 41, xv. 26, cf. § 29, *b*). Inasmuch, now, as the acknowledgment of the Messiahship of Jesus is expressed in this name, and therewith the assurance is given that through Him all the divine promises of salvation are fulfilled, there is no doubt already included in this faith the confidence that, through Him, all the Messianic blessings of salvation will be received. In xv. 11, however, faith appears expressly as trust in the deliverance that is to be expected, through Jesus, in the Messianic judgment.

(*d*) With the pouring out of the Spirit the prophecy of Joel immediately connected the coming of the day of Jehovah, *i.e.* of the great Messianic day of judgment, amid dreadful signs in heaven (Joel ii. 30 f.). By adopting this part also of the prophecy (ii. 19, 20) Peter wishes to intimate explicitly that, as the immediate sequel of the last days which have already commenced, the Messianic day of judgment is near at hand; and according to § 39, *d* this is the day of the second sending of Jesus, seeing that He comes as the Lord and Messiah who

[2] As in the discourses of Jesus, so here also faith is probably not yet directly referred to the person of Jesus; for in x. 43 *πάντα τὸν πιστεύοντα εἰς αὐτόν* is probably an addition of Luke's, which is obviously superfluous alongside of *διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*, and xi. 17 belongs to a discourse whose derivation from the Petrine source is doubtful (§ 35, *b*). On the other hand, *ἡ πίστις* stands in iii. 16, *b*, just as in the discourses of Jesus (§ 29, *c*), for the wonder-working trust in God, which, however, is in so far owing to the Messiah (*ἡ δι' αὐτοῦ*) as only the assurance, that the grace of God which surmounts all difficulties has appeared in Him, could lead to such a trust in God's miraculous help. For this reason it is really the name of Jesus which has restored soundness to the cripple, because of the confidence which Peter places in it (*ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος*), when, in the name of Jesus, he commanded him to walk (iii. 16 *a*, cf. iv. 10).

has been appointed judge. The present generation of the people, laden as it is with the most heinous sin (note *b*, ii. 40 : *γενεὰ σκολία*; cf. Deut. xxxii. 5), can naturally only look for destruction in this judgment (viii. 20 : *ἀπώλεια*, cf. § 34, *c*), unless a way of deliverance is pointed out to it. Such a way, however, Peter has pointed out to the people (ii. 40), by explaining the prophecy of Joel, that every one who shall call on the name of the Lord will be saved, as referring to the name of Jesus who has been exalted to be Lord and Messiah (ver. 21). There is no other name given among men, whereby men can be saved, than the name of the Messiah; therefore it is in Him alone, as the Lord of the completed theocracy, that its members can find the Messianic salvation (iv. 11 f.). In so far Jesus is exalted not only to be the Lord, but also to be the Saviour (v. 31). As the Messiah who is ordained to be the judge (x. 42) He has naturally also to determine who shall be delivered from this judgment; and, according to xv. 11, He will, through His favour, deliver all who show, by their calling upon Him, that they have penitently received the message of salvation. With deliverance from destruction, however, there is at the same time given the completed salvation, which, according to § 34 *b*, consists in (eternal) life. Accordingly, Jesus has also become the Prince of this life (iii. 15 : *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς*) : as the One who has been led to life through the resurrection, He shows to all the way of life.[3]

## CHAPTER II.

### THE MOTHER CHURCH AND THE QUESTION OF THE GENTILES.

### § 41. *The Church and the Apostles.*

At the feast of Pentecost the Church was founded by the pouring out of the Spirit and the institution of the rite of baptism, to the reception of which participation in the forgive-

[3] The inaccurate translation of *ἀρχηγός* by "author" has caused Gess to think exclusively of the life-giving power of Jesus as shown in His miracles of healing (ii. p. 6).

ness of sins and in the gift of the Spirit is henceforth attached. (*b*) The Church continued bound together by their participating in the teaching of the apostles, by the realization of brotherly fellowship with one another, by the rite of the breaking of bread, and by common prayer. (*c*) An organization is incidentally given to the Church through the appointment of overseers of the poor; the place of these is taken later by the elders who also officially look after its other concerns; while the younger members of the Church, without any express official position, attend to its outward services. (*d*) The apostles devote themselves wholly and diligently to prayer and the ministry of the word, without, however, claiming any specific qualification or authority.

(*a*) Through the baptism of the Spirit at the feast of Pentecost the exalted Christ had again borne witness of Himself to His disciples as the One who would and could bring about the realization of the kingdom of God upon earth; there was now a Church of Christ (ἡ ἐκκλησία simply: v. 11, viii. 1, 3) within the Old Testament Church of God, a Church which had been consecrated by Himself through the gift of the Spirit to be the place of its realization. This was not a school or a sect, which was bound together by peculiar dogmas or religious ceremonies; but as the Old Testament Church had been bound together by the divinely-appointed bond of blood relationship, so this Church was bound together by the divine gift of the Spirit, the bestowal of which declared its members to be the true servants of Jehovah (ii. 18), in whose midst the completed theocracy with all its blessings must be realized. From those, however, who should henceforth be gained by the apostolic preaching, and who should wish to connect themselves with this Church, Peter already, according to his first Pentecostal sermon, demanded the baptism of repentance (ii. 38: μετανοήσατε καὶ βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος), which John had once demanded from the whole nation. By submersion the resolution to abandon entirely the old disposition, and to begin a new life as a new man, was to be represented and confirmed in a symbolical act. That which was new was only this, that the act of submersion was performed in the name of Jesus (viii. 16: εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ; cf. ii. 38: ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι, x. 48: ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, which has essentially the

same significance).[1] In this way expression was given to the fact that this act included the recognition of Jesus as the Lord and Messiah, a recognition which was denoted by the name which was currently given to Him in the Church. If, however, in this way, the two demands were fulfilled to which participation in the saving blessings of the Messianic time was attached (§ 40, *b*, *c*), these must also have immediately become the portion of those who submitted to the baptism of repentance in the name of Jesus. Accordingly Peter promises to those, who suffer themselves to be baptized, the forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Spirit (ii. 38).[2] In the outpouring of the Spirit, which is manifested in externally perceptible phenomena (§ 40, *a*), believers had the pledge that this promise was fulfilled (cf. xix. 5, 6); and by means of it the exalted Christ gave them the assurance that it was according to His will and in His name that the apostles had instituted this sign of the covenant (cf. § 31, *b*). Peter could therefore describe baptism as the way which leads to the Messianic salvation (ii. 40), inasmuch as, by its reception, they entered into the Church, which its exalted Lord must deliver from destruction when He returns to judgment (cf. § 40, *d*).[3]

[1] That this was the original expression for the specific use of the rite of baptism in the Christian Church, appears unquestionable from 1 Cor. i. 13, 15 (cf. x. 2). It is not impossible that the naming of Jesus, which was the expression of the acknowledgment of His Messianic dignity, taken in connection with the significance which it gained for the rite of baptism, very early left its mark in the technical Messianic name (ὁ Χριστός) being divested of its appellative sense and joined with the name Jesus into a *nomen proprium* (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός: ii. 38, iii. 6, iv. 10, viii. 12, x. 36—yet almost only where the point in question is the reverential designation of the Messiah); yet we must note the fact, that in these very discourses ὁ Χριστός still occurs frequently in its original technical appellative sense (ii. 31, 36, iii. 18, 20, iv. 26, ix. 34, cf. v. 42, viii. 5), and that it is therefore difficult to determine how far that expression, which is found also in other parts of the Acts of the Apostles, already belonged to the source which Luke employed.

[2] Thus, then, the merely symbolical act of John's baptism of repentance had become a sacrament, *i.e.* the vehicle of supernatural gifts of grace. Already it is plainly a secondary feature, when Mark's Gospel ascribes even to John's baptism the mediation of the forgiveness of sins (i. 4). The earliest tradition (Matt. iii. 11) knows nothing of this, and expressly reserves the baptism of the Spirit for the coming Messiah.

[3] Naturally this does not forbid that the exalted Christ Himself was not confined to this order. There is nowhere any indication that baptism was considered necessary for those who had already become disciples of Jesus, and had been led to repentance and faith by Himself. The first Church of the dis-

(*b*) A short description of the life of the first Church is given in ii. 42, very probably according to the Petrine source, since in ii. 43–47 Luke has sought to explain and supplement it. According to this description, the Church gathered around the teaching of the apostles (which was, indeed, only the continuation of the proclamation of Jesus), just as the stedfast following of Jesus, for the purpose of continually hearing His teaching, was, during the lifetime of the Messiah, the sign of enduring discipleship (§ 29, *a*). Moreover, even the name *μαθηταί* appears to have been retained in the circle of the mother Church (xv. 10, cf. vi. 1, 2, ix. 36, xi. 29). It was bound together by the bond of an inner fellowship (*κοινωνία*); within the wider brotherhood of their fellow-countrymen (ii. 29, 37, iii. 17) it formed a closer brotherhood (i. 15, xi. 29, xv. 1, and frequently), in which they addressed one another as *ἀδελφοί* (cf. i. 16, vi. 3, xii. 17, xv. 7, 13), just as Jesus had already taught His adherents to regard themselves as brethren (§ 25, *c*). This brotherly fellowship found its expression in their compassionate provision for the widows (vi. 1), and, naturally, also for the poor in general; for this purpose not a few well-to-do members of the Church sold all their possessions (iv. 37), without this, however, being regarded as a duty (v. 4). Their meals were in common; and at them the breaking of bread of Jesus on the occasion of the last supper was repeated in a holy memorial feast (ii. 42, cf. § 31, *b*). Lastly, according to ii. 42, the fellowship of the disciples was a fellowship for prayer (cf. i. 14, iv. 24, xii. 12), in keeping with the circumstance that Jesus had made prayer (which would also be heard) the privilege and duty of His adherents (§ 20, *b*, 30, *b*). That, accordingly, the members of the Church had their fixed and separate assemblies, in which they were conscious of their common confession in listening to the preaching of the apostles and in common prayer, admits of no doubt.

(*c*) As Jesus has not determined anything regarding an

ciples receives the gift of the Spirit without baptism (ii. 33); and so, too, the first Church of the uncircumcised (x. 44), in order that their baptism might be occasioned by a divine *σημεῖον* (x. 47, xi. 15–17, cf. also ix. 17 f.). The case even occurs in which the gift of the Spirit does not immediately follow upon baptism (viii. 16, cf. ver. 12).

organization of the future Church (§ 31, *c*), so neither have the apostles, at first, considered such an organization to be necessary. As, in consequence of the growth of the Church, the administration of provision for the poor became more arduous, and required greater care in order that abuses might be avoided, the Church resolved, on the motion of the apostles, who had up to this time received and administered the love-gifts (iv. 37, v. 2), to choose seven men qualified by the Spirit's gift of wisdom to undertake this difficult task (vi. 1–6). These seven men (xxi. 8: *οἱ ἑπτά*) are not styled deacons, although it is a *διακονία* which they undertake (vi. 2). Later, we find also the institute of the elders of the synagogue imitated in the Church, in the *πρεσβύτεροι*, whose calling accordingly must have been the management of the external affairs of the Church. Now, since there was among these none more important and more extensive than that of providing for the poor, and since in xi. 30 it is really the elders, as it had previously been the apostles, who receive the love-gifts, it would appear that, after the temporary interruption of the continuity of the life of the Church (viii. 1), in consequence of which we see one of the seven henceforth active as an evangelist (viii. 5, 26 ff., xxi. 8), these elders took the place and adopted the duties of the seven men, who had been chosen only *ad hoc*, into their more comprehensive official activity. Nowhere do the elders appear as a teaching authority; not even at the apostolic council (Lechler, p. 308), where their activity comes out so prominently (xv. 2, 6, 22, 23, xvi. 4) probably only because the question discussed there had, besides its religious side, an importance of the greatest consequence for the social life of the Church. Also in xxi. 18 ff. they consult with Paul as to measures for maintaining peace and order in the Church (cf. ver. 22). The younger members of the Church (v. 6, 10: *οἱ νεώτεροι* or *νεανίσκοι*), without any special office, perform the external services of the congregation, among which even the external performance of the rite of baptism appears to be counted (x. 48).

(*d*) Quite in keeping with the charge of Jesus (§ 31, *a*) the apostles describe as their specific activity, in which they wished not to be hindered by the management of the external

affairs of the Church, the *διακονία τοῦ λόγου* (vi. 2, 4), in consequence of which they form the teaching authority in the Church. With this *διακονία τοῦ λόγου*, so far as it is exercised within the circle of the Church, there is probably closely connected also the leading of the prayers of the congregation (vi. 4: *προσευχή*), which, equally with teaching, involves the guiding of the assembly. Although they originally also look after its external affairs, yet they soon relieve themselves of this duty, because they consider that it does not fall within their specific province (note *c*); it is only, therefore, as the most prominent members of the Church, and not in virtue of their apostolic office, that they have hitherto performed this task. Not once do we perceive them exercising governmental authority. At their instigation the choice of the seven men was resolved upon and carried out by the Church (vi. 5, cf. i. 23); the discourses of the apostles only prepared the way for the decision at the so-called apostolic council; it was come to, however, by the Church in agreement with them and the elders (xv. 22, 23). The unmasking of the two deceivers, whom the punishment of God overtakes (v. 3–10), is no act of Church discipline. If it is in the apostles that the Holy Ghost appears deceived and put to the proof (vv. 3, 9), this is only because it is they who have received the gifts (ver. 2) which were entrusted to the Church, and esteemed by it because of the Holy Ghost; for all the members of the Church have received the Spirit, and the decree of the Church is a decree of the Holy Ghost (xv. 23, 28). If signs and wonders are done by the hands of the apostles (ii. 43, v. 12), this gift is nevertheless by no means confined to them (iv. 29 f., cf. vi. 8, viii. 6, 7, 13); and Peter expressly opposes the idea that these are performed by means of any special power inhering in them (iii. 12). Others also possess the Spirit's gift of wisdom (vi. 3, 10), speak through the Spirit (vi. 10, vii. 51), see visions (vii. 55), and prophesy (xi. 27, 28: *προφῆται*, cf. xiii. 1, xv. 32, xix. 6), as indeed the Spirit, who is bestowed upon all, is the principal of all the gifts of grace (§ 40, *a*). If it is by the laying on of the apostles' hands that the Samaritans receive the Holy Ghost (viii. 17, 19), ver. 15 shows that this is only a symbol signifying that it was for them that the apostles were praying

(cf. vi. 4); and in ix. 17 (cf. ver. 12) even this laying on of hands is performed by one of the disciples with the same effect. So in vi. 6 the laying on of hands only accompanies the prayer with which the apostles induct into their office the men who, on account of their fitness, had been chosen as overseers of the poor; in an analogous manner the prophets and teachers of the Church at Antioch induct Barnabas and Saul into the missionary office to which they were called (xiii. 3), while in xiv. 23 the officers of the Church are appointed only with prayer. If, in the last place, it is the apostles who, according to viii. 14, appear to make provision for the union of those recently converted with the mother Church, it is the mother Church itself which, in an altogether analogous case, does this by means of one of its other members (xi. 22).[4]

## § 42. *The Conversion of the whole of Israel.*

The mission of the apostles to Israel is only the resumption of the evangelizing and converting activity of Jesus; through the complete conversion of Israel it is to render the return of Jesus and, therewith, the coming of the consummation of all things possible. (*b*) Accordingly, there is still granted to the nation a season of repentance; even the putting to death of the Messiah is to be regarded as a sin of ignorance, and only final disobedience towards Him is to be regarded as the sin of presumptuousness, for which extirpation from the nation is appointed as punishment. (*c*) There remains, therefore, to the apostles the hope that converted Israel will be the Church

[4] The prominent position which Peter assumes in the Church is a result of his peculiar qualifications, in consequence of which he throughout takes the lead in word and in deed; it is not a position which is officially fixed. It was only later that they regarded it as a result of a supremacy which Jesus had given him, and that they applied to him alone the promise of the power of the keys (Matt. xvi. 19), inasmuch as they explained it in accordance with Isa. xxii. 22. Alongside of him, the sons of Zebedee (see, on the one hand, xii. 2, on the other, iii. 1, 3, 4, 11, iv. 13, 19, viii. 14), who already stood nearest to Jesus (§ 31, *a*), must have been specially prominent. After Peter's imprisonment, James, the brother of the Lord, takes his place, although we hear nothing as to any express determination of the matter (xii. 17, xv. 13; cf. xxi. 18).

of the time of the consummation, and with this hope there is necessarily involved their firm adherence to the law of the fathers. (*d*) Even the renewed threatening prophecy of Stephen and his fearful castigatory sermon have not attacked the holy things of Israel, nor do they yet pronounce the divine sentence of rejection upon the nation.

(*a*) According to § 31, *a* the real commission of the apostles is not to the Church, but to the whole nation. They are the witnesses chosen by God, the witnesses who are specially qualified to proclaim the resurrection, and who are charged with the message to the people (x. 41, 42, cf. iv. 19, v. 29). The significance of their number, twelve, as referring to the nation of the twelve tribes, is expressly recognised in the choice of one to fill the place vacated by Judas (i. 20).[1] Through Jesus God had sent the glad tidings to the children of Israel (x. 36); but since the realization of salvation remained dependent upon the repentance of the nation, it had been His first effort to lead each individual in the nation to turn away from sin (iii. 26). This effort had been in vain; instead of being converted, the nation had killed its Messiah. Thereby the direct development of the Messianic work of salvation which had been originally intended was interfered with. The slain Messiah had been raised up by God and exalted to heaven; but now this very exaltation must become to the nation the most powerful motive of repentance (v. 31, for which see § 40, *b*). Accordingly, the apostles were once more sent to the people of Israel (x. 42) with the message regarding the Messiahship of Jesus, and with the demand of repentance. Jesus must now remain in heaven until the times of the general conversion of which Malachi (iv. 5 f.) had prophesied (iii. 21). That it is of this that the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων is to be understood is shown by Mark ix. 12, and confirmed

[1] They can choose this successor of Judas only from such as have been constant followers of Jesus (i. 21, 22) during the whole time to which their preaching refers (x. 37–41). Between those with this qualification whom the Church puts forward (i. 23) God Himself decides by means of the lot which is cast after He has been called upon (i. 24–26). In accordance with the promise of Jesus (Matt. x. 20, cf. § 21, *c*, footnote 1) they are specially qualified by the Spirit to defend themselves before the Sanhedrim (iv. 8), and also otherwise equipped for the preaching of the word (iv. 31). Yet they are far from claiming the exclusive right of preaching (cf. vi. 10, viii. 4, 5, xi. 19, 20).

by the context. Not till then would the nation be prepared for the final consummation of all things which Jesus was to bring on the occasion of His second mission as the Messiah appointed for them (iii. 20, cf. § 39, *d*). In this sense it depends upon their repentance and conversion whether the promised times of refreshing, *i.e.* the Messianic time in its greatest perfection, can come (ver. 19). To bring about the fulfilment of this condition is the task of the mission of the apostles to Israel.

(*b*) It remains, therefore, that the Messianic salvation is appointed for the people of Israel (ii. 39: *ὑμῖν ἡ ἐπαγγελία καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις ὑμῶν*). They are the children of the prophets who have promised all this salvation (iii. 24), they are the members of the covenant which God has made with the fathers and in which He has engaged Himself to the seed of Abraham (ver. 25). This may surprise us, seeing that, according to the earliest tradition, Jesus had already announced the rejection of the nation (§ 28, *d*). But as there is no prophecy of salvation which does not remain dependent upon the behaviour of those who are to be blessed, so there is no threatening prophecy which cannot be averted by a penitent conversion. Even the founding of a Church which belongs specially to Christ within the Old Testament national Church does not yet involve the rejection of the latter, since the former may gradually extend itself until the two coincide. That the rejection of the nation which was threatened by Jesus is still suspended for a time, that it can still be averted by the nation's repentance, this is the presupposition of the whole of the missionary preaching of the original apostles. The Old Testament distinguishes between sins of weakness or inadvertence, which are committed in ignorance (Lev. iv. 2, xxii. 14: בִּשְׁגָגָה, *κατ' ἄγνοιαν*) and which could be atoned for by the institute of sacrifice, and such sins as, committed with daring wickedness (Num. xv. 30 f.: בְּיָד רָמָה), were punished with extermination from among the people (*ἐξολοθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ*). Peter explicitly proclaims to the people that even the daring slaying of the Messiah is still to be regarded as committed *κατ' ἄγνοιαν* (iii. 17), and may still be forgiven in consequence of a penitent conversion (ver. 19). But whoever does not now listen to

the prophet promised by Moses, *i.e.* to the Messiah, over him is pronounced, not the threatening of wrath in Deut. xviii. 19, but the very formula of malediction in Num. xv. 30 (iii. 23), *i.e.* he has committed the sin of which Jesus already says that it cannot be forgiven (§ 22, *b*). Accordingly a time of grace is still granted to the nation; it is to be tried whether the one great σημεῖον, to which Jesus already pointed the multitude when it demanded a miracle (Matt. xii. 39 = Luke xi. 29), cannot yet lead them to repentance (cf. v. 31).

(*c*) The apostles still hope that the whole of Israel will be converted; this hope is the soul of their missionary labours. It is not, thereby, said that every individual will be converted and become a believer; even the prophets had always prophesied that before the coming of the Messianic consummation there would be a sifting, by which the unworthy members of the nation would be excluded from participation in the Messianic salvation. Those individuals among their fellow-countrymen who have refused to listen to the great Messianic prophet, and to attest their repentance by baptism in His name, will be rooted out from among the people (note *b*), so that ultimately there remain only believers in Israel; Israel, converted and believing in the Messiah, this Israel will form the Church of the end of the times, the Church which is ripe for the consummation (note *a*).[2] With this hope of an ultimate conversion of the whole of Israel in this sense there was, however, necessarily involved their unqualified adherence to the law of the fathers. If Israel as a nation was to participate in the Messianic consummation, then it must also adhere

[2] With this hope there is, *per se*, given the possibility that a realization of the kingdom of God in the forms of the Israelitish theocracy may still take place, and therefore that the prophecy may also be fulfilled of the glory of the kingdom of Israel, in which the apostles, at least originally, hoped (Acts i. 6). That this was still hoped for later in the apostolic circle, cannot be proven; it is characteristic of the manner in which they taught, that the question as to the form in which the times of refreshing will be realized (iii. 19) is not entered into more particularly. According to the context, the ἀποκατάστασις of iii. 21 cannot be the restoration of the kingdom of Israel (cf. note *a*), and the heavenly consummation of the kingdom of God which Jesus promised (§ 34) can be reconciled with such a hope only by means of chiliastic ideas, of which there is no trace at this time. Naturally this does not forbid that here and there such hopes were cherished; but it also leaves the way open to the opinion that, by the slaying of the Messiah, the earthly consummation of the Israelitish theocracy was forfeited once and for ever.

to its law; for Israel's whole national life rested upon this law. Israel was a nation separated from the nations only so long as it adhered to this law. And if those Israelites who believed in the Messiah might have, for some reason or other, emancipated themselves from it, they could not have done so without setting up such a wall of partition between themselves and their still unbelieving fellow-countrymen as would have made the conversion of the latter to any great extent impossible. But no word of Jesus set His disciples free from obeying the divine law (cf. § 24) to which they were engaged by circumcision; hence it cannot be surprising that the mother Church remained faithful to the law, and, seeing that it was strict in the performance of all its duties, even became zealous for it in a high degree, as is still testified of it in xxi. 20 (cf. ii. 46, iii. 1, x. 9, 14, xxii. 12).[3]

(*d*) The attitude of Stephen to the question considered in note *c* is naturally to be gathered mainly, not from the accusation made against him (vi. 11, 13, 14), but from his own defence. In this, however, there appears no indication that he regards the law and the cultus of Israel as an imperfect revelation of God (cf. Messner, p. 174). He rather sets forth the divine origin of circumcision (vii. 8), he delights to describe Moses as the great typical deliverer of the nation (vv. 35–37), he makes him receive the law from the mouth of angels, and describes it as λόγια ζῶντα (ver. 38), and as binding upon Israel (ver. 53); and certainly the mediation by angels is meant to guarantee rather than to question the divine character of this law. Just as little does he pronounce the eventual rejection of the nation (cf. Messner, p. 174). It is true the patriarchs have already sinned against Joseph, who was exalted by God (vii. 9, 10), and the contemporaries of Moses have not recognised in him the deliverer sent by God (vv. 25–28), but have denied him (ver. 35), and afterwards,

[3] The question as to the conditions of participation in the Messianic salvation did not, in the first instance, touch this matter at all. Just as certainly as no truly pious Jew believed that because of his piety he could do without the forgiveness of sins and the communication of the Spirit which were looked for from the Messiah, so little could this piety, *per se*, entitle him to membership in the Messianic Church, which depended upon totally different conditions (cf. § 41, *a*), or save him in the Messianic judgment, since this depended solely upon his attitude towards the Messiah.

in disobedience to him, turned to idolatry (vv. 39–43). It is true that, like Jesus Himself (Matt. xxiii. 31), he calls the present generation the sons of the murderers of the prophets, and upbraids them as being stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, because they resisted the Spirit of God which spoke to them in the preachers of the Gospel, as their fathers had resisted the Spirit which spoke in the prophets (vii. 51, 52), and did not even fulfil the law for which they were zealous (ver. 53). But all this is still only a sharp castigatory sermon for the purpose of leading them to repentance; and it is pure arbitrariness to assume, with Schmid (ii. p. 36 [E. Tr. 296]), that the speaker was not allowed to go on to the conclusion of his discourse, which would have pronounced the rejection of the nation. There certainly runs through the whole of the discourse the thought that the divine revelation of salvation is not confined to the temple. Abraham received the primary divine revelation in Mesopotamia, and came later into the promised land (vv. 2–4). His descendants had to be in bondage for 400 years in a foreign land (ver. 6, cf. vv. 9–36), and to wander forty years in the wilderness, where the revelation of the law was given them (vv. 36, 38), just as it was in a foreign land that God appeared to Moses himself (vv. 29, 30). Even in the splendid days of Joshua and David, the Israelites worshipped God in the tabernacle (vv. 44–46), and Solomon first dared to build Him a temple; and even that temple was not yet, according to the word of the prophet (Isa. lxvi. 1, 2), the real and exclusive dwelling-place of God (vii. 47–50). Since these remarks are meant to be an apology with reference to the statements on account of which he was accused, nothing is more likely than that he had reproduced the threatening prophecy of Christ regarding the fall of the temple; and, quite in the spirit of Jesus (§ 24, *d*), he may probably have connected with it the prospect that with this catastrophe the system of worship, whose central point was the temple, would also be changed. But certainly he had not represented this as taking place so directly as the false witnesses asserted (vi. 14), but had threatened it in the event of the definitive obduracy of the nation, an obduracy which was no doubt always growing more and more probable. The whole of his discourse shows that he was conscious that

he had not offended against the holy place and the law; although the incisive manner in which his threatening words pointed anew to the catastrophe, which was always becoming more and more unavoidable, reawakened in the people, for the first time, the consciousness that, with its ultimate consequences, the Messianic sect threatened the national holy things.

## § 43. *The Position of the Gentile Christians in the Church.*

Although, even from the first, there was reserved for the Gentiles an ultimate participation in the Messianic salvation, yet the manner in which He would one day lead these to the completed theocracy was left to God. (*b*) Express intimations of God had first to convince the mother Church that it was His will to introduce Gentiles to the fellowship of the Messianic Church, even before the conversion of the whole of Israel. (*c*) At the apostolic council the freedom of converted Gentiles from the law was expressly recognised, in opposition to the zealots, who demanded that they should pass through Judaism, and only precautions were taken that this recognition should not damage the mission to Israel. (*d*) On the other hand, its decrees were not sufficient to secure the social and religious fellowship of these two sections of the Christian Church, differing entirely, as they did, as to their rule of life; and notwithstanding these decrees, an extreme party in the mother Church soon reverted to their old pretensions.

(*a*) Peter quotes the prophecy which was given to the patriarch (Gen. xxii. 18), according to which all the families of the earth are to be blessed in the seed of Abraham (iii. 25). Therewith the ultimate universal realization of the Messianic salvation was expressed as decidedly as the presupposition, that, before this becomes possible, the seed of Abraham must first participate in this salvation. Accordingly, God has sent His servant, first of all, to Israel (iii. 26), in order to effect its conversion, and therewith to render His blessing by means of the promised salvation possible (§ 42, *a*). But the promise of salvation belongs not only to the Jews, but also to those that are afar off (ii. 39); and according to Isa. xlix. 1, 12, lvii. 19 these are undoubtedly the Gentiles, especially as the

Jews of the dispersion were numerously represented in the audience of his Pentecostal sermon, and therefore embraced in the ὑμῖν. When Peter, however, with an allusion to Joel ii. 32, says that God will call these, the manner in which He will do this is left as indefinite by him as by Jesus (§ 28, *d*), and, at all events, an actual mission to the Gentiles is not present to his mind. According to the earliest tradition, the apostles possessed no commission relating to such a mission (§ 31, *a*); and such a mission was, at first, altogether impossible, because in the eyes of strict Israelitish piety, at least in the Palestinian circles to which the original apostles belonged, it was unlawful to have such an intercourse with the uncircumcised (x. 28, xi. 3; cf. Gal. ii. 12, 14) as a mission among them would have demanded. But even the prophetic descriptions of the manner in which the Gentiles would, in the Messianic time, obtain a share in the salvation of Israel, had never conceived of an actual mission to them. It was rather the Gentiles who, attracted by the glory of Israel, would, of their own accord, set out to attach themselves to the completed theocracy (Mic. iv. 1, 2; Isa. ii. 2, 3, lx. 4, 5; Jer. iii. 17). This completion of the theocracy, however, could be brought about only by the conversion of Israel, upon which Jeremiah iv. 1, 2 expressly makes the salvation of the Gentiles depend; and the more the apostles had learned to recognise the Messianic salvation as a fulness of spiritual blessings (§ 40), so much the more did that completion remain in the first instance independent of the political restoration which was somehow or other to commence with it (§ 42, *c*).

(*b*) As the first indication given by God that, even before the complete conversion of Israel, uncircumcised persons were to be brought into the Church, there appears in the Acts of the Apostles the conversion of the centurion Cornelius. God had expressly shown Peter, in a vision, that he must not regard as unclean what God declares to be clean (x. 10–16); and the Spirit had interpreted this vision to him as meaning that he should follow the messengers of Cornelius, who invited him into the house of the unclean Gentile (vv. 17–20, cf. ver. 28). When he learns there that, in obedience to the divine command, Cornelius is ready to hear whatever God causes to be spoken to him through His messenger (vv. 30–33), he recog-

nises that, without respect of persons, God will have the glad tidings proclaimed to every one who, by reason of his fear of God and his righteousness, is susceptible to it (vv. 34, 35), and preaches the gospel to him (xv. 7). But not until God has shown by the pouring out of the Spirit that He makes no difference between Gentile and Jewish believers, but has cleansed the hearts of the former, by the faith worked in them, from all Gentile profanity, and thus esteems them worthy of fellowship with the people which was consecrated to Him by circumcision, does he allow Cornelius and his household to be received by baptism into the Church, *i.e.* into the fellowship of believing Israel, to whom the promise belongs (x. 44–48). It was not the baptism of Gentiles, which indeed had been performed under such circumstances that no one could contest their right; it was the fact that Peter had gone in to the uncircumcised, and had eaten with them, which gave offence in Jerusalem (xi. 2, 3), and required a detailed justification. As to this point, however, the Hellenistic Jews, who had been accustomed to a freer intercourse with the Gentiles, had fewer scruples; and so there arose in Antioch, through their activity, an essentially Gentile-Christian Church (xi. 20, 21), which the mother Church frankly recognised, and received into union with itself by the sending of Barnabas (ver. 22). It was here, probably, that Christianity first appeared to the Gentiles, no longer as a Jewish sect, seeing that its confessors no longer confined themselves to the Jewish manner of living, but as an independent religious fellowship, to which they gave the name *Χριστιανοί* (xi. 26). In the newly converted Gentiles the mother Church, however, could see only such as God had brought, before the time, to participation in the Messianic salvation, which was to be realized first of all in Israel, and to whom, therefore, they could and must allow an exceptional position. So long as there were only individual Gentile converts, who did not claim an independent significance in the Church, believing Israel remained the real substance of the Messianic Church (§ 42, *c*), to which the fulness of the Gentiles was to attach itself, only when once Israel as a nation was in possession of the promise. The definitive regulation of the relation of the Gentiles to Israel could very easily remain postponed, till they should have been converted as a

whole (and no longer as individuals) to the Messiah of Israel, whether they should then as a body receive the ordinances of Israel, or the Messiah who was soon to return should appoint altogether new ordinances in the completed theocracy.

(*c*) Not until a number of essentially Gentile-Christian churches had arisen in consequence of the mission which was undertaken from Antioch (Acts xiii., xiv.), did the question present itself to the mother Church, whether they should recognise in these Gentile churches an independent portion of the Messianic Church. Many answered this question in the negative, because the Messianic salvation which was destined for Israel could be shared in by the Gentiles, only if they attached themselves to Israel by the reception of circumcision and the law (xv. 1, 5); as, indeed, this had, from olden times, been demanded of proselytes, who wished to enjoy full citizenship in Israel. This demand, however, Peter, at the apostolic council, emphatically refused; for God Himself had, by the communication of the Spirit, declared the believing Gentiles to be clean, and therefore on the same footing with the nation which had been consecrated by circumcision (vv. 8, 9, cf. note *b*), and they must not now demand of Him another sign, which should declare them also free from the law, more especially as even the Jewish Christians hoped to be saved, not through their always imperfect fulfilment of the law, but through the favour of the Messiah (vv. 10, 11).[1] They likewise learned from the communications of Barnabas and Paul that even among the Gentiles God had given efficacy to His glad tidings, and had thus called them to participate in the Messianic salvation (ver. 12; cf. Gal. ii. 7, 8). This indication of God, however, would have remained neglected, if they had compelled the Gentiles first of all to become Jews by the acceptance of circumcision and the law. With this opinion James also substantially agreed, only he regarded the Gentile Christians, who were free from the law, not as incorporated

[1] By means of the last clause expression was only given to the fact that, in this controversy, the question was not at all as to the real ground of salvation, which no Jew who had really become a believer sought in his observance of the law, but as to an obligation which incorporation with the people of the promise involved. The utterance, however, regarding the impossibility of fulfilling the law is an expression of religious experience, and not a dogmatic thesis borrowed from the Pauline system.

with believing Israel, which was faithful to the law, but as a new people, which Jehovah had chosen to bear His name, alongside of the old people of God, even as Amos (ix. 11, 12) had already foretold that the restoration of Israel (which was now begun by the Messiah) would gain the subjection of the Gentiles to His name (xv. 13–18). It was therefore decreed that, apart from their manifesting their brotherly fellowship with the mother Church by their love gifts (Gal. ii. 10), nothing should be enjoined on the Gentile Christians (Acts xv. 19) save that they should abstain from such things as would have kept up the abhorrence of Judaism, as represented in the synagogues, against the uncircumcised Christians, and would thereby have proved an insurmountable obstacle to the conversion of the dispersion (vv. 20, 21). Seeing, viz., that the hope was not yet given up of a complete conversion of Israel, and that the original apostles were unweariedly to carry on the mission to Israel (Gal. ii. 9), precautions had to be taken that the Jews of the dispersion should not feel themselves separated from the Christendom, which was free from the law, by an insuperable barrier which should make any impression upon them impossible. These things were the eating of flesh sacrificed to idols, of blood and things strangled, as well as fornication (Acts xv. 20, 29).[2]

(*d*) This decree of the apostolic council, however, by no

[2] It cannot be proved that the Gentile Christians were thereby placed under the conditions under which the Israelites received the proselytes of the gate into their social fellowship—not even when we go back to its most original form in Lev. xvii., xviii.—(Ritschl, p. 129; cf. on the other hand *Stud. u. Krit.* 1859, p. 137 f.); the resemblance to these, so far as it really exists, resulted naturally from the similarity of the motives which prevailed here as well as there. Further, the decree of the apostolic council was expressly issued only to those churches which stood in a somewhat close connection with the mother Church (xv. 23); for it cannot be surprising that even the Cilician churches are counted among these, since in ver. 41, and probably already in ix. 30, the existence of such churches is taken for granted, and these are undoubtedly conceived of as planted from Jerusalem, seeing that the Acts of the Apostles has as yet related nothing regarding an independent mission of Paul to the Gentiles. Acts xxi. 25 refers back only to the decree in xv. 23, and could prove, at the most, only that, in Jerusalem, they held that the concessions which were then demanded from Gentile Christians in the churches which were connected with the mother Church were necessary everywhere, without the context in any way betraying the intention of insinuating that this is the mind of Paul. If Paul had once introduced the apostolic decree even in the churches which were planted during his first missionary journey (xvi. 4), we have to remember that this journey was

means solved all difficulties. Since it took for granted, as unquestioned, that the Jewish Christians remained faithful to the law of the fathers; and since this, according to the view of the original apostolic circles (note *a*), embraced also total abstinence from all intimate intercourse, and specially from fellowship at table with uncircumcised persons, they were thereby prohibited from holding the more intimate social and religious fellowship with the Gentile Christians, of which, in particular, the common meals formed a part. They could now esteem the Gentile Christians as such cleansed by faith from all Gentile profanity (xv. 9, for which see note *b*), and in consequence of this they could grant them fellowship at table, as Peter did in Antioch (Gal. ii. 12). Therewith, of course, a step was taken towards their being weaned from the strict Israelitish rule of life, a step which could easily lead them much farther. They could also, however, like τινὲς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου (Gal. ii. 12), demand that, on account of the strict custom of the fathers, the Jewish Christians must renounce that fellowship with the Gentile Christians.[3] The apostolic decree itself had not even looked at the case of intercourse in mixed churches; for, according to Acts xv. 21, the concessions of the Gentile Christians were made, not on account of the Jewish Christians, but because of the synagogues (note *c*).[4]

undertaken at the instigation of the church of Antioch, and under the superintendence of Barnabas, a member of the mother Church (xiii. 2, 3, cf. ver. 7).

[3] It is true we do not know whether they really acted according to the mind of James or only alleged his authority; but it is by no means impossible that he adhered to this stricter interpretation of the apostolic decree, an interpretation which was quite in keeping with his view of the independent existence of the new people of God alongside of the old (note *c*).

[4] It may be taken for granted that ver. 21 cannot possibly assign the reason of ver. 19, and cannot, therefore, contain the thought that the claims of Moses are already satisfied through the Jews. But just as little can it contain the thought that in the universal diffusion of the service of the synagogue there is expressed the claim of Moses *upon the Gentiles*, since the proclamation of the law *in the synagogues* can only express its obligatoriness for Jews. But neither is the point in question as to an accommodation with respect to the Jews *qua* Jews, so that a simple διὰ τοὺς Ἰουδ. could have stood here; the point in question is as to an accommodation with respect to the Jewish custom which had struck root in consequence of the Mosaic law (hence the ἐκ γενεῶν ἀρχαίων), and which had been kept always alive by the service of the synagogue. The idea of an accommodation, however, is *necessarily* involved in this, that the clause assigning the reason of the enactment mentions not any need or duty of the Gentile Christians, but a constant practice of the synagogue.

When now Peter, in consequence of the pressure of the zealots, withdrew from the Gentile Christians, Paul justly denounced as ὑπόκρισις (Gal. ii. 13) this conduct which contradicted his better conviction which had previously stood the test, and saw in it an indirect constraint upon the Gentile Christians, who, unless they would for their part give up fellowship with Jewish believers, must adopt the Jewish mode of life, *i.e.* become Jews, by accepting circumcision and the law (ver. 14). The whole argument of Paul, however, shows expressly that Peter must reject the consequence of the conduct adopted by him, a consequence which abolished the freedom and independence of the Gentile churches which had been solemnly acknowledged. On the other hand, there was not awanting a party within the mother Church which, in spite of the apostolic decree, was always reverting to the demand that, in order to obtain a full share in the Messianic salvation, the Gentiles must become incorporated with the people of the promise by circumcision and the acceptance of the law; and this demand was, at least, a logical consequence of that stricter interpretation of the apostolic decree, since a denial of social fellowship must necessarily gradually lead to doubt as to the full fellowship in salvation of the Gentile Christians.[5]

[5] The Tübingen school, however, has not been able to show that the original apostles or James supported the demands of this Judaistic party. Neither their hope of a complete conversion of Israel, nor their opinion that believing Israelites formed the essential part of the Church compelled them to do so. It is true, however, that it was only on the presupposition that the Jewish mission would have a speedy and decisive success, and that the return of Christ which was thereby conditioned (§ 42, *a*) would soon make an end to the whole difficulty, that a more satisfactory solution of the question as to the social relation of the Jewish-Christian and the Gentile-Christian sections of the Church than that which was given by the apostolic decree could remain postponed. This presupposition was not realized; and, accordingly, the further development of Christianity has soon left the standpoint of the apostolic council behind it.

# SECTION II.

## THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE MESSIANIC CONSUMMATION IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

### § 44. *The Elect Race.*

The Christian Church, in which the promised completion of the theocracy begins to be realized, is the elect race, which consists of believing Israelites. (*b*) Their election to participation in the completed salvation is accomplished in baptism, in which God makes them a holy nation by equipping them with His Spirit, and granting them the full forgiveness of sin. (*c*) All Israelites who would not obey the demand of the message of salvation are excluded from the elect race. (*d*) Wherever individual Gentiles are received into the Church through baptism, they are joined to the elect race, whose substance is formed by believing Israel.

(*a*) Since that which is considered in the First Epistle of Peter is no longer the proclamation which lays the foundation, but a building up of churches which already exist (ii. 5), the apostle does not start by proving that prophecy has been fulfilled in Jesus, but the basis of his exhortation is the fact, that in the Christian Church the realization has commenced of that which was set before the theocratic nation as the highest ideal, and which was to be realized in the Messianic time which has now commenced. That which Jesus proclaimed as the coming of the kingdom of God in the midst of the disciples (§ 14), is, for the preaching of the apostle, the completion of the theocracy in the Christian Church. Ye are the elect race (ii. 9), Peter writes to the Christian churches of Asia Minor. It is true they already belonged to the elect

nation in virtue of their descent;[1] for the elect out of the Jewish dispersion in that region (i. 1) have been chosen in accordance with the foreknowledge of God (ver. 2: *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ*). In the election of Israel (Deut. vii. 6, 7; Isa. xliii. 20) there already lay the prevision that in this nation the divine purpose of salvation would be fulfilled, and in the circumstance that its realization has now commenced in the Church of believing Israelites, only that divine foreknowledge is confirmed. But now, the question is not as to the election of Israel as a nation, but as to the selection of individuals out of it, in whom the greatest salvation which is involved in the completion of the theocracy is to be realized; for although this salvation is destined for Israel as a nation in virtue of its election, it is by no means thereby guaranteed to all the individual members of the nation (cf. § 20, *c*). Already Deut. vii. 9 intimates that participation in the salvation which is destined for the elect nation is attached to the fulfilment of the obligations of the covenant; and this covenant obligation of obedience (Ex. xxiv. 7) only those have fulfilled at the decisive moment, who, now when the commencing realization of all salvation through the exalted Messiah is proclaimed, have, in obedience to the will of God (cf. § 40, *c*), accepted the glad tidings concerning Him (i. 14: *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*). Since God declares that these alone are true Israelites, the idea of election is limited to them. It is plain from the context of ii. 9, that only the believers in Israel (ver. 7), those who are not disobedient to the word

[1] According to the common way of looking at our Epistle (§ 36, *a*), ii. 9 would, of course, assert that the ideal of the theocracy, which was once to be realized in Israel, is now realized in a fellowship consisting of those who had previously been Gentiles. This would assume that Israel as a nation has definitively rejected salvation, and has thereby rendered the fulfilment of the promise in its original form absolutely impossible. But for this view there is not to be found in our Epistle even the slenderest support, unless we arbitrarily drag into the *καὶ αὐτοί* of ii. 5, which plainly connects the stones which have been built upon Him with the Messiah who is laid as the foundation and corner-stone in the new house of God (vv. 4, 6), a contrast to those who, agreeably to nature, belong to Christ, *i.e.* the Jewish mother Church (cf. Klostermann, *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1869, S. 698). And yet, for the original apostolic view, this transference of the promise to another subject would have been a giant step, for whose justification hints would scarcely have been awanting. Already the retaining of *γένος*, which points to bodily descent, much rather shows that the elect are also related to one another by blood.

(ver. 8),[2] belong to the elect race, in which the ideal of the theocracy is being realized; only the believing company of Jews in Babylon is elect together with his readers (v. 13).

(*b*) As, in the case of the election of Israel, the Old Testament does not reflect upon an eternal divine decree of salvation, but, at the most, goes back upon the historical relation of Jehovah to their forefathers, so the election of believers out of Israel to participation in the completed salvation is also conceived of as an historical act, which is accomplished ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος (i. 2). Here, undoubtedly, the act of baptism is thought of, by means of which the individual enters into the narrower fellowship of salvation which exists in the midst of the people of Israel, and in which he receives the gift of the Spirit (§ 41, *a*). For as it is by the anointing with the Spirit in baptism that Jesus becomes the God-consecrated one κατ' ἐξοχήν (§ 38, *b*), so God must first, by means of His Spirit, consecrate everything which He chooses for Himself, *i.e.* He must separate it from everything that is profane, and make it fit and suitable for His purposes. Here also, accordingly (cf. § 18, *a*, 40, *a*), the Spirit is conceived of as the principle of the gifts of grace, by means of which God equips His servants and instruments for His purposes, just as He, therewith, equipped the prophets of the old covenant, and now makes men able to preach the gospel (i. 11, 12). The honour which God confers upon them, in that He causes His Spirit, which is a Spirit of glory, to rest upon them, is expressly represented as far outweighing all the dishonour which Christians must endure (iv. 14).[3] As, however, according to Acts ii. 38, the

[2] The connection with ver. 6 shows clearly that in ver. 7 faith is already conceived of as trust in the Messiah, who had been made by God the corner-stone of the theocracy, and who brings about the consummation of all things as well as the final salvation (i. 5, 7, 9, v. 9; cf. Acts xv. 11, for which see § 40, *c*). But from i. 8 it is plain that this application of the idea is owing to the fact, that the conviction of the truth of the evangelic message of salvation is specially referred to the Messiah announced in it, who, although invisible, is nevertheless confidently expected as the one who will manifest Himself at His return (ver. 7). On the other hand, faith still appears here also (cf. § 29, *c*) as the trust in God which is owing to the appearance of the Messiah (i. 21), only that, according to the connection with vv. 15, 17, 18, it obtains a fuller significance in being referred to the calling, the sonship, and the salvation which are secured through Him.

[3] When Pfleiderer (p. 428 [E. Tr. ii. 159]) asserts that the Spirit is regarded as a principle of Christian life, besides appealing to the passages which are

obtaining of forgiveness of sins is the design of baptism, so here also the election which is accomplished in baptism appears as having in view the (purifying) sprinkling with the blood of Christ (i. 2); and in iii. 21 baptism is expressly described as a washing which does not, as in the case of a common bath, aim at the washing away of the filth which cleaves to the flesh, but at the cleansing of the conscience from the consciousness of guilt.[4] Nothing of the profane impurity, which the stain of guilt brings along with it, may any longer adhere to the members of the elect race; and also in this sense it is baptism which first bestows upon those who are chosen out of Israel the quality which was set before the whole nation as an ideal (Ex. xix. 6), but which during the old covenant had been always realized only in the case of individuals (iii. 5: *αἱ ἅγιαι γυναῖκες*). The elect race has now become a holy nation (ii. 9: *ἔθνος ἅγιον*, cf. ver. 5).

(*c*) That many who belong to the nation of Israel in virtue of their descent from the fathers will nevertheless not obtain

correctly explained above, he appeals also to i. 22, where *διὰ πνεύματος* is undoubtedly spurious, and also to iii. 4, where the adjectives show that what is spoken of is a quality of man's spiritual life (cf. § 27, *c*).

[4] Since baptism (more accurately: the baptismal water) had just been described, from the objective side, as the antitype of the water which had once borne Noah and his family in the ark through the flood and saved them (iii. 20 f.; cf. Acts ii. 40), so now, in the apposition clauses, it is more particularly described, from the subjective side, as a submersion (*βάπτισμα*), in which they do not put away (*ἀπόθεσις*) the filth of the flesh, but in which they present to God the prayer for a good conscience (*ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν*), which they can obtain only by means of the forgiveness of sins which removes their consciousness of guilt, and which then makes them certain of deliverance from the destruction to which they are exposed only on account of the stain of guilt (cf. Gess, p. 401). That they obtain in baptism what they pray for in it, is taken for granted as self-evident, since it had just been shown how, by means of the suffering of the Messiah (who is confessed and called upon in baptism), we are freed from the stain of guilt which separates us from God (iii. 18). In consequence of his regarding the genitive *ἀγαθῆς συνειδήσεως* as gen. subj., Reuss (ii. 303 [E. Tr. ii. 273]) finds here the altogether unpetrine thought, that forgiveness of sins is obtained in baptism in consequence of a sincere promise of improvement, and thus first of all drags into the Epistle of Peter the Jewish-Christian rationalism, which, according to page 299 (E. Tr. 270), forms the basis of its theology. The parallelism of the gen. obj. *ῥύπου* already makes it exegetically impossible to take *ἀγαθ. συνειδ.* as a gen. subj., and also excludes the interpretation of *ἐπερώτημα* in accordance with late juristic usage (*stipulatio*), which has been revived by Pfleiderer, p. 429 (E. Tr. ii. 159), and Immer, p. 486,—an interpretation which is otherwise very doubtful linguistically.

the salvation for the realization of which this nation was chosen, yea, that possibly only a remnant of Israel will share in the Messianic salvation,—this the prophets have often enough stated in their prophecies regarding the judgments which precede the commencement of the time of the consummation. This prophecy is now being fulfilled. To those who are disobedient, and therefore do not fulfil their covenant obligation (note *a*), the Messiah has become the stone of offence and stumbling, as is said in ii. 8 with an express allusion to prophecy (Isa. viii. 14). For those, however, who refuse obedience to the proclamation regarding the Messiah, this stumbling is expressly appointed by God as a punishment of their disobedience. The passage (ii. 8) does not speak of the foreordination of individuals to unbelief (Lechler, p. 186), or to exclusion from the kingdom of God (v. Cölln, ii. 351); it states that in accordance with a divine arrangement the disobedient are appointed to stumbling, *i.e.* however, not to going astray morally, but to destruction. According to the connection with ver. 9 this destruction consists in this, that they no longer belong to the elect race, and have therefore no part in the completion of the theocracy which is brought about by the Messiah (ver. 6). Here also, accordingly, as in § 42, *b*, every sin, even the disobedience of those who perished in the flood (iii. 20), is regarded as a sin of ignorance (i. 14: ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ).[5] Only obstinate disobedience to the message of salvation which demands its believing acceptance (ii. 8, cf. iii. 1, iv. 17), and which is nothing else than disobedience to the Messiah Himself, is regarded as the presumptuous sin of godlessness (iv. 18: ὁ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλός), which cannot be forgiven, because through the Messiah the consummation is brought about, and disobedience to Him is of a definitive character. There has, therefore, been no alteration of the

[5] As their walk in the sinful lusts is represented here as a walk which is owing to their imperfect knowledge of the true will of God, which, after the common Jewish manner (§ 24), his readers once thought they could satisfy by an external fulfilling of the law, so in i. 18 it is described as a walk which is vain and idle, *i.e.* not reaching its true end, viz. the blessedness of man in consequence of pleasing God. This, as well as the milder view of all pre-Christian sin as an aberration which has withdrawn them from the guidance of the one true Shepherd (ii. 25), is owing to the circumstance that, looked at from the Christian standpoint, such sin is regarded as a pardonable sin of ignorance.

divine decree of election, no transference of it to another subject. It is in the originally chosen nation that the theocracy is completed; only the unworthy descendants of the fathers are excluded from this completion.

(*d*) It is, *per se*, very possible, that when Peter wrote to the churches of the dispersion, individual Gentiles who had become believers had already attached themselves to them; and if it were really the case that individual expressions of the Epistle refer expressly to Gentile Christians (which I, at least, cannot find to be the case), then we should have to conclude that the Gentile-Christian portion of these churches was not inconsiderable. But in such a case it would only come out the more clearly that Peter holds the believing Israelites to be the real stem, the substance of the Church, to which these Gentiles have been led by God before the time (cf. § 43, *b*). That even such as were not born Jews might enter into the elect race, and participate in its promises, was an idea which had become quite familiar to the Jewish consciousness through proselytism. It is true that circumcision was demanded from the actual proselytes to Judaism; but Peter had, according to § 43, *c*, acknowledged that even Gentiles as such, *i.e.* without accepting circumcision, could be incorporated by faith with God's people; and if even born and circumcised Israelites belonged to the elect race of the time of the consummation only inasmuch as they had become believers, it would certainly not have been a great step in advance to make faith, henceforth, the sole condition of participation in the salvation and promise of Israel. But as the apostolic decree had not thought of placing believing Gentiles in a subordinate position to the Jewish-Christian substance of the Church, after the analogy of the proselytes of the gate, so no such idea can be found in our Epistle, although Reuss (ii. 302 [E. Tr. ii. 272]) still discovers it in consequence of his false interpretation of the address of the Epistle. What, indeed, was the nature of the social relation subsisting between these Gentiles who were incorporated with the elect race and the stem of the Church, which undoubtedly remained true to the law, and whether this question had already arisen—as to these matters there is no indication whatever in our Epistle. The Jews in the far-off dispersion were scarcely accustomed

to so strict an observance of the law, that their social relation to the uncircumcised members of the Church would become such a burning question as in the immediate neighbourhood of Palestine; and even in the Church at Antioch the controversy was imported from Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 12).

## § 45. *The Peculiar People and the Calling.*

In the time of the consummation the elect race has first truly become the people of God's possession. (*b*) In this there is implied, first, that it has been called to all the salvation which God bestows in the Messianic time out of the fulness of His grace. (*c*) Therewith, however, it has also been called to the highest task, viz. as the true servants of God to glorify God in the fear of God and in righteousness, and to serve Him as priests. (*d*) Both points of view are united in the idea of sonship, yet so that the latter still predominates in it.

(*a*) Although God has, according to Deut. vii. 6, chosen Israel that it may be a people of His possession (עַם סְגֻלָּה), yet, as appears from Ex. xix. 5, the realization of this ideal remained dependent upon the obedience of the people. Faithless Israel is no longer the people of God; but it can become so again, if it is converted in the Messianic time (Hos. ii. 23); and since the Israel which has become believing has shown the obedience demanded by God in the Messianic time (§ 44, *a*), it can be described by Peter as the people which has been taken to be His possession (ii. 9: *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν*), the people which has now again become the people of God (ver. 10). Jehovah, however, has promised to dwell in the midst of His people (Ex. xxix. 45 f.); and since, even when He was dwelling in the temple, He still remained separated from the people, the prophets assign to the Messianic time the full fulfilment of this promise also (Ezek. xxxvii. 27). This promise is now, however, fulfilled (ii. 5); the Christian Church has itself become the house of God (iv. 17), in which He dwells (cf. § 31, *d*).[1]

[1] When this house of God (*οἶκος*) is called a spiritual one (ii. 5), it might be thought that the Spirit, who brings about the consecration of Christians to God in general (§ 44, *b*), qualifies the Church also to be His dwelling-place; but it is much more natural to think only of the contrast to the stone temple of the old covenant. It is expressly set forth that this house of God is built up of living

Under a common prophetical image (Jer. xxxi. 10; Ezek. xxxiv. 11 f.) their readoption to be the people of God's own possession is also so represented as if the erring sheep who had gone astray from their shepherd have now returned to God, their Shepherd and Overseer (ii. 25; cf. Ezek. xxxiv. 10, 16), and so form a flock of God (v. 2), over which He, as proprietor of the flock, has set their shepherds, and, chief among these, the Messiah (v. 2–4; cf. Ezek. xxxiv. 23 f.).

(*b*) In the abiding gracious presence of Jehovah in the midst of His people, as well as in the circumstance that the owner of the flock is also their Shepherd and Overseer (note *a*), it is already indicated that the peculiar people is assured of all blessings and of protection from its God. As the people of God it has also become, according to ii. 10, the object of His merciful love (cf. Hos. ii. 23: וְרִחַמְתִּי אֶת־לֹא רֻחָמָה). In ii. 9 the incomparable happiness, to which the members of the elect race are called out of the darkness of their misery, is represented under the symbol of a marvellous light, and in v. 10 the eternal glory of God Himself is named as the ultimate end of their calling.[2] Since God is described here as the God of every grace, it appears that this glory, like *ζωή* according to iii. 7, will only be the last of the graces which Jehovah bestows upon His people in the time of salvation.[3]

stones, inasmuch as the individual members of the elect race attach themselves to the Messiah.

[2] Although in the Gospels mention is also made of participation in the Messianic salvation as, on the one hand, the end of the calling (§ 28, *a*), yet the calling itself is not conceived of here in the same manner as there, viz. as a summons or an invitation, but rather, after the manner of the Old Testament, as the destination which is involved in election, the destination, *i.e.*, to the salvation which is bound up with the end of election; for it is as the elect race that believers in Christ (v. 10) are called to salvation (ii. 9: *ὑμεῖς γένος ἐκλεκτὸν . . . τοῦ ὑμᾶς καλέσαντος*).

[3] The idea of *χάρις* cannot be adequately explained from the Old Testament. The Hebrew חֶסֶד, with which it is generally compared, is commonly rendered in the LXX. by *ἔλεος*, and in i. 3 this denotes the merciful love of God, which, according to ii. 10, is again turned to the peculiar people. On the other hand, the *χάρις* of the LXX. corresponds to the Hebrew חֵן, which denotes the good pleasure, the favour of God. In this sense we found, in Acts xv. 11, in a discourse of Peter, the favour of Jesus described as that through which alone we can be delivered from destruction in the Messianic judgment (§ 40, *d*). In this sense the Old Testament *εὑρίσκειν χάριν ἐναντίον Θεοῦ* (Gen. vi. 8, xviii. 3) or *παρὰ*

An essential part, however, of this grace of which the prophets prophesied (i. 10) is now already offered (*φερομένη*: is being brought) in the revelation of Jesus Christ (ver. 13), *i.e.* in the evangelical proclamation which makes known the part of prophecy which has been fulfilled in Jesus (vv. 11, 12), and the salvation which is therewith given; and believers have taken their standpoint in this grace of God, which the apostle testifies to as true (v. 12). They appear as stewards of the manifold grace of God (iv. 10), by which are meant the gracious gifts of the Spirit, with which God equips the members of the elect race for His service (§ 44, *b*). And although there is still wished for them an increase of grace (i. 2), v. 10 shows that, with the calling given in Christ to the greatest salvation, there is at the same time given the certainty of all further gifts of grace, by means of which God leads them to the salvation of the consummation. Thus as, in the teaching of Jesus, His appearing is described as the grandest revelation of the love of God which was expected in the Messianic time (§ 20 *b*), so here also it appears as a revelation of the divine favour which bestows its graces in the Messianic time.

(*c*) On the other side, the calling is their destination to the fulfilment of an appointed task, such as we have already (§ 28, *a*) found to be its aim. Christians are the true servants of God (ii. 16, cf. § 40, *b*; iv. 10: *καλοὶ οἰκόνομοι*, cf. § 32, *a*), whose fundamental obligation is described, quite in the manner of the Old Testament (cf. Ps. ii. 11), as the fear of God (ii. 17, cf. i. 17, iii. 15; Gen. xx. 11; Josh. xxii. 25; Jer. xxxii. 40; Luke i. 50), which urges them to the fulfilling of every other duty (ii. 18, iii. 2). Those who fear God, however, will also, as in Acts x. 35 (*ὁ φοβούμενος τὸν Θεὸν καὶ ἐργαζόμενος δικαιοσύνην*), live unto righteousness (ii. 24), even if they should suffer for its sake (iii. 14); they are the right-

*τῷ Θεῷ* (Luke i. 30, ii. 52) appears employed metonymically, when in ii. 20 it is said of a particular course of conduct that it is *χάρις παρὰ Θεῷ* (cf. ver. 19), an object of God's good pleasure. It is only another metonymical application of this idea, when *χάρις* denotes the gift of divine favour. In this sense all the Messianic salvation of which the prophets have prophesied, is described as the gift of divine favour that was appointed for the elect race of the time of the consummation (i. 10: *οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος προφητεύσαντες*), and from iv. 10 it appears very clearly that under *χάρις* such a *gift* of divine favour is understood, because it appears there as synonymous with *χάρισμα*, and is manifold.

eous (*i.e.* those who are well-pleasing to God, cf. § 21, *a*) in the Old Testament sense, who do good and avoid evil (iii. 12; cf. ver. 11, iv. 18).[4] To this well-doing Christians have been called (ii. 21, iii. 9); by the right use of their gifts (iv. 11) as well as by the manner in which they bear the Christian name under all their afflictions (ver. 16), they are to glorify God and make known the glorious attributes (*ἀρεταί*) of the God who has called them (ii. 9; cf. Isa. xliii. 21). The highest expression of this task to which the members of the peculiar people are called is their priestly service. The indispensable condition of this service, a condition which was awanting in the people of the old covenant, and which was therefore realized, at least approximately, in their representatives, the Levitical priests (Lev. xxi. 6–8), is now fulfilled in the holiness of the people of God (§ 44, *b*). In this respect, also, the ideal which was set before the people of Israel (Ex. xix. 6), and whose realization Isa. lxi. 6 had looked forward to in the Messianic time, can now be realized; for the whole Christian Church is a holy priesthood (ii. 5), and is also called a royal priesthood (ver. 9), because it serves Jehovah as its king. All the privileges which, in the Old Testament, belong to the Levitical priests alone (Num. xvi. 5), because only the holy one may draw near to the holy God (Ex. xix. 22), must now pass over to the whole Christian Church. According to iii. 18 Christ has brought us nigh to God, has led us to Him from whom we were separated by our

[4] The passage quoted in iii. 11, 12 from Ps. xxxiv. 14–16 already shows that it is only from the Old Testament that we can derive Peter's favourite expression *ἀγαθοποιεῖν* (ii. 15, 20, iii. 6, 17, cf. ii. 14, iv. 19), the opposite of which is *κακοποιεῖν* (iii. 17, cf. ii. 12, 14, iii. 16, iv. 15), and similar more general expressions (iii. 13, ii. 12) for that which constitutes righteousness in the technical sense. Ritschl also finds here an express testimony to the homogeneity of the task of the Christian life with its Old Testament type. How this well-doing stands related to the precepts of the Mosaic law, is nowhere more particularly indicated. From i. 15, 16, however, it appears clearly that the will of God in Christianity (ii. 15) cannot be essentially different from that with which the readers were already made acquainted, during their previous condition, by the law (iv. 2). That this, however, also leaves room for a higher spiritual fulfilment of the ceremonial law in the sense of Christ (§ 24, *d*), is shown by ii. 5, according to which there are in Christianity other priests and sacrifices than the Levitical. Still an emancipation, in principle, from the law is nowhere expressed, for to explain ii. 16 of such an emancipation (Schmid, ii. 201 [E. Tr. 405]; Gess, 411) is altogether opposed to the context.

unholiness. According to ii. 5 it appears as the task of the holy priesthood to offer acceptable sacrifices to God.[5]

(*d*) In the Old Testament the idea of sonship is already synonymous with that of the peculiar people (Jer. xxxi. 1, 9). Jehovah is the God and Father of His people; Israel is His people and His son (cf. § 20, *c*). Here, too, it is taken for granted that Christians are the children of God and call on God as their Father (i. 14, 17), just as, in ii. 17, v. 9, they are also regarded as a brotherhood (cf. v. 12). It is true it does not come out directly that this is meant to express, as in the Gospels (§ 20, *b*), the certainty of the fatherly love of God. Where they are admonished against anxiety and stirred up to trustfulness, Peter appeals to God as the Creator (cf. Acts iv. 24), who, in His faithfulness, will not withdraw His help from His creature (iv. 19), and also to a passage in the Psalms, which treats of divine providence (v. 7, after Ps. lv. 22). But here also, according to the connection of i. 14, 15, the calling to salvation in consequence of the grace of God which is already offered (i. 13), is manifestly conceived of as a calling to sonship, to which the Christian, according to ver. 17, answers, as it were, by calling on the Father, and thereby looks upon sonship as a great blessing. In the exhortation of ver. 17 it is plainly presupposed that they might imagine that the fatherly love of God would prejudice the impartiality of the judge. Undoubtedly, however, the other side of the filial relationship comes out more clearly, according to which, like the relation of a servant (note *c*), with which it does not therefore stand in contradiction (cf. § 32, *a*), it involves the obligation to obedience (i. 14: τέκνα ὑπακοῆς) which election already has in view (ver. 2). In ver. 15, however, this obedience is made to consist essentially in this, that the child conforms himself to his father, becomes like the God who has called him to sonship; only that in doing so it is not, as in the teaching of Jesus, the new revelation of the love of God which is kept in view as the rule (§ 25, *a*), but, on the ground of Lev. xi. 44, the Old

[5] When these sacrifices are called spiritual, it might be thought that the Spirit, who brings about the consecration of Christians to God in general (§ 44, *b*), also makes their sacrifices holy; but it is only the contrast to the animal sacrifices of the old covenant which can be expressed in this way (cf. note *a*, footnote 1).

Testament revelation of the holiness of God (i. 15, 16).[6] From this it appears afresh that, even through the calling to sonship, it is only that which was already set before the people of Israel as an ideal that is to be realized.

## § 46. *The New Birth and the Nourishment of the New Life.*

By means of the living word of God which is contained in the proclamation of the gospel, Christians have been born again to a new moral life. (*b*) In this new life they are able, in obedience to the truth, to cleanse themselves more and more from the lusts which are dangerous to the soul. (*c*) The nourishment of this life, however, a nourishment which is supplied by the word, and is to become more and more precious to Christians, is Christ Himself, who has given us a powerfully working example in the whole of His behaviour. (*d*) In particular, this example works the patient endurance of afflictions, which the Christian can only regard as rich in blessing.

(*a*) It is, however, by God Himself that the Christian is made able to perform the task which is laid upon him in his calling (§ 45). Yet this does not take place, in accordance with § 44, *b*, by means of the Spirit who is bestowed in baptism; but as the proclamation of salvation by Jesus appeared as the principle of the renewal of life (§ 21, *c*), and the message of the apostles itself worked the repentance which it demanded (§ 40, *b*), so here also it is the word of the evangelical proclamation which works the new birth, *i.e.* the commencement of a new (moral) life. Seeing, viz., that the message of salvation is proclaimed in the power of the

[6] The idea of the holiness of God, which is here assumed as well known from the Old Testament (cf. Baudissin, *Stud. zur semit. Religionsgesch.* ii., Leipz. 1878), does not mean God's moral perfection (cf. v. Cölln, ii. 54), but His elevation above all creaturely (ethical as well as physical) impurity; and man can become like God in this respect only by cleansing himself from every stain produced by lust (ver. 14). Even in the idea of holiness, as we learned to know it in § 44, *b*, there lay this more negative moment alongside of the positive one of consecration to God and His service. Further, the idea of sonship is neither connected with the being born again unto hope of i. 3, nor with the figure used in i. 23, ii. 2. It appears also in iii. 6 in that metaphorical sense, according to which one becomes the genuine child of any one by imitating his behaviour (cf. Matt. xxiii. 31).

Holy Spirit sent down from heaven (i. 12), and everything which is spoken by those endowed with the Spirit is to be regarded as a word which comes from God (iv. 11: ὡς λόγια Θεοῦ), that proclamation is a direct message from God (iv. 17: εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ; ii. 8, iii. 1: ὁ λόγος simply, cf. Acts iv. 29), and is, therefore, of exactly the same nature as the word of God which was addressed in the Old Testament to the prophets, and which was likewise suggested to them by the Spirit.[1] When Peter (i. 24) quotes a passage of Scripture which treats of the nature of the Old Testament word of revelation, he says (ver. 25) expressly that the proclamation which has reached his readers (i. 12) is such a word of God. This abiding (*i.e.* imperishable, cf. § 18, *c*) word of God is, however, a living, *i.e.* a powerfully working word, by means of which the Christians have been begotten again to a new life (i. 23); and since that which is begotten must have the nature of that of which it is begotten, this life is also abiding and imperishable.[2] Through this word of His God Himself, therefore, works the new birth; for when, in i. 3, the resurrection of Christ is named as the means which He employs, there is no doubt that, for the consciousness of the apostle, this fact itself is meant (§ 50, *b*); but it was only through the preaching of the gospel that that fact was made known to his readers (i. 12). Similarly, every preservation, strengthening, and furthering of the life of the Christian is traced back, as in the teaching of Jesus (§ 30, *b*), to God (i. 5, v.

[1] How objectively this word of God stood over against the prophets, appears most clearly in i. 10–12, where it is said that, with regard to the facts which were testified to them by the Spirit, and concerning which it was only revealed to them that they were destined for a future race, the prophets searched and enquired very eagerly as to the time to which this revelation referred. This view of prophecy probably leans upon a few facts, such as Dan. ix. 2, 23 ff., xii. 11 ff. On the assumption, however, of a direct Messianic prophecy which throughout kept in view the still far-off future time of salvation, it is unhistorically extended to all the prophets.

[2] Accordingly, the seed of which it is begotten is expressly described as incorruptible, and it is altogether erroneous to understand by it the Spirit, as Schmid (ii. 202 [E. Tr. 406]) does; for, in what follows, the incorruptible seed is expressly described as the living and abiding word of God, whose peculiarity, which is here made prominent and established in i. 24, 25, plainly corresponds to ἄφθαρτος; while the change of the prepositions is owing simply to the circumstance that the figurative idea of a begetting from seed is turned into the literal idea of a production through the word.

10); and to Him, therefore, as their faithful Overseer (ii. 25), they are, in prayer (iv. 7, cf. iii. 7, 12), to commit their soul in the midst of all their temptations (iv. 19). This working of divine grace is also conceived of as effected, not indeed exclusively, yet pre-eminently, by means of the word. It is true that in order to the activity of this word there is need of constant obedience to the truth which it proclaims (i. 22); but this obedience, to which their election points (ver. 2), exists, from the first, in the case of the believing Israelites (§ 44, *a*), and naturally follows from their new filial relationship (§ 45, *d*).

(*b*) The new life of the Christians can be best described by its contrast to their pre-Christian life. According to i. 14 lusts are characteristic of the latter; and these lusts are thought of as sinful, because the lusts of men as they now are[3] stand in direct antagonism to the will of God (iv. 2). Under these lusts, the fleshly, *i.e.* the sensual, lusts in the narrow sense, are mainly thought of (ii. 11). It is true that, according to iv. 3, it is characteristic of the life of the Gentiles that they surrender themselves to these fleshly lusts in riotousness and lewdness; but the author must remind his Jewish-Christian readers that they, who were well acquainted with the will of God, have nevertheless, in the time past, done this will of the Gentiles.[4] On the other hand, however, there belong to these sinful lusts also the motions and expressions of uncharitableness which are enumerated in ii. 1. Because this walk in the lusts has become habitual to men in consequence of education, custom, and tradition, it wields a dominating influence over them, and makes their life servile (i. 18). But by means of the new birth believers have been set free from this power, and can now, in obedience to the truth,

[3] Similarly, it is of men simply as men that mention is made in the discourses of Jesus (§ 33, *c*, footnote 5). On the other hand, the expression κόσμος in v. 9 appears to denote, not the unchristian world of men, but the physical world (*i.* 20). In iii. 18 also all men appear as unrighteous in contrast to Christ, *i.e.* as not answering to the will of God.

[4] That a living in sinful lusts is not excluded by such an external fulfilling of the law as that of his readers previously ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ (i. 14, for which see § 44, *c*), is shown best of all by the polemic of Jesus against the Pharisaic fulfilling of the law (cf. *e.g.* Matt. xxiii. 23–28); and the modern criticism, according to which Rom. xiii. 12–14 is written to Jewish Christians, should be less confident in the assertion that iv. 3 is an argument that the Epistle was written to Gentile Christians (cf. Immer, 474).

purify (ἁγνίζειν) their souls from the lusts that stain them (i. 22); and thus the ἁγιότης which was obtained in baptism (cf. § 44, *b*) is ever being more and more realized in all their walk (vv. 14, 15), and the good conscience which they received in baptism (iii. 21) becomes their abiding possession (iii. 16). In such a case, the place of the life in the lusts is taken by the walk in the fear of God (i. 17); in which fear they abstain from the fleshly lusts, because they endanger the salvation of the soul (ii. 11), since they befog it, as it were, with an intoxication, and so rob men of the clearness of spirit and the sobriety without which they cannot maintain the watchfulness already demanded by Jesus (iv. 7, v. 8, cf. § 30, *b*).

(*c*) Because it was but a short time since the Christians, to whom Peter writes, had become Christians, and had been born again, he calls them (ii. 2) newborn babes, whose thriving growth depends upon their desiring pure nourishment. This the apostle describes in keeping with the image as the nourishment of children (milk); and the adjective λογικόν appears to describe it as being derived from the word, unless it is meant to point out that the expression is merely figurative, of which use of the term there is no example and, here, no need. Here, then, the word which begets life is still distinguished from the nourishment which is afforded in this word; and this nourishment itself (ii. 3) is called Christ, of whom it is said, that, if we have once tasted how sweet He is, we shall continually long for this nourishment. As a matter of fact, the purport of the proclamation of salvation which is contained in the Gospel is nothing else than Christ; and the figurative language employed reminds us strikingly of the Johannean expressions in which Christ calls Himself the bread of life (cf. especially John vi. 35). As during His earthly activity it had been a token of discipleship that one came to Him (§ 29, *a*), so Peter also speaks (ii. 4) of a coming to Him, by means of which the individual becomes a living stone in the temple of God, *i.e.* according to § 45, *a*, a true member of the Church. Here, however, naturally, as is plain from the connection with ver. 2 f., what is spoken of is this, that men come to Him, in so far as He is offered in the word as the nourishment of life, because they have learned to long for this nourishment

in consequence of the experience they have had of its quality. This longing arises if one has acquired an affection for Him who is proclaimed in the word—an affection which is described, figuratively, in ii. 3, as a having tasted of His sweetness; in i. 8, however, without a figure, as a loving of Him whom one has not seen personally, but of whom one has only heard. Christ, however, who is proclaimed in the word, can be called the nourishment of the new moral life, because, as was once the case with His self-manifestation in His earthly activity (§ 21, *d*), so now the proclamation of that manifestation is a powerfully working example (ii. 21, iii. 18, iv. 1, 13). The walk in Christ (iii. 16), accordingly, denotes nothing else than the walk which moves in the sphere which is determined by this example; and it is to this, probably, that the designation of Christians as *οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ* (v. 14) refers, without its being necessary to think of a mystical living fellowship with Christ. From that activity of the proclamation regarding Christ we can also explain the manner in which all the works of Christians that are well-pleasing to God appear brought about by Him (ii. 5, iv. 11),[5] although this combination is not expressly made.

(*d*) Special attention, however, is drawn to this imitation of the example of Christ, when it is said that Christians must share in the sufferings which He had to endure in the world (iv. 13), as He Himself had foretold to His disciples (§ 30, *a*), and as they are now being accomplished in all Christians in the world (v. 9) in consequence of a divine decree.[6] It is of

[5] The clause *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* in ii. 5 does not assert that the spiritual sacrifices of Christians (§ 45, *c*) are rendered well-pleasing to God through Christ; for according to the context, in which the close of the sentence turns back to its starting-point (*πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι*, ver. 4), it is meant to express the fact that the very offering of these sacrifices is brought about by Christ, that it is through Him that we are rendered capable of performing this priestly act. In the same way the same clause in iv. 11 states that every right application of the gifts we have received, and by means of which we glorify God, is brought about by Christ, that it is through Him that we are rendered capable of this activity of the true servants of God (§ 45, *c*).

[6] No doubt these could also be traced back to the devil, who appears in v. 8, as in the teaching of Jesus (§ 23, *a*), as the adversary who endeavours to deliver over Christians to destruction by leading them away from the faith. Also in Acts v. 3, in an utterance of Peter, the sin, which brought death upon Ananias, is traced back to Satan. But according to the biblical view the devil has only so much power as God gives him. Looked at from the other side, accordingly,

the utmost consequence, however, that Christians bear these sufferings as He bore them; for in His innocent and patient (ii. 22 f.) endurance of suffering He has, according to ver. 21, given them an example and, as it were, traced out the footsteps which they are now to follow; and these footsteps (as in Matt. xi. 28 f.) also make this following possible and easier, so that here also the example of Christ is a powerfully working one (note *c*). But because we are called to such a following of Jesus in suffering (ii. 21), we win the good pleasure of God by an innocent and patient endurance of suffering (vv. 19, 20). Accordingly, suffering, which is described in accordance with a common Old Testament image as a glowing fire, is also full of blessing, inasmuch as it serves to our proving (iv. 12); for as perishable gold is tried by fire in order that its genuineness may be proved (cf. Ps. lxvi. 10; Prov. xvii. 3; Mal. iii. 2, 3), so the verification of faith in the trial of affliction appears much more precious, and gains for us praise and glory and honour before God (i. 7, 8). If this view of suffering proceeds from the consciousness that the state of the Christian is a state of salvation, in which everything, and even affliction, must become at last an evidence of divine grace (cf. § 45, *b*), another view of it reflects upon the manner in which it must become conducive to the fulfilment of the Christian calling (§ 45, *c*), and therefore full of blessing. For if Christ has suffered for the sake of the blessed results which are connected with this suffering of His (iii. 18–22), the Christian is also (contrary to the natural dread of suffering) to arm himself with the same thought, *i.e.* with the thought of the blessed fruit of such a suffering; that fruit being immediately stated to be this, that whoever has suffered in the flesh (as a righteous person, or for the sake of righteousness, cf. iii. 14, 17) has thereby ceased, in principle, from sinning, in order that he may no longer live to the lusts of men but to the will of God (iv. 1, 2).[7]

suffering appears as depending upon a volition of God (iii. 17, iv. 19), whose mighty hand lays it upon us (v. 6).

[7] The attempt to explain this statement by means of Rom. vi. 7 (Baur, 290) is substantially renewed by Sieffert, inasmuch as he also thinks of a dying to the sinful lusts (*Jahrb. f. d. Th.* 1875, p. 425 ff.). But it is mere arbitrariness to connect the idea of dying with παθεῖν; and the thought that sin has its seat

## § 47. *Christian Social Life.*

Here, too, unfeigned enduring brotherly love, and the meek humility which manifests itself in mutual service, appear as the cardinal Christian virtues. (*b*) To the subjection to human ordinances which the apostle demands for God's sake there belong especially obedience and honour to the authorities. (*c*) There belongs to it likewise the patient endurance of the wrongs which slaves had often to suffer innocently; and under the same point of view the apostle places the relation of Christian wives to their still unbelieving husbands. (*d*) Lastly, he demands, in general, that Christians shall, by their behaviour, refute the calumnies of the Gentiles, and become the means of blessing even to their enemies.

(*a*) Since Christians call one another brethren (v. 12), and form a brotherhood (ii. 17, v. 9), their specific duty to the brethren appears (ii. 17) to be the love which Christ has called the greatest commandment (§ 25). To such an extent does this form the central point of Christian moral life, that in i. 22 (cf. iii. 8) brotherly love is described as the most immediate aim of purification of heart, and its specific characteristic is derived from the nature of the new birth. In conformity with the general character of all Christian virtue (iii. 15, cf. § 26, *c*), love must come unfeignedly from the heart (i. 22), it must be shown without murmuring (iv. 9), and therefore not only are such forms under which egoism appears (ii. 1), as malice, envy, and slander, to be put away, but also guile and hypocrisy. On the other hand, the essence of love is described in iii. 8 as consisting in similarity of disposition, in sympathy, and compassionateness. That, however, which first of all gives it its real value is the ἐκτένεια

in the σάρξ is not a Petrine thought, as is already plain from the circumstance that, in order to awaken this thought, ver. 2 must necessarily have run: ἐπιθυμίαις σαρκός. Sieffert shows very clearly how that, according to iii. 14, iv. 13, suffering is still for Christians only a πάθειν σαρκί; but the reasons why it is this have nothing to do with dying to the sinful lusts. Neither, indeed, does it appear why suffering in the bodily life should make sinning distasteful (Pfleiderer, p. 423 [E. Tr. ii. 154]); but whoever has suffered from the enmity of sinners (and it is this alone which is spoken of in this connection) has done so because, even at the risk of having to suffer in the flesh, he has not yielded to their sinful desire, but has broken once for all (note the perfect) with sinning.

(i. 22) which results from the incorruptible nature of the life that is begotten of the incorruptible word, *i.e.* the lasting and enduring energy which knows no limits either in giving or in forgiving, and which therefore, according to iv. 8 (cf. Prov. x. 12), covers a multitude of sins (cf. Matt. xviii. 21, 22). The kiss of love is a symbolical expression of this brotherly love (v. 14: *φίλημα ἀγάπης*). Alongside of love, however, there stands humility (iii. 8, v. 5: *ταπεινοφροσύνη*), as in the teaching of Jesus (§ 25, *d*). As regards God, this consists in acquiescing patiently in His ways, and in bowing under His mighty hand (v. 6); as regards our neighbour, it consists in giving to each man the *τιμή* which belongs to him (ii. 17, cf. iii. 7). In this passage, the rule of *suum cuique* expressly forms the second cardinal duty, alongside of brotherly love. Alongside of humility, there stands, on the one hand, as in Matt. xi. 29, the meekness (iii. 4, 15) which patiently bears the injustice and enmity of others, which is not driven to violence by these wrongs, and, on the other hand, as in Matt. xx. 25–28, the humble serving wherein each one subordinates himself to the other (v. 5). In this mutual serving, each one is to administer the gifts, which he has received from God, as a steward (iv. 10), because the word which he speaks has been given him by God, who also lends him the strength for every service.[1]

(*b*) The more the Christians felt themselves to be the elect race, so much the more natural was it for them to believe that they were emancipated from the worldly ordinances of life in which conversion found them, or at least they were the more likely to draw suspicion and persecution upon themselves by

[1] In v. 2, 3 Peter specially discusses the duties of the elders, to whom the office of pastors over the churches (cf. § 45, *a*) has been committed, just as the guidance of the whole Church has been entrusted to him as their *συμπρεσβύτερος* (v. 1). This superintendence of the Church (the *ἐπισκοπεῖν*) is also to be a service of love, which is to be performed voluntarily and readily, not merely from the constraint of duty, nor with a desire to obtain gain or lordship; it is to be performed in the humility which only seeks to give an example to others, and thereby to urge them on to follow. Peter does not yet know of a second ecclesiastical office in the churches to which he writes. As in the church at Jerusalem (§ 41, *c*), it is those who are younger in years (*οἱ νεώτεροι*) who, in accordance with their age, perform the external services of the Church without any special official position, and are therefore admonished to be subject to the elders (v. 5).

an uncalled-for intermeddling with these matters (iv. 15: ὡς ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος) from their higher standpoint. These were only human ordinances, which they could easily regard as sinful, inasmuch as they were also corrupted by the sin which attaches to men as men (§ 46, *b*). The apostle, however, demands (ii. 13) that they submit themselves to every human ordinance (ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις), not indeed as such, but for God's sake (διὰ τὸν κύριον). This applies, now, in the first place, to the ordinance of government. No doubt Christians, *quâ* Christians, are free (cf. Matt. xvii. 26), because, as servants of God, they are not subject to any human authority (ii. 16: ὡς ἐλεύθεροι . . . ὡς Θεοῦ δοῦλοι). But, for that very reason, they are not to use their freedom as a cloak of wickedness; they are rather to render obedience to the government by well-doing, since it also demands the doing of that which is good and punishes the doing of that which is evil (vv. 14, 15). Moreover, since the Christian, according to note *a*, is to give to each man the honour which is his due, Peter demands also for the king, *i.e.* for the Roman emperor (ver. 13), the reverence (ver. 17) which belongs to him; but at the same time he does not fail to point out, by putting side by side their duty to God and to the king after the manner of Mark xii. 17, that the fulfilment of the latter must not in any way prejudice the fulfilment of the former. He does not, here, enter more particularly into the special cases of collision that may occur, when they must obey God rather than men (Acts iv. 19, v. 29).

(*c*) From the same point of view Peter also treats of the case of slaves, inasmuch as he is speaking to Christian slaves who still have unbelieving masters. Here also, in the name of the fear of God, and because of their consciousness that it is God who has placed them in this condition (ii. 19: διὰ συνείδησιν Θεοῦ), he demands submission to their masters, even when these make obedience difficult by their wickedness (ver. 18: σκολιοῖς, cf. Acts ii. 40). If in such a case there is many a wrong to be borne, this is only an illustration of the general truth that Christians are called, after the example of Christ, to gain the good pleasure of God by an innocent and patient endurance of injustice (vv. 19, 20). A similar case occurs where Christian women have husbands who are still unbelievers (iii. 1). In such a case they must, after the

example of the holy women of the old covenant, be in subjection to their husbands, and, continuing in well-doing without any fear of man, put their hope in God (vv. 5, 6). Here, also, their chaste behaviour is to be rooted in the fear of God (ver. 2), and their adornment is to consist, not of outward ornaments, but of a meek and quiet spirit, since this is the only adorning which is of value in the sight of God (vv. 3, 4). It is only incidentally that the apostle glances at Christian marriages, and demands of the husbands intelligent discernment (*γνῶσιν*) in their intercourse with the weaker sex, and the due recognition of the Christian dignity of their wives according to the rule of *suum cuique*, since it is only in this way that their joint prayer, which he seems to regard as the real crown of Christian married life, can remain unhindered (ver. 7).

(*d*) Those who were not Christians were not able to understand the true nature of the new Christian life; and therefore the becoming attitude of Christians towards human ordinances has, according to the will of God, the special aim of showing these, that Christianity obliges and qualifies its adherents to discharge faithfully the duties which were involved in the natural relationships of life of which they were capable of judging; and in this way it puts to silence the ignorance of foolish men (ii. 15). According to ii. 12, those who were not Christians were disposed to calumniate the Christians as evildoers,—partly, really because of their imperfect acquaintance with the Christians' moral life; partly, however, also (according to iv. 4) because they felt themselves condemned by the aversion of the Christians to the immoral life, which they had previously led in common with them; and now they sought, by means of slander, to blunt the sting of this condemnation of their conduct. Since the slanderers must be ashamed of their slander when they look more closely at the Christians' manner of life (iii. 16), the apostle still hopes that, at least when the day of their gracious visitation has come, they will be thereby induced to glorify God for that which He has wrought in the Christians (ii. 12; cf. Matt. v. 16), and thus they will be as good as gained to Christianity. In the same way he hopes that the believing wives will also be able without the word to gain their unbelieving husbands by their behaviour (iii. 1, 2).

It is only necessary to take special care that Christians do not bring upon themselves a well-deserved dishonour by their own sin, or by a well-meant but unseasonable intermeddling with matters with which they have no concern (note *b*, iv. 15). On the other hand, they have an opportunity, in opposition to the positive hostility of unbelievers, of practising the law of love (§ 25, *c*),—not to recompense evil with evil, whether it be an evil word or an evil deed, but to answer the wrong which is suffered with blessing; in ii. 23 they are referred to the example of Christ, and in iii. 9 there is plainly an allusion to the word of Christ (Matt. v. 44 = Luke vi. 28). Not only by means of this testimony in deeds, but also by means of a confession which is equally candid and meek, they are to be ready to give their enemies a reason for their Christian hope (iii. 15). The apostle hopes that their bearing under affliction, if they continue under it immoveably in well-doing, may still prove a blessing even to their enemies, as had been the case with the suffering of Christ, though no doubt in a unique way (vv. 16–18). So long as they live here as strangers in the midst of those who are not Christians (ii. 21), it behoves them not to give these offence, but to be a blessing. It is only in this manner that they can attain the highest goal which, according to § 45, *e*, is set before them as true servants of God, viz. to glorify God. He who suffers dishonour only because of his Christian name (cf. iv. 14) need not be ashamed of it, since he glorifies God by the manner in which he bears this name (iv. 16, read: *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ*).

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE MESSIAH AND HIS WORK.

### § 48. *The Spirit of the Messiah.*

In the end of the times, Christ, who was from the beginning foreknown in the counsel of God as the Redeemer, has been chosen as such and made known to men. (*b*) The Spirit of God, with which He was anointed during His earthly life, has already testified in the prophets regarding that which should

befall Him according to this decree. (*c*) According to His spiritual nature, which was peculiarly potentialized by this anointing, He who was put to death according to the flesh could not abide in death, but had to be made alive through the resurrection. (*d*) In this Spirit Christ has, lastly, during His stay in Hades, proclaimed the message of salvation to the spirits of the dead which were found there in prison.

(*a*) The completion of the theocracy has commenced in believing Israel, because it is the Messianic time; and it is the Messianic time, because the Messiah has appeared. As in § 40, *a*, the end of the times (*τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν χρόνων*, as translation of the prophetical אַחֲרִית הַיָּמִים), which was proclaimed by prophecy, is regarded as present, because at this time the Messiah has been made known (i. 19, 20). Naturally, it is no longer necessary to prove to the believers in Israel that Jesus of Nazareth is this Messiah; the title Messiah, which originally pointed to His equipment for His specific calling (§ 18), and therefore involves the idea of His being the Mediator of salvation, has already passed over so completely to the historical person Jesus, that it has become a *nomen proprium*.[1] What the prophets have prophesied regarding the sufferings which were appointed the Messiah, and the glories that should follow, that is now already announced in the evangelical proclamation regarding Jesus as having taken place (i. 11, 12). Already this view—according to which the glory appears, not as a glory which belongs originally to the Messiah, but as one which was appointed Him in prophecy—makes it little likely that Peter has reflected upon a pre-historical existence, and, consequently, upon an originally superhuman nature of Christ. It is true, such a pre-existence is very frequently found in i. 20 (cf. *e.g.* Lutz, 349; Pflei-

[1] The name Jesus is no longer used by Peter; most frequently, and that, too, specially when His earthly life is looked back to (i. 11, 19, ii. 21, iii. 16, 18, iv. 1, 14, v. 10, 14), He is named simply *Χριστός*; less frequently, and without any perceptible difference, *ὁ Χριστός* (iii. 15, iv. 13, v. 1). Besides this name there is found only the name *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* (i. 1, 2, 3, 7, 13, ii. 5, iii. 21, iv. 11, cf. § 41, *a*), the reading *Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς* in v. 10, 14 being undoubtedly wrong. It is self-evident that this promotion of the official name of Jesus to be a proper name is owing to the circumstance that the person of Jesus stands before the eyes of the Christian always and exclusively in His specific quality as the Mediator of salvation.

derer, 421 [E. Tr. ii. 151]; Gess, 395 f.). But seeing that φανερωθείς purposely refers back to εἰδότες in ver. 18, it alludes not to the manifestation of Christ which resulted from His appearing upon earth, and which could, no doubt, be contrasted with His concealment in a previous state of existence, but to the manifestation of Christ in His significance as Messianic redeemer (ver. 18) by means of His death (ver. 19) and exaltation (ver. 21), and this manifestation is contrasted with the concealment of that significance in the divine decree. For the sake of the Church of the end of the times (δι' ὑμᾶς), *i.e.* in order that it may know that it is redeemed and may build its hope in the completion of salvation upon this faith (ver. 21), Christ has *now* been manifested as that which He will be to it, although God has already *from the beginning* foreknown (προεγνωσμένος) the person Christ as the one through whose blood redemption would be accomplished.[2] This divine foreknowledge, however, no more presupposes a contemporary existence of the person whose qualification God foresees, than that foreknowledge which prophecy, regarded as directly Messianic, involves throughout. In the very same manner as He has chosen believing Israel (i. 2: ἐκλεκτοὶ . . . κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ, see § 44, *a*), God has, in conformity with this foreknowledge, chosen the historical person Jesus for His Messianic vocation (ii. 4, 6).

(*b*) When it is said in i. 11 that the Spirit of Christ, speaking in the prophets, testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, it would be much more natural to understand thereby the Spirit of the pre-existing Christ (cf. Lechler, p. 177). It is no objection to this view, as Beyschlag, p. 121, thinks, that, according to the teaching of Peter, it was through His exaltation that Jesus was first made the Messiah. For if, notwithstanding this, the name Messiah, which has become

[2] The reason why, in the antithesis, the apostle dates back this divine foreknowledge to the first beginnings of time, *i.e.* to a time before the creation of the world, and thereby expressly describes the divine decree of salvation as eternal, is not because he purposed to point to the imperishable nature of Christ in contrast with the perishable gold (Ritschl, ii. 178), but simply because of the mention of the end of the times. That προγινώσκειν does not denote the divine foreordination any more than the πρόγνωσις of i. 2 (cf. § 44, *a*) appears already from the part. perf., which does not describe an individual act (cf. even Pfleiderer, *l.c.*), but the condition of knowing.

a *nomen proprium*, can be used, and that too with preference, of the historical person Christ (note *a*), it can also be transferred to the pre-existing person. But it would certainly be surprising, if it were used in the same sentence indiscriminately of the pre-existing (*τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*) *and* of the historical Christ (*τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα*); and since the meaning which comes out, if we hold it to refer both times to the historical Christ, is one which is thoroughly in keeping with the other presuppositions of the teaching of Peter, this is the only way in which we are entitled to take it. Accordingly, the Spirit with which Christ was anointed at His baptism (§ 38, *b*), and which was therefore His Spirit during His official life, was already, before He received it, active in the prophets. This Spirit is none else than the eternal Spirit of God, in which the decree relating to the Messianic salvation was formed from eternity, and which could therefore testify, in the prophets, regarding this decree, in the same way as it afterwards qualified the Messiah Himself for its execution. If one should call this an ideal pre-existence of Christ in the divine Spirit or in the divine decree, there is scarcely any objection can be taken; but such an existence is involved throughout in the presupposition of a direct Messianic prophecy, from which Peter, with all the writers of the New Testament, starts (§ 46, *a*, footnote 1).

(*c*) In iii. 18 the human person of Christ is looked at from two different sides, the one of which is designated flesh, the other spirit. Beyschlag, however, is mistaken when (p. 113) he sees in these only the two factors of human nature in general; for although, according to § 27, *a*, the flesh is simply the substratum of the earthly-bodily life, yet the spirit cannot here denote the spiritual nature of man in general, as in iv. 6. This, *per se*, viz. could not in any way be the reason why He who was put to death according to the flesh should be made alive, *i.e.* be raised up; for although it is true that the spiritual nature of man endures, as such, after the separation of the soul from the body, and therefore does not, in this respect, need a quickening, yet, on the other hand, it does not *per se* demand such a quickening as took place on the occasion of the resurrection of Christ, it rather dispenses with it, at least, till the last day. No doubt the *πνεῦμα* in Christ corresponds to the *πνεῦμα*

in every man; but just because it was not a common human πνεῦμα, but one anointed, *i.e.* continually filled with the Spirit of God (note *b*), He could not, according to the spirit, remain, like every other man, in death, *i.e.* in the incorporeal condition of Hades, but must be made alive, *i.e.* raised up. If, therefore, in Acts ii. 24, the necessity of the resurrection was still grounded only upon the circumstance that it was foretold (§ 39, *a*), here it is already traced back to the unique spiritual nature of Christ which He received when the Spirit of God, which was bestowed upon Him, made Him the Χριστός. Of course, His resurrection was foretold only because it was necessary for the fulfilment of His Messianic calling; and for the very same reason *it* was grounded in the Spirit, which qualified Him for the fulfilment of this calling.[3]

(*d*) According to iii. 19 Christ has gone down to Hades ἐν πνεύματι, in order to bring the message of salvation to the spirits which were found there in prison (ἐν φυλακῇ; cf. also iv. 6). By these we are to understand, not the fallen angels

[3] No doubt it is not directly asserted in iii. 18 that his πνεῦμα as such *demanded* this ζωοποιεῖσθαι, but only that it *experienced it*; for it will always be most natural to regard the dative as a description of the sphere and not of the rule (cf. Sieffert, pp. 411–413); but since the whole passage unfolds the manner in which the suffering of Christ has come to be so peculiarly fruitful in blessedness, it lies in the nature of the case, that that which happened to Him must have been grounded in the unique Messianic quality of His person. If the absence of the article from πνεύματι and σαρκί should be urged against this view (an argument which, seeing that the article is very frequently omitted by Peter, appears to me somewhat hazardous, and which is already rendered very precarious by the ἐν ᾧ, which refers to πνεύματι), still the only way, in which we can judge of the statement regarding that which happened to Christ with respect to the flesh or the spirit, is by considering whether that which is stated *can* apply to the fleshly or spiritual nature of man in general. Now, just as certainly as the θανατωθείς assumes no other than the (mortal) σάρξ which is common to the human race, so certainly does the ζωοποιεῖσθαι, which, as has been shown above, does not belong to the human πνεῦμα as such, point to the fact that the πνεῦμα of the Messiah must have been different from that of men in general. It is not possible, however, that πνεύματι can refer to the whole being of Christ inclusive of His (pneumatic) corporeity, as Sieffert (p. 419) maintains; for the subject of the ζωοποιηθείς, which, even according to him, denotes the *being* raised up bodily, cannot be the already risen one; it can only be the Christ who lived in the flesh, who, after He had been put to death σαρκί, was now raised up according to the πνεῦμα which He had during His life in the flesh, and which was delivered from the common fate of man by its union with the divine πνεῦμα, *i.e.* was reclothed with His (heavenly, glorified) body, and thus first made alive again in the full sense.

(Gen. vi.), as Baur thinks (p. 291), but the disembodied souls of the dead (§ 27, *c*). The subject, however, is not the already risen Christ (as even Schenkel, p. 221, will have it), who, indeed, no longer existed merely ἐν πνεύματι (cf. footnote 3), but had again received a body at His resurrection; it is rather the slain Christ, who, like every other dead person, after the spirit was separated from the body, still existed, in the first place, only ἐν πνεύματι, and could therefore also work among the disembodied spirits (the dead, who, like Himself, existed only ἐν πνεύματι). But while the other spirits in Scheol lead only a shadowy existence, the spirit of Christ, which was anointed with the Spirit of God which qualified Him for His Messianic activity, or—what is only another expression for the same thing—Christ *in this Spirit*, could carry on His Messianic activity among the spirits in Scheol.[4] As, therefore, the Spirit, which the Messiah received during His earthly life, was already active in the prophets previous to this time, so it was also it that caused Him to be active among the spirits in Hades, even after the end of His earthly life. From this also it appears that, according to the doctrinal views of the apostles at this stage, the higher nature of Christ was still conceived of only as the Spirit of God which had been bestowed upon Him, but which was not confined in its activity to His earthly life.

## § 49. *The Saving Significance of the Suffering of Christ.*

Cf. Fr. Sieffert, "die Heilsbedeutung des Leidens und Sterbens Christi nach dem ersten Brief des Petrus," *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie*, 1875, 3; Laichinger, "die Versöhnungslehre des ersten Petribriefs," *ibid.* 1877, 2.

The suffering of Christ, which was borne by Him with the most perfect innocence and patience, was already foreseen in

[4] As, on the one hand, the soul of the Messiah could not be left in Scheol (Acts ii. 27), so, on the other hand, the spirit which constituted this soul could not participate in the shadowy life of the human spirits in Hades, although it is self-evident that Christ, if once He has died, must go down ἐν πνεύματι into Scheol like every other person. The descent of Christ into Hades, considered by itself, is accordingly regarded as an altogether self-evident fact, and the statement of the apostle refers only to the Messianic activity of Christ which was unfolded in consequence of it; and this activity is mentioned as an evidence of the blessed fruit which has resulted from His death (iii. 17, 18). There is therefore no need to assume that the account of it was derived from a special communication of the risen Lord to Peter (Gess, p. 408).

prophecy. (*b*) The peculiar aim of this suffering was to take away from sinners the staining guilt of sin, inasmuch as, when He died upon the cross, Christ bore the punishment which was incurred by their sins. (*c*) In consequence of the last testament of Christ, this can also be so represented as if the Church has been sprinkled with the atoning blood of a covenant sacrifice, and has thereby become the true people of God which is capable of fellowship with Him. (*d*) Although redemption from the power of sin is also described as a consequence of the death of Christ, yet, in the mind of the apostle, this redemption can only be regarded as its mediate practical effect.

(*a*) Although it is not so much the individual fact of the death of Christ, but, as in Acts iii. 18, His suffering in general which is repeatedly set forth so emphatically (ii. 23, iii. 18, iv. 1, 13, v. 1), and although, in particular, His exemplary behaviour under suffering is reflected upon (ii. 21), yet herein there betrays himself only the eye-witness, before whose eyes Christ in His behaviour during the sorrowful closing days of His earthly life, with all that happened in these days, still stands vividly. According to iii. 18 He suffers as the righteous One (cf. § 38, *b*), and since a saving purpose is ascribed to Him in that suffering, it is plain that it is conceived of as a suffering which was undertaken voluntarily, and therefore also borne willingly and patiently. This is implied also in the image of the lamb, the symbol of quiet patience, which is borrowed from Isa. liii. 7 (i. 19). When this lamb is described as being without blemish (ἄμωμος), the explanatory words (καὶ ἄσπιλος) show that this is meant, not in the ritual sense (Lev. i. 10), but in the sense of moral blamelessness, so that the peculiar value of His suffering (τίμιον αἷμα) can be clearly set forth in the innocence and patience of the suffering one. Lastly, in ii. 22, 23, there are expressly set forth, first, with the words of Isa. liii. 9, the innocence, and then, in a paraphrase of Isa. liii. 7, the silent patience of the sufferer. Although, accordingly, this suffering was a voluntary one, yet, on the other side, it was already foreordained for Christ in Messianic prophecy (i. 11, cf. § 38, *c*); and inasmuch as this part of prophecy is already fulfilled (ver. 12), that part of the Messianic consummation which is already realized must also be essentially grounded in that suffering.

(*b*) Although the suffering of Christ is cited as an example of the blessedness (cf. κρεῖττον : iii. 17) of a suffering which is endured innocently, the apostle, nevertheless, asserts that because of its peculiarly blessed fruits this suffering was of such a unique kind that, from the nature of the case, it cannot be repeated (ver. 18). Christ has suffered once (ἅπαξ) for sins; these must therefore be removed by this individual act of suffering, which is therefore already conceived of as culminating in death. Now since it is stated to be the design of this suffering, that He might make it possible for believers in Israel to have the (priestly) access to God which was necessary for the completion of the theocracy (§ 45, *c*), and since, according to the context, this access was rendered impossible by their sins, it follows that by His suffering in death He has destroyed the guilty stain of the ἄδικοι which was caused by sin.[1] How this has taken place is already indicated when it is said that He has suffered as the righteous for the unrighteous;[2] but it is from the leading passage, ii. 24,

[1] Although Sieffert allows that the bringing of the ἄδικοι to God cannot be effected without their reconciliation, he will nevertheless understand by this itself "their being brought to the sanctifying effects of fellowship with God" (p. 407), in order that here also he may make the effect of the death of Christ consist in practical deliverance from the power of sin, which Pfleiderer (p. 422 [E. Tr. ii. p. 153]) will also at least include. But since Sieffert himself allows the priestly character of the access to God which is rendered possible by the death of Jesus (p. 408), and since a sanctifying effect (in the ethical sense) is nowhere ascribed to this priestly act, it is already plain that that moral effect is simply dragged in, and, besides, it would not be owing to the death of Christ, but to the fellowship with God which is mediated through Him. And since even the "positive consecration to God" throughout presupposes purification (in the ritual sense), as he himself allows (p. 381), and the idea of introduction denotes, from the nature of the case, that access is made possible, and therefore the fulfilment of its presuppositions, it can only be this which is thought of here as the effect of the death of Christ.

[2] It is true that the idea of substitution no more lies in the preposition ὑπέρ here than in ii. 21 (in iv. 1 ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν is spurious); but the contrast, which is made so prominent between the righteous and the unrighteous, necessarily produces the idea, that the suffering which was endured in behalf of these ought really to have been endured by the unrighteous themselves. The suffering of Christ, however, cannot possibly be represented here under the type of the sin-offering (Ritschl, ii. p. 210), since nowhere in the sacrifice does a righteous person suffer for an unrighteous one. The final clause, accordingly, by no means contains "that which Peter has understood to be the purport of sacrifice in general." But if this were the case, it would follow from this very passage, that sacrifice does not provide for the man who approaches God "protection

that it first of all becomes perfectly clear. By its language as well as by its whole context this verse points so plainly to Isa. liii., whose prophecy regarding the servant of God was already (§ 38, *b*) conceived as Messianic, that it is only by means of it that it can be explained. What is said, therefore, is that Christ has borne our sins (Isa. liii. 12: *αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν ἀνήνεγκεν*; in Hebrew, נָשָׂא, סָבַל, *i.e.* however, according to the constant *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament (Num. xiv. 33), that He has suffered their divinely-appointed consequences, or their punishment. When, viz., the innocent one bears the consequences of the sins which should have fallen upon the guilty (an idea which comes out in the *ἡμῶν αὐτός* just as in the *αὐτῶν αὐτός* of Isa. liii. 11), He bears the alien sins themselves, as a burden laid upon Him.[3] On this account, the addition *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον*, in which, as in the Petrine discourses of the Acts (§ 38, *c*), the cross is described as the gallows tree, cannot give to *ἀναφέρειν* the meaning of carrying up the sacrifice on to the altar; it can only, in a pregnant manner, add the thought that He bore our sins, while He was ascending the cross, because it was there that He suffered the specific punishment of sin.[4] It is plain, therefore, that, in consequence of Isa. liii., Peter regards this sin-bearing of Christ in behalf of sinners as the means whereby sin has been removed from them, and by which, therefore, the stain of guilt has been effaced.

against the life-destroying effect of the superiority of God to the creatures" (cf., on the contrary, Riehm, *der Begriff der Sühne im A. T.*, Gotha 1876), but that it is man's sins (*περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*) that hinder this approach, and which must therefore be rendered inoperative by sacrifice.

[3] On the other hand, not only is the idea of sacrifice (cf. Lechler, p. 179) foreign to the context of the passage in Isaiah which we are considering here, but the idea of sin-bearing is also foreign to the ritual of sacrifice. It is never said of a sacrificial animal that it bears sins; it is only of the second goat on the great day of atonement, which was *not* sacrificed, but hunted away into the wilderness, that it is said that the iniquities of the children of Israel were laid upon his head, in order that the complete removal of the sins which were atoned for by the sacrifice of the first goat might be symbolically represented (Lev. xvi. 20–22).

[4] Although Sieffert allows that Peter attaches himself to Isaiah in his language, he nevertheless maintains that by his independent additions he has given the words a totally different meaning, viz. that He carried up our sins (as manifestations of a dominant power of sin) on to the tree, and thus, in principle, annihilated the power of sin which is dominant in man (p. 401 ff.; cf. Pfleiderer,

(*c*) To what extent the words of institution of the supper have become regulative to the apostle for the comprehension of the saving significance of the death of Christ, appears clearly from i. 2. It was only in the case of the sacrifice which was offered, when the old covenant was concluded, that a sprinkling of the people with the blood of the sacrifice took place; and since, according to Ex. xxiv. 7, 8, the obligation to obedience preceded the sprinkling of the blood, the allusion to that passage is evident, because here also the εἰς ὑπακοήν precedes the εἰς ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Both together plainly constitute the forming of such a new covenant as Jesus had described in Mark xiv. 24 as being brought about by His blood (§ 22, *c*). As God concluded the old covenant with the children of Israel at Sinai, after they had bound themselves to obedience, and had been cleansed by the atoning blood of the covenant sacrifice from the stain of guilt which separated them from God, so believers in Israel are described here as being elect unto obedience and sprinkling with the blood of Jesus Christ, *i.e.*, therefore, as being chosen to be the peculiar people of the new covenant (cf. Jer. xxxi. 31–34), the people which is to become, by obedience, a people of true servants of God (cf. § 44), and which is to be cleansed, by the sprinkling of blood, from the stain of guilt which hinders them from enjoying perfect fellowship with God. The bloody death of Christ is, therefore, thought of

p. 422 [E. Tr. ii. 153]). But, according to his own explanation, there is nothing in the words regarding an *annihilation;* and it is pure arbitrariness to say that the idea of the power of sin, which is always calling new sins into existence, is foisted into the τὰς ἁμαρτίας ὑμῶν, which undoubtedly denotes the sins which we have committed. Since Jesus suffers death in His body in the same manner as sinners suffer it (iv. 6), and that too in the form of an unnatural, violent death, in which the judgment of God against sinners is most plainly revealed (§ 34, *c*), the expression, that He bore sins in His body, can be explained without "there being some relation or other between the power of sin which works in men and the particular body of Christ" (p. 403), even if we should not grant the obvious reminiscence of the symbolism of the breaking of bread (Mark xiv. 22), in which the body appears as surrendered to death. Even Ritschl (ii. p. 257) allows that the ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον makes no difference in the meaning of the expression taken from Isaiah; but he then likewise foists into the bearing of the sins of others (in their consequences) the annihilation of sins in the sense of cleansing from them (in the moral sense); and Laichinger even seeks to make this out by conceiving of death itself as a disease of sin which Jesus has taken away from us (p. 294).

here as an atoning covenant sacrifice,[5] without this point of view being placed in any relation with the quite different one in note *b*, which, nevertheless, in iii. 18, comes essentially to the same thing.

(*d*) The deliverance from the bondage of Egypt had already been regarded by Stephen as typical of the salvation which was brought through Christ (Acts vii. 35). In many ways, Messianic prophecy had also looked forward to a deliverance from all enemies (Jer. xv. 21, xxxi. 11: פָּדָה, נָאַל), and such a deliverance formed an essential element of the Messianic expectation in the time of Christ (Luke i. 74, xxiv. 21: *ἠλπίζομεν ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ μέλλων λυτροῦσθαι τὸν Ἰσραήλ*). He Himself had called His death the ransom whereby He would deliver the souls of men from death (§ 22, *c*). In i. 18 Peter also speaks of such a deliverance; but he calls the power from which believers in Israel are redeemed (*ἐλυτρώθητε ἐκ τῆς . . . ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς*) their previous manner of life, which, as a manner of life which was handed down by their fathers, had up to this time exerted an enslaving influence upon them, which hindered them from becoming true servants of God and children of obedience (vv. 14, 17). As the ransom, through which this redemption is effected, Peter names the blood of Christ, whose suffering is here, in accordance with note *a*, set forth in its specific preciousness in contrast with

[5] Sieffert denies that, according to Heb. ix. 22 (where undoubtedly the general statement is meant to explain the special circumstance mentioned in 19 f.), an atoning significance was ascribed, in the apostolic age, to the sprinkling with the blood of the covenant, which even Ritschl, p. 168, acknowledges. Accordingly, he attributes to the blood of the covenant "the leading of the people into the sanctifying living fellowship with God," and, thereby, here also (cf. note 1) foists into the idea of the fellowship of the covenant the totally different idea of a sanctifying living fellowship (in the ethical sense), just as he also makes the saving effect of the death of Jesus have no reference to men's being introduced into the former, but mixes it up with the effects of the latter (p. 881 ff.). When, however, Pfleiderer, p. 427 [E. Tr. ii. 158], concludes from the circumstance that *ὑπακοή* stands first, that this is conceived of as a conditioning presupposition of the forgiveness of sins, and finds therein an evidence that the death of Jesus has not an immediately expiatory effect, but only does away with our sins by being a motive of our moral amendment, it is to be noted that there is no indication of such a causal connection between the obedience and the sprinkling of blood, while their combination and succession are sufficiently explained by the fundamental thought of the passage, and that the *ὑπακοή* is not at all regarded here as an effect of the death of Christ.

that which is usually most precious, viz. gold and silver.[6] As to the manner in which this redemption is effected through the blood of Christ, the passage says nothing directly;[7] in accordance with § 46, *a*, however, it is explained from the circumstance that the message regarding the atoning death of Christ has a greater influence over believers than their previous manner of life, and constrains them to separate themselves from sin. That this was the design of the death of Christ is stated directly in ii. 24, where it is said that Christ has borne our sins, in order that we, being separated from sin, should live unto righteousness, and so be cured of the disease of sin (cf. Isa. liii. 5). Here it becomes quite clear that deliverance from sin (to which Schenkel, § 41, again reduces the saving significance of the death of Christ) is only its mediate consequence, since its immediate object is said to

[6] In opposition to Ritschl (ii. p. 221), Sieffert (p. 390 ff.) has shown conclusively, that λυτροῦν cannot here denote the general idea of setting free, but has really the meaning of ransoming; at the basis of Peter's statement, however, there lies, not the idea of the ransom which He has paid to another, but only the thought that God has caused our redemption to cost Himself a great price (the surrender of His Son to a bloody death). On this account, however, it is *a priori* unlikely that the preciousness of the blood of Christ should be illustrated by comparing it with that of an unblemished lamb, since the sacrifice is a gift to God, while the question here is as to a price which God paid. It is, besides, rather unnatural to compare the faultlessness (ritually) of a sacrificial animal (which, indeed, qualifies it for being a sacrifice, but does not, *per se*, make it specially valuable) with the moral purity of Christ, or even to reflect upon the fact that, like the death of the sacrificial animal, the death of Christ was altogether undeserved (Sieff. p. 395). Neither, as is being always maintained, the ἄμωμος (cf., on the contrary, note *a*) nor the αἷμα, which describes the death as a violent one, and therefore as doubly dreadful (cf. footnote 4), can prove that the apostle is alluding to a sacrifice.

[7] To think of the lamb as a propitiation (*v.* Cölln, ii. 327) is neither demanded by Isa. liii. 7, where the lamb is regarded only as an image of quiet endurance, and not as a propitiation, nor allowed by the meaning (which is not of a redemptive nature) of the propitiation (Lev. xvii. 11). We might think of the Passover lamb (Lechler, p. 178; Ritschl, p. 177 f.), inasmuch as it reminds us of the typical redemption from Egypt. But since the mention of the lamb has, according to the context, a different object (see above), this allusion does not lie in the mind of the apostle, and besides, according to footnote 6, it will not suit in many respects. Nor would it say anything as to the manner in which the redemption is effected, for what is spoken of is not a "ransoming from the death-awarding judgment of God" (Gess, p. 397). To think, lastly, of the sin-offering which was made when the leper was declared clean, because, according to ii. 24, we are cured of the leprosy of sin (Laichinger, p. 297), is mere trifling.

be the bearing of our sins. From the sin, however, whose miserable consequences Christ has had to bear upon the tree, man cannot but feel himself to be separated for ever.[8]

## § 50. *The Resurrection as the ground of Christian Hope.*

It is through His resurrection and exaltation that Christ has first been fully invested with the Messianic dignity and exalted to divine glory. (*b*) It was thereby also that there was first restored to the apostles their hope in the Messianic consummation of all things, a hope which appeared to be lost with the death of Jesus. (*c*) With the return of the exalted Christ the elect must attain to the heavenly inheritance which is appointed them, and in which they receive eternal life and eternal glory. (*d*) He, however, who was exalted to be the judge of the world, was alone able to deliver them from the final (Messianic) judgment which was then impending.

(*a*) God has raised up Christ from the dead and given Him glory (i. 21), under which there is undoubtedly meant His exaltation to the right hand of God; and this is conceived of as having been brought about by means of the elevation to heaven which was involved in the resurrection (iii. 22: *πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανόν*), although not by means of a visible ascension (cf. § 39, *b*). Thereby it was shown that the stone which was rejected by men (after Ps. cxviii. 22, as in § 38, *c*) was the stone chosen by God, and highly honoured (ii. 4), and of which it was said in Isa. xxviii. 16 that God would make it the corner-stone of the completed theocracy (ii. 6, 7). God, however, has done this by making Him our Lord (i. 3) and

[8] It has been attempted to explain this thought by means of the Pauline doctrine of the living fellowship with Christ (Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 416; cf. Schmid, ii. p. 178 f. [E. Tr. 391 ff.], who seeks it also in iv. 1); but that doctrine is quite foreign both to the language and the context of our passage. By translating the *ὅτι* of iv. 1 by "in order that," Sieffert will even find there the thought that, by means of His suffering in the flesh, in which even in Him sin had "the ground of its possibility," although, of course, "only in an abstract manner," Christ has "in principle destroyed the supremacy of the flesh, and therewith the dominion of sin" (p. 429), or that "with the flesh of Christ the universal ground of the possibility of sin is in principle destroyed" (p. 431), in order that he may then declare this very thought to be foreign to the Petrine circle of ideas, and therefore borrowed from Rom. viii. 1 ff. (p. 438), where, indeed, it is no more found than it is here.

the chief Shepherd of His flock (v. 4, cf. § 39, *c*). Thereby He was also first fully manifested as the Messiah (i. 20, 21, cf. § 48, *a*); and now He is also revealed as such (i. 13) in the evangelical proclamation regarding the glories which were already appointed to the Messiah in prophecy (i. 11, 12, cf. § 39, *a*, *b*), and which are now accomplished in Him.[1] He has been exalted, however, not only to be the Lord of the theocracy, but by His elevation to the divine throne He has been exalted also to participation in divine honour and in the sovereignty of the world (cf. § 39, *c*), so that, according to iii. 22, even the angels are now made subject unto Him.[2] Accordingly He is not only called ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, but also simply ὁ κύριος, like God Himself (i. 25, ii. 13, iii. 12), the significance of which fact Beyschlag (p. 118 f.) has not properly estimated. Here also, viz., as in § 39, *c*, a quotation from the Old Testament (Ps. xxxiv. 8), which treats of the κύριος-Jehovah, is applied to Him without more ado (ii. 3); and likewise in iii. 15 (cf. Isa. viii. 13), where the explanatory τὸν Χριστόν is expressly added, there is demanded for Him the ἁγιάζειν, which, like the fear of God (Matt. x. 28), forms the opposite of all fear of man (ver. 14). Here also, therefore, He is, in His exaltation, a divine being; although the doxology of iv. 11 cannot, in conformity with the context, be applied to Him, as it is by Schmid, ii. p. 174 [E. Tr. 389], and Pfleiderer, p. 421 [E. Tr. ii. 151].

(*b*) Looked at from the later standpoint of the apostles, the death of Jesus could easily be perceived to be salvation-bringing; but at first, even for the apostles, every hope in the Messianic consummation which was expected of Jesus seemed

[1] Here also, it is true, the name Son of God is not directly given Him; but, just as in § 39, *b*, God is called His Father in a passage where He is described in His Messianic quality as our Lord (i. 3); and in ver. 2 God is called Θεὸς πατήρ, with express reference to the new Church of God which has been constituted by election, and in which the theocracy is being made perfect, and this name is probably to be understood as referring also to Jesus Christ, who is mentioned in what follows.

[2] In i. 12 the angels appear as a higher order of creatures, who, it is true, take no active part in the Messianic work of salvation, but by their longing to look into the saving deeds which are proclaimed make the glory and greatness of these deeds very manifest. By His exaltation over these (and their different ranks are embraced in the annexed ἐξουσίαι καὶ δυνάμεις) the universal sovereignty of the exalted Christ is brought out, as in § 19, *d*.

to be borne to the grave along with Him (Luke xxiv. 21). It is the expression of the most immediate living experience, when Peter says (i. 3) that they were begotten again unto a living hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Not till it took place was the dead Jesus manifested with absolute certainty as the Messiah, or exalted to full Messianic glory (note *a*). Now for the first time could there open up to the apostles a new life of hope. The risen and exalted Christ could and must make perfect that which He who died upon the cross had left incomplete. So i. 21 describes the genesis of Christian hope. Through Christ the Christians have become believers in God, *i.e.* according to the context: they have learned to trust Him as the Father, who has called them to be His children (vv. 15, 17), and has redeemed them (ver. 18). This trust in God, however, was owing to Him, only if they acknowledged Him to be the Messiah and were assured of His Messiahship, in consequence of the circumstance that God had raised Him up and given Him the glory that was promised according to ver. 11. In this His Messianic glory He had become the one who could with divine power bring about the fulfilment of all the promises, so that the faith of the Christians in the commencement of the time of salvation must now also become hope in the consummation of it (*ὥστε τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι*), which God will bring about through the Messiah.[3]

(*c*) Christian hope attaches itself to the expected second sending of the Messiah (cf. § 39, *d*). Not till then will the still invisible Christ be revealed (i. 7, 8) in His true character and in His full Messianic glory (iv. 13, v. 1). As this second *ἀποκάλυψις* of the Messiah stands parallel with that which is effected through the preaching of the Gospel (i. 13), so also

[3] As the hope of the pious of the old covenant is a hope in God (iii. 5: *ἐλπίζειν εἰς Θεόν*), so the Christian hope, which keeps in view the completion of salvation, is also a hope in Him (i. 21). It is God who has called them in Christ unto eternal glory (v. 10), and has thereby translated them from the darkness of destruction into the light of an incomparable salvation (ii. 9). It is He who has begotten them again unto hope by the resurrection of Christ (i. 3), and who as the God of all grace will also help them to fulfil their calling, by guarding them in His power, as in a stronghold, unto the impending salvation (i. 5), and by perfecting, strengthening, and establishing them by His grace (v. 10). The completion of salvation, as well as the commencement of the time of salvation, is His gracious gift.

the *φανέρωσις* of Jesus as the Messianic chief Shepherd (v. 4) stands parallel with that which has already taken place (i. 20). With it, however, the completion of salvation can also be looked for. And as the fulfilment of the promise which has already taken place is thought of as a realization of the ideal which was set before the children of Israel (chap. iii.), so the fulfilment of all the promises which is still to be expected is also regarded as the realization of the goal which was promised to Israel. Now, however, the specific promise which was given to the elect nation was the possession of the land of Canaan, the *κληρονομία* (Lev. xx. 24; Deut. xix. 10, xx. 16), and so even now the elect race has an inheritance surely appointed it (i. 4: *κληρονομία*),[4] which is reserved for it in heaven, and which is therefore conceived of as heavenly, just as in the discourses of Jesus the perfected form of the kingdom of God, which is conceived of there also as a *κληρονομία*, appears as heavenly (§ 34, *a*). In it, according to iii. 9, believing Israel will inherit a blessing (*εὐλογίαν κληρονομεῖν*), such as was already looked forward to in the patriarchal promise (Acts iii. 25). Wherein this blessing consists, appears from iii. 7, where Christian women are called joint-heirs of life (Acts iii. 15, cf. § 40, *d*), because the life which is surely promised them is already a possession which cannot be lost, although as yet it is but an ideal possession of hope. In iv. 6 this life is more particularly described as being such a life as God lives (*ζῆν κατὰ Θεόν*), *i.e.* as an eternal and blessed life. According to v. 10, however, the characteristic expression for this blessing is the eternal divine glory (*δόξα*), in which the

[4] The predicates, with which Peter extols this heavenly inheritance, perhaps stand in express contrast to the inheritance which was once promised the children of Israel. It is imperishable (*ἄφθαρτος*), whereas the latter was threatened with destruction because of the sin of the people (Isa. xxiv. 3: *φθορᾷ φθαρήσεται ἡ γῆ*); it cannot be defiled (*ἀμίαντος*), whereas the latter was often profaned by the sin of the people (Jer. ii. 7: *ἐμιάνατε . . . τὴν κληρονομίαν μου*); it is unfading (*ἀμάραντος*), whereas the latter was exposed to the vicissitudes of blooming and withering (Isa. xl. 6 ff.). No doubt the hope of a conversion of the whole of Israel was still involved in the view according to which believing Israel forms the substance of the Church (§ 44, *d*); but however such a conversion might one day transform the external relations of the national theocracy (cf. § 42, *c*), to the apostle who had conceived of the Messianic salvation in the sense of § 49, *d* the ultimate goal of Christian hope was no longer an earthly, but the heavenly completion of the theocracy.

approved disciples will yet participate along with their glorified Lord (iv. 13, v. 1, 4, note *a*).[5]

(*d*) The Messianic consummation does not come without the Messianic judgment; and, as in the discourses of Jesus (§ 33, *c*), this appears as the antitype of the flood in the days of Noah (iii. 20). It is true that at all times judgments of God have fallen upon the world, when men, in conformity with their peculiar constitution, were, by means of death, judged in the flesh, which, by its separation from the soul, could be delivered up to destruction (cf. Gen. ii. 17; Deut. xxx. 15, 19; Ps. xc. 6); but, their spirits being still in Hades, they are not by means of that bodily destruction yet shut out from the eternal, blessed life (iv. 6). Even those disobedient ones who remained disobedient in the days of Noah, when the long-suffering of God deferred the judgment (iii. 20), are not yet delivered over to final destruction; for since the manifestation of the Messiah there is only *one* sin which definitively excludes men from salvation, viz. disobedience to the glad tidings (iv. 17, for which see § 44, *c*). Therefore Christ has proclaimed the message of salvation even to the spirits of these disobedient ones in Hades (iii. 19), nay, even to all the dead (iv. 6, see § 48, *d*), in order that not only the living, but also the dead might be judged in the final Messianic judgment, as appears from the logical connection of iv. 5 with ver. 6. And because their final fate is decided in accordance with their attitude to His message, He must also be the universal judge. It is true that, after the manner of the Old Testament, God Himself is still regarded as the righteous

[5] Where the word δόξα does not denote the recognition which one finds, in which sense it is synonymous with τιμή (i. 7), the idea of δόξα still appears in quite an indefinite form, as a description of the glory which originally belongs to God alone (iv. 11). Since δόξα also denotes everything which is brilliant, everything which catches the eye (cf. Cremer, p. 163), this idea, like that of φῶς (ii. 9), can become a symbolical description of the greatest happiness, of perfect blessedness. Whereas, in the synoptical discourses of Christ, (eternal) life is still the common expression for the completion of salvation (§ 34, *b*), here the idea of glory for the most part takes its place. As in these discourses, however, so neither here is the resurrection thought of; for the apostle still hopes to live to see the Parousia along with his readers. For those, however, who are already dead, it is self-evident (as in these discourses) that it is only by means of the resurrection that their souls can attain to the godlike life in the heavenly inheritance; for, according to the view of the New Testament, there is no real life without a restoration of the corporeity.

(ii. 23) judge of the world, who, without regarding His closer relation to His children, impartially judges according to each one's work (i. 17);[6] but in iv. 5, Christ seems to be meant as the one to whom the living and the dead will have to give an account (cf. Acts x. 42). And because He, as the judge of the world, has the final decision at His disposal, He can also deliver His own in the Messianic judgment. Now, since it is through His resurrection and the exaltation which followed that He has attained to the divine glory, in which He alone can fill the office of judge of the world, it is said in iii. 21 f. that the salvation, which baptism in His name brings (§ 44, *b*), is secured through the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the One who is exalted to God's right hand.[7] This deliverance, however, from the end which awaits those who are disobedient to the Gospel of God (iv. 17 f.), is the Messianic salvation; for it is already foreknown by all the prophets, and has been a subject of their investigation (i. 10). Looked at from the negative side, it is the goal of Christian hope (i. 5, cf. § 34, *c*, 40, *d*), to which all growth in the Christian life is ultimately to lead (ii. 2); and as in the discourses of Christ,

[6] Ritschl (ii. p. 113) denies that there is a reference here to a double-sided recompense (and therefore also of wicked works). But that we cannot exclude such a reference follows clearly from the circumstance, that it is upon the consideration of the impartial nature of the judgment that the demand to pass their time in fear is based, and thus the hope is cut off that they can remain free from punishment because of their divine sonship. And although it is certain that in ii. 23 "restoration to His rights" is also intended by His committing the wrong He was enduring to the righteous judge, yet the preceding οὐκ ἠπείλει shows that it is in the awarding of punishment that this is looked for, the very threatening of which would forestall the judge. The appeal of Ritschl (p. 112) to the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament, in which he everywhere finds that by righteousness is denoted only "the consistent behaviour which is in keeping with the salvation of believers," depends upon a conception of that usage with which I cannot agree; because even where righteousness does, substantially, that which is usually ascribed to grace and faithfulness, the point of view is everywhere that of a different judicial treatment of the pious and the godless (which necessarily includes a double-sided retribution, without being limited to that) in keeping with the rule of justice (which rule, it is true, is fixed by God Himself, and includes His promises and threatenings); and certainly the New Testament, at least, does not confirm his view.

[7] In consequence of this passage, Laichinger maintains that forgiveness of sins, considered as an immediate effect of baptism, is traced back, not to the death, but to the resurrection of Christ (p. 291), and that therefore the latter is conceived of as a mediatorial factor (p. 300); but this is a simple confusion of condition and cause.

so here also it appears as a salvation of souls (i. 9), which are thereby (naturally, in a new corporeity) made partakers of the eternal, heavenly life (iv. 6, cf. note *c*).

## § 51. *The Apostle of Hope.*

In the opinion of the apostle, hope forms the real central point of the Christian life. (*b*) It appears in him in the greatest energy, according to which the hoped-for consummation already appears as immediately at hand. (*c*) Nay, by perfect hope this consummation is already anticipated as if it were present, and felt with blissful joy. (*d*) This hope is, however, a living hope which influences the whole moral life, inasmuch as the consummation of all things which is promised as a reward becomes the strongest motive for the fulfilment of all the conditions of its attainment.

(*a*) When we call Peter the apostle of hope, we mean that, in his view of the Christian life, Christian hope assumes a specially prominent position. It is not merely the external occasion of our Epistle which causes him to lay such stress upon hope; for neither is it a letter of consolation (cf. § 36, *a*), nor have the passages in question a specially consoling tendency. In its peculiar characterization of the Christian standing of the readers, the address already shows that Peter looks at the whole of the Christian life from the viewpoint of hope; for it is only as being elect to participation in the heavenly inheritance (§ 50, *c*), that the Christians feel themselves to be people who, still separated from it during their earthly life, remain only for a short time in a place to which they are strangers (i. 1: *παρεπίδημοι*) and regard this earthly life as the time of their sojourning (ver. 17: *παροικία*).[1] The apostle also describes himself, regarded from the viewpoint of hope, as a partaker of the future glory of Christ (v. 1). The new, divinely-worked life of the Christians, to

[1] On this side also there appears an analogy between the situation of the Christian Church and that of the Old Testament covenant people. As the possession of the land of Canaan had once been surely promised to the patriarchs (Gen. xii. 7), and yet they had to live in the land of promise as strangers and pilgrims (Gen. xxiii. 4), as their seed, to whom the land belonged, had also to remain a long time in Egypt as strangers (Acts vii. 6), so Peter calls the Christians strangers and pilgrims (ii. 11).

which they have been begotten again, he calls (i. 3) a life of hope. That which makes the Christian wives equally honourable with their husbands is (iii. 7) that they are joint-heirs of life. The specific element of Christianity, regarding which the Christian should be able to give a reason to every man (iii. 15), is his hope and its ground in Christ, who is rightly sanctified by their frank and open defence. Since in Christianity there is only perfectly realized that which was already realized in individual cases among the saints of the old covenant (§ 44, *b*), it is also characteristic of these that they set their hope in God (iii. 5). If, lastly, according to i. 21, the establishment of their faith through the exaltation of Christ is meant to lead to their faith becoming hope (§ 50, *b*), it is evident that the latter appears to the apostle as the real crown of the Christian life.

(*b*) The appearance of the judge is very near at hand; because He is already prepared to execute judgment upon living and dead, there is therefore, as it were, no longer any obstacle which can delay that judgment (iv. 5). With it, however, the Messianic salvation (from this judgment) is also ready to be revealed (i. 5); and from this it is evident that the last moment (*καιρὸς ἔσχατος*) of the end of the times, in which this salvation takes place, cannot, now that this end of the times has once commenced (i. 20, for which see § 48, *a*), be much longer deferred. The end of all things is at hand (iv. 7). The apostle perceives this from the circumstance that, in the present troubles, the judgment of God has already commenced (iv. 17). Just as, according to the teaching of Jesus, the Messianic judgment brings about a separation between the members of the Church (§ 33, *c*), so, according to Peter, the judgment has begun at the house of God, *i.e.* in the Church of believing Israel (§ 45, *a*). Such a judgment, moreover, had already been looked forward to in Old Testament prophecy (Jer. xxv. 29; Ezek. ix. 6). In the testing afflictions of the present time (§ 46, *d*) there is being carried out the separation between the genuine and the spurious members of the Church, and, therewith, also the judgment over those who fall away during these temptations. The greater these afflictions already are, so much the more dreadful appears the end of the necessarily gathering judgment, which will one day

come upon the unbelievers (iv. 17). But because this testing time, in which even the righteous is scarcely saved (iv. 18), cannot possibly last long (cf. Mark xiii. 20), the afflictions of the present time can only be for a little while (i. 6, v. 10). Thus, with the greatest energy of Christian hope, the apostle already brings the goal of the consummation very close to its commencement.

(*c*) Only then is hope perfect, when it is immoveably grounded upon the grace which is already offered us in the revelation of Christ (i. 13, cf. § 45, *b*), *i.e.* when it sees in the salvation which we have already received (vv. 10–12) the pledge of the impending completion of salvation (vv. 3–5), in the joyous certainty of which no affliction of the present time can make us waver (vv. 6–9). For this there is required a gathering together of ourselves from all apathy and spiritlessness (ver. 13: *ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας τῆς διανοίας*, cf. Luke xii. 35), as well as the spiritual sobriety (*νήφοντες*) which clearly keeps in view the end of hope and excludes all fanatical exaltation. In such a case the Christian knows himself, even in the present time, to be the heir of the gift of grace which is to be hoped for in the end (iii. 7); the exultant joy, which in iv. 13 is looked forward to at the end of the consummation, so fills him even in the present time, that the momentary sorrow, which he feels in consequence of the trying afflictions, can finally, when respect is had to their blessed results (§ 46, *d*), only serve to increase this joy (i. 6, 7). In i. 8, however, this exultant joy is not only described as unspeakably great, but also as glorified (*δεδοξασμένη*), *i.e.* as a joy which is already transfigured by the splendour of the future glory (§ 50, *c*), in which this glory is, as it were, anticipated. With an allusion to a saying of Christ (Matt. v. 10 f.), it is said in iii. 14 that Christians are already blessed in their affliction. The reason of this is assigned in iv. 14; the Spirit of God which, according to § 44, *b*, they have received in baptism, rests upon them, just as in Matt. x. 20 there was promised to the disciples, when they should be persecuted, a special assistance of this Spirit (§ 21, *c*, footnote 1). This Spirit of God is more particularly described as the Spirit of glory, and that, too (according to the connection with ver. 13), of the same glory in which Christ will be revealed at His return, in order to bestow it

upon His own. Here too, therefore, Christians have already, in the possession of this Spirit, a kind of participation in the future glory. In this intensity of Christian hope there is reflected the same interpenetration of present and future, of ideal and reality, which was already implied in the teaching of Christ regarding the kingdom of God (§ 15, *c*).

(*d*) The hope to which the Christian is begotten again the apostle describes in i. 3 as a living hope; and it must be so, since a real birth can bring forth only something living. What is meant, however, is the active influence which hope, if it is of the right kind, exerts over the whole moral life of man. It is with a glance at it, accordingly, that the first series of exhortations in the Epistle commences in i. 13, and the second in ii. 11; it likewise appears in iv. 5 at the close of the latter, and in iv. 7 at the beginning of the third, as the strongest motive of the exhortation. From this we can now also see the manner in which the message of salvation, which is indeed the ground of this hope, must, normally, work this new moral life (cf. § 46, *a*). Just as in the teaching of Jesus (§ 32), viz., the consummation of all things appears also as the reward which faith, when it is approved, obtains (i. 9). The prospect of this reward, however, must ever anew urge on to the fulfilment of the conditions without which it cannot be attained.[2] Here also the equivalence of the recompense in which the reward is bestowed is made very prominent. This equivalence is sometimes put as if we shall then receive what we have surrendered here, as *e.g.* he who humbles himself is exalted by God at the appointed time (v. 6; cf. Luke xiv. 11), or he who suffers with Christ will yet be a partaker of His glory (iv. 13); sometimes the analogy between the reward and the service is already indicated in the expression em-

[2] The behaviour, of which Christian hope thus appears to be the motive, is the complete fulfilment of the task to which the Christian is called (§ 45, *c*, *d*), although we must not, with Ritschl (ii. p. 361), distinguish, in this fulfilment, between self-purification as the building up of a religious-moral character and *right*-eousness as the performance of duty. It is certain, moreover, that in i. 22, where it is the former that is spoken of, the substance of vv. 14–17 is not re-stated; for here it was not the sanctification of the soul, but a quality of the *walk*, *i.e.* of the manner of acting, which was demanded; and according to the train of thought, the latter by no means appears as a "condition," but rather as an effect and consequence of perfect hope (ver. 13).

ployed, as when the joy that is to be looked for at the return of Christ is made dependent upon the cheerfulness with which we have been partakers here of Christ's sufferings (iv. 13), or as when, according to iii. 9, blessing can be received only where blessing has been bestowed.[3] Here, also, the reward is nothing foreign to the service; for it consists mainly only in this, that the proof of faith is recognised, and it accordingly receives praise, glory, and honour at the return of Christ (i. 7). According to ii. 7, this honour must be conferred upon believers also, because he who trusts in Christ cannot be put to shame with respect to his hope of such a recognition (ver. 6). In v. 4 it appears, figuratively, as the unfading crown of glory which the faithful shepherds obtain. This same passage shows, however, that the promised completion of salvation is necessarily bound up with this recognition. No doubt life is a gift of divine grace (iii. 7), and eternal glory is promised the Christians in virtue of their calling (v. 10); but this promised gift of grace must necessarily be adjudged as a reward, where the conditions of its attainment are acknowledged to be fulfilled. It remains therefore substantially the same, whether it is this recognition or the completion of salvation itself which is described as the reward.

[3] In what follows this truth is expressly established by a reference to Ps. xxxiv. 12–16 (iii. 10–12). In this passage, in conformity with the peculiarity of the Old Testament doctrine of recompense, the recompense is thought of as taking place during the present life, inasmuch as it secures good days, in consequence of which they learn to love life (ver. 10). Even this moment of the passage of the Psalm is accepted by the apostle, when he shows in iii. 13, 14 that no one can harm him who strives after that which is good, because even suffering for righteousness' sake can only make him blessed (cf. note *c*).

# SECTION III.

## THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

## CHAPTER V.

### CHRISTIANITY AS THE PERFECT LAW.

Cf. F. Kössing, *das christliche Gesetz*, Heidelberg 1867.

### § 52. *The Word of Truth.*

The gift of God, which Christians have received, is the word of truth, which contains the full revelation of the will of God, as Christ has revealed it by His exposition of the Old Testament law. (*b*) This word is implanted in Christians; by means of it they are begotten again, so that they can now fulfil the perfect law in freedom. (*c*) On the other hand, however, the import of the word is the truth which has to be embraced by faith, the truth, viz., that Jesus is exalted to full Messianic glory, and comes again as judge. (*d*) Because, therewith, the assurance is given that the perfect law announced by Christ can now be also perfectly fulfilled, and that the fulfilment of the law will bring about the fulfilment of all the promises, this word has a regenerating effect.

(*a*) Among the good gifts, all of which come from above, from God, James names as the chief the word of truth, by means of which God has made the Christians what they are (i. 17 f.). This word has, viz., according to ver. 21, the power of bringing about the Messianic salvation, and that because of the revelation of the truth which it contains. Since, however, he who has wandered from the truth can be saved only by being brought back again from the error of his way (v. 19, 20), it is mainly the revelation of truth which regulates the moral life of man that is looked at here. In what follows, the word of truth really appears throughout as a word which is not only to be heard, but also to be done (i. 19–23); and in ver. 25 it is even called the perfect law. In it, therefore, there is given the perfect revelation of the will of God. Now since the Old Testament law already revealed the will of God, the truth

which is revealed in the perfect law cannot differ essentially from that which is already stated there. In fact, James also quotes the great commandment of the perfect law just as it is found in the Old Testament (ii. 8: *κατὰ τὴν γραφήν*; cf. Lev. xix. 18). When he says in ii. 9 that those who show partiality are convicted by the law as transgressors, he can be referring only to the frequent prohibitions of *προσωποληψία* in the Mosaic law (cf. *e.g.* Deut. xvi. 19). Lastly, in ver. 11, two Old Testament commandments are quoted, without more ado, from Ex. xx., as commandments of the law which is valid for Christians. The perfect law, accordingly, can only be the Old Testament law in its full meaning, *i.e.* in that way of looking at it in which Christ, according to § 24, *b*, has taught that it is to be perfectly fulfilled. In fact, James, just like Christ (§ 25), sets forth the love of our neighbour as the royal, *i.e.* as the greatest commandment (ii. 8), and that, too, with special emphasis laid upon the exercise of compassion (i. 27, ii. 13, 15, 16, iii. 17). He regards the judging of one's neighbour (iv. 11, v. 9, cf. iii. 9 f.) as unlawful, although it is only in the law as Christ has taught it to be fulfilled that it appears so; with Him he absolutely forbids swearing (v. 12), and in iv. 2, quite in the spirit of Christ's fulfilment of the law (Matt. v. 22), he appears to regard anger as on the same level with killing.[1]

(*b*) That which is new in Christianity, however, is not only

[1] From the circumstance that it is only moral laws which are spoken of in our Epistle, we cannot infer with Lechler, p. 165, that it is only to this portion of the law that James ascribes an enduring validity; rather, according to the principle of the solidarity of all the separate commandments, which is stated in ii. 10, even the least of the ceremonial laws will have to find its fulfilment (cf. Matt. v. 18, 19, for which see § 24, *c*). It is quite in keeping with this that, in Acts xv. 21, xxi. 20, James assumes and approves of a continued observance of the law on the part of the Jewish Christians (§ 43, *d*); and that such an observance was found in the circle of his readers, follows naturally from their close social, nay, even religious fellowship with their unbelieving fellow-countrymen (ii. 2). When in i. 27 James describes the practice of compassion as a worship of God, the context shows that this is meant, not in opposition to the ceremonial worship, but to a perverted manner in which they fancied they could serve Him (i. 26); and although in i. 18 he makes a figurative application of the idea of the *ἀπαρχή*, the addition *τινα* (a certain, *i.e.* an *ἀπαρχή* to a certain extent) shows how far he was from, thereby, doing prejudice to the legal obligation relating to the *ἀπαρχή*. Still it remains noteworthy that the exhortation of the author never touches upon such duties.

that the word of truth is given in general, but that it is implanted in the Christians (i. 21: λόγος ἔμφυτος), *i.e.* that it does not merely stand over against them externally, but is written in their heart. Now in Jer. xxxi. 33 it had been stated, as a note of the Messianic time, that God would write His law in the people's heart, and therefore, in this implanting of the law, there is given an essential element of the Messianic salvation. Of course, this implanting is not so conceived of as if thereby the objectivity of the perfect law were altogether abolished; rather, according to i. 21, the word of this law, with which the Christian is continually occupied (ver. 25), must be always anew received; but now it finds entrance into the inner man, which has been prepared for it by that implanting.[2] When, viz., just as in Peter (§ 46, *a*), it is said that God has brought forth the Christians by the word of truth (i. 18), the meaning is, that their life has become a new one from the very foundation, and it is through that implanting of the word that this will have taken place. If, however, in consequence of such a regeneration, their nature has become inwardly related to the word which is implanted in them, they will henceforth continually let themselves be determined by it. Accordingly, it can be assumed in i. 25 that the searching and persistent occupation with the perfect law (παρακύψας . . . καὶ παραμείνας) has the fulfilment of the law as its immediate result, just as the right wisdom, *i.e.* the knowledge of the will of God which has become habitual, also immediately brings forth all good fruits (iii. 13, 17). But since for this there was needed the generation of a new life, it is assumed that the natural life of man is determined by another power (viz. sin), and that

[2] This implanting of the law within the inner man, which makes its fulfilment possible, appears in our Epistle also as the wisdom coming down from above, which brings with it compassion and all good fruits as its immediate results (iii. 17), so that it is only from the whole of his good walk that we can recognise the works of a wise man to be such, while it is from these works that we learn the nature of true wisdom (ver. 13). According to the context of i. 5, this wisdom, which God never refuses to him that asks, teaches us in every individual case the manner in which the right disposition has to manifest itself in a perfect way (ver. 4). We nowhere find any indication, it is true, as to the connection between this wisdom and the implanted law; but herein James attaches himself to the later Old Testament doctrine of wisdom, in which there is already prefigured a more inward knowledge of the will of God alongside of its revelation in the written law.

he is now set free from the dominion of this power. James, accordingly, calls the law of the Christian the law of liberty (i. 25, ii. 12), *i.e.* the law which is given to liberty, or to man in his state of salvation, which is delivered from the dominion of sin.[3]

(*c*) That which characterizes the Christian readers of the Epistle *quâ* Christians is, on the subjective side, their faith (ii. 5). What James understands by faith we cannot, with Schmid (ii. p. 105 [E. Tr. 344]), gather from i. 3, 6, v. 15, in which passages, as in the Gospels (§ 29, *c*), πίστις simply denotes trust in God. It is from the section ii. 14–26, where faith is thought of as the specifically Christian faith, that we can first discover its nature. When, by way of comparison, the faith of the demons in the oneness of God is spoken of here (ii. 19), it does not indeed follow that the faith of the Christians is the same as regards its contents; but, if the argument of the author is to have any force whatever, it must be identical with it as regards its nature, *i.e.* it must likewise be the firm persuasion of a given truth. The faith of Abraham likewise appears analogous with Christian faith, and, according to ii. 23, the former is a faith in God (πιστεύειν τῷ Θεῷ), *i.e.*, as in § 29, *c*, 40, *c*, the firm persuasion that the word which God has spoken to him is a true word which will be fulfilled. Now, it is only through the word of truth (note *a*) that the subject can have been brought under the notice of the Chris-

[3] The contradictory idea of a law, which itself works its free fulfilment (Messner, p. 79, 80), is revived by W. Schmidt, p. 63, 64, in a still more confused form. Neither the voluntary acceptance of the law (*i.e.* an acceptance accompanied with inner consent) nor its free fulfilment (*i.e.* a fulfilment which is caused, not by any external constraint, but by an inner willingness) can be indicated by the attribute of liberty being ascribed to the law itself. The genitive which is connected with νόμος can only denote either the lawgiver or the person to whom the law is given. But τῆς ἐλευθερίας could have the former meaning, only if the objectivity of the law were altogether abolished, so that, in consequence of his newly-begotten nature, the Christian spontaneously fulfilled the will of God; but this view is altogether foreign to James, who still speaks of a hearing and doing of the word. For this very reason these passages cannot be treating at all of a freedom which excludes every determination from without. Even i. 25, where the addition assigns the reason why the continual looking into the perfect law is alone necessary, and still more plainly ii. 12, where it is meant to make the Christian think of his greater responsibility—these passages show that the liberty discussed is not a liberty in opposition to the constraint of duty, but in opposition to a state of bondage which hinders the performance of duty.

tians, as to the truth of which their faith is exercised, and from this it is evident, that although this word was to the author mainly a revelation of the will of God, it nevertheless also contained the proclamation of a truth which gave the promise of salvation. And according to ii. 1, the object of the specific Christian faith is really Jesus Christ, inasmuch as He is the Lord of the Christians, and possesses divine glory. This implies that He is exalted to the throne of God, and has become the Messiah in the fullest sense (cf. § 50, *a*);[4] as He is also, in virtue of His divine dignity, looked for as the Messianic judge of the world (v. 8, 9). The firm persuasion of this, however, can be supported by the word of truth, only inasmuch as it proclaims the Messiahship of Jesus.

(*d*) Although these two different aspects of the word of truth are not expressly shown to be related to each other, their inner connection is, nevertheless, self-evident. If the perfect law is the law proclaimed by Christ (note *a*), then it is binding upon Christians, only in so far as they recognise in Him the Messiah (note *c*) who has come to reveal the will of God perfectly. It is true it is nowhere said expressly that it is only in consequence of their faith in the Messiah that the perfect law becomes normative for Christians; but when the one lawgiver is spoken of in iv. 12, in the context of which a commandment has just been quoted, which is found, not in the Old Testament law, but in that which was proclaimed by Christ, it certainly appears as if Christ was thought of as this lawgiver. This is also indirectly implied in the circumstance that, in his exhortations, the author attaches himself so frequently to the sayings of Christ with which he is acquainted from tradition. If, further, it is implied in the idea of the Messiah that He is come to bring the completion

[4] This is the reason why here, as in Peter (§ 48, *a*), the name Messiah is joined with the name Jesus as a *nomen proprium* (cf. i. 1). Here, too, the Old Testament name of God (ὁ κύριος: i. 7, iii. 9, iv. 10, 15, v. 4, 10, 11) is transferred, without more ado, to Christ (v. 7, 8), even where both are named alongside of each other, as in i. 1. As in the Old Testament the name of Jehovah is called upon those who belong to Him (Jer. xiv. 9), so the honourable name of Christ is called upon Christians (ii. 7); as the Old Testament prophets speak in the name of the Lord, *i.e.* of God (ver. 10), so the Christian elders act in the name of the Lord, *i.e.* of Christ (ver. 14), and in the immediate context (ver. 15) the name ὁ κύριος seems to be used again of God.

of salvation, there is therewith given the strongest motive to fulfil the will of God proclaimed by Him; because upon this, it is self-evident, depends their participation in the fulfilment of all the promises which is to be brought by Him, a participation regarding which He, as the judge of the world, decides. Now, however, that the Messiah has appeared, not only can the greatest salvation be looked forward to; in His manifestation there is rather already given the commencement of salvation; and in note *b* we actually saw that the perfect law proclaimed by Him is now implanted in believers or written in their hearts, as had been anticipated for the Messianic time. The proclamation of the Messiahship of Jesus, therefore, implies the certainty that now the will of God is not only perfectly revealed, but that it can also be really fulfilled; and it is this certainty which lends to the word of truth (inasmuch as it contains in itself this message of salvation) the power to beget the new life which is set free from the might of sin, and in which the Christian can fulfil the will of God. As in the teaching of Jesus (§ 21) and of Peter (§ 46), so here also it is after all the message of salvation, with which God graciously meets man, that of itself works the new life that is pleasing to God, although it appears here mainly as the proclamation, that the full revelation of the will of God and the possibility of its fulfilment have been brought by the Messiah. With this fulfilment of the divine will, however, the kingdom of God is realized upon earth (cf. § 13, *a*).

## § 53. *Justification.*

Cf. H. W. Weiffenbach, *Exegetisch-theologische Studie, über Jac.* ii. 14-26, Giessen 1871.

Faith must show itself to be living and operative in the works of the fulfilling of the law, and the law cannot be fulfilled without faith. (*b*) Mere faith, *per se*, cannot save, because only he can be saved whom God justifies. (*c*) It is only, however, in consequence of works, and not in consequence of faith alone, that God can justify. (*d*) This is already shown in the Old Testament examples of Abraham and Rahab.

(*a*) If the word of truth, which James, like Peter, regards

as the specific means of grace whereby God works the salvation of men, is the perfect law, as well as the proclamation of the fact that the revealer of this law has also brought about its fulfilment and comes to adjudge rewards, then that attitude of man to it, which is the subjective condition of salvation, appears, on the one hand, as the doing of the perfect law, and, on the other, as faith in that proclamation. The question therefore arises, in what relation do these two aspects of the condition of salvation, which are so very different, stand to one another? Now, however, it is self-evident that, if the strictest obligation, the strongest motive, and the certainty of ability to fulfil the law are given in faith (§ 52, *d*), it must necessarily produce the works of the fulfilling of the law; a faith which has not works is dead in itself (ii. 17). It is not only that, under certain circumstances, works are added to faith, but they must necessarily proceed from it, if it is living. In ii. 26 James makes this evident by the illustration of the body which is without a soul. He does not compare faith with the body, and works with the spirit; for such a comparison would be very unsuitable, seeing that the spirit is the invisible and vitalizing element, while works are neither. He rather says only that the faith which is without works is destitute of the vital force which must necessarily have brought forth such expressions of life as works are, and therefore that, like the body which is destitute of the source of life, the spirit, it is dead. Conversely, faith is as necessary for the performance of works, as the performance of works for the proof of the vitality of faith. What he says in ver. 22 of the faith of Abraham is plainly meant to be regulative of the relation of faith and works in general. All the obedience which Abraham had previously shown would not have been sufficient to enable him to perform the act of obedience involved in the sacrifice of Isaac, had not his firm faith in the promise of God assisted him. On the other hand, his faith was still imperfect, so long as it had not proved itself to be living by this act of obedience which was performed with its assistance;[1] just as, according

[1] As in accordance with this it is certainly incorrect to say with Baur (p. 281) that works are what they are directly through themselves, so that faith would merely be an accompanying moment of the religious consciousness, of which works are the substantial form, so, on the other hand, W. Schmidt (p. 104, 105)

to i. 4, patience does not prove itself to be perfect, until it makes its influence practically felt in the whole of a man's behaviour. Where this proof by means of works is not found, there faith is simply undiscernible. Conversely, however, faith shows itself by such works as necessarily presuppose faith (ii. 18). A faith which does not show itself in works, James compares with a compassion which has indeed a word of sympathy for one's neighbour, but leads to no active support of him, and which is therefore likewise totally destitute of vitality, of moral energy, and power (vv. 15, 16).[2]

(*b*) The question, whether faith by itself can save, is so put in ii. 14 that it already implies a negative answer. James is not, therefore, opposing a false view of faith and its effects; but, in opposition to such a practical error as Christ opposes in Matt. vii. 21 (cf. § 30, *c*), he asserts the self-evident truth, that the faith which has not works, and which is therefore dead, is of no avail, because it has no saving power; just as compassion is of no profit to the poor man, if it has only words and no deeds (ii. 14–16). In ver. 20 this is so expressed as if faith without works does not accomplish what

is also wrong in making faith, in its essence, receive a completion from works. Faith cannot be made higher and more perfect by the works which it itself brings forth; it can only, by the bringing forth of these, exhibit its true nature as a living (*i.e.* operative) faith, prove itself to be actually existing, and in so far be made perfect by works.

[2] Weiffenbach (p. 57) insists even more strongly than Baur that, in James, faith and works do not stand in any organic relation to one another: they are two co-ordinated "principles," working with and alongside of each other, the latter of which, as the higher, first brings πίστις, which in itself is imperfect and inoperative, to life and perfection. He does not perceive that, if faith which has not works is dead in itself, it follows, not that it is by means of (externally appended) works that it first of all receives vitality, but that it is by works (which it itself produces) that it first of all shows itself to be living (operative). It is obviously incorrect to say that we can infer the existence of that which is to be made perfect from the presence of that which makes it perfect (cf. the forcible reply of Ritschl, ii. p. 358)—an inference which, according to Weiffenbach (p. 19), is made in ver. 18; while he evades the decisive instance of ver. 22 only by making it, contrary to the context, state that faith *only* (?) assists works to attain justification (?), a statement which cannot possibly be proved by means of ver. 21, where nothing whatever was said as yet regarding faith in its relation to justification. In general, however, Weiffenbach has altogether failed to make us able to form any idea of the imagined perfecting of faith by works, in virtue of which, it is asserted, it first of all receives inner power and full life—a view which is supported mainly by the allegorizing misinterpretation of the figurative language of ver. 26.

it should accomplish; like capital which is lying idle, it does not bring the interest which is expected of it, it is unprofitable and inoperative. The predicate *ἀργή*, therefore, does not denote its deficiency in respect of subjective activity, but its deficiency in respect of objective result; and this result is none else than that which is striven after in every religion, and therefore also in Christianity, viz. to make God well pleased, and so secure to man salvation in His judgment. The author illustrates this by reminding his readers of the faith of the demons (who are definitively delivered over to judgment), which, although it is in itself a right faith (*καλῶς ποιεῖς*), is nevertheless so far from having the effect of making these well-pleasing to God, and thereby bringing them salvation, that it rather makes them shudder in dread of God's judgment (ver. 19). In order, viz., to be saved, one must be *δίκαιος* (v. 6, 16), like the pious of the Old Testament (ver. 17), *i.e.* one whose behaviour corresponds with the divine will, one who realizes *δικαιοσύνη* by the fulfilling of the perfect law (iii. 18, cf. § 24). And naturally it is necessary that one be *δίκαιος* in the judgment of God, and be justified by Him; for already in Matt. xii. 37 the opposite of this *δικαιοῦσθαι* is *καταδικάζεσθαι* (§ 32, *d*). Conversely, only he who is justified before God can be saved in the judgment. To the mind of the author, these two ideas (viz. being justified and saved) are so completely correlative, that he answers the question, what is required for salvation (ii. 14), by stating what it was that brought about the justification of Abraham (ver. 21). In ver. 25 it is taken for granted with respect to Rahab that she was justified; and although this is nowhere stated in the Old Testament, yet the author probably infers it directly from the circumstance, that she was saved from the judgment, which fell upon the Canaanites because of their godlessness (Josh. vi. 25).

(*c*) Already in i. 22 James states that the word of truth, through which God seeks to work the salvation of men, cannot save their souls (ver. 21), unless it is not only heard but also done. It is called a self-delusion, if one thinks of being satisfied with a hearing, which, like a passing glance into a mirror, makes only a quickly disappearing, powerless impression (vv. 23, 24). It is not a mere hearer, but only a doer of

the word, or, more accurately, of the ἔργον which is demanded in the word, that will be blessed in his doing (ver. 25).[3] Now, since the blessedness (salvation) of man depends, according to note *b*, upon his justification before the divine forum, and since faith answers to hearing, just as works to doing, it is the same question which is discussed here as in ii. 14–26. James assumes it as self-evident, that only he can be justified by God whose conduct corresponds with the will of God, because he does the works demanded by the law, and is therefore really righteous. He does not oppose an idea of justification, according to which God graciously justifies one who is not righteous in reality; such a possibility does not even enter his mind.[4] He comes therefore to the conclusion that man is justified by works, and not by faith alone (ver. 24). So surely as faith is necessary for the fulfilment of the perfect law, and is therefore the condition of salvation, so surely, nevertheless, the declaration that one is righteous cannot be made, until this faith has co-operated to the rendering of obedience, and is made perfect by the works which are effected through it (ver. 22, cf. note *a*). For not till then has man become really righteous, and not till then can he be justified by the righteous judge.

[3] It is, undoubtedly, of the immediate consequence of the doing, but by no means of a satisfaction which is felt in the doing itself, that this passage speaks. For it is evident from i. 12 that the blessedness which is already enjoyed in the present life consists in the certainty of future salvation; and it is only by pointing to this result of the doing of the word, that the line of thought is completed, which commences with ver. 21, and in which the question considered is the condition under which the word works the (final) salvation.

[4] All the attempts to deprive δικαιοῦσθαι, in James, of its forensic sense, and to understand by it only an exhibition of righteousness (cf. Preuss in the *Evang. Kirchenztg.* 1867, No. 40), or a translating into the condition of a right moral relation towards God (cf. Hofmann, i. p. 645 ff.), founder upon the connection between δικαιοῦσθαι and σωθῆναι pointed out in note *b*. The doctrine, however, of a progressive justification (cf. Hengstenberg in the *Evang. Kirchenztg.* 1866, Nos. 93, 94) is foreign alike to James and Paul. The renewed attempt of W. Schmidt (p. 103) to conceive of δικαίωσις in the Pauline sense, according to which it is an act of grace and includes the forgiveness of sins, has no support either in the language or the line of thought of our Epistle, and only gives rise to the difficulties in which the comparison of the teaching of the two New Testament writers has got involved. It is only an apparent solution, to distinguish between the δικαίωσις in the judgment, in James, and one that is already present, in Paul. It is quite true that the definitive δικαίωσις, like the definitive salvation, cannot

(*d*) Already in the history of the founder of the nation James sees a confirmation of the fact that it is in consequence of works that man is justified; for in consequence of the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen. xxii.), Abraham repeatedly received from God declarations regarding his obedience (Gen. xxii. 18, xxvi. 5), which involve his justification (ii. 21).[5] Now, no doubt, it is said in Gen. xv. 6 that Abraham's faith was reckoned unto him for righteousness; but the author regards this sentence of God as a prophecy, which was first fulfilled (ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα) when the faith of Abraham really co-operated in helping him to obey, and thus furnished him with the righteousness on the ground of which he was justified, and therefore called a friend of God (ver. 23). Not till then had the reality become a reality corresponding with that divine judgment regarding Abraham's faith; that judgment was now fulfilled, seeing that it was proved that in Abraham's faith there already lay *implicite* the righteousness which afterwards sprang from it, the righteousness, viz., for which God had reckoned it. Rahab likewise was saved, and therewith justified, in consequence of what she had done to

take place till the judgment; but throughout the whole of the discussions in Jas. ii. the question considered is, under what condition does man know himself to be already justified before God, and therefore secured against the judgment (note particularly the present δικαιοῦται, ver. 24). Among recent writers, Weiffenbach most vigorously supports the assumption of an objective difference between James and Paul, inasmuch as he also, without more ado, understands by δικαίωσις the justification of *the sinner*, and, for proof, appeals even to the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament (p. 26), although more than the half of the passages adduced by him (Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kings viii. 32; Isa. l. 8; Ps. lxxxii. 3) speak of the justification of *righteous* persons, while all the others regard the justification of unrighteous persons as an act of unrighteousness. This, therefore, only shows how altogether self-evident it appeared when the matter was looked at in the light of the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament, that none but they who are really righteous can be justified.

[5] It is quite arbitrary to think here, with Weiffenbach, p. 31, of the promises of blessing, in which (according to him) the justification of Abraham lies *implicite*. It is the obedience, *i.e.* the conduct which corresponded with the will of God, which is the righteousness. Neither in the case of Rahab can the *promise* which was given her be thought of (p. 51), for this was given her *before* she had saved the spies by her ἐκβαλεῖν. Further, the course of the discussion shows that James does *not* seek to prove that another cannot appeal, in opposition to him, to Gen. xv. 6, a passage which is apparently favourable to such an opponent (Weiff. p. 101); it rather shows that, when he appeals to the example of their progenitor, he means to argue *ex concessis*, and that a conception of Gen. xv. 6 in the Pauline sense is altogether foreign to him.

the spies (ver. 25); but, according to Josh. ii. 11, this deed also had sprung out of her faith in the God of Israel.

## § 54. *Election.*

Election is that act through which God makes the poor in Israel who love Him His peculiar people. (*b*) He accomplishes this act, partly by bringing them forth by means of the word, the aim of this generation being the establishment of a specific consecration to God; partly by the working of faith, in which there is given the possession of all present salvation, as well as the assurance of its promised completion. (*c*) It is peculiar that the state of salvation which is constituted by election is not described as sonship, and is not asserted as the ground of the manifestations of the love of God. (*d*) Still more striking is the manner in which the mediation of Christ is still kept altogether in the background when the most important points of the life of salvation are discussed.

(*a*) In contrast to those who preferred the rich, unbelieving Jew to a poor Christian brother (ii. 1–4), God has, according to ver. 5, preferred the poor, inasmuch as He has chosen them for Himself, *i.e.* to be the people of His possession. The idea of election, therefore, no longer refers to the people of Israel as descended from the fathers; as in § 44, *a*, it denotes the act through which individuals are separated out of the mass of Israelites, in order that the vocation of Israel may be realized in them.[1] By this election we are not at all to think of a pre-temporal act, since ii. 5 points explicitly to an evident fact which has been accomplished in the present time; but just as little are we to think of an arbitrary preference of certain individuals to others. It is rather a definite category of Israelites which God has chosen, viz. the outwardly poor (*πτωχοί*), those who are in a humble, oppressed condition (*i.* 9 : *ταπεινός*). No doubt this statement refers mainly to the special individuals who made up the churches to which James writes (cf. § 37, *a*); but in these individuals there is reflected a higher divine arrangement. Already in the Old

[1] In this sense election could also be very easily made to refer to individual Gentiles who had become Christians, and who had thereby been placed on a level with the chosen Israelites (cf. Acts xv. 14, for which see § 43, *c*).

Testament the promise had often been made specially to the poor and the miserable of the nation (עֲנִיִּים, אֶבְיוֹנִים), inasmuch as it was in this class that true piety had often maintained itself (Ps. xxxvii. 11, cxlvii. 6; Prov. iii. 34, xvi. 19; Isa. xiv. 32, xxix. 19). Now, since, even in the Old Testament, love to God was the fundamental commandment, and it was therefore in it especially that true piety evinced itself, it is to those who love God that it is promised in Deut. vii. 9, that God will keep His covenant with them, *i.e.* that the promise of salvation will be realized in them. Corresponding with this, it is said here also that God has given His promise to them that love Him (i. 12, ii. 5). And so it follows that God has chosen for Himself the poor and the miserable of the people, because it was among them that He found those who love Him.

(*b*) According to i. 18, it is by means of the new birth that God has made the readers Christians. Now, since, according to note *a*, it is also through election that they have become what they are, it follows that the historical act through which God has accomplished their election is their generation by the word of truth. This is therefore also explicitly traced back to the free will of God (*βουληθείς*), *i.e.* to His decree of election. Just as the aim of election, in its original sense, is the promotion of Israel to be God's peculiar people, so here it is stated to be the aim of the new birth, that God might make the Christians a kind of first-fruits (*ἀπαρχή*) of His creatures. The first-fruits, however, was that portion of the harvest which was dedicated to God and brought as an offering; and therefore the figure denotes nothing else than that which Peter calls the consecration to God of His peculiar people (cf. § 44, *b*, 45, *c*). It is probable that this is pointed to also in i. 4, where it is stated to be the end of the Christian life that Christians should be *τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι*. The former is the expression used by the LXX., the latter that used by Philo and Josephus, as corresponding with the Hebrew תְּמִים, which denotes the faultlessness of the sacrifice. On the other hand, it is stated in ii. 5 to be the end of election, that the Christians should be rich in faith (*πλουσίους ἐν πίστει*). In faith,[2] *i.e.* in the assurance of the salvation

[2] Faith is therefore not at all the condition of election; in this very passage, according to note *a*, its condition is differently described. Rather God has

which has come with the Messiah, the Christian, notwithstanding all the baseness of his outward condition, possesses a high estate which is peculiar to him, seeing that he knows himself to be chosen to be the possession of God; in faith he also possesses the whole riches of salvation which is given him in the revelation of the perfect law and in the ability to fulfil it. And since the exalted Messiah both can and will also carry out the work of salvation which He has begun, he also knows himself to be already in hope the heir of the completion of salvation (ii. 5: *κληρονόμος τῆς βασιλείας*), which, naturally, does not exclude the need of his still being proved before he can attain it, for it is only the faith which is proved that is the sufficient condition of salvation (§ 53).

(*c*) One would expect that the state of salvation which is constituted by election would, as in § 45, *d*, be described as sonship. In fact God is also called *πατήρ* in i. 27 and iii. 9, but this designation is not used to denote His relation to Christians in the specific sense. In i. 27 it rather characterizes God as the one who takes a fatherly care of widows and orphans; and the connection of the clauses of iii. 9 shows us that He is so named there, because men are made after His likeness, just as the son has the features of his father. In a still more general sense God is called (i. 17) the Father, *i.e.* the Creator of the lights of heaven (cf. Mal. ii. 10). The Christian readers are also addressed as brethren (i. 2, 16, etc.), and that too, in v. 7, in express contrast to their unbelieving fellow-countrymen, so that it is not merely their relationship as members of the same nation which is implied in that name. Still, brothers and sisters are spoken of in ii. 15,

worked faith in the elect in order that He might enable them to obtain the riches given in faith; or rather we can regard the historical act of election as consisting in the working of faith, as well as in regeneration by the word; for in the Gospels (§ 29, *d*) the working of faith is connected with the same divine arrangement as election is here. Since, however, he says nothing regarding the working of faith, we cannot answer the question, in what relation James has placed it to the new birth. No doubt the word must have been accepted in faith, if it is to work anything in man (Messner, p. 88); but this does not forbid the word itself (in its two aspects, cf. § 52, *a*, *c*) from working not only the new life, but also faith in that which it announces; and although doing, and therefore the new moral life, necessarily proceeds from (living) faith, yet this cannot be thought of as a natural psychological process, but as an effect produced by God by means of the word of truth which is appropriated in faith.

iv. 11, without anything compelling us to think exclusively of Christian brethren; and in i. 9 the name brother does not *per se* denote the believing fellow-countryman. It is the brother of low degree (note *a*) who is the Christian. Neither from this, therefore, does it appear that a specific filial relation of Christians to God was thought of when the name of brother was used. When God is described as the one who is rich in pity and mercy (v. 11), this attribute is not ascribed to Him as standing in a specific relation to Christians; it is shown in His conduct towards Job. It is only in iv. 6, and because of an Old Testament quotation (Prov. iii. 34), that the χάρις of God is spoken of, and that in such a manner that it denotes the gracious recompense of God for the surrender to Himself which He demands. When God appears (i. 5) as the one who gives to all, who ask Him in a right manner, that which they ask, this is promised, not, as in § 20, *b*, to Christians *qua* Christians, but, according to v. 16, rather to all pious supplicants; and in vv. 17, 18 it is an Old Testament example which is referred to, as an evidence of the power of such a prayer. It is only, therefore, that which applied to the pious members of the old covenant, which applies to the Christian in his state of salvation; and here also Christianity appears only as the full realization of that which was striven after in the old covenant, and also, at least partially, attained.

(*d*) Closely connected with this is the circumstance that the work, and specially the death of Christ, is nowhere thought of as the mediating cause of the new state of salvation. In Peter, it is only through the death of Christ that access to God is made possible (§ 49, *b*); here, if one who is upon a wrong way simply draws near to God (which, of course, is not possible without sorrow and self-humiliation), God will again draw near to him with His blessing, and will lift him up (iv. 8–10). So every one can save his neighbour and cause his sin to be covered, *i.e.* forgiven, by bringing him back from the error of his way to the truth (v. 20). Forgiveness of sins appears, directly, as the consequence of a prayer of faith, and of a sincere confession of sin, without the mediation of Christ being thought of (v. 15, 16). God, the giver of all good gifts (i. 17), bestows it directly. It is He also who, according to v. 15, 16, saves the sick person from

his distress and raises him up again in consequence of the prayer of faith. It is only the anointing with oil, which is to be performed upon the sick person by the elders who have been called together, that takes place in the name of Christ, *i.e.* by His command (ver. 14).[3] It is in this silence regarding the mediation of salvation through Christ that the doctrine of James is most strikingly distinguished from those of the other writers of the New Testament. It is of no avail to appeal, with W. Schmidt (p. 69), to the hortatory aim of the Epistle, or to the needs of its readers. It must rather be granted that it is his predominant conception of the salvation which is given in Christ as the revelation of the perfect law and the rendering of its fulfilment possible—a conception which is grounded in his individual peculiarity (§ 37, *b*)—which causes the author, in all other points, to look upon the means of grace, which the pious Israelites already enjoyed, as sufficient for the present time of salvation.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE DIVINE CLAIM AND THE DIVINE RECOMPENSE.

### § 55. *The Divine Claim.*

God demands that the spirit of man turn away from all love of the world and surrender itself to Him with its whole

[3] There is no indication whatever that, in v. 15, it is Christ who, by means of His intercession with the Father, effects the healing of the sick (W. Schmidt, p. 76); for the encouraging example of Elias (vv. 16, 17) points simply to the fact that God hears the prayer of faith. Schmidt's assertion can naturally find no support from the circumstance, that it was in obedience to the command of Christ, that they invoked the miraculous help of God upon the use of the simplest means of healing. This primitive custom of anointing with oil—a custom which we do not meet with again in the later time—had probably been formed, according to Mark vi. 13, in consequence of the means of healing which was recommended by Christ to the disciples. In performing this act, the elders do not appear as discharging a special spiritual function, but only as the leading members of the Church, whom they could most naturally regard as having the power of faith, which alone can give due efficacy to the prayer which accompanies the act of anointing with oil. For, according to v. 16, the prayer, which brings about the forgiveness of sins as well as the healing of the sick, can be requested also of every other member of the Church.

love. (*b*) Every partition of the soul is not only a deficiency in perfection, but also a staining of the heart, because thereby the dutiful subjection to God is violated. (*c*) For this undivided surrender to God, however, there is required also a trust in Him which is free from doubt, and which proves itself by enduring patience in the midst of trial. (*d*) A prayer which is full of trust will always find an answer.

(*a*) James expresses the extent of the claim of God in iv. 5: God yearneth jealously for the spirit which He has made to dwell in us.[1] As a jealous yearning for the sole possession of man is already ascribed to God in the Old Testament, so here also He desires that the spirit, which derives its origin from Him, should belong to Him exclusively with all its love. Accordingly, after the manner of the Old Testament, it is described as adultery, when one withdraws his love from Him, in order to give it to another (iv. 4). In the very same manner as in the discourses of Jesus (§ 26, *b*), the incompatibility of love to the world and love to God is set forth; the friendship of the world is enmity with God, because He wishes to have exclusive possession even of the inclination of the heart (which is purposely denoted here by the weaker *φιλία*), and therefore looks upon everything, which withdraws this inclination away from Him, as enmity to Himself. In this passage (iv. 4) the world, *i.e.* the totality of creaturely existence, stands opposed to God, because it seduces man to turn his inclination to it and thereby to prejudice the fulfilment of the claim of God. According to i. 27, there proceeds from it a staining influence against which true religion has to guard itself. The less one has of earthly goods, so much the less will this influence be; therefore it is the *πτωχοὶ τῷ κόσμῳ*, *i.e.* those who are poor in respect of worldly goods, who love God and are therefore chosen by Him (ii. 5). The rich, on the other hand, often appear, even in the Old Testament, as the godless (Isa. liii. 9; Sir. xiii. 4, xxvii. 1); and, notwithstanding their apparent exaltation, James speaks of their

[1] Naturally, this spirit is not that which is bestowed upon Christians (Schmid, ii. p. 115 [E. Tr. 351]), but the principle which vitalizes the body (ii. 26). When W. Schmidt (p. 93) infers from the circumstance that it is a *communicated* spirit which is spoken of, that we must not think of the natural spirit of man, he overlooks the fact that, according to Gen. ii. 7, this also was breathed into man (cf. § 27, *c*).

abjectness (i. 10), and announces to them, inasmuch as they seek their happiness in perishable riches, a speedy and dreadful end (i. 11, v. 1, 2). Here, too, we hear, throughout, echoes of the sayings of Jesus regarding the dangers of riches.

(*b*) The claim of God is not only an exclusive one; it is the innermost central point of the life of the human individual, the ψυχή, and therewith the καρδία, in which it has its seat (cf. § 27), which is claimed. The soul must therefore meet the demand that is made upon man, and be surrendered entirely to the Lord. From a division of the soul between God and the world there results only an instability of the moral walk (i. 8), which cannot satisfy the claim of the perfect law. According to § 54, *b*, this demands the thoroughgoing perfection of man (i. 4, iii. 2); and it must demand this, because every transgression of an individual commandment makes man guilty, as if he had sinned against them all (ii. 10). But διψυχία is not merely a defect, it is also a staining of the heart, from which it must be cleansed, if it is to correspond with the aim of consecration to God which election assigns to man (ἁγνίσατε, cf. 1 Pet. i. 22, for which see § 46, *b*). As the hands are polluted by sinful actions, so the heart is polluted by the partition of the soul between God and the world (iv. 8). Every turning of the heart to that which is worldly is opposed to the exclusive claim of God, and is described in iv. 6, 7 as pride, as a violation of men's dutiful subjection to God, because true humility does not permit man to choose the object of his inclination at his own discretion, but obliges him to follow therein the claim of God. Again, subjection to God, which is meant to hinder man from loving the world, stands parallel with resistance to the devil. As in § 23, *a*, he is thought of, therefore, as the God-resisting power which is dominant in the world, the power which gives to men's hearts their sinful bent to worldly things, and to whose will man subjects himself, when he allows himself to be seduced by the charm of worldly things.[2]

[2] As in § 23, *b*, there exist alongside of the devil δαιμόνια, who as such are delivered over to the unavoidable judgment (ii. 19). The wisdom which is selfish is described, on the one hand, as of an earthly, on the other, as of a

(*c*) The partition of the soul shows itself not only in the vacillation of its love between God and the world, but also in its vacillating between faith and doubt (i. 8). The doubter resembles the surge of the sea which is driven and tossed by the wind (ver. 6); true wisdom knows not doubt (iii. 17: *ἀδιάκριτος*); and the trust which God demands must be as exclusive of all doubt (i. 6) as love to Him is exclusive of all love of the world. As in Peter (§ 46, *d*), the afflictions which befall Christians are a proving of this trust in God (ver. 3); and as only he whose trust is proved can attain the completion of salvation (ver. 12), they are to account the trials which make such a proof possible as nothing but joy (ver. 2). This proof, viz., consists in the patient enduring of the trials of affliction (ver. 12), and it is this patience (v. 11: *ὑπομονή*) which, in the case of the true Christian, is worked by the proof of his faith (i. 3). If, indeed, affliction continues, a special strength is needed (v. 8) in order that they may be able to show patience in *μακροθυμία* (vv. 7, 10). In the situation of his readers a chief affliction under which they had to show patience was their external poverty, and their consequent humble and oppressed condition. It was therefore necessary that, in the midst of all their earthly baseness, they should remain conscious of the high estate which they possessed in their standing as Christians (i. 9; cf. § 54, *b*). If one prefers the unbelieving brother, because of his better outward circumstances, to the poor believer, he has become, at least temporarily, wavering in his conviction of the value of his Christian estate; for when estimating the value of others he has used a false standard, a standard which does not acknowledge the consciousness of the value of the Christian estate (ii. 4).

(*d*) As means of gaining the victory over these trials of affliction there are mentioned prayer (v. 13) and the intercession, to which, according to vv. 14, 16, we are to invite others. Of course, if prayer is to be heard, it must be, as

demoniac origin (iii. 15). Since the demons are delivered over to the judgment, *γέεννα* is, according to § 34, *d*, the abode which is appointed to them for the future; and since this place is thought of here also as a hell of fire, it is said in iii. 6 that sinful passion is kindled by hell. Hell is therefore thought of as even already the characteristic sphere of the demoniac power, and this latter is regarded as the active principle in sin.

Christ already taught (§ 20, *b*), a prayer of faith (ver. 15), and also, it is self-evident, the prayer of a righteous man (ver. 16). Without prayer we cannot receive anything of which we stand in need (iv. 2). But the prayer must not, of course, be for ungodly objects; for such a κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι can receive nothing (ver. 3). Lastly, it is only by means of prayer that we can obtain the wisdom which we need in order that we may behave rightly under trial (i. 5); but, of course, this prayer can find no answer in the case of the doubter (vv. 6, 7). God, however, the giver of all good gifts (ver. 17), gives liberally, and without upbraiding the one who prays as a troublesome beggar (ver. 5). In iii. 9, 10 it is taken for granted that man, who is made after the likeness of God, glorifies God as His Father; and, according to v. 13, the singing of praise is to be the expression of every condition of prosperity and health.

## § 56. *Human Sin.*

The real root of sin is sinful lust, which is conceived of not only as selfish, but also as sensuous. (*b*) Sinful lust, however, can show itself in action only in proportion as it succeeds in obtaining the mastery of the members of the body as its instruments, and this is effected most easily in the case of the tongue, which, once enlisted in the service of sin, has the most destructive influence. (*c*) There is need, therefore, of the greatest circumspection in the use of the tongue, in order that we may not fall into anger and impure zeal. (*d*) True wisdom, on the other hand, teaches us always to unite with love the gentleness and peaceableness which alone lead to the end aimed at, the reformation, viz., of our neighbour.

(*a*) Although it is the world which God has created that gives the external occasion of sinning (§ 55, *a*), yet we must not say that God tempts us to sin; for God, who is not tempted by evil Himself, cannot instigate another to sin (i. 13). Rather, lust is as characteristic of man in his present condition (ἰδία ἐπιθυμία) as, in Peter (§ 46, *b*), the walk in the lusts was characteristic of the pre-Christian life. In ver. 14 it is personified as a harlot who seeks to catch men by means of her bait, *i.e.* to instigate them to sin. If

man's will yields to the seduction of the harlot, and has illicit intercourse with her, the consequence is the engendering of sin; and if sin is not retracted by a true repentance, but is finished by becoming the dominant power in man, it brings forth death (ver. 15). Lust is bent, in the first place, upon the godless enjoyment of earthly happiness, upon the δαπανᾶν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς (iv. 3); it is therefore thought of, in the first place, as sensuous; and the ἡδοναί of ver. 1 are lusts after the satisfaction of sensuous desire (cf. ver. 2: ἐπιθυμεῖτε), after a wild life of enjoyment, τρυφᾶν and σπαταλᾶν (v. 5). But even the proud self-confidence which forgets that man with his plans is always dependent upon the will of God, and which, in the consciousness of an apparently secure possession, so easily leads to vain boastings (ἀλαζονείαι), is a misuse of earthly goods, and a violation of subjection to God, which is described in iv. 13–17 as sin. On the other hand, the longing after earthly goods, when a neighbour has them in greater abundance, begets strife and quarrels, wrath and impure zeal (iv. 1, 2). The rich oppresses the poor (ii. 6), and in sinful greed diminishes his hire (v. 4). But selfish wisdom, *i.e.* the wisdom which is bent upon making the most of one's own person (§ 27, *b*), also brings forth uncharitable zeal and egoistic factiousness (iii. 14, 15), and, as a consequence of these, discord and all wickedness (ver. 16). Because lust, in its sensuous as well as in its selfish bent, has become a habitual characteristic of man (i. 14), he finds himself in a state of bondage to it, from which he can be freed only by the new birth (§ 52, *b*).

(*b*) The appetite for sensuous enjoyment urges men to hostility towards others; but it is only inasmuch as one of the members of man becomes active in the service of such hostility that it actually breaks out; hence, according to iv. 1, the ἡδοναί carry on their war against others in men's members; hence, according to ver. 8, the hand is stained with sin. Accordingly, everything depends upon their so bridling the body and its members that lust may not be able to use them for the purpose of committing sin (iii. 2). As in i. 14, the will of man is conceived of as confronted by the hostile power of lust, a power with which it has to struggle, as it were, for the use of the body and its members. It is most

difficult of all to bridle the tongue; nay, the author declares (iii. 8) that although man has tamed the most different kinds of creatures (ver. 7), yet experience shows that he cannot tame the tongue, and that because it is so easily accessible to the most varied impulses (vv. 9, 10), because it is an *ἀκατάστατον κακόν*. He, who is able to check sin in its first expression in word, possesses also the moral power of guarding against sins of deed; and therefore it is said in ver. 2 that he who does not fail in word could also bridle the whole body, just as men direct the whole horse with the reins and the whole ship with the helm (vv. 3, 4). If, on the other hand, the tongue has once been enlisted in the service of sin, although it is the smallest member, it can nevertheless cause the greatest mischief. Not only does it itself do many a wrong to one's neighbour (ver. 6: *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*), which is described partly, as in ver. 5, under the image of a fire (cf. Prov. xvi. 27; Ps. cxx. 4), partly, as in ver. 8, under that of deadly poison (Ps. cxl. 3); but it also stains the whole body, since the sin which has once been allowed to reign in the province of this member drags the other members into its service. Experience teaches how very speedily sins of word become sins of deed; the might of sin, when once set free by means of the tongue, kindles like a fire the whole life of man (ver. 6: *τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως*).

(*c*) No doubt it is mainly the concrete circumstances of his readers (§ 37, *a*) which give occasion to the author to discuss, with such special thoroughness, the sins of speech; but in his estimation of these he follows, at the same time, the sayings of Jesus (cf. Matt. v. 22, xii. 37), from which he also borrows the commandment against oaths and judging (§ 52, *a*). He warns his readers against the proselytizing zeal which leads men to seek to be the teachers and masters of others; because, owing to the imminent danger of sinning in doing so, they thereby only increase their accountability (iii. 1).[1] If the other will not hear, then the more ready one

[1] It is an extraordinary misunderstanding on the part of Reuss, that makes him trace back (i. p. 488 [E. Tr. i. p. 423]) the warnings given here to a disinclination of the author to theological discussions, of which there is nothing said at all. So also Immer (p. 440), who even finds it conceivable that the sensuous lusts are named as the source of this love of controversy (iv. 1 ff.).

is in speaking, so much the more easily is one's wrath stirred up (i. 19). It is true, wrath, *per se*, is nothing evil; for the wrath of God is an expression of His righteousness (cf. § 50, *d*, footnote 6); but the easily kindled and often unjustifiable wrath of man does not work the righteousness which God works in His wrath (ver. 20). In such a case he, no doubt, persuades himself that in his wrath he is zealous for God, and serves Him by it; while he is only giving rein to his tongue, so that he deceives himself (ver. 26). He easily falls into an uncharitable zeal and an egoistic factiousness, which, according to note *a*, are a mark of selfish wisdom. Yea, even with his apparent zeal for the truth and against the sin of his neighbour, there are probably mixed up impure motives, such as chagrin at his better outward circumstances (iv. 2). James also looks upon slander as the judging which is forbidden by Christ (iv. 11); and although, according to v. 4, he knows of a crying of the oppressed to God, which the judge hears, yet he speaks also, in ver. 9, of an accusing murmuring against one another, which comes under that sentence pronounced against judging. The highest degree of this judging would be the cursing, which he mentions in iii. 9, 10 with abhorrence.

(*d*) Notwithstanding all this, James by no means seeks to hinder brotherly love from attempting to save an erring brother; in v. 19, 20 he rather describes the beautiful result of such an attempt. But they must first of all, with right meekness, put away all filthiness which cleaves to their speech and wrath in consequence of their own *κακία*, as well as the excess of wrath to which this *κακία* hurries them on (i. 21). True wisdom, which is above everything pure (iii. 17: *ἁγνή*), cannot exist without the meekness (ver. 13) and peaceableness (ver. 17: *εἰρηνική*) which Christ has demanded (§ 25, *c*; cf. § 47, *a*); it is fair and lenient in its judging of others (*ἐπιεικής*), it listens to reasons, and is pliant (*εὐπειθής*). It alone also gains its end; for it is only by the peaceable, who seek to convert their neighbour while still preserving peace, that there is really attained that which the zealous and contentious wisdom never attains, viz. a fruit of righteousness which comes to maturity in their neighbour (ver. 18).[2]

[2] As the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of i. 20 cannot be the *habitus* of a *δίκαιος* before God, which one cannot attain unto by means of uncharitable behaviour towards

## § 57. *Recompense and Judgment.*

The motive of patient endurance under trial, as well as of the avoidance of sin, is the prospect of recompense. (*b*) The recompense is an equivalent one; but for that very reason the merciful has to look also for a merciful judgment. (*c*) The day of recompense is near at hand, because the advent of the Messianic judge of the world is near. (*d*) The reward of sin is death; the promise, for which Christians look, is life and the kingdom.

(*a*) The more Christianity is thought of as a fulfilment of the perfect law, so much the more prominence must be given to the doctrine of recompense (cf. § 32). In i. 12 and v. 11, those are called blessed who have patiently borne suffering, because there awaits them such a transformation of all their sorrow into joy as that which Job experienced at last. The prospect of this end should strengthen them in endurance, as the prospect of the hoped-for harvest strengthens the husbandman (v. 7). On the other hand, James supports his warnings by pointing to the judgment (v. 9, 12). If, viz., according to iv. 17, sin first really becomes sin when one knows what is good (cf. § 32, *d*), the sin of the Christian who has received the perfect law must be specially punishable; and since, through the new birth, he has obtained the possibility of fulfilling the law, and therewith the greater ability to avoid transgressions, the judgment which he has to expect can only be one doubly severe (ii. 12).

(*b*) Like Christ and Peter (§ 51, *d*), James likes to express the equivalence of the recompense in a sententious manner. God draws nigh to the man who draws nigh to Him (iv. 8); the more God demands, so much the more does He also give (iv. 5, 6); the more responsibility one takes upon oneself, so much the heavier a judgment has one to expect (iii. 1). The saying of Christ which promises exaltation to those who humble themselves (Luke xiv. 11) is reproduced by James (iv. 10), as well as by Peter. In a peculiar manner James

others, so neither can the fruit of righteousness mentioned here be the character of one's own life which is pleasing to God, and which the sowing (manner of acting) of the peaceable brings about, although W. Schmidt (p. 126-129) and Ritschl (ii. p. 279) still misinterpret both passages in this sense.

solves the difficulty which apparently arises, if the judgment is to correspond with the doing of man, while yet the imperfection of all human doing must be allowed. Even Christians all sin in many ways (iii. 2), and, as they now need the forgiveness of sins (v. 15, 20), they will one day need a merciful judge (ii. 13). But since, according to § 52, *a*, mercifulness is characteristic of the Christian, and since, according to the law of the equivalence of the recompense, the merciful must obtain mercy (Matt. v. 7), the Christian can, according to this very doctrine of recompense, count upon a merciful judgment, which covers the still existing imperfections, and in so far he can look forward to the judgment with triumphant joyfulness (ii. 13).

(*c*) No doubt there is already, in a certain sense, an earthly recompense. As by Christ (§ 32, *d*, footnote 4), so also by James it is assumed that bodily sickness may be a consequence of sin (v. 15, 16). But the real folly of the godless rich man comes out, not in the circumstance that he has gathered together treasures which God can, by way of punishment, take away from him at any moment, but in this, that he has gathered them together in the last days, *i.e.* in the face of the approaching end of the world (v. 3). The miseries which will then befall the godless are already in the act of coming upon them (ver. 1), and will make a sudden end of all their riches (ver. 2), which is a testimony unto them that the judgment is now coming even upon themselves (ver. 3). Already the day of their destruction is imminent (ver. 5 : *ἡμέρα σφαγῆς*). The reason of this is that the exalted Lord, *i.e.* Christ, soon comes in judgment. His coming (ver. 7 : *παρουσία*), in which He will appear in His full Messianic dignity (so that this coming is thought of, not as a return, but as the expected coming of, the Messiah, cf. § 39, *d*), is already at hand (ver. 8). The Messiah, who appears as the judge of the world, already stands before the door (ver. 9). In iv. 12 also it is probably He that is thought of as the judge, who alone can save or condemn (cf. § 52, *d*).

(*d*) According to i. 15, sin, if it comes to maturity, brings forth death, which is therefore, as in Peter (§ 50, *d*), the punishment of sin. Here too, however, it is thought of as sudden and violent (i. 10 f., cf. also § 34, *c*). The fire of the

judgment (§ 34, *d*) eats the flesh of the godless (v. 3), and they are led to the slaughter (ver. 5). The real destruction (iv. 12), however, to which the Messianic judgment delivers up the godless, is not the death of the body, but the death of the soul (v. 20); and, according to § 34, *c*, this death can only consist in this, that, separated from the body, the soul remains in the eternal torment of the disembodied condition. Accordingly, the Messianic salvation, which Christianity has in view from the commencement, is a deliverance of the soul from this death and destruction. As in Peter (§ 50, *c*, 51, *d*), the opposite of this death is the crown of life (i. 12), which is promised to those who love God. That which in Peter is called the *κληρονόμία*, which will one day be bestowed upon Christians, appears here, as in the teaching of Jesus (§ 34, *a*), as the kingdom which is promised to those who love God (ii. 5). In it there can only be made perfect that which was being already striven after in the fulfilment of the perfect law, so that here also the future reward is nothing heterogeneous to the present service.

# PART THIRD.

## PAULINISM.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### § 58. *The Apostle Paul.*

In consequence of his natural speculative genius, as well as of his rabbinico-dialectic training, Paul possessed the ability and the inclination to strike out a more sharply defined form of teaching, and to work it out into an almost systematic completeness. (*b*) If, even previous to his conversion, he had found no full satisfaction in Judaism as conceived in the sense of Pharisaism, the peculiar manner of that conversion must also have contributed to make Christianity appear to him as a dispensation of grace, which pointed out a way of salvation which was altogether opposed to that of the law. (*c*) His view of the person of Christ, as well as of the salvation which was given in Him, must also have been peculiarly conditioned by the circumstance that his personal relation to Christ was brought about solely by the manifestation of the exalted Lord which was granted him. (*d*) And although, at his conversion, he entered unreservedly into the believing world of the original Christian circles, he has, nevertheless, in his activity as an apostle to the Gentiles, and with a strong consciousness of his independence, worked out his law-free, universalistic Gospel in an altogether peculiar manner.

(*a*) The reason why we have received from the apostle Paul a much greater number of literary monuments than from

the other apostles, from which we can become acquainted with his manner of teaching in its most different aspects, is not only that his extensive missionary activity gave him, most frequently, occasion to make up for the want of his personal presence in the ever-extending circle of his churches by means of epistolary communication, but also that he, most of all, possessed inclination and ability for literary activity, *i.e.* for a connected development of his thoughts. Whatever opinion we may have as to the design of the Epistle to the Romans, we must at any rate admit that in it the development of his teaching goes far beyond its immediate concrete occasion. When we say that he was naturally of a speculative turn of mind, we mean that he felt the need of ascertaining given truths for himself;—however certain they might appear to him *per se*, he must, nevertheless, be explicitly acquainted with their reasons; he felt the need of subsuming the particular under more general points of view, and of trying to discover the inner connection of the various moments of truth. Besides supplying him with the art of explaining Scripture, and of applying and interpreting it in the most varied manner, his rabbinical education supplied him, above all, with the dialectic art of defending his views in controversial discussion, of meeting objections or obviating them by an anticipated refutation, of expressing his ideas in a sharp and definite manner, of elucidating his statements by means of thesis and antithesis, and, when a principle was thus established, of showing the applicability of its consequences in all directions. It is in his writings, accordingly, that Christian truth first appears as a compact whole, whose leading propositions are sharply formulated and exhibited in their necessary connection with one another. This natural endowment of the apostle, however, makes it, *à priori*, in the highest degree improbable that, as has been recently frequently asserted, there should be found alongside of each other, in his teaching, altogether heterogeneous lines of thought with no indication of their points of transition, and unsolved antitheses which are full of contradictions.

(*b*) As a Pharisee, Paul stood upon the soil of orthodox Judaism, yet in such a manner that he had regarded it essentially from its legal side, as a holy rule of life, by the most

punctual observance of which one could earn the salvation promised to the fathers. He had distinguished himself by his zeal for the Pharisaic doctrine of the law, and by his most exact observance of it. Still, according to his own confession (Rom. vii.), he found herein no perfect satisfaction, inasmuch as he always remained painfully conscious of the contrast between the demand of the law and man's fulfilment. But this very dissatisfaction drove him on to the fanatical manifestation of his zeal for the law in the persecution of the Christian Church, as soon as the appearance of Stephen began to lead him to anticipate an opposition of the Church to the legal system and the custom of the fathers. His conversion was a sudden one. In the midst of his fanatical persecuting zeal, instead of being punished for it, he was, by an unparalleled gracious deed of God, vouchsafed a special manifestation of Christ, which entirely changed his opinion of the persecuted Nazarene; he was even called to be His apostle, and qualified for the most extensive labours in His service. Everything which he himself had done in the service of the law, and by means of which he had striven to earn salvation, had not only proved insufficient, it had plunged him ever deeper into the most heinous sin of his life. Grace alone had saved him. From this experience of his life there must have spontaneously grown up the conception of Christianity as a new dispensation of grace, which formed the antithesis of all human doing and desert.[1] If, in his opinion, the doing of the

[1] It has recently been emphatically maintained that it is not by way of such a subjective experience of his own inability to earn salvation (an experience which, it is true, would not be the ground of his conversion, unless there were added his experience of divine grace), but by a process of the theoretical consciousness, a dialectics of his religious thinking regarding the necessity of the death of the Messiah upon the cross, that the genesis of the Pauline gospel of the new way of salvation is to be explained (cf. especially Pfleiderer, p. 4–16 [E. Tr. i. 4–16]). But this assumes that, to the Pharisee Paul, the Messiah was essentially the bringer of the Messianic righteousness, a righteousness which one who was accursed of the law could bring, only if it was a wholly new righteousness, which had no longer anything to do with the law (p. 11 [E. Tr. i. 11]). In the opinion of the Pharisees, however, the Messiah was by no means the bringer of the Messianic righteousness (so that the salvation, which only one who fell under the curse of the law could bring, must necessarily have been a "new righteousness"); He was essentially the bringer of the national-political completion of the theocracy, in which only those could participate who had become, through the law, δίκαιοι in the Pharisaic sense. And when Pfleiderer (p. 12

law had previously been the only way by which salvation was to be gained, there was now a totally new way. It is not its antithesis in principle to Judaism, nor even to the law in general, but only to the way of salvation which was pointed out by the law, that characterizes the Pauline conception of Christianity.[2]

(*c*) Paul had not enjoyed the personal intercourse with Christ, by means of which the religious ideas of the original apostles had been gradually shaped and transformed. It is possible that he had seen Him at Jerusalem, although this cannot be proved from 2 Cor. v. 16; it is possible that the attack which Jesus made upon Pharisaism had prejudiced him against the Nazarene, and made him anticipate earlier than the other members of his sect the danger which was threatened to the law of the fathers by His adherents; but the impression made by the person of Jesus during His earthly life has not

[E. Tr. i. 12]) makes the doubt arise in the mind even of Paul the Pharisee, whether the nation could ever become a righteous nation in the Pharisaic sense (and this is not so very different from the "objective conviction of the impossibility of the righteousness of the law" which is so sharply opposed in p. 4 f. [E. Tr. i. 4 f.]), nothing was more natural, looked at theoretically, than to see in the atoning death of the Messiah the means whereby the remaining defects of the righteousness of the law would be covered. Without such a "completion," however, even the righteousness of the law would not have been that which was sufficing before God, and therefore, even according to such a view, Gal. ii. 21 would be perfectly justified, without demanding a "substitution of the law by means of a new scheme of salvation" (p. 5 f. [E. Tr. i. 5 f.]). For in that case Christ would not have died in vain (Gal. ii. 21), even although the "death of the Messiah upon the cross" had not been recognised to be the "end of the law," or although there had been no recognition of the necessity, in principle, of a new way of salvation. In general, however, it is doubtful whether the opposition, in principle, to the law and the way of salvation given in it, of which there is still no trace at least in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, was conceived by Paul previous to his controversy with Judaism, however certainly it must have been developed out of that first experience of grace.

[2] The legal rule of life, fulfilled in a free spirit, had never appeared to the original apostles as an antithesis of that which Christ had brought; but neither had it ever been to them the central point of their earlier life and striving, it had never been the sole way of salvation, as to Paul the Pharisee. If, apparently in the sharpest opposition to him, a James saw in Christianity the perfect law, which, by working its fulfilment in believers, brings about salvation, yet the law, which was loved and practised by him in the sense of the pious psalmists of the Old Testament, had never awakened such discord in his breast as in the case of our apostle; and since he had never, in the Pharisaic sense, sought the whole of his salvation in its fulfilment, the course of his life had not led him to such a radical break with his past as it led the apostle Paul.

had any great influence upon him. In his disputations with the adherents of the crucified Nazarene (Acts vi. 9), he had naturally heard that He must die and be raised again according to the Scripture (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4); and on these occasions many details of His life may also have been spoken of. But all the attempts to make use of the lines of thought which were possibly excited thereby in his mind, for the purpose of explaining the genesis of his gospel, are at variance with the self-testimony of the apostle; for the express aim of his account in Gal. i. is to show that his whole attitude to Christianity previous to the occurrence at Damascus (ver. 13 f.) excluded the possibility of any human influence in the forming of his gospel (vv. 11, 12). The manifestation of Christ, which, for this very reason, cannot be traced back to a psychologically explicable vision, overtook him in the midst of his fanatical persecuting zeal; and from that manifestation dated his conversion. In the case of the original apostles, it was the picture of His earthly walk, in its historical outlines and relations, it was His historical working in and for Israel that formed the groundwork of their view of Christ. Not so, however, in the case of Paul. Before his eyes stood the exalted Christ in the splendour of divine glory, just as He had appeared to him and changed the whole of his previous life, by condemning it as illusion and sin. To him this heavenly Lord was no longer mainly the Messiah of the Jews who was to bring about the complete consummation of the theocracy; He was the mediator of divine grace to the sinners who had awakened to the consciousness of their guilt. It was not by reflecting upon a possible design of His death upon the cross that he thus conceived of Christ; but because He who was living in heavenly glory had appeared to him in this character, His death could only have been the means of the acquisition of this grace, and was proved to be such by His resurrection and exaltation. Moreover, He had come to him, not as a Jew, but as a lost sinner, and had called him to be an apostle to the Gentiles, who, like himself, were sunk in the irremediable destruction of sin. Christianity must therefore have appeared to him from the first as the salvation of the whole lost world of sinners, which was given in Christ as the divine Lord.

(*d*) It is wrong to think of the Apostle Paul as from the first having no connection with the primitive Christian tradition. No doubt it is but seldom that he expressly quotes sayings of Jesus (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11, ix. 14, cf. 1 Thess. iv. 15); but that many other words of Jesus were known to him is shown by many an echo of them in his writings. Although it was only later that he came into contact with the apostles, yet he was by no means so cut off, from the first, from intercourse with the Christian Church, as not to be acquainted with the religious ideas and doctrines which were current in it. It is true he was conscious that he had not learned from men the gospel which he proclaimed, but had received it by divine revelation (Gal. i. 11, 12), and the whole of his subjective assurance of salvation rested upon this direct attestation of the divine Spirit. But it does not follow from this that, in his exhibition of saving truth, he did not, from the first, attach himself in many ways to the views and forms of doctrine which were current within the primitive Christian circles, as a member of which he unreservedly regarded himself.[3] And when the mother Church praised God because its previous persecutor was now proclaiming its faith (Gal. i. 23, 24), it cannot but have been aware that he had become altogether one of its members. Soon enough, indeed, his calling led him to devote himself more and more exclusively to the mission to the Gentiles; and here the form of his teaching must naturally have become more and more a peculiar one when compared with that in the Jewish-Christian circles. If he was to convert the Gentiles as such, he must proclaim to them a gospel which declared them free from the rule of life laid down by the Jewish law, because the demand that they should adopt the law would have made them Jews; and the manner in which his own experience had taught him to recognise Christianity as a new way of salvation, in opposition to that of the law (note *b*), qualified him for that task. In this his activity as an apostle to the Gentiles, he must, however, have

[3] Just as little does it follow that the working out of his form of doctrine was not conditioned by his individual bent and his natural mental constitution (note *a*); and if we attempt to trace the way in which that development was accomplished in his spiritual life, we must assume it as self-evident, that the propelling impulse and the leading power of this development proceeded from the divine Spirit, which guided him into all truth.

learned also to present Christianity as the satisfaction of a common human need; and as such it had met himself in Christ (note *c*).

## § 59. *Sources of Paulinism.*

The discourse of Paul upon the Areopagus at Athens gives us a picture of his earliest manner of preaching as an apostle to the Gentiles. The Epistles to the Thessalonians, which can still be regarded as an echo of his missionary preaching to his readers, stand nearest that discourse, both as regards time and matter. (*b*) We find the teaching of the apostle most richly developed in the four great Epistles to the Galatians, the Corinthians and the Romans, but in a form which was essentially conditioned by his controversies with the Judaistic party. (*c*) The so-called Epistles of the imprisonment belong to a later period of the apostle's life, a period in which he met with new oppositions; but the change which has taken place in his method of teaching is easily explicable from the circumstances of the time, and the leading peculiarities of the earlier Paulinism are still so apparent in them, that they cannot be denied to the apostle himself. (*d*) The form of the Paulinism is still more peculiar in the Pastoral Epistles, whose genuineness it is difficult to prove, and depends essentially upon the results of the biblico-theological investigation.

(*a*) Of the real missionary preaching of the apostle we have only insufficient monuments.[1] Yet the discourse upon the Areopagus (Acts xvii. 22–31) is probably reported with

[1] The Acts of the Apostles gives us one example (xiii. 16–41) of the synagogue sermons with which he sought to gain the Jews and proselytes. But a great part of this discourse is plainly an imitation of that of Stephen and of the Petrine discourses in the first part of the Acts, and is therefore scarcely derived from the tradition of a hearer. No doubt Luke would not have put such a discourse into the mouth of the apostle, if he, who had heard him often enough in similar situations, had not been aware that, in his synagogue sermons, Paul was wont, in a similar manner, to adduce the testimony of Scripture to the Messiahship of Jesus (cf. Acts ix. 20, 22, xvii. 3). There also occurs in the discourse much that is peculiar, and which is probably characteristic of the manner in which Paul was wont to teach, and which may therefore be looked at incidentally (cf. especially xiii. 29, 31, 33, 34, 39); still, in its present form, the discourse cannot by any means be used directly as a source of knowledge regarding the missionary preaching of Paul.

substantial fidelity, and gives at least a lively picture of the manner in which Paul, in his missionary activity, was wont to find points of contact with the consciousness of the Gentiles, and shows also from what point he was wont to start with his Christian sermon. Also the words which (xiv. 15–17) are put into the mouth of Barnabas and Paul, but which were evidently spoken by the latter, as well as other utterances of the apostle which Luke relates, may be incidentally employed as illustrations of Pauline views. On the other hand, the two Epistles to the essentially Gentile-Christian Church at Thessalonica, which were composed during his stay for a year and a half at Corinth (Acts xviii. 11), are written so short a time after the planting of that Church, that they are, in many ways and expressly, connected with his original missionary preaching there. The circumstance that the moral life of the Church was still manifestly unstable compels him to enter, in an elementary manner, into its Christian aspects; and the excitement which eschatological questions had caused in the Church not only shows with what emphasis Paul had set forth this point in his missionary preaching, but also compels him to discuss that matter still more thoroughly. In both Epistles there are scarcely to be found any indications of the peculiar anthropology and Christology of the apostle, or of his doctrine of justification, and of many other aspects of his doctrine of salvation; and we cannot say of all these points that there was only awanting occasion to touch upon them. But even if this or the other aspect of his teaching, which is here kept in the background, was already fully developed by him, and only not yet expressly emphasized, seeing that he was writing to a young Gentile-Christian Church, it is still of peculiar interest to see the shape taken by the teaching and exhortation of the apostle in their elementary forms. It is characteristic of the period of his life to which these Epistles belong, that as yet he had met with no other opposition than that of the hostile, persecuting, and slandering Judaism, whose attacks upon him are necessarily presupposed by the apologetical and polemical portions of the first Epistle (cf. Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschrift*, 1866, p. 296, 297; Sabatier, p. 96). Hand in hand with this there goes his own more hostile attitude to Judaism,

which has impressed itself especially upon his apocalyptical ideas.[2]

(*b*) The second period of the life of the apostle is filled up with controversies with the Judaistic party, which reasserted in his law-free Churches the demand of the law and of circumcision (§ 43, *d*), and denied his apostolic calling, because he regarded it as a calling which was meant for the Gentiles as such, and thereupon grounded the right and the duty of his law-free preaching. Although the meaning of that demand was not originally that the salvation which Christianity brought was secured through the fulfilment of the law, yet participation in that salvation was made dependent upon such a fulfilment, inasmuch as it was it that was first to make it possible for the Gentiles to enter into the fellowship of the elect nation for which this salvation was appointed; and the apostle easily perceived how, thereby, the right view as to the real ground of this salvation must necessarily be distorted. The Epistle to the Galatians is the first monument of these controversies. The demonstration of the divine origin of his law-free universalistic gospel, and his attack upon the value which was put upon the works of the law, become of themselves a repeated statement and establishment of the conditions to which the salvation of man is attached in Christianity. The First Epistle to the Corinthians introduces us to the concrete circumstances of a Church which was rich, but which had also serious defects; but, in consequence of that peculiarity of the apostle, in accordance with which he usually subsumes the particular under more general points of view, and seeks to show that the demands which he makes upon their life are based upon his teaching, almost all the points of saving truth are incidentally discussed, and, for a special reason, chap. xv. is devoted to a detailed exposition of the doctrine of the resurrection. Although the Second Epistle to the Corinthians is for the most part a personal explanation

[2] The rejection of the two Epistles to the Thessalonians by Baur (cf. *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 2d ed. Leipzig 1866, and *theologische Jahrbücher*, 1865, 2) is logical, only if we once regard the manner of teaching employed in the four great Epistles as the sole criterion of Paulinism; it has no other good ground. The doubts raised as to the second Epistle alone depend essentially upon misinterpretations of its apocalyptical passage, which finds its full explanation in the historical situation of the Epistle.

with his Judaistic opponents in the Church, it is none the less rich in discussions, from which we can gather his apprehension of the truths of salvation. The most extensive quarry for the knowledge of his teaching is the Epistle to the Romans. If the leading import of his preaching is briefly described in i. 16, 17, then the whole dogmatic part appears to be a well-arranged carrying out of this theme; for in i. 18–iii. 20 there is stated the pre-Christian world's need of salvation, in iii. 21–v. 21 the salvation given in Christianity, in chaps. vi.–viii. the new life of the Christian, and in chaps. ix.–xi. the realization of salvation in Gentiles and Jews. Even in the practical part of the Epistle (xii. 1–xv. 13) it is not so much, in my opinion, individual concrete needs of the Roman Church which are entered into, as rather Christian ethics which is sketched in outline.[3] In these four Epistles, which are regarded by every sober-minded criticism as undoubtedly genuine, Paul has unfolded the whole riches of his teaching in the manner in which his controversy with the Judaistic opposition compelled him, and his individuality enabled him, viz., by giving it a deeper foundation speculatively, and defending it on all sides dialectically. But, naturally, in this controversy it must have been that point of his teaching which was especially in danger that was also made specially prominent, that was formulated with special dogmatic precision, and made secure by especially sharp antitheses. No doubt, it is only in the Epistle to the Galatians that Paul directly contends against the real heresy of Judaism; but even the discussions in the Epistle to the Romans, although their direct purpose is only to show how Christianity is related to Judaism, nevertheless manifestly have their origin in the spiritual results gained in these controversies. Even in the Epistles to the Corinthians, the opposition to Judaism is by no means throughout the leading moment which dominates his doctrinal statements; and when we really make a full use of the four great Epistles, we learn that those sides of his teaching which come specially into

[3] The farewell discourse at Miletus (Acts xx. 18–35) stands next these Epistles in point of time, and then the two apologies in Acts xxii. 3–21, xxiv. 10–21, whose comparatively small doctrinal contents may be used incidentally for the purpose of comparison.

prominence in the controversy with Judaism are far from exhausting its riches. It is true that the point of his teaching which was threatened by the Judaists was grounded in the most important experience of his life (§ 58, *b*), and must, in so far, have always had a predominant significance for him; but when we rightly appreciate also those sides of his teaching which lie more remote from this central point, it appears, even from the four great Epistles, that the form which his teaching assumed in these controversies was by no means the only one which was possible for him, or expressed the whole compass of his Christian consciousness.

(*c*) The Epistle to the Colossians' was probably written during the imprisonment at Cæsarea. Its external occasion was the disquieting of the Churches of south-west Phrygia by a Jewish-Christian movement, which professed to lead the Church to a higher stage of Christian knowledge by means of theosophic doctrines, especially regarding the higher spiritual world, and to a higher perfection of Christian life by means of ascetic rules. This movement did not directly proclaim any fundamental heresy; but the apostle perceived that it nevertheless ultimately threatened the dignity of Christ and His work of salvation, as well as the healthiness of the development of the Christian life (cf. Weiss, "Colosserbrief," in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, supplementary vol. i. p. 717–723). The thoughts which were stirred up in his mind by this movement Paul has developed to a greater extent, and with a more general reference to the further consequences and dangers of this heresy, in the contemporary circular letter to the Churches of Asia Minor, which now bears the name of the Epistle to the Ephesians (cf. Weiss, "Epheserbrief," *ibid.* p. 481–487).[4] Separated from these by, at least, a considerable interval of time, the Epistle to the Philippians was written during the imprisonment at Rome. Notwithstanding the more external occasion, and the more personal character of this Epistle, it unfolds a great wealth of teaching and

[4] The autograph letter to Philemon, which was sent along with these two Epistles, has scarcely any special importance for the teaching of the apostle. The apology of the apostle contained in Acts xxvi. 2–23 stands nearest these Epistles in point of time, but neither does it afford much doctrinal matter for comparison.

admonition, and gives us the deepest glimpses, from various sides, into the religious consciousness of the apostle. A leading peculiarity of all the four Epistles of the imprisonment is the dropping of the opposition to Judaism, which I cannot find even in the Epistle to the Philippians (cf. my *Philipperbrief*, 1859, p. 220 ff.). After the necessity had passed away of establishing and defending the thesis which was maintained in opposition to Judaism, the almost dogmatizing severity of the form of teaching which was coined in this controversy must also have gradually disappeared. The appearance of the new doctrine of wisdom made it necessary to develope further those sides of his teaching, on which, also in the evangelic truth of salvation, there are opened up the unfathomable depths of a wisdom which satisfies every true striving after knowledge. It is possible also that the situation of the apostle in his inactive imprisonment gave him more occasion, than his restless missionary life had permitted, to penetrate, meditatively, into the ultimate reasons of the saving truth which he had proclaimed. Lastly, the new needs of the life of the Church compelled him to enter more thoroughly into the concrete relations of its moral life, and, by means of a healthy criticism and regulation of these relations from the standpoint of the Gospel, to oppose the fruitless asceticism to which the Jewish-Christian theosophy was inclined.[5]

(*d*) The genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles can be maintained only on the assumption that, at a period of the apostle's life with which we are otherwise unacquainted, when he had to oppose a morbid aberration of the religious life and striving after knowledge, whose concrete form, it is true, we can hardly discern from his polemic, and when he had to

[5] Whether this transformation of the Pauline mode of teaching was effected by the apostle himself, or by one of his disciples, is only of subordinate interest to biblical theology. Nevertheless, I believe we must hold by the genuineness of the Epistles of the imprisonment, since the transformation which is to be found in them can undoubtedly be explained by the altered circumstances of the time which they presuppose (see above),—a circumstance which Pfleiderer has not taken into account (p. 30, note [E. Tr. i. 30, note]),—and since the special investigation of their biblico-theological material shows that, notwithstanding their peculiarities, the principal traits of the older Paulinism appear in them, conceived with a clearness and a definiteness and yet handled with a freedom, which we do not find in any of Paul's disciples, and which we could not expect in any imitator. It is true, the doubts which specially concern the

make provision for the partially altered needs of the church life, which was always developing itself more richly, but also more and more requiring a firmer guidance, and when he had such intercourse with his fellow-teachers as we have no other opportunity of observing him having, his mode of teaching has undergone a change which appears in many respects even far more radical than that which is found in the Epistles of the imprisonment. That Paul was set free from the Roman imprisonment with which we are acquainted, can neither be proved nor denied with certain historical data; and so these Epistles remain the sole monuments as well as the sole evidence of such a later period in the life of the apostle. Such being the circle in which criticism sees itself involved, without being able to come to a definite conclusion, so much the more depends upon the question, whether the manner of teaching which is peculiar to them still shows such a connection with that of the genuine Epistles of Paul that it can be ascribed to the apostle. But even if, with the Eichhorn-de-Wette school of criticism, they are to be assigned to a disciple of Paul, and therefore show a metamorphosis of Paulinism which was effected in the circle of his immediate disciples, under the influence of the new dangers and needs, and in the midst of the more matured development of the life of the Church in the latter portion of the apostolic age, our Epistles have substantially the same interest for biblical theology. It is only if, with Baur (*die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe*, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1835) and the Tübingen school, they are to be placed in the real Gnostic time, that, according to § 1, *b*, they cease to be an object of biblical theology. Seeing, however, that the three Epistles have a strong resemblance to each other, the attempt which has been often made since Schleier-

Epistle to the Ephesians are not confined to this general question, but still they do not appear to me insoluble; nor have I been able to adopt the most recent attempt to regard the Epistle to the Colossians as the later redaction of a genuine Epistle of Paul (cf. Holtzmann, *Kritik der Epheser- und Colosserbriefe*, Leipzig, 1872), for which Pfleiderer (p. 28 [E. Tr. i. 29]) and Immer (p. 363) have declared themselves (cf. my review in the *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1872, 4). As our representation shows, the Epistle to the Philippians shares in the most characteristic peculiarities of the Epistles of the imprisonment in more important points than Pfleiderer (*l.c.*) will admit, so that it is in fact more logical, if one does not credit the apostle with such a development of his mode of teaching, to declare, with Baur, that all the Epistles of the imprisonment are spurious.

macher, to doubt their genuineness only partially, can hardly be carried out.

## § 60. *Previous Works on Paulinism.*

While the earlier writers on the subject still represent the teaching of Paul according to the customary dogmatic categories, Usteri, Dähne, and, since Neander, the more recent biblical theologians have attempted to arrange their representation of his doctrinal system more according to its peculiarity. (*b*) The Tübingen school, starting from its critical presuppositions, has first given prominent emphasis to the peculiarity of the various groups of Epistles. (*c*) A complete representation of Paulinism will have to do justice to the unity as well as to the diversity observable in its various forms.

(*a*) As Bauer, in his "Biblical Theology" (vol. iv.), represents the Pauline system of doctrine, as well as that of the other writers of the New Testament, according to the three sides of Christology, theology, and anthropology, so G. W. Meyer (*Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Altona, 1801) treats of his dogmatics under the categories of theology, Christology, pneumatology, angelology, eschatology, and anthropology, and then of his ethics as it stands related to these six parts. So also Schrader in his "Apostle Paul" (vol. iii., *Die Lehren des Apostel Paulus*, Leipzig, 1833). Cf. also Gerhauser, *Charakter der Theologie des Paulus*, Landshut, 1816; Lützelberger, *Grundzüge der paulinischen Glaubenslehre*, Nürnberg, 1839. Usteri (*Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Zürich, 1824, 6th ed., 1851) opened up the way for a representation of his doctrine which did more justice to its peculiarity; in the first part he treats of the pre-Christian period, in the second of Christianity, and he characterizes the different sections by means of special leading Pauline ideas or mottoes taken out of his Epistles. Dähne (*Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Halle, 1835) develops the Pauline system, even more organically, from its leading conception, viz. justification by faith; he first of all exhibits man's want of a righteousness of his own, and then the justification by grace, in its various interventions, which

is afforded in Christianity, just as Neander (p. 654–839 [E. Tr. i. 416 ff.]) had already anticipated him in putting in the front the idea of δικαιοσύνη and its relation to the νόμος. Since then, the most of the representations of Paulinism have adopted the following method: starting from the universal need of salvation and its causes, they then exhibit the work and person of the Mediator of salvation, the new way of salvation, the historical realization of salvation and its completion (cf. Schmidt, ii. p. 219–355 [E. Tr. 417–518]; Messner, p. 175–293; Lutterbeck, p. 186–238; Th. Simar, *die Theologie des heil. Paulus*, Freiberg, 1864; van Oosterzee, § 34 to 44). Lechler deviates from the plan followed by these writers; but by no means happily. Starting from the fact of the conversion of Paul, and confounding the importance of the appearance of Christ for the apostle's life with the importance of the doctrine concerning Him in the Pauline system, he puts in the front the doctrine of Christ as the Son of God (p. 33–145). Expressly denying that there is any essential difference of doctrine in them (cf. p. 4), Reuss (ii. p. 3–262 [E. Tr. ii. 1–237]) represents the Pauline theology according to all the thirteen Epistles, deriving from Rom. iii. 21–24 an arrangement of his system of doctrine which is substantially the same as that followed in the previous representations. In particular, his conception of Paulinism as a dialectic mysticism (p. 249 [E. Tr. 226]) permits very important ambiguities and misconceptions (cf. also the excellent and thorough exposition of the leading aspects of the Pauline doctrine in Ritschl, p. 52 to 103).

(*b*) Partly in the interest of proving the spuriousness of the smaller Pauline Epistles, partly for the purpose of assigning them their standpoint in the historical development of the post-apostolic age, the Tübingen school has subjected their theological peculiarities to a more thorough examination than had been given them in the previous representations of the Pauline doctrine (cf. especially Schwegler in his *nachapostolisches Zeitalter*, where the Epistles of the imprisonment are discussed in vol. ii. p. 133–135, 325–338, and the Pastoral Epistles in p. 138–153. See also, specially for the Epistle to the Ephesians, his article in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1844, 2). For biblical theology the results of these investigations have

already been used by Köstlin in the comparative section of his *Johanneischer Lehrbegriff* (1843, p. 289–387); and for the history of primitive Christianity by Plank and Köstlin in the *Theol. Jahrb.* for 1847, 4, and 1850, 2. In his "Biblical Theology," Baur represents the Pauline doctrine exclusively according to the four great Epistles (p. 128–207, cf. *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1867, ii. p. 123–315). Starting, certainly in a too sweeping manner, from the assumption that the essence of Paulinism is the most decisive break of the Christian consciousness with the law and the whole of the Judaism which rested upon the Old Testament (p. 128 f.), he, in p. 132, describes the antithesis more accurately as consisting in this, that Christianity accomplishes that which Judaism was not able to accomplish, viz. it provides righteousness before God; he then, from a purely empirical, religious-historical and anthropological point of view, carries out the negative and positive theses which are involved in this antithesis, so that here the religious-historical method of regarding the apostle is more clearly separated from the really dogmatic method than it had ever been before him. But because he has, *à priori*, conceived of the doctrine of justification as a too comprehensive antithesis, in principle, to Judaism in general, he then, in order to do justice also to the sides of Paulinism which are related to Judaism, represents this as an abstract, general antithesis, which, in its application to the concrete circumstances of real life, becomes a relative one (p. 181 f.); whereby not only the nature of the leading Pauline ideas, especially that of πίστις, but even the significance of his doctrine of justification is altogether misconceived. From faith Baur passes over to Christology, which is followed, somewhat loosely, by the doctrine of the sacraments and eschatology. Attaching himself to C. Holsten (*zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, Rostock, 1868), O. Pfleiderer (*der Paulinismus*, Leipzig, 1873 [translated, Williams & Norgate]; cf. his articles in Hilg.'s *Zeitsch. f. wiss. Theol.* 1871, 2, 4, 1872, 2) attempts, in the first place, to explain the genesis of the peculiar Pauline gospel in the following manner. By a dialectical process, the necessity which irresistibly pressed itself upon him of recognising a crucified Messiah made it also necessary for him to conceive of His

death upon the cross as the means for the providing of an altogether new righteousness, and therefore as the end of the law; while the deep ethical act of self-denial, which he had performed in surrendering himself to this truth, led him to the mystical fellowship with Christ, in which the transcendental-eschatological idea of salvation became to him the immanent-ethical idea, and the source of the new life in the Spirit (p. 1–27 [E. Tr. i. 1–28]; cf., on the other hand, § 58, *b*). In his exposition of the several articles of doctrine, which is distinguished by clearness and precision as well as by the exactness of the exegetical basis, Pfleiderer frequently attempts to discover different lines of thought, which are either complementary as being an objective-theological and a subjective-ethical view of the same subject, or form the antinomy of the new original type of doctrine and the remnant of Jewish presuppositions of which he had not got rid (cf., on the contrary, § 58, *a*).[1] Of special importance is also the account of the conflict between the apostle and Jewish Christianity in its gradual development, in which, according to Pfleiderer, the Epistles to the Romans and the Philippians show an irenical tendency (p. 275–323 [E. Tr. ii. 3–50]. As regards the Epistle to the Romans, cf. Sieffert in the *Jahrb. f. deutsch. Th.* 1869, p. 250 ff.).

(*c*) We begin with a representation, in its outlines, of the earliest preaching of Paul as the apostle to the Gentiles, as it is to be discovered, partly in the discourse at Athens, partly in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (quoted simply as i. ii.). The real doctrinal system of the apostle we also develope

[1] Whereas in Baur the Epistles of the imprisonment (p. 226–277), as well as the Pastoral Epistles (p. 338–351), appear as monuments of different phases of Paulinism as developed in the Gnostic period, to which much is made to refer and is thereby placed in a false light, while the Epistles to the Thessalonians are altogether unmentioned, Pfleiderer still counts First Thessalonians, Philemon, and Philippians among the genuine Epistles, and places the Epistle to the Colossians (in which, according to § 59, *c*, he assumes a genuine Pauline groundwork) along with the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of Barnabas as representatives of a Paulinism which was influenced by Alexandrianism, while the Epistle to the Ephesians (along with First Clement and First Peter) shows it in a state of transition to Catholicism, and the Pastoral Epistles (like the Ignatian) show the Paulinism of the Church in conflict with the heretical Gnosis. Even the conception of Paulinism in the Acts of the Apostles finds, at the end of the work, a special representation (p. 495–518 [E. Tr. ii. 228 ff.]).

according to the four great doctrinal and controversial Epistles. Here, details which do not cohere with the outlines of his earliest preaching will be incidentally discussed, and, throughout, it will be pointed out wherein they also agree. Here, also, we must already point forward to that which is concordant in the Epistles of the imprisonment, without making use of these for the real representation of the system, except when they incidentally serve as an explanation of it. The third section then discusses the peculiarities of the Epistles of the imprisonment. We shall have here, in the first place, to show, in passing, how far the earlier Paulinism is found, as to its principal characteristics, also in them. We shall then have to bring out those points of the doctrine of the earlier Epistles with which the development of the later Paulinism is connected, that we may then be able to set forth this development in its peculiar connection and in its influence upon the separate articles of doctrine which are here specially discussed. Lastly, the characteristic teaching of the Pastoral Epistles will then be discussed. The representation of this in its inner connection will naturally lead to those points where it is connected with the earlier Paulinism. Following the same method, Sabatier (*l'apôtre Paul*, Strasbourg-Paris 1870) has recently described, in a lively manner, the history of the development of the Pauline method of teaching, which is in his opinion, however, also a development of the apostle's theology, and concludes with a spirited sketch of his system, in which, starting from the person of Christ as the principle of the apostle's Christian consciousness, he developes it in its psychological, historical, and metaphysical aspects. Immer follows the same scheme. He discusses the Epistles to the Thessalonians as monuments of undeveloped Paulinism, although he regards the second as spurious (p. 212–224). In his representation of the fully developed Paulinism of the four great Epistles, he starts from the "Jewish element in the teaching of Paul," wherein he already finds, in consequence of the apostle's rabbinical education, a union of abstract juristic reason and mysticism (p. 247–257), and then considers that which is specifically Christian in his teaching (the crucified and risen Christ, justification, the life of faith, the doctrine of the Church, of the divine decree, and of Christian hope). The

Epistles of the imprisonment, regarding whose genuineness he has not reached a definite conclusion, he treats of as monuments of the Gnostic development of Paulinism (p. 357–382), and the (spurious) Pastoral Epistles as monuments of weakened Paulinism (p. 382–399).[2]

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# SECTION I.

## THE EARLIEST PREACHING OF PAUL AS AN APOSTLE TO THE GENTILES.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE GOSPEL AS THE WAY OF DELIVERANCE FROM THE JUDGMENT.

### § 61. *The Ground of Salvation.*

The preaching of the apostle as a missionary to the Gentiles is essentially a proclamation of the approaching judgment, which He who has been appointed by God to be the judge of the world will administer, and which should lead the Gentiles to turn to the one true God and to Christ as the divine Lord. (*b*) The glad tidings regarding the way of deliverance in this judgment is also published by the ambassadors of Christ as a divine call to this salvation; but it is only in the elect that, with divine power, it works the salvation-bringing acceptance of the message. (*c*) Election is accomplished in baptism, in which the elect are consecrated by the bestowal of the Spirit to be God's possession, and become by faith in the truth members of His Church. (*d*) The mediation of Christ, how-

[2] Besides such writings as confine themselves strictly to individual *loci* of the Pauline system, and which will therefore be cited in their proper place, I name here a few which also treat of various aspects of the system. Among these are: Ernesti, *vom Ursprung der Sünde nach paulinischen Lehrgehalt*, Wolfenbüttel 1855, 1862; *Die Ethik des Apostel Paulus*, Braunschweig 1868. R. Schmidt, *die Christologie des Apostel Paulus*, Göttingen 1870. A. Schumann, *der weltgeschichtliche Entwicklungsprozess nach dem Lehrsystem des Apostel Paulus*, Crefeld 1875.

ever, is looked at almost exclusively in its bearing upon the completion of salvation, while, in its bearing upon the work of the grounding of salvation, it is still kept strikingly in the background.

(*a*) The discourse of the apostle upon the Areopagus, attaching itself to what remains of the Gentile consciousness of God, proclaims, in the first place, the one true God (Acts xvii. 22–29). Then follows the proclamation of the approaching judgment of the world, supported by the fact that God has already appointed a man who will execute this judgment, and that He has given the strongest reason to believe in it by raising Him up from the dead (ver. 31). Upon this message Paul bases his demand that they repent, and this repentance will consist in their turning away from vain idols to the living God (cf. xiv. 15), and in serving Him, in view of the impending judgment, according to His will as it is proclaimed by His ambassadors. Their fate in the judgment will depend upon their attitude to this demand; for God is willing to overlook the past as the time of ignorance (xvii. 30). It is in a similar manner that Luke makes the apostle usually characterize his preaching as a missionary to the Gentiles (xx. 21, xxvi. 20). Its fundamental thought is, accordingly, the nearness of the Messianic judgment. It was not the promising, but only the threatening aspect of the Messianic prospect of the future (cf. § 40, *d*, 50, *d*, 57, *c*) that could, in the first place, be set before the Gentiles, if they were to be startled out of their sinful life; for them faith in the Messiahship of Jesus becomes faith in Him as the judge of the world, upon whom, then, their salvation in the judgment also depends (xvi. 31). That his missionary preaching at Thessalonica had not been different appears from his own retrospect of it (1, i. 9, 10). According to this, the motive which had led the Thessalonians also to turn from idols to the service of the living and true God was the proclamation of the coming wrath, *i.e.* of the impending judgment, which must bring divine punishment (2, i. 8) upon all who, without knowing the true God, walked in their lusts (1, iv. 5). They had learned that Jesus, who was raised from the dead, was to be looked for as the judge of the world coming from heaven, and that therefore also He alone could deliver from the wrath of God (1, i. 10,

cf. 2, i. 7 ff.). Seeing that he had begun his preaching in Thessalonica in the synagogue, where he proclaimed Jesus as the Messiah promised by God (Acts xvii. 2, 3), Paul could there, following the precedent of the Old Testament (§ 17, *b*), call Him the Son of God (1, i. 10; cf. Θεὸς πατήρ, 2, i. 2), or even the Christ.[1] But although the idea of His glory as a ruler was already implied for the Jewish consciousness in this name (cf. § 39, *c*, 50, *a*, 52, *c*), no sufficient point of contact would have been found in his preaching to the Gentile-Christians for an allusion to Old Testament promise with its picture of the king anointed by God, and therefore in it the name κύριος is always used instead.[2] And although this proclamation of the κυριότης of Christ drew political suspicion upon the apostle in Thessalonica (Acts xvii. 6, 7), yet it is plain from the function of judge of the world that is assigned to Him, that this κυριότης was thought of in the sense of divine sovereignty over the world.[3] It is as their divine Lord who has been exalted to heaven, and who comes from heaven, that Jesus can save the Gentiles in the coming judgment; for them, accordingly, His quality as the Mediator of salvation is summed up in this name; and hence it is this name which is glorified when the converted Gentiles attain, through Him, the completion of salvation (2, i. 12).

(*b*) In this preaching of Paul, which shows to the Gentiles

[1] Here also this name, when it stands alone (1, iii. 2; 2, iii. 5, and therefore also without the article, 1, ii. 6, iv. 16), or when it is combined with the name Jesus (cf. § 48, *a*, footnote 1, 52, *c*, footnote 4), has already become a *nomen proprium*; yet Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, which is so common in Peter, never occurs without additions (cf. footnote 3). On the other hand, the name is found inverted in the formula ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (1, ii. 14, v. 18).

[2] It is significant that, apart from 1, i. 10, it is only in 1, iv. 14, where the death and resurrection of Jesus are spoken of, that this, His historical personal name, occurs alone. Even in 1, ii. 15, where it is meant to describe the greatness of the sin of putting Him to death, Jesus is called the κύριος; and throughout He is usually called ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν (or ὁ κύριος) Ἰησοῦς, mostly with reference to His quality as ruler (1, iii. 11, iv. 1, 2) or judge (1, ii. 19, iii. 13; 2, i. 12, i. 7, ii. 8). Here, however, the reverential designation of Jesus is always the name which occurs but once, and with special emphasis, in Peter (1, i. 3) and in James (ii. 1), viz. ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (1, i. 3, v. 9, 23, 28; 2, ii. 1, 14, 16, iii. 18), or the shorter κύριος Ἰησ. Χρ. (1, i. 1; 2, i. 1, 2, 12, iii. 12; only in iii. 6 probably ὁ κύριος Ἰησ. Χρ.).

[3] While ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν is never found without the addition Ἰησοῦς or Ἰησ. Χριστός, the simple ὁ κύριος stands very frequently for Christ (1, i. 6, iv. 15, 16, 17; 2, i. 9; cf. ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου, 1, iv. 15; ἐν κυρίῳ, 1, iii. 8, v. 12; σὺν κυρίῳ, 1, iv. 17). This

a way of deliverance in the coming judgment, there is addressed to them a joyous message, which God sends to them (1, ii. 2, 8, 9 : τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, cf. 1 Pet. iv. 17), and with which He has entrusted the apostle and his companions (ii. 4). God Himself therefore comes graciously to the Gentile world, which is sunk in sin, and therefore irremediably lost in the approaching judgment. He does so in the λόγος τῆς σωτηρίας (Acts xiii. 26), in which He causes Christ to be proclaimed to them as the Mediator of salvation, in order that they may be saved (1, ii. 16 : ἵνα σωθῶσιν ; cf. 2, ii. 10). For it is of Christ that the glad tidings treat (1, iii. 2 ; 2, i. 8, where τοῦ Χριστοῦ is to be taken as gen. obj.), and it is Christ Himself who has sent forth the messengers whom God has esteemed worthy of such a service (1, ii. 6 : Χριστοῦ ἀπόστολοι), in order that they should bear witness to the divine glory of the exalted Christ, which Paul himself has seen (2, i. 10 : τὸ μαρτύριον ἡμῶν). Through this message the call to salvation is now addressed to them (2, ii. 14 : εἰς ὅ refers to εἰς σωτηρίαν, ver. 13, = εἰς τὸ σώζεσθαι), and those who have received it (1, i. 6) know themselves as chosen by God out of the mass of the Gentile world (ver. 4). For as, in the Gospels, the knowledge which brings salvation is not obtained without a divine operation (§ 29, *d*), so here also God is thanked that the readers have received the message, which was addressed to them by the apostles, as a word of God (1, ii. 13). Here also it is the message itself, in its quality as the word of God (1, i. 8 ; 2, iii. 1), which works upon the heart with divine power ; only, that while in Peter and James (§ 46, *a*, 52, *b*),

expression also occurs frequently (a circumstance which Gess, ii. p. 55, overlooks), after the manner of the Old Testament, as the name of God, just as in § 39, *c*, 50, *a*, 52, *c*. Thus 1, i. 8 ; 2, iii. 1 : ὁ λόγος τοῦ κύριου = 1, ii. 13 : λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ; 1, v. 27 : ἐνορκίζω τὸν κύριον ; 2, iii. 3, 5 (cf. ver. 4 : ἐν κυρίῳ), cf. 1, v. 24 ; 2, iii. 16 : ὁ κύριος τῆς εἰρήνης = 1, v. 23 : ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ; 2, ii. 13 : ἠγαπημένοι ὑπὸ κυρίου = τ. Θεοῦ, 1, i. 4. It is specially characteristic that such an Old Testament expression as ἡμέρα κυρίου (1, v. 2 ; cf. 2, ii. 2 : ἡ ἡμ. τοῦ κυρ.), in which the κύριος-Jehovah is meant there, is transferred, without more ado, to Christ. In such passages as 1, iii. 12, iv. 6, it can scarcely be decided with certainty whether God or Christ is meant (an ambiguity which Hofmann, *in loco*, even regards as intended), and in 2, iii. 16 it is probable that, as in Jas. v. 14, 15, ὁ κύριος is used first of God, and immediately thereafter of Christ. On the other hand, that in 2, i. 12 it is meant to describe Christ as our God and Lord (Hofmann) is little likely, seeing that κύριος Ἰησ. Χρ. appears so often elsewhere without the article (cf. footnote 2).

in keeping with their more legal view, it is the new moral life which it works, here it is already the commencement of the Christian life in the reception of the word, and that, here, this effect is already expressly traced back to the Spirit of God which was operative in the preaching (1, i. 5). And just because this effect does not by any means always take place (2, iii. 2), those in whom it does take place thereby know their election (1, i. 4). Now they know themselves as the beloved of God (1, i. 4, cf. 2, ii. 13, iii. 5), and may call God their God (2, i. 12, cf. 1, ii. 2) and Father (2, ii. 16, cf. 1, i. 3, iii. 11, 13). It is through His grace, which overlooks all the guilt of the past (note *a*), that He has given an eternal comfort (2, ii. 16) and perfect peace of mind (1, v. 23; 2, iii. 16) to their conscience, which was terrified at the prospect of the approaching judgment. Instead of fearing the well-deserved punishment, they may now, in conformity with this grace of their God, hope for the supreme glory to which God counts them worthy of being called (2, i. 11, 12). God has not appointed them to wrath, but that they should obtain salvation through Christ (1, v. 9); if, however, they have been chosen unto salvation, He has also at the same time called them to the possession of glory (2, ii. 13, 14).[4]

(*c*) As in James (§ 54, *a*), so here also, according to 2, ii. 13, election is accomplished in a historical act, in which God takes individuals out of the Gentile world to Himself (note the significant εἵλατο) as an ἀπαρχή (so we must read with Hofmann), *i.e.* as a first-fruits, which is taken out of the province of the profane life of the world, and which henceforth belongs to Him, and which, as such, naturally cannot but be saved from the

[4] In 2, ii. 14, as well as in 1, iv. 7, the calling already appears, as in the fully-developed Pauline system, to be the divine act of grace through which God effectually calls the elect to faith, and thereby to participation in the fellowship of salvation. But although the ὁ καλῶν ὑμᾶς of 1, v. 24 can be taken, as in Gal. v. 8, without any reference to time, yet in 1, ii. 12 καλεῖν appears, according to the context, to be the calling activity of God which is continued in the apostolic exhortation; and in 2, i. 11 κλῆσις can be understood only of the calling to the completion of salvation. The idea, therefore, is not yet conceived in the full technical definiteness which it received later; but even here it is distinguished from the Old Testament idea of Peter (§ 45, *b*, note 2) in this, that it denotes a divine transaction which comes into visibility as distinguished from the inner-divine act of election; and here also the idea of a mere summons or invitation (cf. § 28, *a*) is already far remote.

destruction which is approaching the sinful world (εἰς σωτηρίαν). He does this, however, ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, *i.e.* by bestowing upon them, through His Spirit, the necessary consecration. As in 1 Pet. i. 2 (cf. § 44, *b*), it is only baptism that can be thought of; in it believers receive the Spirit, which puts them into the condition of being consecrated to God; for without the Spirit nothing is fitted to become God's possession. In 1, iv. 7, also, where this act is already described as the κλῆσις (cf. footnote 4), Paul reminds them that they were called, not on the ground of their Gentile uncleanness, but in an act which consecrated them to God.[5] Seeing that it is a condition which the Spirit is to establish that is spoken of here, we cannot naturally think of deliverance from the guilt of sin; but since nothing can be consecrated to God, which is stained with guilt, and therefore unclean, it is self-evident that the consecration by the Spirit in baptism makes him, who receives it, also assured of complete forgiveness of sin (§ 41, *a*, 44, *b*). Now, however, it is only believers that receive baptism, and hence the subjective moment of faith is named alongside of the objective moment of consecration by the Spirit (2, ii. 13). This faith, it is true, is also a work of God; for, according to 1, ii. 13, its existence is owing to the circumstance that God has caused the elect to receive the message, that reached them, as a word of God (cf. the correlation of ἐδέξασθε . . . ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν), and therefore to embrace it with unlimited trust.[6] But although it is, in so far, not possessed by every one (2, iii. 2), yet the operation of God which begets it is by no means thought of as an operation that constrains

[5] Still Christians are nowhere called ἅγιοι in our Epistles; for in 1, v. 27 ἁγίοις is spurious, and in 1, iii. 13; 2, i. 10 the holy ones are the angels. The symbolical idea of the ἀπαρχή, however, is only a figurative expression for this predicate of ἁγιότης.

[6] Faith, accordingly, is the firm conviction of the truth which forms the import of the proclamation (2, ii. 12: πιστεύειν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, opposed to πιστεύειν τῷ ψεύδει, ver. 11; 2, ii. 13: πίστις ἀληθείας; cf. 2, i. 10: ἐπιστεύθη τὸ μαρτύριον ἡμῶν), whether that import be the proclamation of the one true God (πίστις πρὸς τὸν Θεόν: 1, i. 8), or the message regarding Jesus as the one who has been exalted through the resurrection to be the judge and Saviour (πιστεύομεν ὅτι Ἰησ. ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη: 1, iv. 14). In consequence of this faith, Christians, who are throughout characterized as believers (1, i. 7, ii. 10; 2, i. 10; cf. ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν: 1, iii. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10), are no longer in the darkness of ignorance; they are children of light, inasmuch as they are enlightened by the truth which they have received (1, v. 4, 5).

the will of man; for the refusal to receive the word according to the will of God is, as in § 44, *c*, described as a disobedience which is worthy of punishment (2, i. 8), and is traced back to an unsusceptibility to the love of the truth, which is rooted in pleasure in unrighteousness (2, ii. 11, 12). Hence faith can also be regarded as the first and most necessary service (*τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως*, 1, i. 3),[7] a service in which, as in the performance of every other duty, we must be more and more strengthened and made perfect (1, iii. 2: *παρακαλέσαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν*; ver. 10: *καταρτίσαι τὰ ὑστερήματα τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν*). Those whom God has taken to be His possession in consecration by the Spirit and in faith in the truth (2, ii. 13) now form *His* *ἐκκλησία* (1, ii. 14; 2, i. 4).

(*d*) From this it is evident that his preaching as an apostle to the Gentiles is from the first a message of grace, a message which not only promises a salvation which is altogether undeserved, but which also itself works in the obedient that which is most necessary for the attainment of that salvation. But however decidedly the salvation which is to be brought through the exalted Christ (1, v. 9) forms the central point of this message of salvation (note *a*), yet the mediation of Christ in the grounding of the Christian's state of salvation is still kept strikingly in the background. Only once is it mentioned, and in a very general way, that Christ died for us in order to procure salvation (1, v. 10); there is no more particular discussion whatever of the saving significance of His death. Although forgiveness of sins is certainly given to Christians with their consecration to God (cf. note *c*), it is not traced back to Christ; the divine sonship of Christians is not grounded upon their justification. It is only because all the hope of Christians ultimately rests in the fatherly love of God (note *b*), and in the sovereignty of Christ as the Mediator of salvation (note *a*), that Paul grounds his salutation upon these (1, i. 1; 2, i. 1: *ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ κ. κυρ. Ἰ. Χρ.*), and begins, in his second Epistle, to derive from both the *χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη* which he beseeches for his readers (ver. 2; cf. ver. 12: *κατὰ τ. χάριν τ. Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρ. Ἰ. Χρ.*, and

[7] The reference of this *ἔργον* to love (cf. Reuss, ii. p. 184 [E. Tr. ii. 167]) is rendered impossible by the *ἀγάπη* which stands alongside of it. On the other hand, the *ἔργον πίστεως* of 2, i. 11 appears to stand for every doing which faith involves.

ii. 16); just as his readers are also commended to the guidance of the grace of Christ (1, v. 28; 2, iii. 18), in whose name the completion of their salvation is founded (2, i. 12). It is both that direct the way of the apostle (1, iii. 11) upon which he seeks to help his readers to the perfecting of their faith. It cannot certainly be thought that, when the apostle wrote our Epistles, he had not yet worked out, even in its outlines, that aspect of his doctrine of salvation which treats of the grounding of salvation through Christ. But it is also certainly not accidental, that in his earliest preaching as an apostle to the Gentiles this aspect is so completely in the background. As the exalted Lord had appeared to himself as the sole Saviour and Mediator of divine grace (§ 58, *c*), so he preaches Him to the Gentiles, in order to lead them to the way of deliverance in the approaching judgment. The fuller knowledge which he had received, and which he will receive more and more richly, regarding the interpositions which this revelation of grace presupposes, is reserved for the more thorough instruction of believers. His initiatory missionary-preaching did not require it; nor could it communicate it, seeing that its presuppositions were still awanting in the case of his hearers.

## § 62. *The Demands of the Gospel.*

The normal development of the life of salvation is conditioned by the preservation of the condition of being consecrated to God which is established in the believer, a condition which excludes the vicious life of the Gentiles, and includes the fulfilment of the will of God, as it is proclaimed by the apostle by command of Christ. (*b*) The central point of its demands is, in addition to faith, love to the brethren, as well as to all men, and hope, which manifests itself in patience and stedfastness. (*c*) For the fulfilment of these demands, however, God, in answer to their prayer, lends the needed strength, by making the apostolic exhortation efficacious. (*d*) The Holy Spirit also appears already as the God-given principle of the new life, as well as of inspiration and prophecy.

(*a*) In order that they may be led to salvation, Christians have been translated by God Himself into the condition of being consecrated to Him (§ 61, *c*); and yet, seeing that

they live in the midst of the sinful world, there is always, manifestly, the danger that they be defiled anew with sin. This very fact implies that an ever progressive sanctification, by means of which they are always anew laying aside that which is not in keeping with their condition as being consecrated to God, is the will of God regarding them (1, iv. 3), and that they must therefore guard themselves against the lusts and sins of the Gentiles, and specially against unchastity and avarice (vv. 3, 6), as well as against every form of evil (v. 22) which defiles men (cf. § 45, *d*, footnote 6) and makes them unworthy of their condition of belonging to God. For the final attainment of salvation, therefore, it is necessary that man be preserved blameless in the state of holiness (ἄμεμπτος ἐν ἁγιωσύνῃ: 1, iii. 13), and that, too, in the judgment of God (ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ Θεοῦ), and that thus the condition of being consecrated to God be more and more completely realized in him (v. 23: ἁγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς), by body, soul, and spirit being preserved blameless.[1] In the first passage the divine claim is, exactly as in Christ's teaching and in that of the original apostles (§ 26, *c*, 47, *a*, 55, *b*), expressly made upon the heart (στηρίξαι ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας ἀμέμπτους, cf. 2, ii. 17, iii. 5), because it is God who proveth the hearts (1, ii. 4), so that every manner of good pleasure in goodness (2, i. 11, in opposition to εὐδοκεῖν ἐν τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, 2, ii. 12) is demanded of Christians. For the Gentiles, however, it is necessary that they should learn what the divinely willed goodness is, in which they are to have delight, and our Epistles show no trace that the apostle has referred them for that knowledge to the Old Testament law. The revelation of the will of God which is appointed for them is given in Christ Jesus (1, v. 18), and that, too, not in any law which Jesus has given during His earthly life (as in § 52, *a*), but inasmuch as His ambassadors are authorized by Him to

[1] In this popular description of man according to all the sides of his nature, especially seeing it is Christians that are spoken of, who are distinguished from other men by the possession of the Spirit of God (§ 61, *c*), we certainly must not, with Dähne (p. 61), Usteri (p. 415), and Neander (p. 677 [E. Tr. i. 421]), seek a trichotomy. How far this passage is from being regulative of the fully developed Pauline anthropology appears already from the circumstance that its most important idea, that of the σάρξ, does not occur at all in our Epistles (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 67, note [E. Tr. i. 66 f. note 2]).

give them precepts, the observance of which He demands as their divine Lord (1, iv. 2: παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν ὑμῖν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ). According to ver. 3, the import of these precepts is nothing else than the will of God (cf. iv. 1: τὸ πῶς δεῖ περιπατεῖν καὶ ἀρέσκειν τῷ Θεῷ; ii. 12: τὸ περιπατεῖν ἀξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ καλοῦντος). These precepts, accordingly, Paul gives them in the name, *i.e.* by the command, of the Lord Jesus Christ (2, iii. 6), whether they refer to their Christian moral life in general, or to individual special relationships (2, iii. 4, 10; 1, iv. 11); his exhortation rests in the Lord Jesus, who has given him the necessary authority (1, iv. 1; 2, iii. 12), and what they have therefore received from Him (1, iv. 1; 2, iii. 6), that they are bound to observe in obedience to his word (2, ii. 15, iii. 14). Thus even the preaching of the apostle has a legal side, according to which it seeks to regulate the Christian moral life of the converted Gentiles.

(*b*) As in the teaching of Christ and of the original apostles (§ 25, 47, *a*, 52, *a*), love appears the central point of all the apostle's precepts to such an extent, that even their preservation in holiness is made dependent upon its perfection (1, iii. 12, 13). Alongside of faith, which must also be more and more established and perfected (1, iii. 2, 10; cf. § 61, *c*), it is love which characterizes the gratifying continuance (1, i. 3, iii. 6) and the healthy growth of the Christian life (2, i. 3). If the question is as to the weapons with which Christians must be equipped as children of the day, which has dawned upon them with the light of the Gospel, in order that they may maintain the watchfulness and the sobriety (1, v. 5 ff.) which secure them against the impure motions of sinful inclinations (cf. § 30, *b*, 46, *b*), the apostle names, along with the faith which appropriates the enlightening truth of the Gospel, the love which fulfils the fundamental commandment of the Gospel (ver. 8). This love is, in the first place, love of Christians to one another, or brotherly love (1, iv. 9, 10; cf. 2, i. 3); for, as in the teaching of Jesus and in Peter (§ 25, 47, *a*, 52, *a*; cf. also § 41, *b*), Christians are brethren (1, iv. 6, v. 26, 27; 2, iii. 6, 15), who are at peace with one another, assist one another (1, v. 13 f.), and pray for one another (1, v. 25; 2, iii. 1). But the love of Christians extends not

only to one another, but also to all men (1, iii. 12); for, following the example of the divine love (2, iii. 5; cf. § 25, *a*, *c*) which they have experienced, they do not render even unto their enemy evil for evil (1, v. 15).[2] In addition to faith and love, hope of salvation in the approaching judgment of the world (v. 8), or in Christ, through whom they have to look for this salvation (i. 3), appears to be characteristic of Christians as distinguished from the Gentiles, who have no hope (1, iv. 13). Because Christians have in this good hope an eternal comfort (2, ii. 16), with which they can also encourage the fainthearted (1, v. 14), the apostle can exhort them to rejoice alway (ver. 16), notwithstanding all the afflictions which they suffer and must suffer (iii. 3, 4; cf. Acts xiv. 22), and can point them to the joy with which, as imitators of him and the Lord, they once received the Gospel in much affliction (1, i. 6); because of it he can also sum up all his wishes for them in that of a peace of soul that cannot be shaken (2, iii. 16). This joy which arises from hope will show itself in the patience (1, i. 3) which endures affliction after the example of Christ (2, iii. 5),[3] and which is already demanded by Christ and the original apostles (§ 30, *a*, 46, *d*, 55, *c*). With this patience there is then connected faithfulness under the persecutions and afflictions which they have to endure for the sake of the kingdom of God (2, i. 4, 5); the Christian does not allow himself to be moved in these afflictions, although the devil attempts to seduce him by them (1, iii. 3, 5; cf. § 46, *d*, note 6); he maintains the standpoint which he has taken as a Christian (2, ii. 15: στήκετε); he remains stedfast by Christ (1, iii. 8: στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ). Thus this demand also ultimately refers to the maintenance of their faith.

[2] When Paul commands Christians to lead a quiet life of labour (1, iv. 11; 2, iii. 12), the reason is partly that they may give no offence to their Gentile neighbours (1, iv. 12); a point of view which, according to § 47, *d*, Peter also maintains so emphatically. The exhortation to esteem their superiors highly (1, v. 12, 13) reminds us of § 47, *a*, footnote 1.

[3] Here Ritschl (ii. p. 99, note 4) thinks of their resting their assurance of salvation upon the love of God and Christ's fidelity to His calling; but, apart from the change of meaning which this interpretation gives to ὑπομονή, it is opposed by the circumstance that, according to the connection with ver. 4, the point in question in his wish is the fulfilment of his confidence that they will *do* what he has *commanded* them.

(*c*) These demands, however, which are made upon the Gentiles who have become believers, are by no means thought of as if they were thereby thrown upon their own resources. Just as, following the precedent of Christ and the original apostles (§ 30, *b*, 46, *a*, 55, *d*), he urges them to pray, with thanksgiving, for themselves (1, v. 17, 18) as well as for one another (1, v. 25; 2, iii. 1), a practice in which he himself gives them an example (1, i. 2; 2, i. 11), so he thanks God for every progress which his readers have made in the Christian life (1, i. 2, iii. 9; 2, i. 3), and thereby traces it back to the working of divine grace. Nor is the assistance of divine grace ever entreated in vain. Upon the faithfulness of God as the one that calls them there is grounded the assurance that He will also lead the Christian to the salvation which He has made him hope for (1, v. 24), by strengthening (*στηρίζειν*, as in 1 Pet. v. 10; cf. § 46, *a*) him for the fulfilment of the necessary conditions, and guarding him from the evil one (2, iii. 3), or by helping him to attain to the completion of his sanctification (1, v. 23). It is God who teaches him to show brotherly love (1, iv. 9: *θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους*), and directs his heart unto love and patience (2, iii. 5). He does this, however, by continuing His calling activity through the exhortation of the apostles (1, ii. 11, 12; cf. § 61, *b*, note 4), inasmuch as their word, which has been received as a word of God, is now also producing a further effect in them that believe (ver. 13; cf. iii. 2). So also, of course, the encouragement and strengthening, which the Christian needs for the unhindered development of his Christian life, can be wished from Christ and God at the same time (2, ii. 16, 17, cf. 1, iii. 11). Nevertheless, the doctrine of the living fellowship with Christ, upon which the new life of the Christian rests in the later Pauline system, is still altogether awanting in our Epistles. No doubt the formula (*ἐν Χριστῷ* or *ἐν κυρίῳ*) which was coined later for this idea already appears here; but it may be reasonably doubted whether it already has its specific meaning.[4]

[4] Certainly this is not the case where the Church is described as being founded in Christ (1, ii. 14). In an altogether similar manner, however, dead Christians are called *οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ* (1, iv. 16), and the Christian overseers *προϊστάμενοι ὑμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ* (1, v. 12). Although we could take the *πεποιθέναι ἐν κυρίῳ* of 2, iii. 4

(*d*) On the other hand, the characteristically developed Pauline doctrine of the working out of the new life in the Christian already appears at another point. In 1, iv. 8 God is described as the one who is continually bestowing His Holy Spirit upon Christians (read: *διδόντα*); and the reason why He is so described is, that it may be brought out how doubly inexcusable it is in one to despise the will of God, which is proclaimed by the apostle, and according to which Christians should more and more sanctify themselves (note *a*). This Spirit must therefore be conceived of as a spirit which urges men to sanctification from within, as the word of the apostle urges them from without; and, in keeping with this, sanctification, which is traced back in 2, ii. 13 to the Spirit, must also be already the effectual commencement of a new life. To what an extent, however, the Spirit is conceived of as the divinely-given principle of the new life, appears from 1, i. 6, where the joy of the Christian under affliction is described as the work of the Spirit (however, cf. § 51, *c*). As in the original apostolic teaching (§ 40, *a*, footnote 1, 44, *b*, 46, *a*; cf. § 18, *a*, footnote 2), it also appears as that which lends to the apostolic preaching its divine power and efficacy (1, i. 5), and as the principle of the gifts of grace, especially of prophecy (v. 19, 20). Yet there is always need of proving that which is spoken under spiritual influence (ver. 21), because a lying spirit, sent by the devil, can also inspire man and deceive the Church (2, ii. 2). From the former significance of the Spirit we perceive how it is that God Himself is conceived of as qualifying man for the fulfilment of His demands, while from the latter we perceive how the apostolic preaching and exhortation can, as the word of God, accomplish its

by itself in the sense of the more fully developed Pauline doctrine, yet the context of this passage, as well as the *παῤῥησιάζεσθαι ἐν Θεῷ* of 1, ii. 2, shows that we are to think there of his confidence having its ground in God, just as we think here of God being the ground of Christian boldness. The *στήκειν ἐν κυρίῳ* of 1, iii. 8 corresponds most of all to the later use of the formula; but, according to note *b*, it can also be regarded as meaning stedfast adherence to Christ. On the whole, the use of the formula in our Epistles corresponds rather to that which we observed in Peter (cf. 1 Pet. v. 14; see § 46, *c*); and it is natural to conjecture that we have to do here with a common Christian mode of expression, which denoted, in the first place, only the Christian state as such, and upon which Peter and, later, Paul and John, in a more fully developed manner, have stamped a peculiar meaning in their respective systems of doctrine.

specific working in the commencement (§ 61, *b*) as well as in the development of the life of salvation (note *c*).

## § 63. *The Pauline Apocalypse.*

Cf. Schneckenburger, "zur Lehre vom Antichrist," in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1859, 3. Weiss, "Apocalyptische Studien, 2" (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1869, 1).

While the Gentiles, it is true, often remained disobedient to the Gospel and persecuted its followers, still it was only unbelieving Judaism that had as yet shown itself to be the real seat of radical hostility to Christ. (*b*) This hostility of Judaism to the Gospel must now increase until it comes to be a total apostasy from God and His law. (*c*) Not till then could there issue forth from it the pseudo-Messiah, who, with blasphemous arrogance, and equipped with Satanic powers, will seduce the world to believe in his lies. (*d*) The Roman government, it is true, still stood as an obstacle in the way of the pseudo-Messianic revolution; but when once, the Roman power being overthrown, Antichrist has attained full dominion, then the true Messiah must also come to make an end of His adversary, and even the present generation is to witness this catastrophe.

(*a*) Paul also starts from the fundamental thought of apocalyptic prophecy (cf. § 33, *b*), that, while the close of the development of the world is brought about by a supernatural interposition of God, yet the moment of this catastrophe is conditioned by the development of the world itself, and especially by mankind having made full the measure of its guilt, and having thus become ripe for judgment. Hence the great day of the Lord, which brings at once the consummation and the judgment, cannot come until evil has reached its fullest development (2, ii. 2, 3). The only question is, where in the historical situation of the apostle could such a development be looked for. That the Gentiles were exposed to the judgment of God on account of their ignorance of the true God, and their dissolute, vicious life, was the presupposition of the whole missionary preaching of the apostle (§ 61, *a*). That their liability to punishment was increased, if they disobeyed the summons to believe in the Gospel (2, i. 8), that

they were exposed to the righteous judgment of God, if they persecuted and afflicted their fellow-countrymen who had become believers (vv. 4–6), was self-evident; and ever since the commencement of the preaching of the Gospel in Thessalonica (1, i. 6) they had in many ways made themselves partakers of such guilt (ii. 14, iii. 3, 4). Nevertheless, the apostle, in his activity, had never met with a fundamental opposition from the Gentiles. The evil and unreasonable people, who everywhere stood in his way (*ἄτοποι καὶ πονηροὶ ἄνθρωποι*), to be delivered from whom was, in his opinion, the condition of an unhindered activity of the word of God (2, iii. 1, 2), and by whom Satan had already often hindered him (1, ii. 18), were the fanatical Jews. They had for the most part remained disobedient to the Gospel (2, i. 8), they had persecuted him from the commencement of his missionary activity (Acts ix. 23, 24, 29, xiii. 8, 45), they had everywhere stirred up the heathen populace against him (xiii. 50, xiv. 2, 5, 19, xvii. 5, 13), and had shown themselves his deadly enemies (xviii. 6, cf. 1, iii. 7). It was against their evil calumnies and slanders that he had to defend himself, in the first Epistle, before the young Christian Church, which they sought, by these means, to turn away from their teacher (cf. § 59, *a*). Therefore the whole wrath of the apostle breaks out against the unbelieving Jews in the middle of that apologetic section (1, ii. 14–16). As they had once slain the prophets, so they have put to death the Lord Himself (cf. Matt. xxiii. 30–34 = Luke xi. 47–49); as they have persecuted the Churches in Judea, so they persecute the apostle and his companions; as they please not God, so they are contrary to all men, inasmuch as they seek to hinder the mission to the Gentiles, and, thereby, their salvation through the preaching of the Gospel. It is as if they wished to make full the measure of their sins (Matt. xxiii. 32), although the wrath of God is already resting upon them (*ἔφθασε*) in the highest degree (*εἰς τέλος*). They are therefore the real opponents of Christ and His Gospel; it is in them that the antichristian principle reveals itself. It is in conscious opposition to the Mediator and finisher of salvation that the sin, which He has come to destroy, must reach its climax.

(*b*) In 2, ii. 3, Paul describes the impending apostasy as

the point which the development of evil must reach; for under all circumstances the sin of the apostate is more heinous than the sin of him who has not yet known and served the true God. For this very reason there cannot be any word whatever of an apostasy within the province of heathendom; that which is spoken of can only be the apostasy of the nation, which, as contrasted with the Gentiles, is the worshipper and servant of the one God. If we could assume that Paul had really thought of the apostasy which is foretold by Daniel (Hofmann *in loco*), then it would be perfectly clear that it is only an apostasy within the province of Judaism that can be thought of; for the direct transference of that which is prophesied of the Old Testament people of God to the New Testament Church is not indicated by anything in the sphere of thought of our Epistle; nor is there the slightest indication in the Epistle itself that Paul expects an apostasy in the Church, while the whole of the description in vv. 3–12 plainly speaks rather of events which take place outside of it, and which affect it only in so far as they ultimately bring about the coming of Christ. Now, in what follows, this *ἀποστασία* is characterized by *ἀνομία*; and hence it is as impossible to seek the latter as the former upon the soil of heathendom, which, besides, cannot really be accused of a rejection, in principle, of the law (*ἀνομία*) as the culmination of its sin, seeing that it does not possess the divine *νόμος* in the specific sense. Now since, according to 2, ii. 7, the still hidden nature of this highest form of the development of sin (*τὸ μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας*) is already working, and since, according to note *a*, it was only within the province of Judaism that the apostle had met sin as an antichristian principle, it is only in the hostile opposition of Judaism to the mission to the Gentiles that he can have seen the first motions of that mysterious power, which was one day to reveal itself in the coming apostasy. If Judaism proceeded upon this path, it could not but come, ultimately, to a complete apostasy from the God whom it had hitherto worshipped, but whose Gospel it had rejected, and whose ambassadors it had persecuted. Then, however, that would be revealed, which still appeared concealed, viz. that, in its deepest essence, the nature of this Judaism, which was zealous for the law of God, was hostility to Him and His will;

it would be revealed that it was, in principle, *ἀνομία*, as the apostle, not without a fearful irony, describes the essence of full-grown hostility to Christ. While the original apostles still hoped to see the consummation of all things coming with the conversion of the whole of Israel (§ 42), the apostle to the Gentiles, who was persecuted by Jewish fanaticism, and who had, as a Jew, persecuted Christianity himself, conceived the final catastrophe as dependent upon the completion of the obduracy of unbelieving Judaism. Although this view is conditioned by the circumstances of the time, it is, nevertheless, also characteristic of this period of extreme tension between him and his Jewish past.[1] As to the rest, Paul and the original apostles agree in this, that the definitive decision of the Jewish nation with regard to the message of salvation is the condition of the commencement of the end, although it is still hoped by the apostles of the circumcision that that decision will turn out to be different from that expected by the apostle to the Gentiles.

(*c*) As in Daniel, so here also, the highest potentiation of sin is ultimately concentrated in one person, who is described as the man of sin, the son of perdition (2, ii. 3), the adversary (ver. 4), and simply as *ὁ ἄνομος* (ver. 8). By this person some have thought, erroneously, of a Roman emperor,[2] and have attempted to explain the description of this adversary (ver. 4) by means of their apotheoses. But the man of sin who raises himself out of the apostasy of Judaism, and in whom its *ἀνομία*, which is still operative in secret, comes to its fullest revelation, can only be a Jew himself, and that, too, the pseudo-Messiah (cf. Sabatier, p. 104). Christ had already

[1] For this very reason it need not surprise us if, in Rom. xi., Paul has already given up this view; and yet this is the only argument which is always being still used against this, the only possible explanation. Gess, indeed (ii. p. 61), also objects that Paul could not have imagined that the Jewish nation would reject the law; but even according to the representation given above, he is as far from meaning that, as he is from crediting it, according to note *d*, in ver. 7, with the overthrow of the *κατέχων*; for it is not the appearing, but only the full revelation of the *ἄνομος* in his antichristian character that follows upon that overthrow (ver. 8). By the *κατέχων*, Gess himself thinks, with Hofmann, of the angel in Daniel, who is allied with the Prince of Israel, and "comes forth from the midst" in due time (p. 67 f.).

[2] In particular, the attempt of Baur to explain the passage, on the assumption of the spuriousness of our Epistle, as referring to the first appearance of a

warned against false Messiahs (§ 33, *a*), and enmity to the true Messiah could not but ultimately come to a head in their setting up a lying imitation in opposition to Him. Since God Himself came to His people in the true Messiah (Luke i. 17, 76), the behaviour of the pseudo-Messiah could only be described as a blasphemous usurpation of divine honour and worship (cf. Mark xiv. 64). The description in 2, ii. 4, which leans upon Dan. xi. 36 ff., states that, even when looked at from the standpoint of the Gentiles, he will appear as a blasphemer against the majesty of God, inasmuch as he exalts himself above everything which is called God, and above every object of divine worship, and, finally, to show his divine dignity, sets himself down in the temple of God (at Jerusalem). Even from this it is plain that it is only a Jewish pseudo-Messiah that can be thought of, since this presupposes that he regards the temple at Jerusalem as the dwelling-place of God. The apotheosis of self, which apparently is not in keeping with the Jewish image of the Messiah (cf. also Acts xii. 21, 22), is easily explicable from the circumstance that here it is meant to characterize the blasphemous assumption of the Messianic dignity, in its inmost essence, as an apostasy of Judaism from God and His law (*ἀνομία*). This pseudo-Messiah is, however, also the false prophet. Christ had already spoken of false prophets, who would, with lying wonders, tempt men to believe in the false Messiahs (Mark xiii. 21, 22; cf. § 33, *a*); and the Jewish jugglery of his time, which Paul had also occasionally come into contact with (Acts xiii. 6–11; cf. viii. 9, 10), suggested to him the idea that this form of the manifestation of evil would also come to

false Nero (cf. *Theolog. Jahrb.* 1855, 2), is altogether mistaken; for the warning of the apostle does not presuppose that they had too hastily taken any one for the Antichrist; it rather presupposes the very opposite, viz. that they appeared to have forgotten what events had still to precede the return of Christ (2, ii. 3). Hofmann's opinion is that it refers to the reappearance of Antiochus Epiphanes from the supermundane world; but for this opinion I can find no reason whatever either in the echoes of the words of Daniel, or in the parallelism with the returning Christ, and, least of all, in the *ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι* which is asserted of him, since the latter merely refers to the highest personification of evil, a personification which comes to the light in a historical person, and is described by *ὁ ἄνθρ. τ. ἁμαρτ.*, *ὁ ἄνομος*. Cf., against this opinion, also Gess, who himself thinks only of a false prophet of Gentile-Christian libertinism (ii. p. 64–67), whose followers are meant in ii. 7, and himself in ver. 3.

a head in the pseudo-Messiah himself, and that he would in this way imitate the true Messiah with His divine miracles. The ἄνομος, who for this very reason cannot be thought of as a Roman emperor, will perform lying wonders by the power of Satan (2, ii. 9), in order thereby to seduce those, who have not received the truth, to believe a lie, and so become ripe for the approaching judgment of God (vv. 10–12).

(*d*) The pseudo-Messiah could only be thought of as the hero of the Jewish revolution, whose outbreak Christ, according to § 33, *b*, already foresaw. He must proclaim the Messianic kingdom in the sense of fleshly Judaism, and win the dominion of the world for the elect nation, in order that he might then extend his work of temptation over the whole world. It is true there still stood in his way a great obstacle, viz. the Roman world-power and its civil government. As this had already repeatedly protected the apostle against the attacks and accusations of the Jews, and of the populace which was roused to fanaticism by them (Acts xvii. 5–9, xviii. 12–16, cf. also xvi. 37–39), so he saw in it (2, ii. 6: τὸ κατέχον), or in its representative, the Roman emperor (ver. 7: ὁ κατέχων), the dam which still stood in the way of the advance of Jewish anti-Christianity, and which was to remain standing in its way till the time appointed (ver. 7) for its revelation (ver. 8). Not until the Jewish revolution had, under its Messiah, who was equipped with Satanic, and therefore with superhuman powers, overthrown this rampart, did nothing more stand in the way of the full unfolding and dominion of the anti-Christian principle; not until then had the world become ripe for the judgment of Christ who was coming from heaven. The coming of Christ (παρουσία, 1, ii. 19, iii. 13, iv. 15, v. 23; 2, ii. 1, as in James, § 57, *c*) necessarily takes place, when once the development of sin in Antichrist has reached the highest point. The coming of Antichrist, which is purposely denoted by the same word, seeing that it is the Satanic counterfeit of the expected coming of the true Messiah to complete the kingdom of God (2, ii. 9), is the immediate occasion of the latter. The judgment can be no longer delayed, when once the measure of guilt has become full; the coming of Christ must destroy His counterfeit. For that purpose there is no need of a special battle; He slays him

with the breath of His mouth (cf. Isa. xi. 4), and annihilates him by the mere appearance of His coming (2, ii. 8). No doubt the day of this final catastrophe remains uncertain, because it comes like a thief in the night (1, v. 2, cf. Matt. xxiv. 43); but as Jesus held out the prospect of His return even during the current generation (§ 33, *a*), so Paul also hopes to witness the day of the coming along with the majority of the Church, since he identifies those who are still living with him, on the whole, with the περιλειπόμενοι (1, iv. 15, 17).[3] The excitement of men's minds in Thessalonica, an excitement which had almost reached the point of fanaticism, and which it was only with difficulty that he could suppress (1, v. 1–3; 2, ii. 2, iii. 6–15), shows sufficiently with what emphasis Paul had proclaimed the nearness of the return of Christ.

## § 64. *The Parousia and the Completion of Salvation.*

Christ comes down from heaven in divine glory and accompanied by angels, as He Himself has prophesied. (*b*) The day of the Parousia is the day of the Lord, when the divine judgment of wrath brings eternal destruction upon all the godless. (*c*) Those Christians who have died, however, will, after being raised up, be gathered together along with the survivors to the coming Lord. (*d*) Then commences their enduring life in His fellowship and in the glory of the heavenly kingdom of God.

(*a*) In § 63 we have already repeatedly met with echoes of Jesus' words of prophecy, and although it is only in 1, iv. 15

[3] The attempts to get rid of this clear state of the case by means of exegesis (cf. Hölemann, *Neue Bibelstudien*, Leipzig 1858–1866; and, against him, *Theolog. Literaturblatt*, 1858, No. 45) are always supporting themselves with the argument that Paul could not assume that no more of them would die before the Parousia. But this assumption is not implied even in the right conception of his words; for even according to it they are not at all meant to answer the question, who will witness the Parousia; they only assert with respect to the present generation, as contrasted with those that have fallen asleep, what he has to say regarding those who will see it. Whoever, therefore, of the present generation dies (possibly even himself), will then be one of the κοιμηθέντες; but without the presupposition that he and the majority of the Church would not die, Paul could never, by means of the ἡμεῖς, have applied to himself and his contemporaries that which he has to say of the οἱ ζῶντες.

that he expressly appeals to a word of the Lord, the description which Paul gives of the return of Christ is plainly based upon His discourse regarding His Parousia. Quite in the spirit of the prophecy of Christ he taught the Thessalonians to look for the Son of God from heaven (1, i. 10; cf. iv. 16: *καταβήσεται ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ*; 2, i. 7), and in 1, iv. 17 it is assumed that He comes in the clouds of heaven (Mark xiv. 62). The glory of His might in which He is then glorified (2, i. 9, 10) is none other than the glory of His Father (Mark viii. 38; cf. Matt. xxiv. 30), in which He is to appear on the occasion of His return; and seeing that, although the Jesus who is exalted to be *κύριος* already possesses this glory (2, ii. 14), it is then that it is to be first revealed, the Parousia is called the *ἀποκάλυψις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ* (i. 7; cf. § 50, *c*). In this divine glory He is, as in the prophecy of Christ (§ 19, *d*), the Lord of the angels; these accompany Him as the executors of His decrees (2, i. 7), and are called His holy ones (1, iii. 13; 2, i. 10, after Dan. iv. 10). According to 1, iv. 16, the return takes place upon a word of command given by God, while an archangel calls together the angels to form the retinue of Christ, and the trump of God (cf. Matt. xxiv. 31) announces to the whole world the coming of the great day of the Lord.

(*b*) That the day of the return is the day of judgment, is already evident from this, that the wishes of the apostle for the completion of the sanctification of his readers are everywhere expressed in view of the Parousia (1, iii. 13, v. 23; cf. ii. 19). From the connection of 2, ii. 1, 2, however, it is clear that the Old Testament designation of the great Messianic day of judgment (*ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ κυρίου*: Joel ii. 30, 31; Acts ii. 19, 20; cf. § 40, *d*) is transferred to it (cf. also 1, v. 2; ver. 4: *ἡ ἡμέρα*; 2, i. 10: *ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη*). The annihilation of Antichrist (§ 63, *d*) is nothing else than the first act of this judgment. Christ appears that day in flaming fire (2, i. 8: *ἐν πυρὶ φλογός*), *i.e.* in the symbol of the divine judgment of wrath (1, i. 10, v. 9; cf. § 34, *d*), as the one who takes vengeance (*ἔκδικος*) upon the godlessness and wickedness of the Gentiles (2, i. 8; cf. 1, iv. 6), upon their careless and secure worldly life (1, v. 3; cf. Matt. xxiv. 37–39; see § 33, *c*), as well as upon their unbelief (2, i. 8, ii. 12) and hostility to the

Gospel (2, i. 6). As the judge of the world He brings an eternal destruction upon all the godless (2, i. 9: ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον; cf. 1, v. 3), a destruction which is also called ἀπώλεια (2, ii. 3, 10), as in the discourses of Christ and in James (§ 34, *c*, 57, *d*). Once it is described, in general, as θλῖψις, in order to set forth, in the same manner as we found in the teaching of Christ and the original apostles (§ 32, *d*, 51, *d*, 57, *b*), the equivalence of the righteous recompense of God in the very expression (2, i. 6, 7).[1]

(*c*) According to § 62, *a*, it is to those who are found blameless at His coming that Christ brings salvation from this destruction which is threatened in the judgment (1, iii. 13, v. 23). It is plain that, in his first missionary preaching, Paul had, no more than Christ and the original apostles (§ 34, *b*, 50, *c*, footnote 5), spoken expressly of the fate of the dead, seeing that he still hoped to live to see the Parousia along with all the faithful (§ 63, *d*). Hence the first cases of death in the young Church at Thessalonica had given rise to the apprehension (1, iv. 13) that the dead would either not at all be partakers of this salvation, or not in the same manner as the survivors, but that the latter would rather have some advantage over the former. Now Paul refers them,

[1] Since the double-sided recompense which Christ is to bring to the θλίβοντες as well as to the θλιβόμενοι is expressly described as that which is δίκαιον παρὰ Θεῷ, the righteous judgment of God (ver. 5) must consist in this same double-sided equivalent recompense, a recompense which brings to the former the θλῖψις which they have brought upon others, and to the latter relief from that which they suffer. It is in vain that, in opposition to this, Ritschl (ii. p. 113 f.) seeks to maintain his false conception of the idea of δικαιοσύνη (cf. § 50, *d*, footnote 6); for not only through the prominence given to this equivalence in ver. 6, but also directly in ver. 8 f., the fate of the θλίβοντες in this judgment is described as a *punishment* and *not* as "a means for the completion of the salvation of the θλιβόμενοι;" and, indeed, this consummation is thought of as an exaltation into the kingdom of God, and therefore as altogether independent of that punishment. The ἄνεσις which is promised them as a recompense is not even described as a deliverance from those that afflict them. For the very reason, however, that, as Ritschl remarks in note 7, their reception into the kingdom of God itself is *not* thought of as a recompense (and therefore not as a judicial act), the righteousness of the divine *judgment* cannot come into consideration at all as "the consistent behaviour which guarantees the completion of salvation to the pious;" and that the recompense of the θλίβοντες is mentioned first, "although the interest of the pious is, primarily, in their own fate," only shows how, in the mind of the apostle, it is the recompense of punishment that is mainly implied in the idea of the δικαία κρίσις.

in ver. 15, to the word of Christ, according to which *all* His elect will be gathered together around Him at His return (Matt. xxiv. 31; cf. § 33, *c*). To this end the Christians who are dead will then rise first (ver. 16). The πρῶτον is by no means meant to contrast this resurrection with a second general resurrection, which would be separated from the first by a thousand years' reign. It rather appears from the context that what is to be made prominent by it is only, that, by this resurrection, the dead will be placed on a level with the survivors, *before* the hour of blessedness has struck for the latter, and that therefore these can in no wise precede the former (ver. 15). Then the survivors, along with the dead who have been thus raised up, will be caught up in the clouds and borne into the air, in order to meet the Lord who is descending from heaven (ver. 17). Nothing, however, is indicated as yet as to the manner in which their earthly bodies are made capable of such an emancipation from the limits of the earthly life. Thus, then, there is effected that gathering together of the elect unto Christ (2, ii. 1: ἡμῶν ἐπισυναγωγὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν), with which their salvation from the world, which is delivered up to destruction, as well as their greatest blessedness, commences.

(*d*) The life, which the saved attain to according to the preaching of the original apostles (§ 50, *c*, 57, *d*; cf. § 34, *b*), is here more particularly described as an enduring (πάντοτε) life in fellowship with the Lord (1, iv. 17). So certainly as we believe that Jesus has risen again from the dead, will God through this Jesus, who has risen again, and who has thereby been exalted to be the Mediator of salvation, one day bring with Him those who are fallen asleep (ver. 14). From this it naturally follows that they will then find themselves in a condition which is analogous to that of the exalted Christ. Where God will bring them is not said. But as it is by no means indicated that Jesus leaves His heavenly dwelling-place at the Parousia, in order to receive dominion in an earthly kingdom, ver. 17 can only be understood to mean that they will be brought to meet the Lord, not for the purpose of fetching Him down to earth, but to be led home by Him. And since the dead and the living are one day to live together with Him (v. 10), the former, however, being raised

up by a resurrection which is of the same nature as that of Christ (iv. 14), and therefore not to an earthly, but to a heavenly life, every thought of an earthly reign of Christ is excluded; here too, rather, the completed kingdom of God, to which believers are called (1, ii. 12; 2, i. 5), is plainly conceived of as a heavenly kingdom such as Christ had held out the prospect of (§ 34, *a*; cf. the *βασιλεία* of James, § 57, *d*, and the *κληρονομία* of Peter, § 50, *c*). It is there also, accordingly, that they attain to participation in the divine glory (1, ii. 12), or in the glory of the exalted Christ (2, ii. 14), as in Peter. It by no means follows, however, that Paul has here already worked out the idea of *δόξα*, which he had received from the original apostolic preaching (cf. § 50, *c*, note 5), in the more definite manner in which this is done in his later system.

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# SECTION II.

## THE DOCTRINAL SYSTEM OF THE FOUR GREAT DOCTRINAL AND CONTROVERSIAL EPISTLES.

## CHAPTER II.

### UNIVERSAL SINFULNESS.

### § 65. *Human and Divine Righteousness.*

From his Pharisaic past Paul had already brought with him the view, according to which everything depends in religion upon the realization of righteousness. (*b*) Righteousness, however, is that condition of man in which he corresponds with the rule of the truth or of the will of God, which is revealed in the law. (*c*) The righteousness of God consists in this, that, without respect of persons, He judges and recompenses man according to his doing. (*d*) The *summum bonum*, which He bestows wherever righteousness has been realized, is the life which has no end.

(*a*) That it was through the exalted Christ alone that salvation was to be obtained in the judgment, and that this salvation was assured to him ever since God had, in a wonderful manner, converted him to believe in His Son,—this was the saving fact from which the development of the Christian consciousness of Paul, as well as his preaching of the gospel, started. But since we saw that, in his earliest preaching to the Gentile Christians, the question as to the manner, in which such a salvation through Christ had become possible and necessary, was still kept altogether in the background (§ 61, *d*), it is only gradually that, in the development of his consciousness, the need of a complete answer to this question will have made itself felt; and since the form of teaching, which he has coined in this respect, is manifestly conditioned by his opposition to the Judaistic movement, it is very natural to assume that it was in his conflicts with that movement that Paul first gave his teaching its characteristic shape. Now it is true that even the Judaistic movement did not deny that it was through Christ that salvation was brought; but by making participation in that salvation dependent, for the Gentiles, upon their incorporation with the people of the promise, an incorporation which had to be purchased by the acceptance of circumcision and the law, it was always giving fresh support to the idea that salvation was somehow or other also brought about by a human performance, while Paul had from the first received and proclaimed it as a gift of free divine grace. In order to put an end for ever to such an aberration, the question had to be thoroughly discussed, upon what the salvation and destruction of man in the judgment really depended; for, from the answer that was given to this question, it must then further appear, whether the condition of eternal salvation is to be satisfied or not by a human performance, and whether the manner in which Christ has satisfied it still leaves room for any human performance whatever. If, in his earliest preaching as an apostle to the Gentiles, Paul could simply count upon their conscience bearing him testimony, when he assumed the lost condition of all men in view of the approaching judgment, he must now enter more particularly into the question, how such a wretched condition has been brought about, and why it is

that man cannot himself perform that which is necessary for his salvation. If he could formerly simply assume that it was through the Christ, the proclamation of whom in the gospel was to lead the Gentiles to the way of deliverance, that salvation must also be grounded, it must now be more particularly shown, in how far salvation was grounded through Him in such a manner as was sufficient and excluded all other means, and also how thereby that was effected which men could not effect for themselves. The idea, however, around which the whole of this further development of the Pauline theology turns, is the idea of righteousness; it is in it, therefore, that that fundamental condition of salvation must lie.[1] Yet Paul has by no means formed this idea himself. Even the polemic which Jesus made upon the Pharisaic mode of interpreting Scripture (Matt. v. 20) shows that they gave special attention to the question of righteousness. Paul had brought this idea with him from his Pharisaic past; even as a Pharisee he had busied himself specially with the question, how man could attain to righteousness; and, to him, this had not been a question of the school, but a question of life. To him the idea of righteousness was no idea formed by reflection, it was the received expression for that which his deepest religious need desired. As soon, therefore, as he once reflected more particularly upon the grounding of salvation in Christ, the only question for him to consider could only be, why man does not possess and cannot attain to righteousness of himself, and in how far it is to be attained through Christ and through Him alone.

[1] Certainly we cannot say with Baur (p. 132) that Paul has defined the nature of religion by means of this term, in order that he may be able to subsume Judaism and Christianity under a higher idea, and so contrast them with one another. It is true, however, that this term denotes for him the highest religious-ethical ideal, the realization of which every religion must ultimately strive after, because it is only in consequence of its realization that man knows himself to be standing in that right relation to God which guarantees his salvation. According to the context of 1 Cor. vii. 19, there is no doubt that the primary meaning of the verse is only, that that which is of importance is not the possession or want of circumcision *per se*, but only that each one fulfils the commandment of God, according as it bids him continue in the concrete relationships of his life circumcised or uncircumcised (vv. 17, 18); but inasmuch as circumcision and uncircumcision are so often, for the apostle, expressions for the two pre-Christian religions, he could not state the proposition so generally, if the thought were foreign to him, that the aim of every religion is ultimately the fulfilling of the divine will, *i.e.*, however, the realizing of righteousness.

(*b*) Paul nowhere explains the meaning of the term righteousness; he assumes it as known and granted. It is altogether vain, however, to seek to explain it by means of the classical meaning of the word *δικαιοσύνη*, as even Schmid does (ii. p. 241 [E. Tr. p. 430]); the origin of the idea is rather to be sought in the Old Testament. There צֶדֶק or צְדָקָה denotes, first of all in the physical sense, that which is straight, normal. In Lev. xix. 36, אַבְנֵי צֶדֶק, מֹאזְנֵי צֶדֶק are right balances and weights; in Ps. xxiii. 3, מַעְגְּלֵי צֶדֶק are right, straight paths; and in Joel ii. 23, God gives the rain לִצְדָקָה, *i.e.* according to a normal measure. Applied to that which is moral, the word denotes the normal character of moral conduct. Looked at from the religious point of view, however, the rule of moral conduct is not the nature of man himself or his relation to other men, but the nature or will of God and man's relation to Him. He alone is righteous, who is righteous in the judgment of God (Rom. ii. 13: *δίκαιος παρὰ Θεῷ*; cf. 2 Thess. i. 6: *δίκαιον παρὰ Θεῷ*). Righteousness, therefore, is not an individual virtue, in accordance with which we give, in word and deed, to each man that which is his due; it is the quality or condition of man in which he corresponds with the rule of the divine will.[2] So Deut. vi. 25 already explains the meaning of the term צְדָקָה; so we found it in the teaching of Jesus (§ 24, *a*), in Peter and James (§ 45, *c*, 53, *b*). But while here the pious men of the Old Testament are throughout called *δίκαιοι*, without its being thereby assumed that their religious-ethical life was of an absolutely normal character, Paul, who had already learned in his Pharisaic past to seek the essence of salvation-bringing righteousness in the most painful fulfilling of the divine will, has given the term a more precise dogmatic meaning, and, with the term so defined, has then raised the question as to the way of obtaining salvation. If, however, the question is as to the absolutely perfect fulfilment of the divine will, then the knowledge of it, or the truth, is of primary import-

[2] In Rom. vi. 13 the antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη* is *ἀδικία*; and although this word, along with others from the same root, is also used of unrighteousness in the narrower sense (Gal. iv. 12; 1 Cor. vi. 7, 8; 2 Cor. xii. 13, vii. 2), it usually stands, in the comprehensive sense, for the opposite of that normal condition (1 Cor. xiii. 6, vi. 1, 9; Rom. i. 18, 29, ii. 8; cf. 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12).

ance.[3] Now, however, the Jews possess a copied representation (μόρφωσις) of the truth in the Old Testament law (Rom. ii. 20) with its ordinances (ii. 26, viii. 4), inasmuch as it teaches them to know the normative will of God, and to prove thereby the difference between good and evil (ii. 18; cf. xii. 2). Accordingly, the truth which is revealed in the law states, in conformity with the divine will, what is good and evil, in order that, in consequence of its demand, the former may be done.[4] In the estimation of him who had been a Pharisee, and who looked specially at the legal side of the Old Testament revelation, righteousness was to be attained only by the doing of the good which is described in the law as the will of God, just as, in his opinion, even the remnant of morality, which is to be found in heathendom, is a ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ νόμου (Rom. ii. 14). It is by no means

[3] The truth in the absolute sense is that which we really know of God and divine things in consequence of revelation, and therefore in an authentic manner. Thus, in Rom. i. 25, ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ Θεοῦ stands for the true nature of God as known in consequence of the revelation of nature (cf. i. 18: ἡ ἀλήθεια simply); and in 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12, 13, Gal. v. 7, 2 Cor. iv. 2, vi. 7, ἡ ἀλήθεια is the substance of the divine will relating to salvation as revealed in the Gospel (cf. Gal. ii. 5, 14: ἡ ἀλήθ. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου). Elsewhere ἡ ἀλήθεια likewise denotes the agreement of a matter of fact with a statement or a judgment (2 Cor. xii. 6, vii. 14; Rom. ix. 1; cf. Rom. ii. 2), corresponding with the adjective ἀληθινός (1 Thess. i. 9), or, conversely, the agreement of a human statement with the matter of fact, *i.e.* subjective truthfulness (1 Cor. v. 8; 2 Cor. vii. 14, xi. 10; Rom. iii. 7, xv. 8), corresponding with the adjective ἀληθής (2 Cor. vi. 8; Rom. iii. 4). If now, to the apostle, the principal matter in religion is not any theoretical knowledge of the divine nature, but the knowledge of the divine will, inasmuch as its fulfilment produces righteousness, then, to him, the leading import of all truth will be the substance of this divine will, and thus the truth can be thought of as an ethical principle, as the rule of righteousness. In this sense ἀπιθεῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ stands opposed to πείθεσθαι τῇ ἀδικίᾳ (in the comprehensive sense, Rom. ii. 8; cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 6), and in 2 Cor. xiii. 8 it is the truth which is realized by τὸ καλὸν ποιεῖν (ver. 7 = ποιεῖν κακὸν μηδέν).

[4] This more general description of that which makes up the contents of righteousness is found by no means unfrequently. Paul speaks of the doing of that which is good (τὸ ἀγαθόν, Gal. vi. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; Rom. ii. 10, vii. 19, ix. 11, xiii. 3; cf. Rom. xii. 9, 21; 1 Thess. v. 15) or honourable (τὸ καλόν, Gal. vi. 9; 2 Cor. xiii. 7; Rom. vii. 18, 21; cf. Gal. iv. 18; 2 Cor. viii. 21; Rom. xii. 17; 1 Thess. v. 21; 2 Thess. iii. 13), and of ἔργα ἀγαθά (2 Cor. ix. 8; Rom. ii. 7, xiii. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 17). On the other hand, cf. the analogous expressions: φαῦλον πράσσειν (Rom. ix. 11) or τὸ πονηρόν (Rom. xii. 9; cf. Gal. i. 4; 1 Thess. v. 22), τὸ κακὸν ποιεῖν (2 Cor. v. 10, xiii. 7; Rom. ii. 9, iii. 8, vii. 19, xiii. 4, 10; cf. 1 Cor. x. 6, xiii. 5; Rom. xii. 17, 21, xiv. 20, xvi. 19; 1 Thess. v. 15), ἔργον κακόν (Rom. xiii. 3).

implied in this that righteousness is conceived of only as an external performance as distinguished from the disposition (cf. Reuss, ii. p. 22 [E. Tr. ii. p. 18])—a perversity which lay, no doubt, in the practice, but by no means in the principle of Pharisaism; but it is implied that it is looked at as a righteousness which is to be realized by a human performance, and to be attained by a definite course of conduct.

(*c*) It is only in Rom. iii. 5 that, for reasons which lie in the context, the term δικαιοσύνη is so applied by Paul to God that, as in the case of man, it denotes the normal behaviour in general.[5] But even here it by no means denotes "the consistency of God's way of acting" *in abstracto*, and still less in its one-sided reference to the men who are appointed to salvation (Ritschl, ii. p. 115); it denotes the character of His behaviour as corresponding with the rule set up by Himself. Since this, however, is really self-evident, the righteousness of God is usually spoken of only in reference to the fact that, in His judgment of men, and in His behaviour towards them, He binds Himself to the rule of justice which He has set up (cf. § 50, *d*, footnote 6), *i.e.* it is thought of almost exclusively as judicial, as is also most frequently the case in the Old Testament (Ps. vii. 11, ix. 4; Jer. xi. 20; cf. Ps. xcvii. 2, lxxxix. 14). He will judge the world in righteousness (Acts xvii. 31). It is not because "He visits the unrighteous also with His wrath, instead of leading all men to salvation by His righteousness" (Ritschl, ii. p. 115), but because the unrighteousness of men only contributes to the establishing of the righteousness of God, and is thus in keeping with the

[5] In Rom. iii. 4, viz., the point in question is that, by keeping His word even though men are unfaithful, God proves Himself to be true (cf. ver. 7 : ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ Θεοῦ), while every one who maintains that the unfaithfulness of men could do away with the faithfulness of God is made a liar. In this case, therefore, the unfaithfulness of men only contributes to the manifesting of the faithfulness of God under the severest test; and since, in ver. 5, the former is looked at under the general point of view of ἀδικία, the latter is, by way of contrast, called δικαιοσύνη, because truthfulness, or the keeping of his word, is, in the case of man, a part of his moral normal behaviour. Here, however, the transference of this idea to God was natural in consequence of the circumstance that, in the passage quoted in ver. 4 (Ps. li. 4), God was, with a daring anthropomorphism, represented, as it were, as an accused person who is found innocent (righteous) in the judgment, and therefore comes forth from it as a conqueror. Even here, on the other hand, δικαιοσύνη and πίστις are by no means treated as synonyms, as Ritschl (ii. p. 115) maintains.

highest rule set up by Himself, according to which everything which men do is to serve His purposes, that the question arises in Rom. iii. 5, whether it is not unrighteous in God to visit them with the wrath which falls upon those who oppose His purposes. Nor is it upon the assumption that "the wrath of God is required for the judgment of the world" that Paul bases the negation of this question; but on the assumption that only the righteous one can judge the world, and that it is acknowledged that God will do so, he, in ver. 6, *à priori*, strikes down every doubt as to the righteousness of God. It would be a contradiction if, in giving judgment, the judge were not bound by the same rule by which He has, as lawgiver, bound man. For this there is required, first, negatively, that He has no respect of persons (cf. Lev. xix. 15), *i.e.* takes no account of any condition of the person who is to be judged, that does not stand in connection with the subject of the judgment (Gal. ii. 6: *πρόσωπον Θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει*; cf. Rom. ii. 11; Col. iii. 25; Eph. vi. 9); positively, that His judgment is *κατὰ ἀλήθειαν* (Rom. ii. 2), *i.e.* in conformity with the real matter of fact, and the real matter of fact of righteousness is constituted by the perfect fulfilment of the divine will.[6] The righteousness of God will therefore show itself in this, that He bears Himself in one way towards him who is found *δίκαιος* according to this criterion, and in another way towards the *ἄδικος*; it is expressly described as the essence of the divine *δικαιοκρισία* (ver. 5), that He renders to every man according to his works (ver. 6).[7]

[6] God can therefore take no account of the circumstance that man bears himself as a friend of the divine will by his *κρίνειν*; He can take notice only of what man does (Rom. ii. 1, 2). Not the hearers of the law are righteous in the judgment of God, but the doers of the law will be justified (ver. 13). Here it is plain from the parallelism that *δικαιοῦν* (= הִצְדִּיק, Ex. xxiii. 7) stands *sensu forensi* (cf. Rom. iii. 4 after Ps. li. 4) for the judgment of God, whereby He declares one to be *δίκαιος*, as in Matt. xii. 37 and in James (§ 53, *b*). The condemnation pronounced by God stands opposed to this justification (*κατάκριμα*, Rom. v. 16, 18, viii. 1; *κατακρίνειν*, 1 Cor. xi. 32; *κατάκρισις*, 2 Cor. iii. 9); for this condemnation *κρίμα*, which stands literally *sensu medio* (Rom. v. 16), is also often used (Gal. v. 10; 1 Cor. xi. 29, 34; Rom. ii. 2, 3, iii. 8, xiii. 2; cf. *κρίνειν*, *sensu medio:* 1 Cor. v. 13; Rom. ii. 16, iii. 6; more frequently *sensu malo:* 1 Cor. xi. 31, 32; Rom. ii. 3, 12, iii. 7; 2 Thess. ii. 12).

[7] In consequence of his conception of the idea of righteousness, Ritschl (ii. p. 115) makes the righteousness of God refer here also to the completion of the

Where this is not the case, as in the history considered in ix. 10–13, the doubt arises: is there not un-righteousness with God (ver. 14). Wherever sins are passed by unpunished, and therefore it appears as if God does not deal with the sinner in such a manner as corresponds with his behaviour, a demonstration of His righteousness is required (iii. 25). Even in the passage quoted in Rom. ix. 27 (Isa. x. 22) righteousness is that which determines His behaviour towards sinners (cf. also 2 Thess. i. 6, 7, for which see § 64, *b*, footnote 1). For the very reason, therefore, that the righteousness of God recognises and deals with human righteousness as such, as well as with human unrighteousness, the salvation of man depends upon his attaining to δικαιοσύνη (note *a*).

(*d*) What the salvation is which man has to expect from God as the one who is moved by His righteousness to a corresponding behaviour, appears from this, that not only in quotations from the Old Testament (Rom. ix. 26, xiv. 11), but also elsewhere (2 Cor. iii. 3, vi. 16; 1 Thess. i. 19), the true God is called the living God. Life is so great a blessing, because it is participation in a good which is essential to God. Even in the Old Testament it is the greatest good; in Deut. xxx. 19 it appears expressly as the sum-total of all the blessing which is to be expected from God, and therefore as the consequence of the doing of His commandments (Lev. xviii. 5, cf. Gal. iii. 12; Rom. x. 5) or of righteousness (Hab. ii. 4; Prov. xi. 19).[8] In order, therefore, that this greatest blessing may be attained, there must be the realization of righteousness. It is true the bestowal of life upon the righteous is nowhere expressly traced back by Paul to the righteousness of God (yet cf. Rom. ii. 7 with ver. 5 f.); but this is only in keeping with the fact that, as we shall see, the

salvation of the righteous, and regards His wrath against the unrighteous as a means to that end. This idea, however, is simply dragged in; for according to the exposition that follows, ver. 6 points to the *double-sided* recompense.

[8] That righteousness and life are still correlative terms to the apostle, appears from Rom. v. 17, 21, and is very evident in Gal. iii. 21, according to which that which is in a position to give life must also be able to work righteousness, as well as in Rom. v. 18, according to which the sentence of justification, which declares one to be righteous, is described as pertaining to life (δικαίωσις ζωῆς). Accordingly, even the law, the fulfilment of which works righteousness, was given unto life (vii. 10).

righteousness of man is never actually realized by himself, and that therefore life is never awarded by a simple judgment of divine righteousness; its bestowal is rendered possible only by an interposition of divine grace. If now, in the Old Testament, this life is conceived of primarily as earthly (it being, of course, self-evident that long life is a blessing only when it is connected with wellbeing and happiness (Deut. v. 33, xxx. 20), without this being implied in the word), it appears in Paul in the pregnant sense as a life which has no end, even where it is not expressly called eternal, as in Gal. vi. 8, Rom. ii. 7, v. 21, vi. 22, 23. How this life is realized notwithstanding the fact that death reigns in humanity, we shall see later. In this sense life or eternal life had already been called the greatest blessing in the discourses of Jesus as well as in Peter and James (cf. § 64, *d*). On the other hand, there is no need whatever, for this line of thought, that the idea should be transformed into that of spiritual life, an idea which has its place, in Paul, in a totally different connection.

## § 66. *The Impossibility of a Righteousness of our own.*

To the Christian consciousness it is, *à priori*, a matter of certainty, that the possibility of man's attaining to righteousness by himself has never been and never can become an actuality. (*b*) This, it is true, is not owing to the fact that the works of the law as such are not in a position to work righteousness; it is owing to the fact that, according to experience and Scripture, every one's fulfilment of the law is imperfect. (*c*) The deeper reason of this is the dominion of sin in man, a dominion which manifests itself in the passive condition into which lusts have put him, and in his inability to do the good which he acknowledges and wills. (*d*) On account of this sin, however, he is exposed to the divine judgment of wrath, which brings upon him the death which is followed by no life, or destruction.

(*a*) If the doers of the law are accounted righteous, or are righteous in the judgment of God (Rom. ii. 13), there is given, even to pre-Christian humanity, the possibility of men's realizing righteousness by themselves, and thus of attaining to salvation; for in the law of Moses God has revealed

His will to the children of Israel (ver. 18), and He has written the work of the law in the hearts of the Gentiles (ver. 15). As such a righteousness would be brought about by the fulfilling of the law, it would be owing to the law (x. 5: *ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου*), inasmuch as the law, as the revelation of the divine will, has made it possible; it would, however, be also one's own (ver. 3: *ἡ ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*), inasmuch as it is a righteousness which has been earned by man by his fulfilment of the divine will (cf. Phil. iii. 9). Such a fulfilling of the law man could boast of before God, he could set it before Him as his merit. If Abraham has really been justified in consequence of works which he has done, and by which he has fulfilled the will of God, then he has something of which he can glory (Rom. iv. 2). The apostle is so convinced that this is the necessary consequence of that hypothetical premiss, that he argues from it as to the admissibility of that premiss. Because, viz., looking at the matter from the Christian standpoint, he is, *à priori*, convinced that no man (and therefore not even Abraham) has or can have anything of which he can glory before God (*ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς Θεόν, scil. καύχημα ἔχει*), neither can Abraham have been justified by works. The line of thought is the same, when, in iii. 28 (read *οὖν*), Paul *deduces* his thesis, that man is justified without works of the law, from the fact that the glorying of man would not be excluded by the legal way of obtaining salvation (ver. 27). The reason, however, why the apostle assumes it as self-evident that the realization of righteousness, and therefore the attaining of salvation, cannot be connected with a glorying of man, is that, to him, Christianity is a dispensation of grace (§ 58, *b*), and divine grace excludes all human merit and glorying (iv. 4).[1] In accordance with this it must

[1] The whole manifestation of Christ, and especially His death, by means of which the grace of God is brought to us, would have been purposeless, if righteousness could have been actually realized in that way which was possible in itself. In that case it would only have been necessary to point each one to this way. If it is by the law that righteousness is brought about, then Christ has died in vain (*δωρεάν*), *i.e.* without reason, unnecessarily (Gal. ii. 21); the same end could have been reached in another way. If we are justified on the ground of the law (*ἐν νόμῳ*), *i.e.* by its fulfilment, the bond is broken which connects us with Christ (*κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*) considered as the ground of our salvation; there likewise ceases our connection with divine grace (*τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε*, Gal. v. 4); in that case it has nothing more to do to us, since,

be a matter of certainty to the Christian consciousness, that no man is declared to be righteous in God's sight on the ground of the law (Gal. iii. 11), *i.e.* that no man will ever be justified before God on account of works of the law (Rom. iii. 20).

(*b*) The impossibility of becoming righteous by means of works of the law can, however, also be proved by facts. This impossibility, indeed, is by no means owing to the circumstance that works of the law are in themselves an imperfect fulfilment of the divine will, as if by its fulfilment were understood only an external performance of all manner of prescriptions from sensuous motives, as even Neander (p. 660 ff. [E. Tr. i. 418 ff.]) and Usteri (p. 57 ff.) think (cf. on the other hand, Pfleiderer, p. 78 [E. Tr. i. 77]). Nowhere does Paul distinguish between the doing of the law, which, according to Rom. ii. 13, can of itself justify, and the works of the law, by which no one is justified (iii. 20). If the law were not the perfect revelation of the divine will (which, however, it is according to § 65, *b*), then only a completion of the law, and not a new way of salvation, would be given in Christianity. Paul, however, who was well aware that the law demands the love of our neighbour (xiii. 10) and forbids wicked lusts (vii. 7), cannot have understood by the demands of the law a sum of external rules.[2] The works of the law, *per se*, could therefore easily justify, if they only existed; and they should do so, for the law was given unto life (vii. 10); but, as a matter of fact, they never exist to such an extent that they could alone secure the righteousness of man.[3] Paul starts from the fact of

according to His righteousness, God already declares the doer of the law to be righteous.

[2] It is also altogether arbitrary to understand by the ἔργα *per se*, or by the ποιεῖν and πράσσειν which the law demands, mere external performances. Among the ἔργα τῆς σαρκός (Gal. v. 19), which are described in ver. 21 as a πράσσειν, there are counted also such dispositions as ἔχθρα, ζῆλος, θυμός, ἐριθεία φθόνος (cf. 2 Cor. xi. 15), and, conversely, even the preaching of the gospel (1 Cor. iii. 13–15, xv. 58, xvi. 10) and every truly Christian mode of living (Gal. vi. 4; 2 Cor. ix. 8) are ἔργα; yea, Paul even speaks, in 1 Thess. i. 3, of an ἔργον πίστεως.

[3] Paul asserts the solidarity of all the individual commandments of the law as decidedly as Jesus (§ 24, *c*) and James (ii. 10). Whoever once submits himself to the law by the acceptance of circumcision, thereby comes under the obligation of keeping the *whole* law (Gal. v. 3); and the law pronounces its curse upon every one who does not keep *all* its commandments (iii. 10, after Deut. xxvii. 26).

experience, that no one has kept all the commandments; for all have sinned (Rom. v. 12), all fall short of the glory which God bestows when He declares one to be righteous (iii. 23), and stand under the curse of the law which excludes the blessing of Abraham (Gal. iii. 9, 10).[4] The moral corruption of heathendom, as Paul describes it in Rom. i., required no proof; but even the Jews, notwithstanding all their apparent zeal for the law, nevertheless fail to keep it (ii. 1, 2), and that, too, not because their fulfilment is an external one and proceeds from impure motives, but because, in their doing, they transgress the simplest commandments, such as the sixth and seventh (vv. 21, 22), and by this transgression dishonour the law of God, whose honour demands the keeping of His commandments (ver. 23). What experience teaches, Scripture confirms. In a series of Old Testament passages (Rom. iii.

[4] Ritschl (ii. p. 306, 314), indeed, maintains very emphatically that the actual non-fulfilment of the law, or the impossibility of fulfilling it, was not, for the apostle, the real ground of the impossibility of justification by the works of the law and of the appointment of a new way of justification. But from the argumentation in Gal. iii. 11, 12, to which he appeals, it only follows that the thoroughgoing non-fulfilment of the law, which can never be proved empirically, is, *à priori*, a matter of certainty to the apostle, because of the incompatibility of faith as the condition of salvation, which is borne witness to in prophecy, with the condition of doing which is stipulated in the law. Pfleiderer (p. 78 [E. Tr. i. 77]) is right in distinguishing this logical ground from that real ground; but we cannot even say that the latter was for Paul "only secondary and derived," since he felt the need of seeking to discover an actual proof of that of which he was, *à priori*, assured (note *a*). Above all, however, that assertion of Ritschl's rests upon the altogether untenable presupposition that the discussions in Rom. ii. 6–13 were only an *argumentum e concessis*, which was meant to refute the Pharisaic assumption of a double-sided recompense of reward and punishment (p. 152, 155). The Pauline thesis, that, according to the original appointment of God, man could and should be justified by works of the law only in consequence of a righteous recompense, rests no doubt upon his conception of the Old Testament, which, according to § 58, *b*, looks one-sidedly at its legal side (cf. Ritschl, p. 305, 308); but its force is by no means weakened, as Ritschl (p. 314) thinks, by the circumstance that, according to it (under the empirical circumstances), a universal punishment would be necessary. Paul rather finds in that very circumstance a proof of that of which he was convinced, *à priori*, viz. of the necessity of a new way of justification. For this very reason, neither is there in Rom. ii. 6–13 any "antinomy" with his doctrine of the impossibility of the fulfilling of the law; for the imagined "ordinary moral and specially Jewish legal view," from which this passage is written according to Pfleiderer (p. 79 [E. Tr. i. 78]), is, according to the apostle, only the expression of that original appointment of God, which was hindered from attaining its purpose by the coming in of human sin.

10–18) Paul finds a description of the universal sinfulness of man; for in ver. 19 he declares explicitly that, according to the intention of Scripture, the Jews should apply these passages also to themselves;[5] and, according to Gal. iii. 22, the Scripture has shut up everything under sin, by declaring that all men, with all that they do, are equally sinful. This very fact is likewise the presupposition of the preaching of Jesus (§ 21, *a*), as well as of the original apostles, only that for Paul, with his idea of δικαιοσύνη (§ 65, *b*), it involves also the impossibility of the realization of righteousness on the part of man. If it belongs to the idea of righteousness that the religious-ethical life be absolutely normal, then every experience teaches that no man is δίκαιος.

(*c*) This experience, however, to which there is no exception, must have a deeper reason. This Paul finds in the circumstance that man is dominated by a power which hinders him from fulfilling the law, and therefore from realizing righteousness. This is the power of ἁμαρτία. Whoever makes himself a servant of sin has thereby freed himself from righteousness (Rom. vi. 20) and made his members weapons of ἀδικία (ver. 13), by means of which, therefore, there is realized, not the divinely-purposed δικαιοσύνη, but ἀδικία.[6] So long as man stands under the control of this power of sin (Rom. iii. 9, cf. Gal. iii. 22), so long as it has an absolute

[5] With altogether untenable exegetical reasons, Ritschl (ii. p. 315 f.) denies that this verse refers to what precedes it. He does so, in order to find in it the thought that the law (in the narrower sense) has only the design of making the whole world liable to punishment, so that it could not, in the judgment of Christians, be looked at as the original way of attaining to righteousness. But this statement regarding the design of the law has no connection whatever with the preceding discussion; and even it would by no means prove that it was only hypothetically or dialectically (for the purpose of refuting it) that Paul had previously asserted the significance of the law as the measure for the double recompense (cf. footnote 4). For it would still be meant only from the empirical point of view, and would therefore by no means exclude the possibility that, supposing the law were fulfilled, it would award life τοῖς ἐν νόμῳ, just as it now delivers them over to the judgment.

[6] When the thought of Rom. vi. 13 is resumed in ver. 19, sin is described according to its essence, partly as moral pollution (cf. i. 24), partly as an express negation of the divine will (ἀνομία; cf. 2 Cor. vi. 14, where it is opposed to δικαιοσύνη), wherefore the development of sin reaches its climax in the revelation of the ἄνομος (2 Thess. ii. 8, cf. § 63, *c*). The individual manifestations in which sin is realized (ἁμαρτίαι: Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 17; Rom. vii. 5; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 16; Col. i. 14; Eph. ii. 1; ἁμαρτήματα: 1 Cor. vi. 18; Rom. iii. 25) are

dominion over him (Rom. v. 21: *βασιλεύει*) and makes him its weak slave (vi. 17, 20), he cannot realize the righteousness, the opposite of which it is the endeavour of the power of sin to realize. The original apostles already teach that he is dominated by this power (§ 46, *b*, 52, *b*), only Paul has with greater psychological precision analyzed the manner in which man comes to be conscious of this state of bondage. The power of sin, which is in man, is apparently dead, until it gives the first indication of its vitality by exciting evil lust in him (vii. 8).[7] Lust is neither sin itself, since it is by sin that it is produced, nor is it the only form in which sin appears; but it is that form in which the nature of sin as a power which dominates man comes out most distinctly. For lust obtains the mastery of man and puts him into a passive condition, it begets the *πάθος ἐπιθυμίας* (1 Thess. iv. 5; cf. Rom. i. 26: *πάθη ἀτιμίας*), the *παθήματα* (Gal. v. 24: *παθήματα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*; Rom. vii. 5: *παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*). Through this passive condition, into which lust puts him, man becomes conscious of the power of sin, which dwells in him (Rom. vii. 17, 20), as a power which is distinct from his ego, and which is able to stir up in him something which he does not recognise as his own, in opposition to which he feels himself, not free, but dependent, not active, but passive. Of his own accord he would not do that which

called transgressions (iv. 15: *οὗ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις*; cf. Gal. ii. 18; Rom. ii. 25, 27) when there is a reference to the law which forbids it (Gal. iii. 19; Rom. ii. 23), or to an express commandment of God (v. 14). But sin remains punishable even when it cannot be accounted a transgression on the ground of a positive commandment forbidding it (Rom. v. 13, 14, cf. ii. 12). The expression *παράπτωμα* also denotes primarily the transgression of a positive commandment (Rom. v. 15, 17, 18, 20, xi. 11, 12); but it stands also for sins in general (Gal. vi. 1; 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. iv. 25, v. 16; cf. Col. ii. 13; Eph. i. 7, ii. 1, 5).

[7] By lusts (*ἐπιθυμίαι*) Paul, like Peter and James (§ 46, *b*, 56, *a*), understands, not the natural appetites of the body, because in empirical humanity these no longer appear as such, but the sinful, godless inclinations (Rom. i. 24), whether these be of a sensuous or of a spiritual nature. He purposely quotes the Old Testament commandment against sinful lust (Ex. xx. 17; Deut. v. 21) in such a manner, that it is not any definite objects of lust, but the *ἐπιθυμεῖν* as such that he calls forbidden (vii. 7). In his sense every lust is a product of sin (ver. 8), which compels us to obey the lusts of the body (vi. 12); every natural appetite may be perverted by sin into an *ἐπιθυμία* (xiii. 14). Such passages as 1 Thess. ii. 17 and Phil. i. 23 have naturally nothing to do with this technical use of the word *ἐπιθυμία*.

is evil, as soon as he has learned from the divine law to know that which is good; and now, seeing that, along with the law, he must condemn his own unlawful deeds, he consents to the law that it is good (vii. 16). As it is only in that which is good that the law has pleasure, so he delights with the law in that which is good (ver. 22), he would do good (ver. 21). But this volition remains inoperative, it never comes to performance (ver. 18). He does not do the good which he would, but the evil which he would not (vv. 15, 19). This incomprehensible self-contradiction (ver. 15: ὃ κατεργάζομαι, οὐ γινώσκω) is solved only by the assumption that a foreign power dwells in man (vv. 17, 20), viz. the power of sin. This always makes evil so present to him who would do good, that he first of all lays hold of the former, and must do so (ver. 21). In the conflict between sin and the better volition, the former always remains victorious, and brings man, as to his better ego, into captivity under its law, so that he must serve it (vii. 23, 25), and feels himself as sold into slavery to it (ver. 14). What the apostle thus states to be his own experience, he can also regard as the universal experience of man. If the sin which exists in man always attains supremacy even where, in consequence of the revelation of the law, and of such a very high estimation of it as was found in him as a Pharisee, there exists the knowledge and the willing of that which is good, it must exercise this dominion everywhere, and only the more absolutely wherever this knowledge or willing of that which is good is obscured or awanting.

(*d*) In consequence of this subjection to sin, which hinders them from realizing righteousness, men are exposed to the judgment of God (Rom. iii. 19, 20), who demands δικαιοσύνη, and must therefore, in His righteousness, punish its absence, just as He recognises its presence by His judgment and behaviour (§ 65, *c*). This execution of justice God has reserved to Himself (Rom. xii. 19, after Deut. xxxii. 35); it is the necessary expression of His wrath (xiii. 4: ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργήν) against sin; and they are to give place to this wrath by not anticipating it in avenging themselves. The law works this wrath, inasmuch as it gives man's sin the character of a transgression of its express commandment (iv. 15); it is revealed, however, against *all* ἀδικία (i. 18), even where sin

is not accounted παράβασις (v. 13, 14), because committed by such as had no positive law which condemns sin as punishable (ii. 12). The judgment of God, from which the evil-doer is not to imagine that he will escape (ii. 3), is nothing else than an expression, on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, of the divine wrath which he has heaped up for himself by his transgression of the law (vv. 5, 8).[8] As in the original apostolic preaching (§ 50, *d*, 57, *d*), so also in Paul, physical death expressly appears, according to the Old Testament view, as the punishment appointed for sin (vi. 21, 23, vii. 5, viii. 10) in consequence of the judicial ordinance of God (δικαίωμα, i. 32).[9] No doubt, however, death as distinguished from life in the pregnant sense (§ 65, *d*) can be thought of only as a death to which there is no termination (by means of the resurrection), which

[8] Although it is in the day when God judges the world as the righteous One, that this wrath will, as it were, discharge itself upon the sinner (Rom. iii. 5, 6, v. 9, ix. 22), yet preliminary revelations of it are not excluded (i. 18). The attempt of Ritschl (ii. p. 142 ff.) here, as well as in 1 Thess. ii. 16 (where the allusion to Zeph. i. 18, even if it were not incapable of being proved, is far from being sufficient to preserve "the eschatological meaning of the divine wrath" in the "judgment in the *present time*"), to conceive of the revelation of wrath as eschatological, by regarding ii. 5 as a resumption of i. 18, breaks down on the impossibility of taking together i. 32–ii. 4 (p. 145), since the κρίνοντες τὸν ἕτερον of ii. 1 cannot possibly be identical with the ἐπιγνόντες of i. 32, who even συνευδοκοῦσιν τοῖς πράσσουσιν (cf. also xiii. 4, where the authorities as the servants of God are ministers of the divine wrath in their execution of justice). It is altogether unjustifiable to make the salvation of believers from the judgment of wrath (Rom. v. 9; cf. 1 Thess. v. 9) refer to their preservation from "the refusal of obedience to the grace of God" (p. 150 f.), for this salvation is expressly based, at least in Rom. v., upon their justification, *i.e.* upon their absolution from the pre-Christian sins which would have drawn this wrath upon them. It is a matter of indifference whether we regard the wrath in Rom. iv. 15 eschatologically (although this idea is very remote) or not; at any rate, it is implied that the transgression of the law already calls forth this wrath, and there is no justification whatever for the assertion that this thought "belongs to the pre-Christian standpoint" (p. 151).

[9] It is pure arbitrariness to think here of anything else than physical death, and to drag in, as Schmid (ii. p. 253 [E. Tr. 437 f.]) and Lechler (p. 98) still do, the idea of spiritual death, an idea which, like that of spiritual life, belongs to a totally different line of thought; or to assume, with Usteri (p. 35), that without sin death would only not have stood in any connection with the evils which we feel to be the consequence of sin, and would not itself have appeared as an evil (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 81 [E. Tr. i. 80]); for what 1 Cor. xv. 56 asserts is not that sin gives its bitterness to death, but that sin, which has death as its consequence, gives it the sting with which it slays man (cf. Jas. i. 15).

no new life follows (cf. § 34, *c*), and which therefore endures eternally like that life (Rom. viii. 13). In this sense death is the fate of the *ἀπολλύμενοι* (2 Cor. ii. 15, 16), and this *ἀπόλλυσθαι* (cf. 1 Cor. i. 18, viii. 11, xv. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 3, 9) is identical with being judged (Rom. ii. 12), where that expression stands *sensu malo*. According to Rom. ix. 22, the *σκεύη ὀργῆς* are appointed to *ἀπώλεια*, and hence this term, which here, as in § 34, *c*, denotes primarily a violent death (1 Cor. x. 9, 10), appears as an expression for the definitive destruction, to which man is delivered over in the judgment (cf. also Phil. i. 28, iii. 19), being used interchangeably with the synonymous expression: *φθορά* (Gal. vi. 8; cf. 1 Cor. iii. 17); cf. § 64, *b*.

## § 67. *The Transgression of Adam and its Consequences.*

Cf. A. Dietzsch, *Adam und Christus*, Bonn 1871.

It is a fact that, in the present age, mankind is determined by a godless power, and bears in itself the character of sinfulness. (*b*) Paul traces back this fact to the transgression of their common ancestor. (*c*) In consequence of the fact that death was appointed the punishment on the occasion of his sin, it has also become the universal punishment of all sinners. (*d*) It may also be assumed with the greatest probability that Paul has traced back the pernicious influence of Adam upon his race to the blood relationship which is brought about by procreation.

(*a*) That which each individual is taught afresh by his own experience is naturally true also of humanity as a whole, or the *κόσμος* (2 Cor. i. 12; Rom. i. 8).[1] Because it serves sin, the whole world is exposed to the judgment of God (1 Cor. iv. 13, vi. 2, xi. 32; Rom. iii. 6, 19), and needs reconciliation with Him (2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. xi. 12, 15). Its spirit is opposed to the spirit of God (1 Cor. ii. 12), its wisdom is godless (1 Cor. i. 20, 21, 27, 28, iii. 19), its sorrow

[1] It is seldom that *ὁ κόσμος* stands in Paul for the universe in general (1 Cor. iv. 9, viii. 4, xiv. 10; Rom. i. 20), or for the sum-total of all earthly things (Gal. vi. 14; 1 Cor. iii. 22, vii. 33, 34; Rom. iv. 13), as in Peter and James (§ 46, *b*, footnote 3, 55, *a*). Inasmuch as the present world ends with the expiry of the present aeon of the world, it is also called *ὁ κόσμος οὗτος* (1 Cor. vii. 31).

leads to death (2 Cor. vii. 10). In the term ὁ κόσμος, which has become a *term. techn.*, there is therefore expressed the idea of the sinfulness of the human world as known by experience. No doubt it is not humanity as such which is thought of when this term is used, but only humanity inasmuch as it belongs to the αἰὼν οὗτος, *i.e.*, in accordance with the terminology of later Judaism, the pre-Messianic age of the world (הָעוֹלָם הַזֶּה), an age whose character is sinful (Rom. xii. 2; cf. Gal. i. 4: πονηρός), and whose wisdom is ungodly (1 Cor. i. 20, ii. 6, 8, iii. 18). Inasmuch as the sinful human world belongs to this aeon of the world, it is also called ὁ κόσμος οὗτος (1 Cor. iii. 19, v. 10). The world, however, which is in the service of sin, stands, as in § 23, *a*, 55, *b*, under the dominion of Satan; he is therefore called the god of this age (2 Cor. iv. 4), and will yet equip the perfected manifestation of the man of sin, or of lawlessness, with his wonder-working powers (2 Thess. ii. 9). It is his spirit which, as it were, animates and moves the κόσμος (1 Cor. ii. 12), and impresses upon it its sinful, ungodly character.[2] It is by no means meant, however, that the universality of sinfulness is hereby explained; this is never traced back to the circumstance that it is the power of Satan which moves every individual to commit sin. Rather, just as certainly as the transgression of our first parents is, notwithstanding the temptation of Satan, conceived of, in the manner of the Old Testament, as a free deed and moral guilt, so certainly is the universal sinfulness of humanity not the consequence but the ground of its having fallen under the dominion of Satan. Only because it serves sin does humanity become the kingdom of Satan. Now, however, since Paul cannot possibly abide by the mere fact of the dominion of sin in the κόσμος, he must take another way of explaining it.

(*b*) To the apostle humanity is not merely the sum-total of all the separate human individuals, it is rather an organic human race. This is of such importance in his mind that, in

[2] He is also apparently already conceived of as the tempter of our first parents. With an evident allusion to the narrative of the fall (Gen. iii.), it is said in 2 Cor. xi. 3 that the serpent beguiled Eve by his craftiness, and there is scarcely any doubt that, with the current Jewish theology (Sapient. ii. 24), the serpent is conceived of here as an organ of the devil, who thus led the first human beings to their disastrous transgression.

his elementary preaching as a missionary to the Gentiles, he connects with the proclamation of the one God also the proclamation of the descent of the nations from one (Acts xvii. 26). The universal condition of servitude to sin, which is found throughout the whole human family, can therefore be traced back only to that which constitutes the unity of the race, viz. to its connection with its ancestor. In Rom. v. 12 it is said expressly that sin has entered into the human world through one man (*i.e.* Adam, according to ver. 14); and since we have already met it there as a dominant power, this position of authority which it has in the human world will also have been brought about through the first man.[3] With this assertion the assumption is absolutely incompatible, that the principle of sin, which was immanent in man from the beginning, only first appeared in actuality in the transgression of Adam (Baur, p. 138, 191; Holsten, p. 413, 418), and that Paul, accordingly, knows nothing of a fall of Adam. If the latter assumption is already excluded by the undoubted allusion to the Old Testament narrative of the fall (cf. also 2 Cor. xi. 3), of which we are expressly reminded by Adam's transgression being traced back to a *παρακοή* (Rom. v. 19), so is also the former by the *εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον*. At least it should have been said that the *παράβασις* has come into the world through Adam, or, more accurately, that *in* Adam, or *with* his transgression, sin has become actual (cf. also R. Schmidt, p. 43; Dietzsch, p. 76, 77). It is, however, said expressly that *through* him, and that, too, according to what follows, *through* his *παράπτωμα* (vv. 15, 17, 18), sin has come into the world as a principle (or as a dominant power),

[3] That in a passage, which is so important doctrinally, *ὁ κόσμος* is to be taken in its technical sense (note *a*) is, *à priori*, very probable; it is, however, made undoubted by the circumstance that, in the second clause of the verse, *εἰς τὸν κόσμον* is resumed by *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους*. No tautology arises from this view, as Dietzsch (p. 88) thinks. Rather, when one understands it of the physical world, the sphere of earthly human existence (which *ὁ κόσμος per se* by no means signifies), the expression becomes quite meaningless; for it is self-evident that if sin insinuated itself into this earthly world, it could do so, first of all, only at one spot (and that, too, according to the nature of the case, only into one man), whereas the very nerve of the thought lies in this, that through *one* man sin and death have entered into the multiplicity of the *κόσμος*, and that, too, into *all* its individual members, as is immediately more particularly explained.

and has therefore become operative, in the first place, in himself, and then in the human race which is organically connected with him. In consequence of this assertion, accordingly, it can be *assumed* in what follows that *all* (without exception) have sinned. To think that he means that all have sinned *in Adam* as their forefather (cf. Philippi and Meyer *in loco*) is perfectly arbitrary, if once it is admitted that the catholic-traditional reference of ἐφ' ᾧ to Adam (*in quo*) is altogether mistaken; for the aorist, which simply represents the fact that all have sinned as a completed fact (in consequence of that very εἰσῆλθεν), by no means compels us to think of something which has taken place in and with the individual transgression of Adam. Hence neither can v. 19 be understood as meaning that, in the judgment of God, the sin of the forefather was imputed to all; it can only be understood as meaning that through the disobedience of the one the many (*i.e.* as a matter of fact, all the members of the human race) were made sinners (κατεστάθησαν). As appears already from the διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς, which takes the place of the παράπτωμα, which has been used hitherto, simply because of the following διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς, the expression is conditioned by the antithesis, and keeps in view the fact that it was because the sin, which came into the human world with Adam's transgression, had become the dominating power in all, and had therefore occasioned all to sin, that they came to stand as sinners before Him, who pronounces His κατάκριμα upon all.

(*c*) According to Gen. ii. 17, the transgression of Adam was one for which death had been expressly appointed the punishment. Naturally, we have to think of physical death, in which the soul is severed from the body, and the latter falls a prey to corruption. Accordingly, death has also come into the world through the sin which came into it with Adam's transgression; and so, *i.e.* in consequence of this causal connection which has been once established between death and sin, death has passed unto all men, because (ἐφ' ᾧ = ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅτι) all have sinned, and now their sin has drawn death upon all (Rom. v. 12).[4]

[4] Following Hofmann, Dietzsch (p. 48) and Pfleiderer (p. 39 [E. Tr. i. 39]) make οὕτως mean simply that death has reached all men through one man. But if death has come into the human world (in the sense of footnote 3) through one man, it is self-evident that its passing unto all the individuals of that human

Thus by the transgression of one the many died (ver. 15, cf. ver. 17), because of one the judgment of God against their sin (*τὸ κρίμα*) has become condemnation (*κατάκριμα*, ver. 16, cf. ver. 18). Here we have therefore the plain explanation of what is meant, when it is said in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22 that death has come through one man, or that it is owing to him (or rather, more particularly, to their vital connection with him) that all die. It is vain to appeal against the assumption, that death in the Old Testament sense is conceived of as a punishment of sin (§ 66, *d*), to the fact that Adam was mortal in

world could only be also brought about by him, and the *δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου* is so far from being more strongly emphasized than the *διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, that it is rather only the latter that is spoken of in connection with the coming in of death, it being of course self-evident from what was already stated that the sin of the one man is meant. This being the case, however, *οὕτως* can only point back to the fact that, on the occasion of this first sin, death was appointed to be its punishment; and in plain agreement with this is the prominence which is expressly given to the circumstance that the passing of death unto all men had its ground in the sinning of all. Yet it must not be overlooked that this sinning of all is not something accidental or independent of the transgression of Adam; according to the first hemistich, when rightly understood, it is caused by it, so that in the *πάντες ἥμαρτον* there is only expressed directly, and without exception, that which was already indirectly implied in the *ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*. It should not at least be urged against this interpretation, which is the simplest, and does most justice to the words, that in this way of looking at the origin of the dominion of sin and death in humanity, the dogmatizing casuistic question as to the death of children, who are still incapable of sinning, is left out of account, while Hofmann's interpretation of *ἐφ' ᾧ*, which is adopted by Dietzsch (apart altogether from its very doubtful grammatical justification), amounts only to the statement, which is altogether meaningless in this connection, that, the dominion of death being already established, all sinned. Pfleiderer also adheres correctly to the interpretation of *ἐφ' ᾧ* as causal; in consequence, however, of his wrong interpretation of *οὕτως*, he maintains that there is now a double reason assigned for death passing unto all, viz. the sin of Adam *and* the sin of all, and that this is explicable only on the assumption that the sin of Adam was, as such, already the sin of all (p. 40 [E. Tr. i. 39 f.]), which amounts to the false opinion, refuted in note *b*, that all have sinned in Adam. It is in vain that he appeals to vv. 13, 14; for it is not shown there that the death of all could not be grounded in the personal culpability of the individuals (p. 42 [E. Tr. i. 41]); it is shown, rather, that their death was grounded, not in the capital nature (which was not yet fixed by any law) of their sins, but only in the causal connection between death and sin, which was established once and for ever on the occasion of Adam's sin (see above). For since Paul also knows of a law in the conscience (Rom. ii. 14 f.), the sins which were committed previous to the Mosaic law (which, according to ver. 14, is alone spoken of here) cannot be thought of as "objectively innocent" (cf. Wendt, p. 197 f.). Paul does not know of a "pre-legal condition," which would exclude even that law, and at least such a condition is *not* spoken of here.

virtue of his original condition (1 Cor. xv. 47 : ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός), which even Genesis (iii. 19, cf. ii. 7) teaches. Even there the consequence of sin consists in this, not that Adam became mortal, but that he actually died, that man who was created mortal in himself did not attain to the gift of immortality, which was appointed him (iii. 22), and which would have transfigured his earthly corporeity into the heavenly without its being destroyed in death. As we shall see (cf. already § 64, *c*), Paul also knows of a way whereby man, without passing through death, can come from this earthly corporeity, which, indeed, cannot attain to the heavenly kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv. 50), to an incorruptible one. But in consequence of the condemnation which was pronounced against Adam's sin, this way to (eternal) life is denied to the sinful human race. Ever since, death has become unavoidable for all men; not, however, because the corporeity which is derived from Adam is, by a necessity of nature, exposed to death, but because the same original sin, which brought about the appointment of death as the punishment of sin, at the same time caused sin to enter into the world, in consequence of which all sinned, and thereby became worthy of death. That it is really only in consequence of the edict of punishment which was issued on the occasion of the first fall into sin, that death has become its permanent punishment, the apostle proves from the circumstance that, although between the transgression of Adam and the Mosaic law, which declared sin to be a transgression worthy of death, no deed of man could really be counted as sin in this sense, death was nevertheless universal, and befell even those who had not, like Adam (and the transgressors of the Mosaic law), transgressed a commandment which was connected with the threatening of death (Rom. v. 13, 14).

(*d*) Paul does not express himself directly as to the manner in which he conceives that the influence of Adam upon his whole race (note *b*), which produces universal sinfulness, is brought about. But since it is only by the process of procreation that Adam stands in a living connection with the whole race, this being also the reason why it is he that is named throughout Rom. v., although it was really Eve that sinned first, it is in the highest degree probable that, like Philo (*de*

*vita Mos.* iii. p. 675), he has conceived of that influence as being brought about by sexual procreation.[5] This depends, however, as in § 27, *a*, upon the fleshly union of the two sexes (Eph. v. 21, after Gen. ii. 24), which, when accomplished outside of the marriage union (as a divine ordinance), in *πορνεία* (1 Cor. vi. 16), defiles the flesh (2 Cor. vii. 1). In it, therefore, there is begotten, primarily, the flesh (cf. Heb. xii. 9; John iii. 6), as the material substance of the bodily organism,[6] a substance which was formed, in the case of the first man, out of the dust of the earth (1 Cor. xv. 47, after Gen. ii. 7), and therefore the relationship which is brought about by procreation is a fleshly one (Rom. ix. 3: *συγγενεῖς κατὰ σάρκα*; xi. 14: *ἡ σάρξ μου*; cf. Phil. iii. 4, 5). More particularly, however, the substance of the earthly corporeity (which cannot attain to the heavenly kingdom of God) is described as flesh and blood (1 Cor. xv. 50; cf. Eph. vi. 12); and, according to the Old Testament view, it is in the blood that the soul has its seat (cf. § 27, *b*). Now, since, in the procreation of a living man it is naturally living flesh, *i.e.* flesh possessed of a soul,[7] which is begotten, the soul is

[5] Eph. ii. 3 has nothing whatever to do with our question; there *φύσει* cannot possibly refer to the bodily origin, but only to the natural development (Rom. ii. 14).

[6] The substance of the animal organism is also flesh (Gen. ii. 19), only different in kind from that of the human organism (1 Cor. xv. 39). In this sense Paul speaks of the fleshly tables of the heart as a bodily organ (2 Cor. iii. 3), and of circumcision as being accomplished in the flesh (Gal. vi. 12, 13; Rom. ii. 28; cf. Col. ii. 13; Eph. ii. 11). Since bodily sickness affects primarily the material substance of the bodily organism, he speaks of the *ἀσθένεια τῆς σαρκός* (Gal. iv. 13, 14), of the *σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί* (2 Cor. xii. 7), of the *ὄλεθρος τῆς σαρκός* (1 Cor. v. 5). The mortality of the *σῶμα* (Rom. viii. 11) is owing to the circumstance that the *σάρξ* is mortal (2 Cor. iv. 11, where *ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν* resumes the *ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν* of ver. 10), the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* (Col. i. 22), or the *σάρξ* itself (Eph. ii. 15), suffers death. The life of the body is nourished by homogeneous substances (*τὰ σαρκικά*) being added to its material substance (1 Cor. ix. 11; Rom. xv. 27); loving the body forms the antithesis of hating the flesh (Eph. v. 28, 29). The flesh constitutes that in man which is perceptible to the outward senses (Col. ii. 1, 5; cf. John viii. 15); it is only in this earthly life, however, that it forms the substance of the bodily organism; hence *ἐν σαρκὶ ζῆν* (Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. x. 3; cf. Phil. i. 22) stands where only the present corporeity is thought of. In all this there is nothing which deviates from the common New Testament idea of the *σάρξ* (cf. § 27, *a*).

[7] In Paul, also, just as in § 27, *b*, the soul is the bearer of the bodily life. It is it that is aimed at when one seeks to kill a man (Rom. xi. 3, after 1 Kings xix. 10); it is threatened by death (Rom. xvi. 4; cf. Phil. ii. 30); it is it that

evidently conceived of as being also begotten.[8] If, therefore, the sin which has become, through Adam's transgression, the dominating power, first of all in himself, has passed over to all his descendants, it can have done so with the σάρξ, only because it had its seat in the σάρξ and the ψυχή, or because man's σάρξ, which is possessed of a soul, was one which was dominated and corrupted by it. In fact, however, it is said in Rom. vii. 18 that in the (empirical) σάρξ there dwelleth no good thing; and since this statement is meant to assign the reason why Paul traces back that contradictory doing of that which is evil on the part of the man, who wills that which is good, to the sin which dwells in him (vv. 15–17, for which see § 66, *c*), it is thereby indirectly stated that this sin, which dwells in him, is that very evil which dwells in his flesh. And if, according to 1 Cor. ii. 14, the psychical man is as unsusceptible to the Spirit of God as, according to Rom. vii. 14, the carnal man is, nay, if, according to the connection with 1 Cor. iii. 1–3, ψυχικός is there also merely a synonym for σαρκικός, it is clear that, according to Paul, sin has its seat in the flesh, which is possessed of a soul, and is transmitted from Adam to his descendants along with this flesh which is corrupted by it.[9] How this, however, is to be understood, can only appear from a more particular consideration of the Pauline anthropology, so far as it is peculiarly developed from the Old Testament primitive-Christian basis.

one sacrifices with one's life (1 Thess. ii. 8); hence it is upon it that Paul calls the Lord of life and death as a witness (2 Cor. i. 23). Exactly in the same manner as in § 27, it forms the central point of the life of the individual (cf. the Old Testament בְּלֹ־נַפְשׁ, Rom. ii. 9, xiii. 1, and the ἐκ ψυχῆς of Col. iii. 23, Eph. vi. 6), so that one delivers oneself up for the soul (the ego) of others (2 Cor. xii. 15; cf. the μιᾷ ψυχῇ and σύμψυχοι of Phil. i. 27, ii. 2). Through it as the subject of every sensuous perception, the flesh, which is possessed of a soul, also becomes capable of feeling, and therefore of suffering (θλῖψις τῇ σαρκί, 1 Cor. vii. 28; cf. Col. i. 24).

[8] While the first man, who was formed out of the dust of the earth, became a ψυχὴ ζῶσα by the inbreathing of the divine breath of life (1 Cor. xv. 45, after Gen. ii. 7), every descendant of Adam becomes a living soul by procreation; for the earthly corporeity, with which each one is born, is one that is formed out of a substance of flesh (cf. 2 Cor. iii. 3), as well as one whose nature is determined from the very first by the ψυχή (σῶμα ψυχικόν, 1 Cor. xv. 44). As the same flesh and blood, so also, so to speak, the same soul essence is propagated through the human race.

[9] Just as little as the σῶμα ψυχικόν of 1 Cor. xv. 44 can be a body "which

## § 68. *The Pauline Anthropology.*

Cf. Tholuck, "über σάρξ als Quelle der Sünde" (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1855, 3); Krumm, *de notionibus psychologicis paulinis*, 1858; Holsten, *die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im Lehrbegriff des Paulus*, 1855 (reprinted in Holsten, *zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, iv.; Rostock 1868); H. Lüdemann, *die Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus*, Kiel 1872; Ecklund, *σάρξ voc. quid apud P. Ap. significet*, Lundae 1872.

Paul has neither thought of the material substance of the body as being evil in itself, nor of sensuality as the principle of all sin. (*b*) By flesh he rather denotes man according to his natural being, in so far as it is originally specifically distinguished from God, and made hostile to Him by the sin which dwells in it. (*c*) Paul knows also of a side of man which is godlike; but in opposition to the power of sin in the flesh this remains powerless, and is unable to determine man's practical behaviour. (*d*) Because, on this account, this better ego of man never asserts itself externally, Paul calls it the inner man as distinguished from the dominion of sin, which alone manifests itself in the body and its members.

(*a*) It has recently been frequently asserted that the Pauline anthropology has altogether forsaken the soil of the Old Testament view, and has passed over to the dualistic view of the world of Hellenistic philosophy. It is true that if Baur ascribes to the apostle the opinion that the material body, with the appetites and faculties that dwell in it, forms the real substantial being of man, which as such could only be opposed to the divine (p. 143 f.), Holsten has avoided this evident confusion of σῶμα and σάρξ, and describes the σάρξ (which is possessed of a soul) as the living material substance of man, which stands in an absolute antithesis to God, and is the principle of all evil (p. 396, 398). Since this, however, is plainly at variance with the fact that the coming in of sin into humanity is traced back to the trans-

envelopes an earthly ψυχή" (Wendt, p. 130), since, when this σῶμα σπείρεται, *i.e.* is placed in the grave, the soul has already severed itself from the body, so little is the ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος of ii. 14 a man "who possesses in his ψυχή merely the organ of purely human knowledge" (p. 128), for the πνεῦμα in the antithesis does not denote the "organ of religious knowledge," but the divine principle of revelation, whose activity is hindered by the condition of man which is determined by his ψυχή.

gression of Adam (§ 67, *b*), Pfleiderer has assumed that this dualistic view, according to which the material σάρξ is itself an anti-spiritual causality and the principle of sin, which is therefore derived from the nature of man, and more particularly from the material of his corporeity, is held by Paul along with the other, which traces it back to the sin of Adam (p. 46, 61 f. [E. Tr. i. 46, 60 ff.]; cf. Lipsius, p. 334).[1] But apart from the improbability of such an unsolved antinomy in Paul, this opinion is already refuted by the fact that (as Pfleiderer himself allows, p. 48 [E. Tr. i. 48]), according to Rom. vii. 18, the flesh is not itself sin, *i.e.* in Paul, who always thinks of sin as an operative power, the principle of sin; but sin only dwells in it. If sin, however, is rooted in the material substance of the body, inasmuch as the nature of the flesh is evil in itself, then, previous to the transformation of this its substantial basis (1 Cor. xv. 44), the body could not belong to the Lord (vi. 13, 15), be God's temple (ver. 19), be a sacrifice well-pleasing to God (Rom. xii. 1), or serve righteousness with its members (vi. 13, 19), as Wendt (p. 109) has conclusively shown.[2] Stripped of its philosophical form, this view would only amount to this, that the σάρξ is the sensuous nature (Usteri, p. 410; cf. Dähne, p. 64), *i.e.* the totality of the appetites which are rooted in the bodily organism or in its material substance. If, now, the

[1] In another way Lüdemann assumes in Paul two radically different lines of thought, which move upon contrary anthropological bases. Expression is given to the first of these in Rom. i.–iv., and to the second in Rom. v.–viii., the latter resting entirely upon the Hellenistic dualistic view, the former upon that of the Old Testament. But (according to Lüdemann, p. 206) these two lines of thought are found in Paul, only because, in chaps. i.–iv., "he purposely places himself upon the standpoint of the Jewish-legal consciousness." Although, on the other hand, Biedermann also regards sin as a necessary outcome of the fleshly nature, which was from the beginning implanted by God in man, in its resistance to the influence of his spirit, he sees therein no dualism, but only a moment employed by the decree of God for the purpose of revealing His love as pure grace (p. 200); and he is so far from finding therein a contradiction with the narrative of the fall, that he sees the genesis of sin represented in accordance with it even in Rom. vii. 7, refusing, indeed, to entertain any thought of an original sin.

[2] On this account Holsten has been at last obliged to come to the conclusion that 2 Cor. vii. 1 is un-Pauline (p. 387). If the σάρξ is, according to its nature, the principle and source of every sinful defilement, it cannot, of course, be the object of such defilement; and since Paul undoubtedly speaks of a defilement of the flesh, the σάρξ is not conceived of as being sinful in itself.

flesh, as such, is a principle which is opposed to God, these are sinful in themselves, and the sanctification of the body could consist only in the mortification of all sensuous appetites and impulses, in which, however, it does not, as a matter of fact, consist according to Paul. At the most, therefore, sin could dwell in the material σάρξ, only in so far as the preponderance of the sensuous appetites and impulses over the spiritual nature of man, which ought to have the supremacy, is the ground-form and principle of all sin. In reality it is to this that R. Schmidt comes, when, holding firmly by the physical meaning of σάρξ, he ultimately declares that the materiality of the human nature is the source and ground of every individual sinful action, not in itself, but only in so far as, in its present condition, there belongs to it the significance of an operative principle of life (p. 44). But even this cannot be made good in the case of Paul. Among the works of the flesh (Gal. v. 19–21) there are named by no means only such sins as owe their origin to the sensuous nature, but also sins of uncharitableness; the false προνοια τῆς σαρκός begets not only revelling and unchastity, but also strife and jealousy (Rom. xiii. 13, 14), and in Gal. v. 13 love forms the antithesis of the licentious freedom of the flesh. Because of their jealousy and strife the Corinthians are σαρκικοί (1 Cor. iii. 3). Not only a φρόνημα (Rom. viii. 7), but even the restlessness of a fear and an anxiety, which was by no means of a sensuous nature (2 Cor. vii. 5), is attributed to the σάρξ, and 2 Cor. i. 12 speaks of a σοφία σαρκική (cf. 1 Cor. i. 26; 2 Cor. i. 17).[3] If it follows from

[3] To this R. Schmidt (p. 25) replies that it is not necessarily logically implied in a view which finds the empirical ground of sin in general in the material corporeity, that it must be possible to trace back every individual sin with the same directness to this ground (cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 55 [E. Tr. i. 54 f.]). But here purely spiritual sins are *directly* traced back to the σάρξ, and are expressly called works of the flesh. As Schmidt (p. 23 f.) has been altogether unsuccessful in explaining the idea of a σοφία σαρκική from his presuppositions, so Pfleiderer (p. 52 [E. Tr. i. 52]) evidently explains it in a manner which is contrary to the sense of the words, understanding by it a wisdom which keeps to the outside, to the surface of sensuous appearance (cf. on the other hand, Wendt, p. 168 f.). If "the natural will that is directed towards the finite natural life of the individual, as it shows itself sometimes as sensual, *sometimes as selfish*," is the principle of all sin (Pfleiderer p. 56 [E. Tr. i. 56]), then the σάρξ, conceived of as the animated material of the body, cannot be any longer itself the objective principle of sin (p. 59 [E. Tr. i. 59]); for it will contradict not only "modern

this that the idea of the σάρξ, where it is conceived of as the seat of sin, is by no means resolved into that of sensuousness, then it is altogether out of keeping also with the Pauline view of sin, to see in sensuality the principle of all sin. He to whom the essence of moral renewal consists in man's ceasing to live unto himself (2 Cor. v. 15; Rom. xiv. 7), and to whom the highest form in which sin appears is the sin which consists in the pride of blasphemous arrogance (2 Thess. ii. 4, for which see § 63, *c*), cannot have sought the real essence of sin in sensuality.

(*b*) In order that we may correctly understand the sense in which Paul describes the σάρξ of (living) man as the seat of sin, we must above all remember that, when it is so spoken of, it is thought of in perfect unity with the ψυχή (cf. § 67, *d*), and that therefore its materiality, as such, cannot come into account at all here; for in the ψυχή as the vital principle of the flesh (a vital principle which, according to § 27, *c*, endures even after its separation from the σάρξ, which has fallen a prey to death) there is already involved at least an immaterial element. It is also indubitable that, according to Gen. ii. 7 (1 Cor. xv. 45), this vital principle is conceived of as originally derived from God, and therefore not as standing in an *original* opposition to Him. But man is distinguished from God and the higher spiritual beings by this very fact that, in his case, the divine principle of life has entered into the flesh; his corporealness accordingly constitutes his specific characteristic in distinction from the divine nature, and therefore man, according to his natural being, can be described by σάρξ. Already in the Old Testament human nature in its specific distinction from the divine is frequently called flesh. Flesh forms the antithesis of God (Ps. lvi. 4; Jer. xvii. 5), of His word (Isa. xl. 6–8; Deut. v. 26), or Spirit (Isa. xxxi. 3; Job xxxiv. 14, 15).[4] Here that which constitutes this antithesis is

psychology," but also every natural view "to regard the animated matter of the body itself as the subject of this natural will" (p. 57 [E. Tr. i. 56]).

[4] The Old Testament כָּל־בָּשָׂר (§ 27, *a*) occurs also in Paul; but also only where human nature is to be put expressly in contrast with God, as in Gal. ii. 16, 1 Cor. i. 29, Rom. iii. 20, where the human striving after righteousness and glory is judged of from the standpoint of that which is righteous and praiseworthy before God. Similarly σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα (cf. § 67, *d*) in Gal. i. 16 excludes the conferring with men instead of with God, from whom, according to ver. 15, the

neither the finitude and perishableness nor the weakness and vanity of human nature, but primarily its natural basis which is given in the flesh. In many passages where flesh in the literal sense is undoubtedly spoken of, this contrast dominates the expression. Thus in Rom. ix. 8 the *τέκνα τῆς σαρκός* are children begotten according to the flesh, in contrast, however, with those who are begotten, not on the ground of the order of nature, but in virtue of the divine promise (cf. Gal. iv. 23, 29); so in Rom. i. 3, ix. 5 *κατὰ σάρκα* denotes the bodily descent of Christ, but in contrast with His higher nature, which does not depend upon this descent; so in 1 Cor. x. 18 the *Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα* stands in contrast with the *Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which is not constituted by bodily descent (Gal. vi. 16); so in Gal. ii. 20 (cf. Phil. i. 22) the *ζῆν ἐν σαρκί* stands in contrast with a higher life, which is of divine origin. Since this latter, however, is expressly described as a living of Christ in him, the original meaning of *σάρξ* already passes over here altogether into the designation of that which is characteristic of the earthly man as such. And so it comes about that flesh is the expression for the natural human being in its specific distinction from God, even where there is no allusion to the original physical meaning of the word.[5] That the fleshly,

revelation of His Son had come to the apostle (cf. Matt. xvi. 17; see § 27, *b*). It is quite true that the formula *πᾶσα σάρξ* denotes man in the concrete and not the abstraction human nature (R. Schmidt, p. 18); but man is described according to this side of his being, only because it is in it that there lies his specific distinction from the divine nature. I also regard it as incorrect to speak of different "meanings" of the word *σάρξ* in Paul; but since (§ 67, *d*), even in Paul, *σάρξ* often denotes *only* the material substratum of the *σῶμα*, the use of the word in the sense considered above can only be described as a peculiar "amplification" of the term. I purposely avoid, however, making it refer to the "nature of man as a creature," which Wendt prefers, because this nature belongs also to the higher spiritual beings, who are not *σάρξ*.

[5] No doubt the *καυχᾶσθαι κατὰ σάρκα* of 2 Cor. xi. 18 includes the pride of the Jews in their genuine Israelitish descent (ver. 22); but it also refers to all the advantages which man has acquired in a natural way (ver. 23; cf. Phil. iii. 3 ff.). In 2 Cor. v. 16 the *εἰδέναι κατὰ σάρκα* denotes the knowing of man according to what he is by nature, in contrast with his divinely-produced new life in Christ, even where there is no thought whatever of bodily descent or condition. In Rom. iv. 1 and Gal. iii. 3 the *κατὰ σάρκα* and *σαρκί* denote exclusively that which is attained by natural human activity, in contrast with that which is produced by the grace or the Spirit of God; and in 2 Cor. x. 3, 4 they denote the striving with merely human weapons instead of with the divine powers, by means of which alone man attains the victory. In this sense a *σοφία σαρκικὴ* can be spoken

however, simply denotes the naturally human as such, appears most clearly from 1 Cor. iii. 3, where the σαρκικὸν εἶναι is first more particularly defined by κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν, and then, in ver. 4, its place is even taken by ἄνθρωπον εἶναι (read ἄνθρωποί ἐστε; cf. Rom. vi. 19, where σάρξ and ἀνθρώπινον are likewise synonymous terms). This turn which is given to the idea of σάρξ, in which there is no reflection at all upon the original physical sense of the word, is thoroughly characteristic of Paulinism. It is certainly altogether wrong to say on this account, that, in the technical sense of the Pauline system, σάρξ is human nature in its state of estrangement from the divine life (Neander, p. 664 [E. Tr. i. 422]), or the sinful propensity in general (Schmid, ii. p. 269 [E. Tr. p. 448]). The σάρξ in this sense is as little sinful in itself as the σάρξ in the physical sense (note *a*). For that, in consequence of his natural basis, man lives, with consciousness and free self-determination, a life which is in a peculiar manner relatively independent, and suited to his earthly circumstances and needs, can only be the will of God, who made man a living soul (Gen. ii. 7), and therewith implanted in him the principle of individuality (§ 67, *d*, footnote 7). If, now, according to the Pauline view, sin dwells in this σάρξ, this can only mean that the idiosyncrasy of the human nature, which is the consequence of man's natural basis, has become and becomes an occasion to him to assert this individuality of his in opposition to the divine will, and so to determine himself in a manner contrary to God. This has happened first of all in the transgression of Adam, and if, through him, sin has entered into the whole human world, there has certainly thereby taken place a radical change of the nature of the σάρξ, as transmitted by him to all his descendents (§ 67, *b*, *c*).[6] Now, in consequence of the fact that from Adam onwards sin dwells and reigns in it, the σάρξ of empirical humanity[7] has

of (2 Cor. i. 12, 17; cf. 1 Cor. i. 26) in contrast with divine grace. As contrasted in the same manner with the power and the Spirit of God this wisdom is called σοφία ἀνθρώπων or ἀνθρωπίνη (1 Cor. ii. 5, 13, cf. footnote 3).

[6] When Pfleiderer (p. 61 [E. Tr. i. 61]) can find nothing at all of this in Paul, the only reason is that he refuses to carry out the obvious combination between Rom. v. 12 and the Pauline statements regarding the σάρξ, and rather allows such a sharp dialectician to be satisfied with an unsolved antinomy.

[7] To this Schmidt (p. 16) objects that the quite general character of such

become sinful, *i.e.* the original distinctiveness and relative independence of the natural human being in relation to the divine have been perverted into a self-willed opposition. Now, man τῇ σαρκί serves the law of sin (vii. 25); and if the law of God is unable to work its own fulfilment (viii. 3), the reason is that in this respect it was weak through the flesh (ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός), by whose resistance, led as it was by the power of sin which dominates it, the strength of the law was broken. For since sin is the God-opposing principle, the σάρξ which is dominated by it cannot subject itself to the law of God, and because it cannot do so, the object of its endeavours (τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός) must be that which is hostile to God (in contrast with that which is well-pleasing to Him, and which forms the import of the law, viii. 7: ἐχθρὰ εἰς Θεόν). Accordingly, they that are in the flesh, and are therefore under the dominion of sin, cannot please God (vii. 5, viii. 8); the ζῆν (or περιπατεῖν, 2 Cor. x. 2; Rom. viii. 4) κατὰ σάρκα must rather bring death (viii. 12, 13). The works of the σάρξ are sinful (Gal. v. 19; cf. ver. 13); it stands in positive opposition to the divine πνεῦμα (Gal. v. 17, vi. 8). Wherever his naturalness still constitutes the whole being of man, so that he is σάρκινος (and therefore sold under the sin which rules in the σάρξ), he stands in unsolvable contradiction with the spiritual law of God (Rom. vii. 14), and is unsusceptible to the spiritual as such (1 Cor. iii. 1, read σαρκίνοις).[8]

formulæ (without the article) as κατὰ σάρκα περιπ., ἐν σαρ. εἶναι, which in themselves already imply moral blame, excludes such a modification, and that therefore (if our conception of the idea is correct) they would denote human nature in general, and not a human nature which is modified so or so. This objection, however, loses all its significance, as soon as we remember that Paul does not philosophize over σάρξ and ἁμαρτία in themselves, but discusses, in its ultimate grounds, the fact of the dominion of sin within empirical humanity. This dominion being really a matter of fact, there is only one σάρξ which is dominated and corrupted by sin, and Paul can therefore very easily speak of the nature of σάρξ in general, and yet be thinking all the time only of the σάρξ as it is constituted in empirical humanity. But because he does this, I cannot accept the distinction of Wendt. According to him, the Pauline σάρξ is, on account of its creaturely weakness, incapable of knowing the divine and of fulfilling the law, but errs and sins, only if it attempts to know the divine and to fulfil the will of God with its own strength (p. 200 f.). This view seems to me to obtrude upon the apostle reflections which are foreign to him, and in many ways to forsake the right point of view.

[8] Against this view of the Pauline doctrine of σάρξ Pfleiderer (p. 57 f. [E. Tr.

(*c*) If the apostle, speaking in Rom. vii. 18 of the seat of sin in his ego, defines this seat expressly as the σάρξ, then there must also be in this ego a certain antithesis to the σάρξ; and in ver. 25 it becomes perfectly clear that there is still another side of the human being, which, as essentially related to God, is from the first distinguished from that fleshly nature, and is therefore not the domain of sin in the same sense as that. Now, since it is only in the flesh as possessed of a soul (note *b*) that Paul sees the specific nature of man as distinguished from the divine, to which it has entered into a hostile antithesis through the dominion of sin in it, he cannot think of the ψυχή (which, according to § 67, *d*, is, in empirical humanity, no longer a direct breath from God, but is propagated in its sinful corruption by means of procreation, and is therefore completely entangled in this antithesis; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 14) as the bearer of this higher godlike life, and this is the reason why ψυχή *nowhere* occurs in him in this the sense which is common to all the other writers of the New Testament (§ 27, *c*). But neither could he use the term πνεῦμα for it; for in the Old Testament sense, according to which the πνεῦμα, as the spirit of life from God, made man a living soul, the πνεῦμα is really nothing else than the ψυχή.[9] In the sense, however, in which, in Paul, *and first in him*

i. 57 f.]) has only objected that in that case it would be impossible in Rom. vii. 18 to distinguish between the ego and the flesh, although this passage is discussed in detail in note *c* in substantial agreement with his own excellent exposition (p. 63 f.), and that those passages would also remain unexplained, in which the σάρξ is connected with the σῶμα and the μέλη. These passages, however, are all discussed thoroughly in note *d*; and here already it appears that, according to our view, the flesh in the narrower sense always remains the basis of the flesh in the wider sense. When it is denied that sin has its seat in the σάρξ as the material substance of the corporeal nature, because the statements regarding this subject demand a wider meaning, it is by no means denied that, after it has once entered into the whole natural human being, it dwells also in the body, which with its members is an essential part of that being.

[9] Naturally this sense also is not foreign to the apostle. It is because of it that human nature can be described in a popular manner as the synthesis of flesh and spirit (Mark xiv. 38) or of body and soul (Matt. x. 28). Paul adopts this popular *usus loquendi* (which Wendt, p. 121, is certainly wrong in declaring to be peculiar to him; cf. § 27, *c*), when he contrasts his presence in the spirit with his absence in the body in 1 Cor. v. 3, as with his absence in the flesh in Col. ii. 5. In all the other passages, which are usually cited for this use of the term, their religious reference compels us to think of the new spiritual life of Christians (§ 86, *b*). It is different with 1 Cor. ii. 11. Here Paul illustrates

(cf. § 62, *d*), the Spirit from God or the Holy Spirit is the principle of a new holy life in the Christian, it is self-evident that the natural man cannot possess the *πνεῦμα*; and it is in this sense alone that Paul speaks of the *πνεῦμα*, when he speaks didactically. As that amplification of the idea of the animated *σάρξ* is conditioned by his deepening of the doctrine of sin, which he follows up to its ultimate sources and describes in its whole power over the natural man, whom it makes absolutely incapable of doing that which is good, so this narrowing of the idea of the *πνεῦμα* is conditioned by his more precise conception of the doctrine of the divine origin of the new moral life in man, for which he must reserve the term *πνεῦμα* in the specific sense. And inasmuch as the former doctrine is only the necessary complement of the latter, it is evident that it is his doctrine of salvation, with its antithesis of sin and grace followed up to its ultimate grounds, that has called forth in Paul this peculiar remodelling of the anthropology of the New Testament. In vii. 25, accordingly, Paul describes the other side of the natural man, which is opposed to the *σάρξ*, as the *νοῦς*.[10] In the Gentiles this *νοῦς* is the organ of the knowledge of good and evil, a knowledge which is lost only when the *νοῦς* is corrupted (Rom. i. 28; cf. Eph. iv. 17), as well as the organ by means of which they know God in consequence of His creation (ver. 20); it is its *νοήματα* that

the fact that the Spirit of God knows the deep things of God (with all the decrees of salvation which are hidden in them), and is therefore able to reveal them, by stating that no man knows the nature of man (with all that is hidden in its depths) except the spirit which is in him. Here, therefore, where that comparison made it necessary to use the term *πνεῦμα*, the spirit is the principle of human self-consciousness, and as such has no direct connection whatever with the distinction between a side of the natural man which is related to God and another which is alienated from Him. How far it is from following from this passage that all spiritual life in man is as such already conceived of also as the higher, godlike side of his being, appears most clearly from the fact that, in this very connection, the *ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός*, who has at least a self-consciousness, and therefore also a *πνεῦμα* in this sense, is described as incapable of receiving that which comes from the Spirit of God (ver. 14).

[10] This term never stands as a synonym for *πνεῦμα*, for the peculiar expression in 1 Cor. ii. 16 (*νοῦς Χριστοῦ*) is simply determined by the language of the preceding quotation (Isa. xl. 13; cf. Rom. xi. 34). Nay, in 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15 (cf. ver. 19) the *νοῦς* even appears expressly contrasted with the *πνεῦμα* of the Christian. Here also it would be well, when considering the meaning of the term *νοῦς*, to look away, in the first instance, from those passages where it is the *νοῦς* in the believer that is spoken of (cf. § 86, *b*).

can also be opened to the knowledge of the Gospel or shut against it (2 Cor. iii. 14, iv. 4). The *νοῦς* is therefore, as contrasted with that which is bodily, unquestionably something spiritual in man, and that too, primarily, a theoretical faculty; but it is not spirit in the specific sense. As contrasted with his fleshly nature, it is a godlike element in man; for it knows the divine and the good, and, by the tribute of delight which it must pay it, recognises it as its law (Rom. vii. 22, 23, 25); but it is not, like the *πνεῦμα* of the Christians, a holy divine power. This explains why it is that, when in conflict with the *σάρξ*, it remains absolutely powerless, so that it can be corrupted by the sin which dominates in the *σάρξ* (i. 28), and therefore likewise needs to be renewed (xii. 2). To this Pauline term there would answer best of all our "consciousness" (sometimes even "sense"), in so far as it is conceived of not merely as a theoretical faculty, but is also capable of a practical though ineffectual impulse. In this consciousness man knows God, and feels himself bound to do His will (*δουλεύει νόμῳ Θεοῦ*, Rom. vii. 25); but now that, in consequence of sin, his natural being has once entered into a hostile opposition to God, this consciousness is no longer able to determine his behaviour, but is itself dimmed and perverted.[11]

(*d*) Seeing that in Paul, as well as in § 27, *d*, the heart is conceived of as the central organ in man, in which all spiritual life has its seat,[12] it is only in it that the *νοῦς* also can be

[11] The circumstance that in Rom. vii., where he expressly treats of the being of the natural man, Paul purposely avoids using the expression *πνεῦμα*, shows unmistakeably that he reserves *πνεῦμα* in its (for him) specific sense (and therefore apart from the popular use of the term considered in footnote 9) for the nature of man as re-created in Christianity, and therefore that he does not distinguish between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* as the two sides of the natural man, although it is still attempted to prove this by means of passages which relate only to Christians (cf. Reuss, ii. p. 27 [E. Tr. ii. p. 23]; Beyschlag, p. 205; R. Schmidt, p. 29-31). This is also recognised by Pfleiderer, who energetically maintains the godlike nature of the *νοῦς* against Holsten (p. 62 [E. Tr. i. 62]); and when he still speaks also of a natural *πνεῦμα* as the subject of the human personal life (p. 66 ff. [E. Tr. i. 65 ff.]), whose relation to the *νοῦς* must then necessarily cause him difficulty, this is in consequence of his making a number of passages (besides those considered in footnote 9) refer to the natural man, which speak only (cf. § 86, *b*, footnote 4) of the new spiritual life of the Christian (not, of course, of the objective Spirit of God in the Christian).

[12] The heart is conceived of primarily as a bodily organ of flesh in the physical sense (2 Cor. iii. 3), as a part of the *σπλάγχνα* (2 Cor. vi. 12, vii. 15; cf.

found. According to Rom. i. 21, the heart is the seat of the original knowledge of God which is obtained by means of the νοῦς (ver. 20); according to ii. 15, it is the seat of the original moral consciousness which is likewise obtained in the same way. The connection of 2 Cor. iii. 14, 15 (cf. Phil. iv. 7), moreover, shows clearly that the νοήματα of the νοῦς themselves have their seat in the heart. Now, however, everything which has its seat in this inner man is, from the nature of the case, hidden.[13] Thus there arises the idea of the inner, and therefore hidden man, and of the outer and visible man, an idea which there is therefore no need whatever to explain by means of contemporary philosophical notions. The manner in which Paul (Rom. vii. 22, 23) identifies the νοῦς and the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is peculiar, and in keeping with the fact that the former has its seat in the heart (cf. Eph. iii. 16, 17). This seems to favour the view that the σάρξ, which is opposed to the νοῦς in vii. 25, belongs altogether to the outward bodily life. But since even the (fleshly) lusts dwell in the heart (footnote 12), and therefore, in this respect, belong likewise to the inward man, while, conversely, the heart is primarily a

Col. iii. 12; Philem. 7, 12, 20; Phil. i. 8, ii. 1). It is the seat of all emotions and feelings, of sadness and anxiety (2 Cor. ii. 4; Rom. ix. 2; cf. 2 Thess. ii. 17), as well as of delight and joy (Rom. x. 1; Acts xiv. 7), of peace and consolation (Col. ii. 2, iii. 15, iv. 8; Eph. vi. 22; Phil. iv. 7), and above all, of love (2 Cor. vi. 11, vii. 3; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 17; 2 Thess. iii. 5; Phil. i. 7). To the heart belong also the determinations of the will (1 Cor. iv. 5: βουλαὶ τῶν καρδιῶν; vii. 37: κέκρικεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ; cf. 2 Cor. ix. 7). It is in the heart that zeal for that which is good has its seat (2 Cor. viii. 16); temptation addresses itself to the heart (Rom. xvi. 18); the heart needs strengthening in holiness (1 Thess. iii. 13); penitence and impenitence are traced back to the καρδία (Rom. ii. 5, 9). The heart is also the seat of consciousness (2 Cor. iii. 2), of thought (Rom. x. 6, 8: εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ; cf. Col. iii. 16; Eph. v. 19), and of knowledge (1 Cor. ii. 9; cf. Eph. i. 18, iv. 18). It appears already from this that καρδία may have the most varied import. On the one hand, the heart is the seat of the fleshly lusts (Rom. i. 24); on the other, it is into the heart that the Spirit is shed (Gal. iv. 6; 2 Cor. i. 22, iii. 3; Rom. v. 5); it is in the heart that Christian enlightenment takes place (2 Cor. iv. 6); it is in it that faith dwells (Rom. x. 9, 10; cf. Eph. iii. 17).

[13] That which is in the heart of man is the genuinely true (Rom. vi. 17: ὑπακούειν ἐκ καρδίας), in contrast with every pretended (2 Cor. v. 12: προσώπῳ . . . καρδίᾳ) or constrained (2 Cor. ix. 7: μὴ ἐκ λύπης ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) appearance (cf. Col. iii. 22; Eph. vi. 5); on that account, however, it is also that which is concealed from man (1 Cor. xiv. 25: τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας; cf. iv. 5 and Rom. ii. 29, where περιτομὴ καρδίας stands parallel with ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος), and known only to God, the searcher of hearts (Rom. viii. 27; 1 Thess. ii. 4; cf. § 62, *a*).

bodily organ, the ideas, outer and bodily, or inward and spiritual, by no means answer to one another. The ground of that identification must therefore be a different one. Since, viz., the *νοῦς* is, according to note *c*, powerless in opposition to the *σάρξ*, and is always overcome by the sin which dwells in the latter, the better ego of man which is hidden in the *νοῦς* never comes to the light. That which manifests itself is always only the dominion of sin which determines the whole life of man which is outwardly visible. The organs, however, by means of which that which is in man becomes outwardly visible, are the members of the body. While, therefore, the conflict of the *νοῦς* against sin remains altogether confined to the inward man, the dominating power of sin becomes visible in the members (Rom. vii. 23: *βλέπω ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου*), when the *παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* (vii. 5) are operative in them, and they therefore enter into the service of sin (vi. 13). Therefore the *σῶμα* always appears as a body which is ruled by sin (Rom. vi. 6: *σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*;[14] cf. vii. 24), and the lusts of the body are sinful, inasmuch, viz., as sin rules in it and corrupts the natural appetites (vi. 12, viii. 13). It is expressions of this kind that have given support to the erroneous opinion that Paul conceives of sin as dwelling in the body and its members, whereas it is only the dominion of sin which manifests itself in them, because the *νοῦς*, in which, according to note *c*, there lies the only reaction against this dominion, belongs altogether to the inward hidden life of man, and because of its powerlessness never determines his outer life in a manner which comes into visibility (cf. Wendt, p. 209 f.). Sin can make the *νοῦς* powerless, and thereby confine it to the sphere of the hidden inward life,

[14] This is the only relation which the genitive can express, viz. that the body belongs to the sin which dominates it in man's natural condition. For, in Paul, *ἁμαρτία* does not denote the quality of sinfulness, but the power of sin as an operative principle (cf. § 66, *c*), and therefore the genitive cannot be a *gen. qualitatis*, any more than in the quite parallel *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου τούτου* (vii. 24). So *ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* (2 Thess. ii. 3) is not the sinful man, but the man who has altogether fallen a prey to sin, the man in whom it has reached its highest development (§ 63, *c*). On this account the *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας* of Rom. viii. 3 cannot denote a *σάρξ* whose nature is sinful (cf. even Schmidt, p. 101), but a *σάρξ* which is dwelt in and dominated by sin, such as Paul assumes it to be according to note *b*. Hence the sinful passions are called in Rom. vii. 5, not *παθήματα ἁμαρτίας*, but *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*.

whereas it positively dominates the σάρξ, and incites it to a godless behaviour, which becomes visible through the organs of the body.[15]

## CHAPTER III.

### HEATHENDOM AND JUDAISM.

### § 69. *The Apostasy of Heathendom.*

The Gentiles have originally had a knowledge of God, which rests upon His revelation in nature, and likewise a consciousness of the divine demand and the culpability of its transgression, so that they are with justice exposed to divine retribution. (*b*) This original knowledge of the truth, however, has been lost to heathendom, because it has practically turned away from God. (*c*) The consequence of this was an imaginary wisdom, which is, nevertheless, foolishness before God, and which culminated in the punishable sin of idolatry or the deification of the creature. (*d*) The further consequence was an unlimited self-surrender to the natural lusts, a self-surrender which culminated in the unnatural sensual vices and the complete blunting of the moral consciousness.

(*a*) It is characteristic of the apostle Paul not merely to regard such questions as that relating to the origin and extent of universal sinfulness from the anthropological point of view, and to discuss them in theoretical generality, but also to look at them from the concrete religious-historical point of view. Such being the case, however, he had to enter more particularly into the great religious-historical antithesis, which divided the pre-Christian world, and to him as the apostle to the Gentiles

[15] The contrast appears somewhat different in 2 Cor. iv. 16. The outward man is the body, which, on account of its substantial basis, the ὑπὸν σάρξ (ver. 11), is gradually decaying (διαφθείρεται) in consequence of the troubles of the earthly life, while the inward man is renewed day by day. Here it is plainly the inward life of the Christian as a Christian which is meant; and this is naturally not identical with the inward life of the natural man. But from the fact that the ἔσω (or rather ἔσωθεν) ἄνθρωπος is not identical here with the νοῦς, it does not really follow that this is not the case also in Rom. vii., as Schmidt (p. 39) maintains.

the question was specially natural: how has heathendom come into the irremediable condition in which it is actually found? Although it was self-evident to the Jewish consciousness that the Gentiles, or as Paul, following the leading representatives of heathendom, often calls them, the Greeks (Gal. iii. 28; 1 Cor. i. 22–24, x. 32, xii. 13; Rom. i. 16, ii. 9, 10, iii. 9, x. 12), are sinners (cf. Gal. ii. 15), and destitute of righteousness, yet the question may arise, whether they are not at least excusable (Rom. i. 20) and therefore free from punishment? If the Gentiles do not know God (Gal. iv. 8; cf. 1 Thess. iv. 5), then it seems as if the fulfilment of the divine will could not be demanded of them. Still we saw in § 64, *b* that the judgment of God falls upon those who do not know Him (2 Thess. i. 8). Paul, viz., starts from the assumption that the Gentiles have originally had the knowledge of God (Rom. i. 21: *γνόντες τὸν Θεόν*), and that, too, in consequence of a revelation of Him, which has manifested unto them that which was knowable by them (*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*), that which they from their own standpoint should have known of His nature (ver. 19).[1] God had therefore done His part to lead them to the knowledge of Him, so that they might be without excuse if they, nevertheless, did not attain to it (ver. 20). It is true the Gentiles had not also the positive Mosaic law; in this sense they are *ἄνομοι* (1 Cor. ix. 21), they sin *ἀνόμως* (Rom. ii. 12). But the very fact that they have, nevertheless, individual virtues, through which they, from natural inclination (*φύσει*), and without the impulse of a positive law, fulfil individual requirements of this law (cf. ii. 26, 27), shows that they are a law unto themselves (ver. 14),

[1] Ever since the creation of the world He has manifested unto them by His works His eternal power and the fulness of His divine attributes (*θειότης*, Rom. i. 20). He has borne witness of Himself to them by His good deeds, in that He gave them from heaven rain and fruitful seasons, and filled their hearts with food and gladness (Acts xiv. 17), and distributed the nations over the earth, and gave them firmly appointed bounds of time and space for their dominion (xvii. 26). In doing this, no doubt, their ill-doing was taken into account. Through their wisdom they should have known God in His wisdom (1 Cor. i. 21), they should have sought Him, who cannot, of course, be felt after and therefore found by means of the senses (Acts xvii. 27); and the organ which was given them for that purpose was the *νοῦς* (Rom. i. 20: *νοούμενα*; cf. § 68, *c*), by means of which the invisible attributes of God (*τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ*) could be perceived spiritually (*καθορᾶται*).

and that the work which is commanded by the positive law is written in their heart as a work which is demanded by God. This is the moral consciousness which is originally implanted in men; its presence is testified to by the conscience (*conscientia consequens*), which teaches them to judge, according to it, of the character of their own and other men's actions (ver. 15). The Gentiles, however, have also the consciousness that they that do *τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα* are worthy of death, and are therefore liable to punishment (i. 32). When he says this, Paul may possibly be thinking of the myths of the Gentiles regarding Hades, or of the judgments in which God revealed even to them His wrath against sin (i. 18). Accordingly, the fundamental law of divine retribution applies to them as well as to the Jews (ii. 9, 10). By patience in well-doing they also could strive after glory and honour before God, and consequently after incorruption, and thus attain eternal life (ver. 7); but they could also, by disobedience to the truth which had been revealed to them, obey unrighteousness (ver. 8), and, in consequence of this, could be delivered up by the wrath of God to destruction, even without the rule of the positive law (*ἀνόμως*: ii. 12; cf. § 66, *d*).

(*b*) The Gentiles have not cherished the germ of truth which was given them in their original knowledge of God (cf. § 65, footnote 3); they did not count it worth the trouble to possess the knowledge of God (Rom. i. 28: *τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*); they have rather hindered it in its development (*κατέχειν*), and the hindrance, by means of which that knowledge of the truth was, as it were, smothered, was their (practical) godlessness and unrighteousness (ver. 18). How Paul conceives of this appears plainly from ver. 21. They have neither glorified nor thanked God, so far as they knew Him in virtue of His original revelation. The *δοξάζειν* would have been the practical recognition of His *δύναμις* and *θειότης* (ver. 20), the *εὐχαριστεῖν* the practical recognition of His goodness and kindnesses (Acts xiv. 17). They have refused Him both, and this was the fall of heathendom. It is not in consequence of an intellectual error, but in consequence of a practical aberration, that they have lost their original knowledge of God.

(*c*) In consequence of this practical turning away from God the Gentiles have now lost the highest object of their thought, and have accordingly turned their thoughts to that which is vain and empty (Rom. i. 21: ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν; cf. the ματαιότης τοῦ νοός of Eph. iv. 17), until the organ (found, according to § 68, *d*, in the heart) for the knowledge of the divine, unaccustomed to its appointed activity, becomes at last incapable of it (ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία), and being thus deprived of the light of the truth is delivered up to darkness (Rom. i. 21: ἐσκοτίσθη; ii. 19: οἱ ἐν σκότει; 2 Cor. vi. 14; Eph. iv. 18, v. 8; 1 Thess. v. 4, 5). With this loss of the truth which is communicated by divine revelation there commences, it is true, a conceit in their self-devised wisdom (Rom. i. 22: φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί); but this self-conceit only stamps them as fools (ἐμωράνθησαν), since this wisdom is foolishness in the judgment of God (1 Cor. iii. 19). For the thoughts of this wisdom, which knows not God in His wisdom (i. 21; cf. ii. 8), are only vain (iii. 20, after Ps. xciv. 11), and God has known how to expose it in its foolishness and vanity (i. 20). The climax of the foolishness, however, into which heathendom thus fell is, idolatry. For there is no greater folly than for one to change the δόξα of the incorruptible God into a ὁμοίωμα of an image of a man or a beast (Rom. i. 23). Here, therefore, Paul is not thinking of the coarse fetichism which looks upon the idol itself as the deity; but he rightly infers from their idolatry that heathendom regards the deity as a being who is similar to that which is represented in the images of men or beasts, and who could therefore be represented by these[2] (Acts xvii. 29). Thereby, however, they have at least exchanged the correctly known true nature of God (cf.

[2] The more recent treatises regarding the Pauline idea of the ὁμοίωμα, which have been occasioned by Rom. viii. 3 (cf. Overbeck and Zeller in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1869, 2; 1870, 3), have not yet done full justice to this passage. As Zeller correctly shows (p. 302), a ὁμοίωμα is originally something which is similarly made, then a thing which is similar to another. Thus in Rom. v. 14 the sin, which it is said none previous to the law committed, is undoubtedly one which is similar to the παράβασις of Adam, in so far as, like that, it was to be thought of as a transgression of a positive commandment; so, in Rom. vi. 5, an occurrence which is similar to the death and resurrection of Christ is called their ὁμοίωμα. Here, however, the apostle cannot have been thinking that, although the Gentiles look upon these images as idols, they are still really nothing else than images of men and beasts (Overbeck, p. 206, 208); nor yet that they are not

§ 65, *b*, footnote 3) for one that passes for it in a lying manner, and passing by the Creator, they have worshipped a created being (Rom. i. 25), for it is only such a being that can find its ὁμοίωμα in these images. The inmost essence of heathenism is therefore the worship of nature, the deification of the creature; and this is not only folly, but also deep degradation. Such divine beings as it represents to itself (εἴδωλα: 1 Thess. i. 9) do not even exist (1 Cor. viii. 4, x. 19); they are at least not divine beings at all, but a lie (Rom. i. 25). In contrast with the true living God they are vanities (μάταια: Acts xiv. 15; cf. Jer. viii. 19), speechless idols that cannot give any answer when they are called upon; they cannot reveal themselves like the living God (1 Cor. xii. 2; cf. Hab. ii. 18). Accordingly, this folly of idolatry is a sin which is self-caused, and therefore punishable (v. 10, vi. 9).

(*d*) On the practical side, the consequence of that turning away from God (note *b*) was an ever deeper sinking into godlessness (Rom. i. 18; cf. iv. 5, v. 6), the fundamental disobedience (xi. 30) which no longer strives after righteousness (ix. 30), which imagines itself to be altogether emancipated from the law of God (2 Cor. vi. 14: ἀνομία), and walks in ἀδικία (1 Cor. vi. 1). If man, however, no longer knows any rule standing over him, he falls a prey to the natural appetites, to the lusts of the flesh (Rom. i. 24), which in this very emancipation of theirs from the divine will become sinful, and specially to unchastity and covetousness (1 Cor. v. 10), which are regarded here also as the cardinal vices of the Gentiles (cf. § 62, *a*). But even thereby man does not attain that which he hopes to attain; instead of gaining the imagined boundless freedom, he becomes a slave to his

images of definite men and beasts, but images fashioned in accordance with the type of the human or animal form (Zeller, p. 304). These ideas cannot have been present to the apostle's mind, because it was of no importance to characterize these images; that which was of importance was to characterise the idea of God, which was implied in their representing their gods in them, and for which they accordingly changed the idea of an incorruptible God and His δόξα. Now, however, the image is undoubtedly the ὁμοίωμα of that which is represented in the most literal sense, and therefore, conversely, that which is represented is also a ὁμοίωμα of the image. If, now, the idols are images of men and beasts, then the idea of the deity, which they express, must be such as to make the deity appear, like the men and beasts that are represented, a ὁμοίωμα of these images, and therefore similar to those men and beasts.

passions (*πάθη*: Rom. i. 26; cf. 1 Thess. iv. 5), which reduce him to a condition of utter passivity (§ 66, *c*). Paul regards the unnatural sensual vices as the culmination of the sensual life of the Gentiles (Rom. i. 24, 26, 27); in the age when heathenism was declining, these had really attained a horrible diffusion. This was, however, in fact a necessary development; not only because many immoral myths and rites of heathenism palliated and stirred up sensuality, but chiefly because it lies in the nature of sensual lust that, easily blunted by the usual means of enjoyment, it is always seeking for new stimulants, and thus finds an unnatural satisfaction. When this takes place, their surrender of themselves to nature has degenerated into a perversion of nature, in which, however, there comes to the light only that perversion of the natural order, which lies in man's surrendering himself to the natural appetites, instead of governing them according to the will of God. At last, however, heathendom loses altogether the moral consciousness which was originally implanted in it. They do that which is unbecoming even when looked at from their own standpoint (*τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα*: vv. 28–31); not only do they do so themselves against their better knowledge and conscience, but they even approve of it in others (ver. 32), although man is usually only too ready to find fault with the wickedness of others, even when he excuses *his own*. When the apostle calls this total blunting of the moral consciousness (cf. Eph. iv. 19) a *νοῦς ἀδόκιμος* (Rom. i. 28), it is natural to suppose that he has thought not merely of a reprobate mind, but also of such a mind as no longer proves and distinguishes between good and evil (Rom. xii. 2, ii. 18).[3] In point of fact we find even in the cultured Gentile writers of that time open apologies for paederasty, vindictiveness, and other vices, and at any rate the moral indifference of the great mass (Rom. ix. 30: *ἔθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην*) bears witness to such a blunting of the moral consciousness.[4]

[3] No doubt the word *ἀδόκιμος* is derived from *δέχομαι*, and means that which is rejected (1 Cor. ix. 27); but it could easily occur to the apostle to connect it with *δοκιμάζειν*, especially as he seems to intend a play upon *ἐδοκίμασαν*.

[4] It must be remembered that, throughout, the apostle is describing heathendom on the whole, as it had become in consequence of its natural development. In Rom. ii. 14, 26, 27, he expressly presupposes that cases actually occur in which the Gentiles do that which the law demands, and observe its ordinances.

## § 70. *Heathendom and the Divine Training.*

Within the province of heathendom God suffers humanity to walk in its own ways, in order that it may be made manifest where the natural development of humanity leads to. (*b*) In this development heathendom appears primarily only under the point of view of youthful immaturity, and of the state of bondage which that involves. (*c*) But in this condition it falls a prey to the powers of darkness, which it worships, and by which it is determined to a godless behaviour. (*d*) And thus there is brought about that dreadful depravity of heathendom, in which the divine judgment of wrath against its original apostasy punishes sin by means of sin.

(*a*) When Paul says in the Acts of the Apostles that God suffered all the nations to walk in their own ways (Acts xiv. 16), this permission stands in contrast with His saving interposition in the history of the Jewish nation. But although God leaves the other nations to their natural development, which is always leading them to a worse and worse corruption, He by no means needs to despair of realizing His purposes of salvation even in them. That permission may rather involve the pedagogic purpose of causing heathendom to experience what it would come to with its own powers as the necessary consequence of the direction which it has once taken. If it turned out that sin led it into a more irremediable corruption, then abhorrence of the sin which was thus known in its deepest essence must be thereby aroused, and they must be made to feel their need of salvation. That which the apostle (Rom. vii. 13) says regarding those who were under the law, that by the furthering of its development sin should manifest itself in its true nature, undoubtedly applies in this respect also to heathendom; and this thought plainly lies in the background of the

But, according to § 66, *b*, these individual exceptions cannot annul the judgment regarding the whole of their moral behaviour even in the case of the individual persons, not to speak of that pronounced regarding heathendom on the whole, since it is not in virtue of the nature of heathenism, but in spite of it, that these exceptional virtuous deeds have been performed.

whole description of the sinful development of heathendom (Rom. i.). But Paul has certainly by no means always looked at this development of heathendom from this pedagogic point of view.

(*b*) When Paul regards the seduction of the Gentile Christians of Galatia to Jewish legalism as a *relapse* to the *ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα* (Gal. iv. 9), he thereby looks at their previous condition, not from the point of view of an apostasy which was worthy of punishment (§ 69), but from that of such an imperfection as corresponded with the still immature childhood of humanity. Looked at from this point of view, heathenism is a religion for beginners, a religion in which humanity (*ὁ κόσμος*) has begun to learn the elements, the A B C, as it were, of religious knowledge and behaviour (*στοιχεῖα*); and these elements are, naturally, still meagre, and cannot work (*ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχά*) that which man demands of religion.[1] The Gentiles are thereby regarded as *νήπιοι*, whose immaturity did not yet admit of any higher instruction, just as the Jews probably usually regarded them as *νήπιοι* in contrast with themselves (Rom. ii. 20). Now, since man, while he is a child, has still more or less of the position of a *δοῦλος* (Gal. iv. 1), with this immaturity of theirs there corresponded also the state of servitude which this religion for beginners involved, viz. their *δουλεύειν*. Because

[1] We must adhere to this explanation of the *στοιχεῖα* (or *στοιχ. τοῦ κόσμου*, iv. 3), because the connection in which the idea appears for the first time unambiguously leads us to think of the immature youthful age, to which only such rudiments (cf. Heb. v. 12) are intelligible. To make these expressions refer to the stars (a reference which can possibly be justified by the *usus loquendi*, only, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it would require a *τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*) is equally unsuitable in its application to heathenism, which Paul does not know and regard merely as a worship of the stars, as in its application to Judaism, whose "dependence upon the powers of heaven" is brought out only in an extremely artificial manner. If we were to make them refer to the material elements of the world (cf. 2 Pet. iii. 10, 12), that which is characteristic in the expression would not lie at all in the *τὰ στοιχεῖα*, but in the genitive *τοῦ κόσμου* (which is, nevertheless, altogether awanting in ver. 9), by which we should have to think specially of the world in its present condition (and, therefore, of that which is expressly called *ὁ κόσμος οὗτος* in 1 Cor. vii. 31); and, at any rate, it would be a very forced and vague expression for a system of outward ordinances. The combination of both these interpretations (Pfleiderer, p. 71 [E. Tr. i. 70]), however, is altogether unexegetical; and the assertion that, grammatically, the genitive can only denote the whole which is made up of the elements, is already refuted by Heb. v. 12.

they did not know God, *i.e.* the true God, they had to serve gods who are in reality no gods, whose dominion—a dominion to which they had no claim—brought them therefore into a condition of abject slavery (ver. 8). And because they did not know the true will of God, they had to be satisfied, in a servile manner, with the ordinances of a false religion (ver. 9), which, naturally, could not gain for them the good pleasure of God. It was, indeed, the time of ignorance, which God, according to Acts xvii. 30, is willing to overlook. It does not follow, of course, from this expression, that this ignorance (ver. 23) is excusable; nay, the proclamation that it is overlooked would have had no meaning, unless it could also have been looked upon as blamable.[2] But in the view of the Epistle to the Galatians the religious ignorance of heathendom undoubtedly seems to be traced back to a blameless immaturity, while its corrupt religious practices are traced back to a state of bondage which corresponds with this condition. The natural course of development, to which God gave up the Gentiles (Acts xiv. 16), appears to be still regarded here as such that the infantile condition of humanity did not yet admit of a higher knowledge and fulfilment of the divine will. Hence the positive godlessness and moral degradation of their life are not yet urged.

(*c*) On the other hand, the view of the apostle is essentially different even in the Epistles to the Corinthians. Although the false gods, whom heathendom serves, are already conceived of as actual beings in Gal. iv. 8,—only they are not, according to their (demoniac) nature, that for which the Gentiles take them, and cannot claim the service which the Gentiles in their ignorance slavishly render them (note *b*),—

[2] Pfleiderer (p. 514 [E. Tr. ii. 248]) appears to me to overlook this when he represents this ignorance as altogether blameless; but even if this were meant, it would only be in keeping with the standpoint of a missionary address, if Paul does not reflect upon the question whether this ignorance is blamable or not. It is incorrect, moreover, to say that heathenism is described here, in an un-Pauline manner, as a "tentative groping of men after the God who is near them;" for xvii. 27 f. speaks only of that which should have happened, but which has not happened. At least the view of the Epistle to the Galatians, in which, moreover, the δουλεύειν of the Gentiles by no means appears as a bondage which was "ordained by God," but only as something which was in keeping with their childhood, stands much further removed from that of the Epistle to the Romans than does that of Acts xvii., which certainly cannot be called un-Pauline.

yet it is in 1 Cor. xii. 2 that heathendom first appears quite plainly under the dominion of a foreign power, which drives them without will and understanding to the dumb idols, and thus becomes the occasion of their degrading idolatry (§ 69, *c*). Here, however, it becomes quite clear that it is actual, and, that, too, superhuman beings, which are worshipped in the idols; and adopting an idea of later Judaism (cf. the LXX. Deut. xxxii. 17; Ps. xcvi. 5; Baruch iv. 7), Paul calls them demons (x. 20). In the sense in which even the Old Testament speaks of many gods and lords (cf. Deut. x. 17), these may be called deities (1 Cor. viii. 5), and indeed even Paul himself incidentally calls the devil the *θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* (2 Cor. iv. 4); but to the Christians (1 Cor. viii. 6) they are only *λεγόμενοι Θεοί* (ver. 5); there are no deities in the sense of the Gentiles, there are no such idols as they imagine (viii. 4, x. 19). As in the Gospels (§ 23, *b*), these demons are undoubtedly thought of as the servants and organs of Satan, so that it is very specially through them probably that the devil has dominion over heathendom. At least, among the characteristic features of heathenism mentioned in 2 Cor. vi. 14–16, Belial (= בְּלִיָּעַל), or the devil, is named (ver. 15) after *ἀνομία* and *σκότος*, and before the *εἴδωλα*. The connection of heathendom with the demoniac kingdom is thought of as very real; for according to 1 Cor. x. 20, 21, Paul assumes that the heathen sacrificial feasts, participation in which was therefore forbidden to the Christians, brings men into a real (and, naturally, polluting) fellowship with the demons, to whom that which is partaken of there is dedicated as a sacrifice, just as the Christian supper brings them into fellowship with Christ. It is plainly, therefore, the demoniac powers which have drawn heathendom into their godless (2 Cor. vi. 14, *ἀνομία*) and polluting sinful condition (ver. 17: *ἀκάθαρτον*; cf. the *πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα* of the Gospels, § 23, *b*). Here, accordingly, heathendom in its condition of childish immaturity and bondage has fallen a prey to the powers of darkness, whom it must now serve in a religious as well as in a moral sense.

(*d*) It is in the Epistle to the Romans, however, that Paul first looks away from that natural immaturity (note *b*) as well as from this influence of supernatural powers (note *c*), and

places himself entirely upon the ethical standpoint, according to which even heathendom could be given up to the powers of darkness, only because it had turned away from the living God and had surrendered itself to sin (cf. § 67, *a*). It is here, therefore, that we first meet with the idea of an original fall of heathendom and of its sad consequences, consisting in an ever deeper intellectual and moral declension. But that which is peculiar is, that Paul even regards this process of development (described in § 69) as one that was ordained by God. In Rom. i. 18–32 he looks at it from the point of view of a judgment, in which there is revealed the wrath of God against the original apostasy of heathendom. It is quite in keeping with the fundamental law of divine retribution, according to which guilt demands an equivalent punishment (§ 64, *b*), if God punishes sin by sin, by causing the sinner to sink deeper and deeper into sin through the process of the development of sin which He has ordained. Thus sinners must receive in their own persons (*ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*) the equivalent reward (*ἀντιμισθίαν*) of the error of their apostasy from God, which was necessary (*ἦν ἔδει*) according to divine appointment (Rom. i. 27). God accordingly gives them up to the uncleanness of the unnatural sensual vices (vv. 24, 26); these are, on the one hand, the necessary consequence of their idolatry and of their life in the lusts (§ 69, *d*); on the other hand, they are their righteous punishment through the dishonour which they bring with them. But this sinking into darkness and folly (§ 69, *c*) is already characterized by the passives in vv. 21, 22 as a judgment of God, although it is also the natural consequence of their original turning away from Him. How exactly, however, that punishment corresponds with their guilt, the apostle indicates even in the expressions which he employs. They who have taken away God's honour (ver. 23) must dishonour themselves (vv. 24, 26); they who have changed (*μετήλλαξαν*: ver. 25) the natural order of things in the deification of the creature, must now also change (*μετήλλαξαν*: ver. 26) the moral order; and corresponding with the circumstance that (*καθώς*) they *οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν* to possess the knowledge of God, God gave them up *εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν* (ver. 28, for which see § 69, *d*, footnote 3). Thus Paul has sought to penetrate deeper and deeper into the natural development of heathendom as left to itself;

and even here, where its more and more dreadful religious-moral declension appears as an effect of the divine judgment of wrath, he comes back again to that starting-point, according to which there is revealed in the very fact, that God left the Gentiles to themselves (note *a*), the rule of a divine training, which guided the development of humanity. If the time of their childish immaturity and servitude caused them to fall away to the powers of darkness, or brought them into a state of moral decay, which delivers them up to the righteous judgment of God's wrath, this could only excite in them the longing for a time, when the saving grace of God would raise them up to a higher stage of development, in which the imperfection of the lower stage, with its sad consequences, would be overcome. And in this longing there already lay the anticipation that the prophecy of a better future hovers even over the irremediable misery of heathendom.

## § 71. *Judaism and its Law.*

Cf. B. Duhm, *Pauli ap. de Judaeorum religione judicia*, Götting. 1873; A. Zahn, *das Gesetz Gottes nach der Lehre und Erfahrung des Apostel Paulus*, Halle 1876.

Among all the nations the Jewish, in virtue of its descent from the patriarchs, stood in a special relation to God as His possession and His child. (*b*) In consequence of this, it possessed in its sacred writings the revelation of God regarding His nature, and also a written law, which placed before its eyes the will of God in immoveable objectivity. (*c*) This law was given through Moses, and was written down by him in the Pentateuch; but the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures was also a revelation of the divine will. (*d*) Nevertheless even the Jews did not fulfil the law, and were, equally with the Gentiles, exposed to the judgment.

(*a*) Although, as regards the need of salvation, the Jews, or the circumcision, as Paul often calls them in accordance with their characteristic sign (Gal. ii. 7–9, v. 6, vi. 15; Rom. iii. 30, iv. 12, xv. 8), stand altogether on the same level with heathendom (§ 66, *b*), it is not at all meant to be denied that in many respects they have some advantage over the latter (Rom. iii. 2: *πόλυ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον*); it only follows that

they do not have an advantage in every respect (*οὐ πάντως*), viz. not as regards universal sinfulness (ver. 9). The enumeration of their advantages, however, reaches its climax (ix. 5) in the descent from the fathers, from the last of whom the Jews derive the theocratic title of Israelites (ver. 4). Upon this descent, as well as upon this name, Paul lays stress even for himself (Rom. xi. 1; 2 Cor. xi. 22; cf. Phil. iii. 5). What is the significance of this descent, whose sign is circumcision (Rom. iv. 12), and therefore, also, what is the significance of this latter, which is expressly acknowledged in ii. 25 to be advantageous, appears from xi. 16. According to the principle that the branches are holy if the root is holy, their consecration to God passes over from the fathers to their descendants; in the former the latter are elected, quite in the Old Testament sense (cf. § 44, *a*), to be God's possession, and as His possession they are the elected object of His love (ver. 28: *κατὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἀγαπητοὶ διὰ τοὺς πατέρας*). The people of Israel is *His* people (xi. 1, 2, xv. 10, after Deut. xxxii. 43), He causes His glory to dwell among them (ix. 4: *ἡ δόξα*), and they can glory in Him as their God (ii. 17). This special relationship of love, in which the people stands to its God, is described, however, after the manner of the Old Testament (cf. § 17, *b*), as a filial relationship (ix. 4: *ὁ υἱοθεσία*); the seed of Abraham are the *τέκνα Θεοῦ*, as appears clearly from the connection of ix. 7, 8, where *τέκνα Ἀβραάμ* and *τέκνα Θεοῦ* are interchanged as synonymous expressions. It is plain, also, from vv. 25, 26, that the ideas of being God's people, of being beloved of God, and of being His sons, are synonymous ideas.

(*b*) In consequence of this advantage, which the Jewish nation has over all nations, it is entrusted with the oracles of God (*τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ*: Rom. iii. 2), *i.e.* with the divine revelations, which are contained in its sacred books. Although Paul never expressly asserts that the Jews possessed in the Old Testament Scriptures a revelation regarding the nature of God, which was more intelligible and richer than that which the Gentiles originally had (§ 69, *a*), yet, for him, this is self-evident. From this it also follows that a representation of the Pauline system cannot give any peculiar doctrine of God; as to the nature of God, Paul will only teach that which the

Old Testament teaches, and what the Jews could also have known from it.[1] No doubt we must remember that even the Jewish scribes did not know God in His wisdom as it unfolded itself in the Old Testament, because the wisdom with which they investigated the Old Testament was a perverted wisdom (1 Cor. i. 20, 21), like that of sinful humanity in general (cf. § 67, *a*). Now, since, for the securing of righteousness and salvation (cf. § 65, *b*), a revelation of the divine will is specially important, the revelation which God has given to His people could not be without this. In the law the Jews possessed a copied representation of the truth, from which they learned to know the will of God and to prove the difference between good and evil (Rom. ii. 18, 20). In the mind of the apostle this possession of the law is so characteristic of them that he calls them *οἱ ἐν νόμῳ* (Rom. iii. 19; cf. ii. 12), and *οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον* (1 Cor. ix. 20; cf. Gal. iv. 5). Even the Jews were conscious of this as a great advantage, they gloried in it (Rom. ii. 23), on the ground of it they assumed the place of teachers (vv. 19, 20) and judges of the Gentiles (vv. 1, 3). Although the Gentiles also possessed a law in a certain sense (§ 69, *a*), yet, according to Rom. ii. 27 (cf. 2 Cor. iii. 6), it was a substantial advantage that the Jews possessed it in a fixed written form, so that they could hear it read in the synagogues (ver. 13), and could be instructed out of it (ver. 18). Thereby the law stood over against them in fixed objectivity, so that the consciousness of the difference between good and evil could not be extinguished in them as in the Gentiles (§ 69, *d*).

(*c*) The basis of this law is the Mosaic legislation, which has first proclaimed again the will of God, connected with a definite threatening of punishment (Rom. v. 14). Among the special advantages of Israel, Paul counts (ix. 4) the solemn act of the giving of the law (*ἡ νομοθεσία*), in which the law which was written on tables of stone (2 Cor. iii. 3, 7; cf. Ex. xxxi. 18) was promulgated at Sinai.

[1] When he is speaking of any divine attribute he repeatedly appeals to the Old Testament. Thus for God's truthfulness he appeals to Ps. li. 4 (Rom. iii. 4), for His free mercy to Ex. xxxiii. 19, ix. 16, Isa. xlv. 9, 10 (Rom. ix. 15, 17, 20), for His unsearchable wisdom to Isa. xl. 13 (1 Cor. ii. 16; Rom. xi. 34), for His unmerited grace to Job xli. 2 (Rom. xi. 35), for His righteous judgment to Deut. xxxii. 35 (Rom. xii. 19), and for its universality to Isa. xlv. 23 (Rom. xiv. 11).

Following a rabbinical tradition, which is already found in the LXX. (Deut. xxxiii. 2) and in Josephus (*Antiq.* xv. 5. 3), and to which Stephen already refers in his discourse (Acts vii. 53, cf. ver. 38), he assumes that the people received these tables of the law at the hand of Moses, it is true (ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου), but through the intermediation of angels (Gal. iii. 19: διαταγεὶς δι' ἀγγέλων). In saying this, however, there is no intention of denying its divine origin.[2] Moses appears also in Rom. v. 14 (cf. ver. 20) as the giver of the law; from him comes the written Thora, as it is still read in the Pentateuch (2 Cor. iii. 15); even the prescription in Deut. xxv. 4 is represented as being written in the law of Moses (1 Cor. ix. 9; cf. Rom. x. 5, according to which Moses has written Lev. xviii. 5; ver. 19, according to which he has written Deut. xxxii. 21). This law of Moses (Rom. vii. 7; cf. Ex. xx. 17) is now the law of God (vii. 22, 25, viii. 3, 7), it springs from His Spirit (vii. 14), and is holy as He is holy (ver. 12). This applies to the law in its whole extent.[3] Among the advantages of the Jewish nation Paul expressly counts the כְּבוֹד יהוה (ἡ δόξα: Rom. ix. 4), which, according to a rabbinical idea supported by Lev. xvi. 2, continually hovered over the ark of the covenant, and therefore made the temple the real place of revelation, just as he also regards the altar of burnt-offering (1 Cor. x. 18, after Ex. xx. 24) as the place of

[2] Klöpper (*Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol.* 1870, 1, p. 94) has recently attempted to prove that Paul derives the law, so far as it regulates circumcision along with all the other specifically national (Levitical) ordinances, from the co-operation of subordinate angelic powers (Gal. iii. 19), in order to indicate the changeable and temporary nature of this fleshly side of the law. But it is altogether wrong to say that, in the polemical argumentation of the apostle, it is this side which comes under consideration, for the law, as to the impossibility of fulfilling which the question is raised in the context of that verse, is the spiritual law, which could only serve to the increase of παραβάσις because of the sinful nature of man (cf. § 72, *b*). According to Ritschl, Paul in Gal. iii. regards even the Mosaic law in general (so far as it sets up a legal regulation of mutual performances between man and God, which has no religious character (?)) as an (ungodly) institution of the lower angelic powers (ii. p. 309 f.), to which he makes even the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου refer (p. 249), because, according to him, Paul judges of the law according to the predominant impression made by its ceremonial commandments, while, in the Epistle to the Romans, he looks at it differently in accordance with the impression made by its ethical elements (p. 251).

[3] No more than Jesus or any of the original apostles (§ 24, *c*, 52, *a*) doe Paul make any distinction between the ethical and the ritual part of the law (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 70 [E. Tr. i. 69]); and the assumption that he did not reckon

God's gracious presence, whereby the Israelite is made partaker of the blessings of the latter. From this it is evident that it was quite in the sense of the Old Testament and of Judaism that he regarded the Old Testament regulations relating to worship; and he even counts among these advantages (Rom. ix. 4) the Jewish λατρεία, from which it naturally follows that he looked upon the ritual part of the law, which gave the prescriptions regarding this λατρεία, as a part which was given by God, and rich in blessing for the nation of Israel. Although it cannot be directly proved, yet it may be taken for granted, that, when Paul speaks simply of the law, he thinks not only of the Mosaic legislation, but also of all the commandments of God, as they are contained in the Old Testament, and therefore also of the development of the law by the prophets. As the Pentateuch is called ὁ νόμος, not only where its legislative portion, but also where its historical (1 Cor. xiv. 34; Rom. iii. 31) or prophetic (iii. 21) portion is considered, and yet only where there appears from the history or the prophecy the will of God, which regulates the new way of justification for men (Rom. iii. 21, 31) or the right behaviour of men (1 Cor. xiv. 34), so, conversely, the whole of the Old Testament is called ὁ νόμος, even where it is passages out of the Psalms and prophets that are considered (1 Cor. xiv. 21; Rom. iii. 19), but also only because it reveals the will of God in all its parts.

(*d*) In regard also to the Jews, Scripture (Rom. iii. 9–19) as well as experience (ii. 1–3, 21–24) teaches that they do not keep the law, and that they are therefore, along with the Gentiles, exposed to the judgment of God (iii. 19; cf. § 66, *b*). It is

the latter as a part of divine revelation, or even of the law of Moses (cf. Holsten, p. 21, 22), cannot, naturally, be proved from the circumstance that, in his disquisitions relating to the ethical condition of pre-Christian or Christian humanity, it is only the former that is spoken of. Naturally, that which he says of the relation of the Christian to the law cannot come under consideration here at all. When, however, the apostle (Rom. ii. 28, 29) sets before the Jew that, in order to receive praise from God, he must be circumcised not only in the flesh but also in the heart, he says nothing else than that which the law also demands (Deut. x. 16); and when he describes this circumcision as one that is not grounded in the letter of the law, but accomplished in the Spirit of God, he likewise says only that which Deut. xxx. 6 says, viz. that this circumcision is accomplished by God Himself (through His Spirit) in all them that obediently turn to Him with their whole heart (ver. 2).

not hereby meant to assert that their sinfulness was not of a different nature from that of the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 15); nay, Paul allows that they have a zeal for God (Rom. x. 2) and a striving after righteousness (ix. 31, x. 3). But since even their fulfilment of the law was imperfect, it could not secure to them justification. If they were perfectly satisfied with their possession of the law (ii. 17: *ἐπαναπαύῃ νόμῳ*; cf. ver. 13), or with the zeal for it which they showed in their judging of others (vv. 1–3), they forgot that the Gentiles also possessed a law in a certain sense (vv. 14, 15), and that God, because of His impartiality in the judgment, can inquire only as to the doing of His will (vv. 2, 6; cf. § 65, *c*). Even so great a blessing as circumcision, which secured to them, in another respect, advantages which were indisputable and could not be lost (note *a*), could be of no assistance to them in this respect, seeing that God, in accordance with His impartiality in the judgment, cannot judge in accordance with this personal advantage, but only, in the case of the circumcised as well as of the uncircumcised, in accordance with the fulfilment or transgression of the law (ii. 25, 26), and can bestow the praise of the righteous, not upon him who calls himself a Jew outwardly (ver. 17), but only upon him who, by the circumcision of the heart which is demanded in the law (note *c*, footnote 3), proves himself to be a genuine Jew in the eyes of the Searcher of hearts (vv. 28, 29). Nay, since the Jew has in the written law and in circumcision a double impulse to fulfil the law, the virtues of the Gentiles can only condemn him in the judgment (ver. 27); judgment will be pronounced against his wickedness first (ver. 9: *Ἰουδαίου πρῶτον*), because his very law passes sentence upon him (ver. 12: *ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται*). If, finally, they appeal to the previous gracious dealings of God towards Israel, they only show that they misunderstand and despise His forbearance and long-suffering, which are leading them to repentance (ii. 4; cf. ix. 22), and by their hardness of heart and impenitence increase their guilt (ver. 5).

## § 72. *The Law and the Promise.*

Seeing that sin dwells also in the Jews, the law could not

secure its fulfilment among them, it could only solicit sin to transgress it, and so bring upon them judgment and death. (*b*) Accordingly, the design of the law could only be to reveal the sin, which was brought by it to maturity, in all its destructive power, and thereby to awaken in them the longing after redemption. (*c*) That being the case, however, the law can only be a temporary institute, an institute which shows that for the Jews also the time of youthful immaturity and bondage must be followed by a time, which opens up the prospect of a higher end of the divine training. (*d*) This end was already indicated to the Israelites in the promise which was given to the fathers, a promise which could not be attached through the law to new conditions that could not be fulfilled, and which cannot therefore be lost to them.

(*a*) Under the given circumstances, *i.e.* on the presupposition that sin dwells in humanity ever since Adam's fall (§ 67), the apparently so glaring contradiction between that which the Jews have received in the law and the result of their religious-moral development was not accidental but necessary. That the written law stood over against the Jew in fixed objectivity (§ 71, *b*), is expressly regarded in Rom. ii. 27 as an advantage of the Jews as contrasted with heathendom with its natural moral consciousness (ver. 15),—an advantage which should have led the Jew to fulfil the law,—and even in 2 Cor. iii. 3, 6 it only stands in contrast with the operation of the πνεῦμα in Christianity. That which made the law weak, so that it could not work its fulfilment, was not therefore this its rigid objectivity, nor any defect whatever in the law, which in itself is καλός (Rom. vii. 16); according to viii. 3 it was rather the power of the flesh which was opposed to it, or rather, the power of sin which dwells in the flesh (§ 68, *b*). Just because the law was spiritual (πνευματικός), issuing from the Spirit of God and having His character (ἅγιος, cf. vii. 12), it could not but meet with a radical opposition from man, who had fallen away altogether to the flesh (σάρκινος), and therewith to the dominion of sin (ver. 14). Nay, Paul had found in his own experience, and held it to be the general experience of all who are under the law, that the commandment forbidding concupiscence does not suppress it, but only stirs it up (vv. 7, 8), that the very inter-

position of the positive law makes an end of the relatively innocent condition of moral ignorance, by awakening (vv. 8, 9) the power of sin which is slumbering in man (§ 66, *c*). This power, viz., receives occasion through the commandment, to hold up that which is forbidden before man's eyes as a good that is worth striving after, and to tempt him by means of this deceit to lust after it, and therefore to transgress the commandment (ver. 11, cf. ver. 8). Naturally, this is not owing to the law, which cannot possibly be sinful (ver. 7), which is rather holy and righteous and brings blessing to man (ver. 12); it is owing to the sin which dwells in his flesh (ver. 13). Seeing that man's nature is fleshly, the effect of the law can only be that sinful passions are thereby stirred up (ver. 5), and that the sin which dwells in him receives the power to lead him to transgress the law (1 Cor. xv. 56: *ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ νόμος*). So long, therefore, as man stands under the dominion of the law, the dominion of sin over him cannot be broken (Rom. vi. 14; Gal. iii. 23; cf. ver. 22). If sin, however, has once seduced man to transgress the law, the law now works the wrath of God, inasmuch as it demands the execution of the punishment which was threatened by it to the sinner (Rom. iv. 15, for which see § 66, *d*), and so pronounces its curse upon man (Gal. iii. 10). Since the law, however, expressly stipulates that death shall be the punishment of sin (Deut. xxx. 19; cf. ver. 15), the letter of the law pronounces sentence of death upon man (2 Cor. iii. 6: *τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει*); the *διακονία* of Moses is a *διακονία θανάτου* and *κατακρίσεως* (vv. 7, 9).

(*b*) Seeing that the law was given when the sinful development of humanity, which dates from Adam, was already in progress, and therefore the effect of it which we have just described must have been foreseen by God and taken into account, it could not have been given for the purpose of commencing a new epoch and of leading humanity by the fulfilment of the will of God which is revealed in it to the righteousness, which it has lost ever since Adam's fall. Its design can only rather have been that which has been actually realized; it has come in besides (*παρεισῆλθεν*), *i.e.*, it has entered into the development of humanity, not as an epoch-making, but as a relatively secondary moment, which was

only to bring to maturity the development which had once begun, by increasing transgression (Rom. v. 20). In the same sense it is said in Gal. iii. 19, that it was added (to the promise) because of transgressions (*i.e.* in order to increase them), for according to the context it is altogether inadmissible to find herein the thought, that the law was intended to check transgressions (cf. Messner, p. 222; Reuss, ii. p. 49 [E. Tr. ii. 43]), apart altogether from the circumstance that, according to note *a*, it had not actually fulfilled this design.[1] The same divine training, which purposely left heathendom to itself, in order that the development of the sinful tendency which it had once adopted might come to maturity (§ 70, *a*), reached the same end within the province of Judaism by the interposition of the law. According to Rom. vii. 13 sin should manifest itself as that which it is (*ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία, scil. ἡ ἁμαρτία*), yea, it should do this by being compelled to show itself altogether in its true character, to set forth all its consequences, and so come to maturity (*ἵνα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς ἡ ἁμαρτία*). This it did, however, by

[1] The more particular information, which this passage gives regarding the manner in which the law was promulgated, is no doubt intended to support this statement regarding its design, although it certainly does not represent the law as a mediator between promise and fulfilment (Holsten, p. 307). That being the case, it cannot, of course, like Acts vii. (cf. § 42, *d*), set forth a special glory of the law; for although it is certainly not the intention of the apostle to deny the divine origin of the law (or of a portion of it; cf. § 71, *c*, footnote 3), he yet plainly sees in the circumstance that it was ordained through angels an indication of its transitory design (*προσετέθη, ἄχρις οὗ*), for it is always only with reference to passing earthly designs that the service of the angels is engaged, whereas the personal conferring of the promise by God Himself (vv. 17, 18) already secures its abiding significance. According to Ex. xx. 19, on the other hand, the agency of a mediator on the occasion of the giving of the law can only indicate that, because of their sinful uncleanness, the people were not in a position to receive the law directly from God or His holy angels. In the fact, however, that the law was given to a sinful people, there was already implied, for the apostle, the certainty that it could not have been given in order to be fulfilled, but only in order to be transgressed (*παραβάσεων χάριν*), just as the result has also shown that it has only increased transgressions (note *a*). In accordance with this, ver. 20, which has been so much disputed, is to be understood as simply meaning that, in general, it is not an individual, but a number of individuals, which are accustomed to make use of a mediator in order to have dealings with another. Since God, however, is one, Moses can only have been the mediator of the people; seeing that, when dealing with God, they required a mediator because of their sinfulness, he received the law in their stead. In the interpretation of this passage the view is gradually finding acceptance, that, when the unity of God

its receiving occasion through the law to solicit man to transgress it, and so to put him into the condition which Paul represents as death (in the metaphorical sense), as the loss of the true life which consists in the condition of relative innocence (vv. 9, 10, 24). The law demands righteousness, and will originally, along with it, give life (§ 65, *d*). In consequence, however, of the presence of sin, which is operative in man, it has worked (although with the foreknowledge of God, and not without His will) the very opposite of that which it was meant to work (ver. 10), inasmuch as it has now brought upon man spiritual death as well as (according to note *a*) death as the punishment of sin. Accordingly, it is evident that, for man, sin has turned this great good into its opposite (ver. 13). When man, however, has thus once experienced the whole destructive power of sin (iii. 20),[2] there spontaneously arises from him the cry of anguish for deliverance out of this state of death into which it has brought him (vii. 24), and through the awakening of this longing for salvation the law becomes the παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 24).[3]

is set forth, the point in question cannot be as to the contrast with the duality of the parties to be brought together (an explanation which is still given by Immer, p. 282 f., but which would necessarily demand ὁ εἷς), but as to the contrast with a multiplicity. This, however, cannot possibly be the multiplicity of the angels, as is now-a-days being frequently assumed (cf. Vogel in the *Stud. und Krit.* 1865, 3; Klöpper, *ut supra;* Ritschl, ii. p. 247). If that were the case, the μεσίτης could only be a messenger or agent, and the syllogism of the apostle (the general validity of whose major premiss is not altogether unquestionable even according to our interpretation) would be altogether untenable, as Klöpper himself (p. 106) really admits, for, according to the view of the Old Testament, God, in ordinary cases, always makes use of such mediators for the purpose of communicating His messages to man. Moreover, the thought that, when such an intermediate agent is employed, we cannot be certain that we have received the true and clear expression of the intention of the one who gave him authority (Klöpper, p. 108), is certainly far from the mind of the apostle.

[2] Sin cannot reveal its real nature more clearly than by showing that, for man, it turns the blessing into a curse. It is not only because the law leads man to have an experience of his own of the evil lusts which are thereby stirred up (Rom. vii. 7), nor only because it convinces all men of their own sinfulness, by discovering the contradiction between their conduct and the will of God (iii. 19), but also inasmuch as it is with respect to it that sin reveals itself in its most destructive consequences, that the law works the knowledge of sin (iii. 20: διὰ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας).

[3] If, according to iii. 23, the law stands as a warder (ἐφρουρούμεθα ὑπὸ νόμον) before the prison, in which sin with its dominion keeps us confined (read

(*c*) From the pedagogic Paul justly deduces the transitory character of the law. If the goal is reached to which the pedagogue is to lead, then his activity ceases of itself (Gal. iii. 25: *οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν ἐσμεν*). With the coming in of faith or of Christ as the object of faith there is involved the end of the law (Rom. x. 4), because God now no longer justifies on the ground of the works of the law, but on the ground of faith. The law is a *καταργούμενον* (2 Cor. iii. 11), not, however, because it has failed in its purpose with respect to the sin of man, but because it was originally given only for a temporary purpose, after the attaining of which its significance naturally ceases. Even Moses was well aware of the *τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου*, although he had still reasons for concealing this from the people (2 Cor. iii. 13);[4] for the law was originally only added to the promise until an appointed time (Gal. iii. 19: *ἄχρις οὗ*), which has come in with the appearing of Christ and faith in Him. With this way of looking at the subject there is naturally connected the point of view, under which Paul regards the divine education of heathendom in § 70. If the law is only meant for a definite epoch of the development of humanity, it also belongs to the *ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (iv. 3, 9), to

*συγκλειόμενοι*. Cf. ver. 22: *συνέκλεισεν . . . ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν*), or if, without a figure, it is continually promoting the dominion of sin in man (cf. Rom. vi. 14) by ever and anon stirring him up to transgress it (Gal. iii. 19), in order that (according to the connection with vv. 21, 22) he may not by the fulfilling of the law attain that which he should attain first of all *ἐκ πίστεως*, and if *from this* the pedagogic character of the law is deduced (*ὥστε*), the law can be called a pedagogue, only in so far as it brings men to Christ, by continually convincing them of their inability to attain to righteousness by themselves and by their own doing, and leads them to seek justification by the way of faith in Him, and not by the way of the works of the law. Pfleiderer (p. 86 [E. Tr. i. 85]) finds, especially in Gal. iii., an objective-theological mode of viewing this matter, as distinguished from the subjective-anthropological point of view in Rom. vii. (see above); but the latter is only the explanation of the former, for the comprehension of which it is absolutely necessary, and is already indicated in Gal. iii. 19.

[4] That Moses had, for pedagogic reasons (probably even by command of the angels, whose mediator he was, according to Klöpper; cf. footnote 1), given to the whole law, and that, too, abidingly, the nimbus of divine inviolability, which rests upon the Levitico-theocratic commandments of the Pentateuch, and still conceals its transitory character even from the Jews of the present day (Klöpper, p. 115), can by no means be proved, for the fact, that even in the present day a veil lies upon the reading of the Old Testament, is mentioned expressly in ver. 14 as an evidence of the obduracy of the people.

the elementary rudiments of religion, which were alone adapted to the immature condition of humanity which was characteristic of that epoch, not, however, because of its natural character (cf. Baur, p. 171), but because of its merely preparatory significance (note *b*). So long as the child is still in the condition of the *νήπιος*, he stands under guardians and stewards (ver. 2). This applies also to the Jews (ver. 3). But because man, while in the condition of immature childhood, has still more or less of the position of a *δοῦλος* (ver. 1), under the law he finds himself in the condition of bondage (ver. 3: *δεδουλωμένοι*), the law is a *ζυγὸς δουλείας* (v. 1), the covenant of the law, presignified by the son of Abraham by the handmaid, determines to bondage (Gal. iv. 22–24; cf. Rom. viii. 15). Of course, it is only so long as sinful man opposes the law that it appears to him as a servile yoke. While, however, the effect and design of the law usually appear conditioned by the sin which is present in man, this bondage appears here as a consequence of a still imperfect stage of development, which points away beyond itself and opens up the prospect of a better future, which will commence at the term appointed by the father for the declaration of the majority of his child (Gal. iv. 2: *ἡ προθεσμία τοῦ πατρός*).

(*d*) While, however, heathendom could only look out with anticipative longing towards such a better future, the Jews possessed the definite promise of it, a promise which God was bound to fulfil for His truth's sake (Rom. xv. 8: *ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας τῶν πατέρων*), seeing that He has solemnly ratified it in the covenants which He entered into with the patriarchs (ix. 4: *αἱ διαθῆκαι . . . καὶ αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι*; cf. Eph. ii. 12). These promises are the most essential import of the oracles of God (*τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ*), to be entrusted with which is the leading advantage of the Jews or the circumcision (Rom. iii. 1, 2). According to iv. 13, however, the import of the promise which was given to Abraham and his seed is the *κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι κόσμου*.[5] Now, God has granted this Messianic posses-

[5] In consequence of the relation in which his blessing appears often put to all the nations of the earth (Gen. xviii. 18, xxii. 18), the possession of the land of Canaan, which was primarily promised to Abraham (xv. 7, xvii. 8), is widened into the idea of the possession of the world, and this is realized in the promised

sion of salvation (ἡ κληρονομία; cf. § 34, *a*, 50, *c*) to Abraham by promise, as a gift (Gal. iii. 18: κεχάρισται), not as a reward for a definite performance, but on the ground of the righteousness of faith (Rom. iv. 13), of which circumcision was the seal (ver. 11), and therefore κατὰ χάριν (ver. 16). From this it follows, however, that it is altogether independent of the law. Seeing it had long beforehand been rendered valid (ratified) by the forming of the covenants, the testament, by which God had bound Himself to fulfil this promise to Abraham's descendants, could not be rendered invalid by the law which was given 430 years later (Gal. iii. 17). This, however, would have happened, if the attaining of the κληρονομία had then been made dependent upon the fulfilling of the law; for in that case it would not have been attained on the ground of a gracious promise, as it was granted to Abraham, but on the ground of a legal performance (ver. 18). The law would have been against the promises, it would have abrogated them (ver. 21). Nay, if the Messianic κληρονομία were to be attained on the ground of the law (εἰ οἱ ἐκ νόμου κληρονόμοι), *i.e.* so that it would be dependent and remain dependent upon the fulfilling of the law, the promise would be altogether done away with (Rom. iv. 14); for seeing that sin reigns in man, the law necessarily calls forth transgression of the law and thereby the wrath of God (ver. 15; cf. note *a*). Wrath, however, excludes the manifestation of grace which the fulfilling of the promise would involve; God could no longer fulfil the promise to the objects of His wrath, as the connection of the thought in Gal. iii. 10 with that in ver. 9 also presupposes (cf. § 66, *b*). It was given, however, κατὰ χάριν, in order that it might not be dependent upon a condition that could not be fulfilled, and therefore be always uncertain, but that it might be firm and sure (Rom. iv. 16:

Messianic kingdom. This comes out still more clearly in the other explanation which Paul gives in Gal. iii. 16 to the patriarchal prophecy. According to this explanation τὸ σπέρμα is not a collective term for the descendants of Abraham, but a designation of the Christ who was descended from the fathers (Rom. ix. 5). It is to Him, therefore, as the Lord of the Messianic kingdom, that the promise of the possession of the world specially refers (Gal. iii. 19). With the Messianic kingdom, however, every Messianic blessing is directly promised to the seed of Abraham (in the collective sense), or through his seed (in the personal sense).

βεβαίαν; cf. xv. 8: βεβαιῶσαι), in order that it might remain inalienable to the seed of Abraham. Accordingly the law could only have been given, till the seed should come, to whom the promise was (primarily) given (Gal. iii. 19), and in order to secure the fulfilment of the promise in the only way which was in keeping with its character (by means of the righteousness of faith, and therefore κατὰ χάριν). From this, however, it follows, that while the advantage, which was given to Israel by its law, could be turned into its opposite by the sin which was present in it (note *b*), the advantage, which it possessed in the promise of the Messianic salvation in virtue of its descent from the fathers, was an advantage which it could not lose.[6] If that is the case, however, the fulfilment of the promise, and therefore the attainment of the Messianic salvation, had to be brought about in a way which was quite new and altogether independent of the law. Here, then, we stand upon the boundary line of the pre-Christian age, and there is opened up the prospect of the new era of grace and salvation.

## CHAPTER IV.

### PROPHECY AND FULFILMENT.

### § 73. *The Prophecy of Scripture.*

Inasmuch as Scripture refers to the Messianic salvation and its realization, its significance belongs exclusively to those who

[6] The unfaithfulness of the people in keeping the divine revelation, which certainly included also obligations for them, could not possibly do away with the faithfulness of God (Rom. iii. 3; cf. § 65, *c*); in order to be true, He must keep His word, even though the people by their unrighteousness made this, so to speak, difficult for Him (vv. 4, 5). For His truth's sake Christ had to become a minister of the circumcision, and so secure to the descendants of the fathers the possession of the Messianic salvation, in order that the promises given to the fathers might not be made of none effect, but might be confirmed as true by their fulfilment (xv. 8; cf. 2 Cor. i. 20); because of these promises the salvation which is proclaimed in the Gospel is for the Jews *first* (Rom. i. 16). For the gracious gifts of God, and specially the calling to the Messianic salvation, which He has given to that people, can neither be repented of nor be taken back by Him (xi. 29).

receive that salvation, and therefore to the Christian present. (*b*) The divine decrees which are disclosed in this present, as well as the events which are closely connected with them, are directly foretold in Scripture, even in detail. (*c*) In many respects, however, the Christian present is also typically presignified in the history and institutions of the Old Testament. (*d*) It is often only by means of an allegorical interpretation that this prophetic sense of the history and institutions of the Old Testament can be brought out, especially where the literal sense shows itself to be inadmissible.

(*a*) The promise which was given to the fathers, and belongs inalienably to the nation which is descended from them, accompanies, as prophecy, the nation of Israel through its whole history, and is therefore also an essential part of its Holy Scriptures. Nay, the whole of Scripture (ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται: Rom. iii. 21), which appears from one side as a revelation of the divine will (ὁ νόμος; § 71, *c*), can also be thought of, from the other side, as prophetic. If, however, it is only for the Jews that the law has its significance (iii. 19), —and even for them this significance is only transitory (§ 72, *c*),—it is for the future generations, which should see its fulfilment, that Scripture considered as prophecy first has its real significance (cf. 1 Pet. i. 12, for which see § 46, *a*, footnote 1). This necessary consequence of the conception of prophecy as directly Messianic, Paul has drawn as well as Peter. The import of God's message of salvation, which the apostle proclaims, God has promised afore by His prophets in the Holy Scriptures (Rom. i. 2). But as even here the prophetic activity is looked at exclusively from that side, according to which its organs have put down their prophecies in the writings which were appointed for the future, so it follows from xvi. 26 that the specific significance of these writings is such that it could only be meant for that future. There, viz., it is said, that in the Christian present the mystery of salvation is made known through the Scriptures of the prophets, inasmuch as, by means of the proof, that that which is now proclaimed was already foretold by the prophets, the basis was laid for the knowledge, that it is really the divine decree which was formed long ago, which the apostles

preach. Thus the participation of the Gentiles in Abraham's salvation, which was indicated in Gen. xii. 3, was preached beforehand as glad tidings by the *Scripture;* it (*i.e.* God, who speaks in it) foresaw the future justification of the Gentiles by faith (Gal. iii. 8). Nay, that which was thus witnessed by the law and the prophets was by no means yet manifested by this witness to their own age, which could not yet regard it and understand it in the light of its fulfilment (Rom. iii. 21; cf. Eph. iii. 5); it was first manifested in the day of salvation by means of the gospel (i. 17). Accordingly, the significance of that which was written beforehand does not belong to the time in which it was written; it was written for *our* instruction (Rom. xv. 4) and admonition (1 Cor. x. 11).[1]

(*b*) The extent to which Paul found the import of the Messianic message of salvation directly preached beforehand in Scripture, appears from his incidental allusions to Old Testament prophecy. Christ has died and risen again according to the Scriptures (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4); the reproaches that fell upon Him are foretold in Ps. lxix. 9 (Rom. xv. 3), the dominion which was given Him in Ps. viii. 6 (1 Cor. xv. 27). Where he has found the promise of the Spirit (Gal. iii. 14; cf. Eph. i. 13), the apostle does not say. The doctrine of the righteousness of faith is witnessed by the law and the prophets (Rom. iii. 21; cf. Gal. iii. 11; Rom. i. 17, after Hab. ii. 4; Rom. iv. 6–8, after Ps. xxxii. 1, 2); in particular, witness is borne to faith as the condition of salvation in Isa. xxviii. 16 (Rom. x. 11), and as the source of the preaching of the gospel in Ps. cxvi. 10 (2 Cor. iv. 13). The universality of the preaching of salvation Paul finds in Ps. xix. 4 (Rom. x. 18); the destruction of human wisdom by the foolishness of preaching in Isa. xxix. 14 (1 Cor. i. 19); the calling of the Gentiles in Hos. ii. 23, i. 10 (Rom. ix. 25, 26); Deut. xxxii. 21; Isa. lxv. 1 (Rom. x. 19, 20); Ps. xviii. 49; Deut. xxxii. 43;

[1] Even the practical demands that are made upon the behaviour of men, which are contained in these prophecies of the divine decrees, are meant for the instruction of those who see their fulfilment. Thus, such a prophecy as Isa. xlix. 8 refers to men's behaviour in the Christian present (2 Cor. vi. 2; cf. Eph. v. 14); and like every other statement regarding the will of God (cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 34), even the Mosaic law itself can be regarded as prophetic, and as having a direct bearing upon the regulation of Christian circumstances (1 Cor. ix. 9, 10: δι' ἡμᾶς ἐγράφη).

Ps. cxvii. 1; Isa. xi. 10 (Rom. xv. 9–12); Isa. lii. 15 (Rom. xv. 21); and in a certain sense even in the promise to the patriarchs (Gal. iii. 8; Rom. iv. 18). The unbelief of the Jews he sees foretold in Isa. liii. 1, lxv. 2 (Rom. x. 16, 21); the offence which they take at Christ in Isa. viii. 14, xxviii. 16 (Rom. ix. 33); their obduracy in Isa. xxix. 10, vi. 9, 10; Deut. xxix. 4; Ps. lxix. 22, 23 (Rom. xi. 8–10); their partial rejection in Isa. x. 22, 23, i. 9 (Rom. ix. 27–29); their final salvation in Isa. lix. 20; Jer. xxxi. 33, 34 (Rom. xi. 26, 27). That the Christian Church is the temple of God, he finds in Lev. xxvi. 11, 12; Isa. lii. 11; Jer. xxxi. 9; 2 Sam. vii. 14 (2 Cor. vi. 16–18); the bestowal of the gifts of grace he finds in Ps. lxviii. 18 (Eph. iv. 8–10); and even the special gift of speaking with tongues in Isa. xxviii. 11, 12 (1 Cor. xiv. 21). The continual persecution of Christians is foretold in Ps. xliv. 22 (Rom. viii. 26); the final overthrow of death in Isa. xxv. 8; Hos. xiii. 14 (1 Cor. xv. 54, 55).

(*c*) Scripture is prophetic not only in its expressions, but also in its typical history. In consequence of the divine guiding of history, the events of the Messianic time were represented as to their nature and significance in earlier historical events. Thus, according to Rom. v. 14, Adam is a type of the future (second) Adam, inasmuch as in him it is shown how an influence extends from one to the whole race. So the Israelites of the Mosaic time, with their experiences of salvation as well as with the judgments of God which befell them, are *τύποι ἡμῶν* (1 Cor. x. 6); what happened to them happened to them typically (*τυπικῶς*), *i.e.* so that we might learn what we have to experience and shall experience, if we conduct ourselves similarly (ver. 11). Naturally, he always keeps in view the committing of this history to writing; it was by this means that it could first receive this significance for the future (note *a*). What Scripture relates regarding the justification of Abraham is not only written in order to describe his justification (*δι' αὐτόν*), but also to instruct us as to the manner of our own (Rom. iv. 23, 24; cf. iii. 31). Moreover, the boundary line between this way of looking at the history as a type and the simple borrowing of illustrative examples out of it is a fluctuating one. When the comfort, which God gave to Elias (Rom. xi. 2–4), is made to apply to

the present (ver. 5), when the procedure of God when He elected Isaac or Jacob (ix. 6–13), or when He hardened Pharaoh's heart (ver. 17), illustrates His present bearing, these are, primarily, only historical examples, which, however, could have been equally well regarded as types.[2] That Paul looked at the institutions of the Old Testament also from this point of view cannot be directly proved. When, however, Christ is represented as a ἱλαστήριον (Rom. iii. 25) and as a paschal lamb (1 Cor. v. 7; cf. Eph. v. 2), when the sacrificial system in general (Rom. xii. 1, xv. 16) and the rite of the feast of Passover in particular (1 Cor. v. 7, 8) are given an application to Christian circumstances (cf. Col. ii. 11; Phil. ii. 17, iii. 3, iv. 18), when the Church is called the true temple of God (1 Cor. iii. 16; 2 Cor. vi. 16), when an appointment of the law relating to the priests is used as an illustration of an ordinance of God in the Christian Church (1 Cor. ix. 13), and the Jewish sacrificial meal appears as an analogon of the Christian supper (1 Cor. x. 18), there lies at the basis of all these allusions the presupposition that these institutions which were appointed by God have a typical character as well as the events which were under His guidance, from which, however, it does not by any means follow that this part of the law does not also have its significance as law (cf. § 71, *c*).[3]

(*d*) In consequence of his rabbinical training, Paul was also acquainted with the allegorizing way of interpreting the Old Testament, and made use of it. According to it the narratives of the Old Testament have, without prejudice to their historical character, also another meaning than that which the words express, inasmuch as the Spirit, who suggested these words, meant to prophesy something future with them, and it

[2] Jesus already regards the fate of Jonah as a type of His fate (Matt. xii. 40), and the flood as a type of the last judgment (xxiv. 37–39; cf. 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21). On the other hand, Sarah, in Peter (1 Pet. iii. 6), and Job and Elias, in James (v. 11, 17), are simply biblical examples. A similar usage is found already in the discourses of Christ (Matt. xi. 21–24, xii. 41, 42).

[3] As the history does not cease to be history in consequence of its being typical, so neither does the law cease to be a revelation of the will of God for the time of the law, although it is also recognised to be a prophecy of future events or of demands that God is to make in the future, as we have already seen in the teaching of Jesus and the original apostles (cf. § 24, *d*, 45, *c*, footnote 4, 52, *a*, footnote 1).

is the business of the interpreter to discover this meaning by a deeper comprehension of Scripture (Gal. iv. 24: *ἅ τινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα*). Thus the two sons of Abraham by the maid and the free woman are an allegory of Judaism enslaved by the law and of Christianity free from the law (iv. 22–31). Here, therefore, a fact of the past is a prophetic type of a fact of the Messianic present; it is not so, however, *per se*, but in consequence of the fathoming of its deeper meaning. In a similar manner Paul explains the story of the shining countenance of Moses, and of the veil with which he concealed it (Ex. xxxiv.), allegorically, so as to make it refer to the transitory glory of the law and to the circumstance that this its transitory character was hidden from the unbelieving Jews (2 Cor. iii. 13–16; cf. ver. 7). So the hidden allegorical meaning (*τὸ μυστήριον*) of Gen. ii. 24 refers to Christ and His Church (Eph. v. 32). In a similar manner Paul can now also explain legal precepts allegorically, as when, *e.g.*, he makes the precept in Deut. xxv. 4 refer to the right of the preachers of the Gospel to be maintained by the Church (1 Cor. ix. 10). In this case, however, he justifies his explanation by expressly excluding the literal meaning as being absolutely inadmissible (ver. 9: *μὴ τῶν βοῶν μέλει τῷ Θεῷ*); his religious appreciation of the Old Testament cannot bear that one of its appointments could have in view the well-being of animals and not that of man.

## § 74. *The Use of the Old Testament.*

For the most part Paul introduces his quotations simply as words of Scripture, and it is Isaiah, the Psalms, and the Pentateuch that he chiefly uses. (*b*) Although he betrays an acquaintance with the original text, his quotations are, for the most part, given according to the Septuagint, in many places very freely, and often changed to suit his argument. (*c*) In the use that he makes of the passages of Scripture he pays no attention to their historical references or to their connection; it is only their language that he takes into account. (*d*) In doing so, however, the boundary line between literal quotation and the homiletical use of Scripture is a fluctuating one.

(*a*) Paul quotes Scripture very frequently. It is in our

four Epistles, however, that by far the most of his quotations are found; and of these Epistles it was those to the Romans and the Galatians whose aim most of all directly demanded them. In the Epistles to the purely Gentile-Christian Churches of Thessalonica, Philippi, and Colosse, there are no quotations at all.[1] The apostle usually introduces them with a γέγραπται, which is found about thirty times, or with the similar formula ἡ γραφὴ λέγει (Gal. iv. 30; Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, x. 11, xi. 2; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 13: κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον; 1 Cor. xv. 54: ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος; cf. Rom. ix. 9, iv. 18: κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον).[2] It is only in 1 Cor. ix. 9 (ἐν τῷ Μωϋσέως νόμῳ), xiv. 21 (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, cf. Rom. vii. 7), and in Rom. xi. 2 (ἐν Ἠλίᾳ) that indications are found as to the place of Scripture in which the quotation in question stands (cf. Mark xii. 26: οὐκ ἀνέγνωτε ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ Μωϋσέως ἐπὶ τοῦ βάτου, and Acts i. 20: γέγραπται ἐν βίβλῳ ψαλμῶν; vii. 42: γέγραπται ἐν βίβλῳ τῶν προφητῶν). It is seldom that Paul introduces the writers as speaking (Rom. iv. 6, xi. 9: David in the Psalms whose title bears his name; x. 5, 19: Moses in passages out of Leviticus and Deuteronomy; ix. 27, 29, x. 16, 20, xv. 12: Isaiah).[3] It is very seldom that God appears in him as the one that

[1] We shall treat here also of the few quotations in the Epistle to the Ephesians, just as we have already taken notice of them in § 73. For the sake of comparison we shall also remark here upon the use of Scripture in the types of doctrine which we have already discussed.

[2] The earliest tradition makes Jesus introduce His quotations with this γέγραπται (Matt. iv. 4, 7, 10, xi. 10; Mark vii. 6, ix. 12, 13, xi. 17, xiv. 21, 27; Luke x. 26); it is found in Peter (i. 16), and in the discourses of the Acts (i. 20, vii. 42, xv. 15), although Scripture is also appealed to in another way (Mark xii. 10: οὐδὲ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἀνέγνωτε; cf. Matt. xii. 3, 5; 1 Pet. ii. 6: περιέχει ἐν γραφῇ; Jas. ii. 23: ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα; cf. iv. 5, 6, ii. 8: κατὰ τὴν γραφήν). In Peter and James it is only in these five passages that quotation-formulae are found.

[3] Similarly the earliest tradition makes Christ trace back passages of the law to Moses (Mark vii. 10; cf. xii. 9: Μωϋσῆς ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν), and a prophecy to Isaiah (Mark vii. 6), and in Mark xii. 36 f. the whole argument of Christ (cf. § 19, *a*) rests upon the circumstance that, according to the title, it is David that speaks in Ps. cx. 1 (ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ). Similarly, in his discourse in Acts ii. 25–28, 34, 35, Peter starts expressly from the Davidic authorship of the passages quoted (cf. § 39, *a*, *b*); in Acts iv. 25 a Psalm is even treated of as Davidic whose title does not assign it to him. In Acts ii. 16, vii. 48, xiii. 40, passages from the prophets are merely described as such, without the naming of the prophet; on the other hand, in Mark i. 2, Luke iv. 17, Acts viii. 28, 30, xxviii. 25, Isaiah is named; through him, according to the last of these passages, the Holy Ghost spake.

speaks (2 Cor. vi. 2, 16, 17; Rom. ix. 15, 25: ἐν Ὡσηέ), and that, too, only where the point in question is as to an express utterance of God[4] (cf. Acts iv. 25: ὁ διὰ στόματος Δαυὶδ εἰπών; xiii. 47). By far the most of his quotations are from Isaiah and the Psalms; next in order comes the Pentateuch, specially Genesis and Deuteronomy. Individual quotations are found also from the other prophets, and one from Job (1 Cor. iii. 19; cf. Rom. xi. 35); here and there a few sayings out of the book of Proverbs are used without being expressly quoted (2 Cor. ix. 7; Rom. xii. 17, 20). The case is exactly the same in the Epistle of Peter and in the discourses of the Acts.

(*b*) As it is substantially in the form of the text of the Septuagint that the earliest tradition of the discourses of Jesus and the apostles puts into their mouths the quotations from the Old Testament that are made by them,[5] so it is mainly that text which Paul also uses, even in cases where the Greek text varies essentially from the Hebrew (Gal. iii. 13; Rom. ii. 24, iii. 4, iv. 3, ix. 27–29, xi. 9, 10, 26, 27, xv. 10, 12, 21; 1 Cor. i. 19, vi. 16; Eph. v. 31, vi. 2); yet here and there there already appears in him an independent knowledge and

[4] This is also the case in Gal. iii. 16, where *ad synesin* ὁ Θεός is only to be supplied; and it is probable that Paul looked in the same way upon the quotations in 1 Cor. vi. 1β, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, which are introduced only with φησί or λέγει. In Rom. xv. 10, on the other hand, it is certainly ἡ γραφή that is to be supplied.

[5] Cf. Matt. iv. 4, 7, 10, ix. 13; Mark vii. 6, x. 7, xii. 10, 11; Acts i. 20, ii. 17–21, 25–28, 34, 35, iii. 22, 25, iv. 25 f., vii. 42 f., 48–50, xv. 15–18. The only exception, viz. in Matt. xi. 10, where it is apparently the original text that is gone back upon, is explained by the circumstance that the ἐπιβλέψεται of the LXX. did not at all suit the use that is made of the saying. In the case of Mark xiv. 27 it is certainly doubtful whether the author had before him a Septuagint text which agreed with the language of his quotation; but at any rate his deviation from it goes back, not upon the original text, but upon the application of the prophecy in the mouth of Jesus, an application which was in keeping with that original (cf. my *Marcusev.* p. 41, 454). All the other quotations in Luke are also given freely according to the LXX.: Luke iii. 4–6, iv. 18, 19, xxii. 37; Acts viii. 32, 33, xiii. 33–35, 41, 47, xxviii. 26, 27. In James (cf. ii. 23, iv. 6) and Peter (cf. i. 16, ii. 6, 22, iii. 10–12, iv. 18, v. 5) also, it is only the Septuagint text that shows itself in the actual quotations. On the other hand, it is worthy of note that in 1 Pet. ii. 7 f., where two single, apparently often used expressions out of Isa. viii. 14 are connected with the words of Ps. cxviii., 22, the former are nearer to the original text than to the Septuagint. That is the case also with the allusion to Prov. x. 12 in 1 Pet. iv. 8.

use of the original (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 19, xiv. 21, xv. 54 f.; Rom. ix. 17: ἐξήγειρά σε; xii. 19; Eph. iv. 8), as we might naturally expect from his rabbinical training.[6] In his quotations Paul uses great freedom. As, according to note *a*, the particular writings from which the several quotations are taken are seldom reflected upon, so totally different passages of Scripture are often freely combined with one another (1 Cor. xv. 54, 55; 2 Cor. vi. 16–18; Rom. iii. 10–18, ix. 25, 26, xi. 26, 27), or completely mixed up together (Rom. ix. 33, xi. 8). But elsewhere also the quotation is often a very free one;[7] and there are found not only great abbreviations (1 Cor. i. 31), or insignificant changes of expression (2 Cor. vi. 16; Rom. xiv. 11), but also changes (Gal. iv. 30: τῆς ἐλευθέρας; 1 Cor. iii. 20: τῶν σοφῶν; Eph. iv. 8: ἔδωκε) and additions (1 Cor. xv. 45: πρῶτος . . . Ἀδάμ; Rom. x. 11: πᾶς), which are of great importance for the apostle's application of the passages.[8]

(*c*) Closely connected with the manner in which the passages of Scripture are considered only as such, and not as individual utterances of definite writers (note *a*), and are therefore taken out of their connection and freely combined (note *b*), is the circumstance that their explanation attaches itself simply to the words. Herein Paul follows the exegetical method of his time. Accordingly, what is said in the original of a

[6] Kautzsch comes to somewhat different results (*de veteris testamenti locis a Paulo apostolo allegatis*, Lipsiae 1869). Apart from the quotations from Job, the translation of which seems to have been unknown to the apostle, Paul (according to Kautzsch) has nowhere purposely forsaken the LXX., although in a few passages the original as well as the translation appears to have been present to his mind. But this exceedingly careful and acceptable work may, nevertheless, have underestimated the occasions on which the apostle has regard to the original.

[7] In 1 Cor. ii. 9 there is probably a confusion of an apocryphal passage with one from Isaiah, which had only a few verbal similarities; in Eph. v. 14, on the other hand, Isa. lx. 1 seems really to be meant, and only to be rendered with an exegetical explanation. Whether 1 Cor. xv. 55 is intended as a quotation or as a free use of Hos. xiii. 14 remains doubtful.

[8] We find the same already in the discourses of Christ, where different passages are mixed up together (Mark xi. 17; cf. also 1 Pet. ii. 7, 9), in Matt. xi. 10 and Mark xiv. 27, where the Old Testament passages are changed freely to suit their Messianic interpretation, and in the discourses of the Acts (cf. the significant changes in Acts ii. 17, for which see § 40, *a*; in iii. 23, for which see § 42, *b*; and in i. 20: αὐτοῦ).

definite time can be generalized (Rom. iii. 10–18), or what is said there of definite persons or circumstances of the past can be made to refer to persons and circumstances of the present (Rom. viii. 36, x. 19–21, xi. 9, 10, 26). What was meant of Gentiles can be applied to Jews (Rom. ii. 24), and *vice versa* (Rom. ix. 25 f.); Paul can even, as occasion requires, take τὸ σπέρμα, now as collective, and now as personal (Gal. iii. 16; Rom. iv. 13, for which see § 72, *d*, footnote 5); in 2 Cor. viii. 15 he can give Ex. xvi. 18 an application which suits its language, without considering that, according to their original allusion, these words refer to the gathering of manna, and therefore do not at all admit of the application which he gives them. He does not inquire as to the original meaning of Old Testament expressions; he takes them in the sense which he is accustomed to give to similar expressions, even in the case of such terms as πίστις, κύριος, εὐαγγελίζεσθαι (Rom. i. 17, ix. 33, x. 13, 15), or he gives them a metaphorical interpretation (Rom. iv. 17, 18). Accordingly, it is often the most accidental verbal resemblances with which his application is connected (1 Cor. xiv. 21; Eph. iv. 8). At the basis of this practice, however, there lies the presupposition that, on one side, the whole of Scripture prophesies of the Messiah and the events of the Messianic time (§ 73, *a*), so that everything which simply admits of being applied to these circumstances is interpreted in this sense, and that too as a direct prophecy. Thus in Ps. lxix. 9 the Messiah Himself is conceived of as speaking (Rom. xv. 3), and Joel ii. 32 is applied by him, as well as by Peter (Acts ii. 21), to the Messiah (Rom. x. 13). Even passages which, like these, are undoubtedly Messianic in the wider sense, appear as having a reference to the person of Jesus, which is originally foreign to them (Rom. ix. 33; cf. 1 Pet. ii. 6).[9]

(*d*) From these actual quotations of Scripture we must distinguish those cases in which the apostle avails himself of well-known sacred words of Scripture for the purpose of

[9] In the same way the earliest tradition already makes Jesus give the Old Testament a Messianic interpretation (Matt. xi. 10; Mark xii. 10, 11, 36, xiv. 27), and develope a deeper meaning out of its words (Mark xii. 26); according to the Acts of the Apostles, Peter makes David speak, not only with reference to the person of Jesus (ii. 25–28), but also regarding the traitor (i. 20, cf. ver. 16).

clothing his own thoughts, as, *e.g.*, in 1 Cor. v. 13, x. 22, 26; Rom. xi. 34, 35, xii. 20; Eph. i. 22, iv. 26. This way of using Scripture is also found already in the discourses of Jesus (Matt. x. 35; Mark iv. 12), and in the Epistle of Peter it is the most common. In such cases acquaintance with the scriptural words in question is for the most part taken for granted, and the allusion appears intentional; yet it is a peculiarity of the Epistle of Peter, that even where the line of thought demands that they should be recognised and taken to be words of Scripture (as in i. 24), there is no express quotation formula. There is no example of this to be found in Paul; he even inserts his *καθὼς γέγραπται* where the words are only used as a clothing of his own thought (1 Cor. i. 31). In such a case, naturally, it is by no means surprising if the words of Scripture appear without any reference to their original meaning as determined by the context (Rom. x. 18), and if they are altered with very great freedom as each occasion requires (x. 6–8; cf. 1 Cor. xv. 55, for which see footnote 7). Since this, however, is done also in the case of actual quotations (notes *b*, *c*), and even the presence or absence of a quotation formula is not absolutely decisive, it is often impossible to decide with full certainty which of these uses of Scripture we have before us.

## § 75. *The Time of Grace.*

The time, which God had appointed for the fulfilment and revelation of His hidden decree of salvation, has commenced in the Christian present. (*b*) The new epoch of the world which commences with this present is characterized by the sovereignty of grace, which is diametrically opposed to sin and the law, as well as to all human work and merit. (*c*) Grace is neither conceived of as a divine attribute, nor as a gift of divine favour, but as the spontaneously operative principle, from which the whole of man's salvation proceeds. (*d*) The activity of this new principle of salvation, however, is brought about by Christ, or rests in Him, in whom every promise becomes fulfilment.

(*a*) It appears from prophecy that the salvation which is

being realized in the present was long ago resolved upon by God, and depended upon a decree of His wisdom, which was formed by Him (*ἣν προώρισεν ὁ Θεός*) from all eternity (*πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων*), and hidden (*σοφία . . . ἀποκεκρυμμένη*), a *μυστήριον* (1 Cor. ii. 7), *i.e.* absolutely unknowable by human knowledge of itself, and such it remained, even after prophecy, until its fulfilment (Rom. xvi. 25: *μυστήριον χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένον*). Even prophecy has not broken this silence (cf. Eph. iii. 5); for it was for the present that prophecy was first appointed (§ 73, *a*), and therefore it was by the present alone that it could be understood in the light of its fulfilment. Now, however, that mystery (Eph. iii. 3), or the individual mysteries which are contained in it, such as the complete conversion of Israel (Rom. xi. 25), the resurrection and transformation of believers (1 Cor. xv. 51), are revealed by God (xiii. 2) and preached by His stewards (iv. 1). According to Rom. xvi. 26, however, the revelation of this mystery had already begun (*φανερωθέντος*) before the apostles, supporting their proclamation with the word of prophecy (cf. § 73, *a*), made it known (*γνωρισθέντος*)—it had begun when the salvation which was resolved upon was actually realized. This happened with the sending of the Son, when the *πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου* came (Gal. iv. 4; cf. Eph. i. 9, 10). This expression presupposes that a definite measure of time had to be filled up before the moment appointed for the execution of that decree appeared. If pre-Christian humanity is conceived of as being in a state of youthful immaturity and nonage (§ 70, *b*, 72, *c*), then the moment must come which the Father has appointed for the declaration that it has attained its majority (Gal. iv. 2: *προθεσμία τοῦ πατρός*). It is this moment, of which it is said in 1 Cor. x. 11, that the ends of the past ages are come upon the generation which is living in the present (*τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων*), inasmuch as each of these ages has, in its own way, served to prepare for this moment of maturity, which forms the close of the whole of the previous development of the world. That this time, in which the world was ripe for the accomplishment of the decree of salvation, *i.e.* the Messianic time, has come, is only the Pauline expression for the proclamation of Jesus, that the time is fulfilled, and that the promised kingdom of God has come

(Mark i. 15; cf. § 13, *a*), or for that of the original apostles, that the Messianic time of the end has commenced (§ 40, *a*), that the completion of the theocracy, in which God bestows His graces (§ 45, *b*), has begun. Only, in the case of the apostle to the Gentiles, the coming of salvation no longer appears merely under the point of view of a fulfilment of the promise of Israel, but, since heathendom and Judaism are looked at in the same manner from the point of view of the divine training, which prepares humanity for the coming of salvation, it appears also as the historical epoch, which concludes the whole development of the human race.

(*b*) In the previous age of the world the principle which dominated the development of humanity was the sin, which had come into the world through Adam's transgression (§ 67, *a, b*); the principle which rules in the new age is the grace of God (Rom. v. 21). The dominion of sin was owing to the dominion of the law (§ 72, *a*); hence grace forms the antithesis of the law (vi. 14: *οὐκ ἐστε ὑπὸ νόμον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ χάριν*). The law, which attaches salvation to the fulfilment of its demands, and grace, which works salvation itself, exclude one another (Gal. ii. 21, v. 4, for which see § 66, *a;* cf. Rom. iv. 16). The law demands works, which man performs; grace, by undertaking to provide salvation, excludes all human activity; works and grace are diametrically opposed to one another (Rom. xi. 6; cf. Eph. ii. 8, 9). Human doing acquires merit; grace, however, is not deserved, but presented gratis (Rom. iii. 24: *δωρεάν*); grace and merit are also diametrically opposed (iv. 4). Grace is given (1 Cor. i. 4) and received (2 Cor. vi. 1; Rom. i. 5); in it we stand (Rom. v. 2) and walk (2 Cor. i. 12); it is the new standpoint upon which the new time is placed. In all the introductions to his Epistles Paul wishes it for his readers as the ground of Christian salvation (Gal. i. 3; 1 Cor. i. 3; 2 Cor. i. 2; Rom. i. 7; cf. 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 2; Eph. i. 2; Phil. i. 2; Col. i. 2; Philem. 3); it is through it that men are called (Gal. i. 15) and justified (Rom. iii. 24); it is upon it that Christian hope is based (2 Thess. ii. 16). The Christian is what he is through the grace of God (1 Cor. xv. 10). Thus, in conformity with the fundamental experience which made him a Christian (§ 58, *b*),

the Christian time is characterized by the apostle as the time of grace.

(*c*) Grace is not conceived of as a passive divine attribute or disposition, it is not the divine חֶסֶד (LXX.: ἔλεος). It is to the mercy of God (ἔλεος), which certainly cannot be accounted for by any behaviour of man, but depends solely upon the compassion felt by God when He beholds man's need (Rom. ix. 15, 16), that the salvation presented to the Gentiles is specially traced back (xv. 9; cf. ix. 23, xi. 31, 32), inasmuch as God was not bound to them by any promise of salvation as He was to the Jews. Nor is grace the love of God (*ἀγάπη*), although the death of Christ, upon which the new dispensation of grace rests, can also be regarded as a proof of that love (Rom. v. 8); for it is within the dispensation of grace that this love is first restored to man (cf. v. 2–5, where the love of God is shed abroad in the hearts of those who stand in grace, and 2 Cor. xiii. 14, where the love of God comes after grace; cf. Eph. ii. 4). Nor is grace the goodness of God which shows itself in the conferring of benefits (Rom. ii. 4, xi. 22: *χρηστότης*; cf. Eph. ii. 7). When a particular grace which is given to individuals is spoken of (Gal. ii. 9; 1 Cor. i. 4, iii. 10; 2 Cor. viii. 1; Rom. i. 5, xii. 3, xv. 15; cf. Eph. iii. 2, 8, iv. 7), it might seem as if (as in Peter, § 45, *b*) *χάρις* denoted a gift of divine favour; but elsewhere the *χαρίσματα* are expressly distinguished from the *χάρις*, in consequence of which they are given (Rom. xii. 6: *χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα*; cf. 1 Cor. i. 4, 7), and in Rom. v. 15 the idea of the *χάρισμα* (which, opposed as it is to the *παράπτωμα* of Adam, can only be a gift of grace given by Christ) in the first hemistich is expressly explained in the second by *ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (cf. ver. 17: *ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ δωρεά*, and 2 Cor. ix. 14 f., where the unspeakable gift is the proof of the exceeding grace). Grace is rather, according to note *b*, conceived of as a sovereign power, as an operative principle; it is the divine favour thought of in its activity, which for that very reason excludes all human activity; it is the expression for the exclusive divine causality of salvation (2 Cor. v. 18: *τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*; cf. 1 Cor. i. 30, and the analogous *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*, used of the first creation: 1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom.

xi. 36). As already in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 61, *d*), the grace of God is the operative principle of salvation in Christianity.[1]

(*d*) As it is through the grace of God that the Christian is what he is (note *b*), so he also owes it to Christ (1 Cor. viii. 6: ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ); everything for which he has to thank God has been brought about by Christ (1 Cor. xv. 57: χάρις τῷ Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; cf. Rom. i. 8, vii. 25, xvi. 27; Col. iii. 17). It is through His instrumentality that the new principle of salvation exercises its dominion (Rom. v. 21: ἡ χάρις βασιλεύει . . . διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ); it is through Him that we obtain grace or access to it (Rom. i. 5, v. 2), reconciliation (2 Cor. v. 18; Rom. v. 11; cf. Col. i. 20), peace with God (Rom. v. 1; cf. 2 Cor. iii. 4; Eph. ii. 18), salvation (Rom. v. 9; 1 Thess. v. 9), life and resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 21, 57; Rom. v. 17). The expression ἐν Χριστῷ, when it stands in an objective sense, is only another expression for this mediation of salvation through Christ: it rests in Him, is grounded in Him. It is in Christ that grace is given us (1 Cor. i. 4; cf. Eph. i. 6, ii. 7); in Him rest reconciliation (2 Cor. v. 19), redemption (Rom. iii. 24; cf. Eph. i. 7), justification (Gal. ii. 17; 2 Cor. v. 21; cf. Eph. iv. 32), the love of God (Rom. viii. 39), and eternal life (vi. 23). In Him all the promises of God are fulfilled (2 Cor. i. 19, 20), and the blessing of Abraham comes upon us (Gal. iii. 14); the new time of grace (note *b*) is therefore the promised Messianic time (note *a*). Accordingly, just as in § 61, *d*, in the introductions of the Epistles (note *b*) grace is derived from God as its ultimate author *and* from Christ as its Mediator, and in the concluding benediction the grace of Christ, *i.e.* His enduring gracious activity (2 Cor. xii. 9), can even be wished for alone to the readers, to accompany them continually (Gal. vi. 18; 1 Cor. xvi. 23; Rom. xvi. 20, 24; cf. Phil. iv. 23; 1 Thess. v. 28; 2 Thess. iii. 18; Philem. 25: μεθ' ὑμῶν), in order to be the means of securing to

[1] In those passages where χάρις seems to be equivalent to χάρισμα, it therefore denotes a definite effect of grace (cf. 2 Cor. i. 15, ix. 8), an individual manifestation of favour, just as in 1 Cor. xvi. 3, 2 Cor. viii. 4, 7, 19 (cf. Eph. iv. 29) it stands for a manifestation of love on the part of man. Occasionally χάρις stands also for a definite manifestation of favour, which Christ has given us in His incarnation (2 Cor. viii. 9) or in His death (Gal. i. 6; Rom. v. 15).

them enduringly the love of God and the fellowship of the Spirit (2 Cor. xiii. 14), wherewith is represented the sum of all the blessings of salvation, which the new time brings.

## CHAPTER V.

### CHRISTOLOGY.

Cf. Räbiger, *de christologia Paulina*, Breslau, 1852; Hilgenfeld, "Bem. über den paulin. Christus," *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*, 1871, 2.

### § 76. *The Lord of Glory.*

The specific title of the Mediator of salvation, whom the apostle preaches and the Christians confess, is the name of their Lord. (*b*) At the same time, however, this name describes Him as the sovereign of the world, to whom belong divine honour and worship. (*c*) Notwithstanding this divine dignity, in the sovereignty, which He has received for the purpose of executing His mediatorial office, Christ remains dependent upon the counsel and will of God. (*d*) As the exalted Lord He is the image of God, inasmuch as the supermundane radiant light of the divine glory forms the substance of His glorified corporeity, which has become altogether an organ of the Spirit.

(*a*) If Christianity is the revelation of the grace of God in Christ, then the preaching of the apostle must state, in the first place, who this Christ is who is represented as the Mediator of the perfect revelation of God; for, as shown in § 61, *a*, the name Christ has already become also in Paul simply a proper name.[1] Now, however, it was not till this

[1] The simple name Jesus occurs only in a few places (Gal. vi. 17; 1 Cor. xii. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 5, 11, 14, xi. 4; Rom. viii. 11, x. 9, and other five times, where the text is doubtful), and for the most part only where the historical manifestation of Jesus is expressly referred to; while the simple Χριστός occurs very frequently as a pure *nomen proprium*, forty times with, about a hundred times without the article. As in the Epistles to the Thessalonians, the compound name (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός) stands alone comparatively seldom, viz. twenty-two times, and here too the codices often vary, inasmuch as they omit one or other of the two. As in these Epistles, this name is found inverted, without various readings, most frequently in the formula ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (some twenty times;

Christ had appeared to the apostle as the Lord who had been raised up by God and exalted to heaven, that He became, to him, the Mediator of salvation (1 Cor. ix. 1, xv. 8; cf. § 58, *c*). For him, therefore, the peculiar dignity of Christ is summed up in the title κύριος. He himself describes the sum of his preaching as consisting in this, that he preaches Jesus Christ as the κύριος (2 Cor. iv. 5); and inasmuch as his preaching is always gaining new confessors of Christ, it ministers to the glorifying of His name (Rom. i. 5). The specific confession, therefore, of the Christian Church declares that Jesus is the κύριος (1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. x. 9; cf. Phil. ii. 11; Col. ii. 6). In this title is summed up all that Christ is to it; and hence the reverential designation of Christ as the Mediator of salvation is: Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν (1 Cor. i. 9; Rom. i. 4, v. 21, vii. 25), or, as in the Epistles to the Thessalonians, still more frequently inverted (some nineteen times): ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.[2] Here, accordingly, we find a confirmation of that which we already saw there, viz., that in the apostolic preaching to the Gentiles the Old Testament conception of the Messiah, of which the moment of sovereignty is an essential element, has passed over into that of the κύριος. As, in the preaching of the original apostles, Jesus is acknowledged to be the Mediator of the expected completion of salvation, because He has proved Himself to be the promised and expected Messiah, so He can be acknowledged by Paul and the Gentile Christians to be the Mediator of the grace of God which has been revealed and is operative in

cf. 1 Cor. xv. 31; Rom. vi. 23, viii. 39: ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν), which is connected with the formula ἐν Χριστῷ, which also occurs about twenty times. Occasionally, there already occurs also Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, without any various reading in Gal. iv. 14, and also in other passages with preponderating authority (Gal. ii. 16, v. 24; 2 Cor. iv. 5; Rom. vi. 3, xv. 5); cf. § 61, *a*, footnote 1.

[2] As in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 61, *a*, footnote 2), Christ is also called simply the Lord, almost as often, and without any perceptible difference, κύριος (some thirty-seven times, seventeen of these: ἐν κυρίῳ), as ὁ κύριος (some thirty-four times). Here, too, alongside of these fuller formulae, there appear the shorter κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (1 Cor. i. 3; 2 Cor. i. 2; Rom. i. 7) and ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (2 Cor. xiii. 14; Rom. xiii. 14), generally, however, only in the addresses, and for the most part with the various reading ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς, which can be regarded as fully established only in 1 Cor. xvi. 23; 2 Cor. i. 14, xi. 31; Rom. xiv. 14. Neither does ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ever occur here by itself; and only once do we find ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς (1 Cor. v. 4; cf. Ἰησοῦς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν: 1 Cor. ix. 1; Rom. iv. 24) and ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστός, Rom. xvi. 18.

Christianity, only if He is confessed as the heavenly Lord of the Church. To belong to Him as Lord, is the characteristic mark of all Christians (Rom. xiv. 8; cf. 1 Cor. iii. 23), since, in order to obtain this sovereignty, He has died and become alive again (ver. 9; cf. 2 Cor. v. 15). His command is decisive for them (Gal. vi. 2; 1 Cor. vii. 10, 12, 25, ix. 14, 21), from Him is derived all authority in the Church (1 Cor. v. 4; 2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10), He Himself is also expected as their judge (2 Cor. v. 10).

(*b*) With regard, however, to the sovereign relationship of Christ which the Church acknowledges, the question is by no means only respecting a supreme authority in religious matters. For it is not to the prophet that appeared in Israel that Paul pointed the Gentile Christians, but to the Christ exalted to heaven, as He had appeared to himself as the Mediator of divine grace. Accordingly, the name ὁ κύριος describes Him as the divine sovereign of the world (Rom. x. 12: κύριος πάντων, cf. 1 Cor. xv. 27) sitting at the right hand of God (Rom. viii. 34), to whom is given the possession of the world which was promised to the seed of Abraham (Gal. iii. 16; cf. § 72, *d*, footnote 5). Like Peter (§ 39, *c*, 50, *a*), Paul also, without any explanation, applies to Christ passages in the Old Testament which treat of the κύριος-Jehovah (1 Cor. ii. 16, x. 22; Rom. x. 13),[3] and, as we have already found in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 61, *a*), designates Him the Lord (Rom. xiv. 6–9) in a connection where God has just been designated ὁ κύριος (ver. 4: read ὁ κύριος). Paul, moreover, draws the full consequences of this designation of Christ. At His return, the exalted Messiah appears with such full divine omniscience as is possessed only by the Searcher of hearts (1 Cor. iv. 5); either He as the κύριος (2 Cor. xii. 8) or His κύριος-name (1 Cor. i. 2) is called upon (cf. Phil. ii. 10); and Rom. x. 12, 13, where the passage Joel iii. 5 is applied to Him, shows plainly that this is to be understood in the sense of divine worship. It is clear that,

[3] He also follows the *usus loquendi* of the Septuagint (in which κύριος is the translation of the Old Testament name of God), both in his actual quotations and also where he adopts Old Testament words (1 Cor. i. 31, iii. 20, x. 26, xiv. 21; 2 Cor. vi. 17, 18, x. 17; Rom. iv. 8, ix. 28, 29, x. 16, xi. 3, 34, xii. 19, xiv. 11, xv. 11), and in the same sense he uses κύριος when speaking of God (1 Cor. iii. 5, iv. 19, vii. 17, x. 9 [read: τὸν κύριον], xvi. 7; Rom. xiv. 4).

according to this, the completion of the human as such does not afford the adequate expression for the essence of the (exalted) Christ, as R. Schmidt (p. 158) still maintains.[4] For it is not His sovereignty as the Mediator of salvation that exalts Him for believers to a "godlike dignity;" but as, already in the preaching of the original apostles, it is *after* He is exalted to the right hand of God that Christ has first attained His Messianic sovereignty (*i.e.* His sovereignty as the Mediator of salvation) in the full sense, so, also for Paul, the certainty of His divine dignity is the *presupposition* of His being the Mediator of salvation, in which office the ultimate question at least is as to salvation, by the power of God, in the last judgment (Rom. x. 13), a salvation which can lie only in the power of one who is the divine sovereign of the world in the most comprehensive sense. Accordingly it cannot be surprising if in ix. 5 Christ is extolled as Θεὸς ἐπὶ πάντων. Certainly this is the only passage in our Epistles where there occurs this designation of Christ and a doxology is applied to Him; but the explanation which is most natural, and most in conformity with the language and the context, is nevertheless that which makes it refer to Christ and not to God.[5]

(*c*) Since it is through His being raised up by God (2 Cor. xiii. 4; Rom. iv. 24, 25) that Christ has first attained His

[4] It is in vain that Schmidt (*in loc.*) seeks to limit the contrast in which the mediation of Christ stands, in Gal. i. 1, 12, with all *human* mediation to this, that, because Christ is the pure and absolute organ of God, therefore everything which is accomplished by Him is also something done by God Himself. The invocation of Christ, however, is grounded, *not* upon His historical position as Redeemer, in virtue of which He is for faith the completed revelation and the representative of God, but upon the dignity which He has attained through His exaltation. From the circumstance that the participation of Christ in the divine sovereignty of the world comes into consideration, only when it is the work of salvation which is discussed, Schmidt infers that it was far from the mind of the apostle to think of the natural course of the world, when it does not stand in an express relation to the kingdom of God, as being determined by Christ (p. 127 f.); but Paul has nowhere reflected at all upon a divine "government of the world," which would not have salvation in view; and, in fact, no action of that government is conceivable which would not minister to His ultimate purposes of salvation.

[5] While Baur (p. 194) and Beyschlag (p. 210) still adhere to the false interpretation which makes the doxology refer to God, H. Schultz (*Jahrb. für d. Theol.* 1868, 3) has recently thoroughly established the right interpretation,

exaltation, since it is by God that everything is first made subject to Him (1 Cor. xv. 27, after Ps. viii. 6), and He is always only the Mediator of a salvation whose ultimate ground, according to § 75, rests in God, it is self-evident that, notwithstanding His divine dignity, He is, in His saving activity, in the last analysis, only the executor of the divine will. Although, in regard to the realization of salvation, He is co-ordinated with the Father (cf. the introductions of the Epistles, § 75, *b*), or with the Father and the Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 4–6; 2 Cor. xiii. 14), this by no means forbids that, through His mediation of it, He simply serves the Father, who has resolved upon it and pointed out the way by which it was to be attained. As we belong to Christ and must serve Him with everything which we are and have, so He belongs to God (1 Cor. iii. 23); as the husband is set over the wife as her head, so is God over Christ (xi. 3). Certainly the meaning of these passages cannot possibly be that He "is the Lord of the world only inasmuch as He is the perfect instrument of the Father" (Pfleid. p. 135 [E. Tr. i. 135]); probably the meaning is that the dignity of Christ, which is brought about by His exaltation, ultimately only ministers to the divine purposes. From this we can also understand in what sense Jesus Christ is distinguished, in viii. 6, as the one Lord, from the Father as the one God (cf. xii. 5, 6; Eph. iv. 5, 6). Already it appears from ver. 5 that *Θεός* and *κύριος* are essentially synonymous terms (and, according to note *b*, that distinction is not observed strictly; God, rather, is also called *κύριος*, and Christ, *Θεός*), and that both are meant as designations of divine beings (since the very question which is discussed in the context is, whether the superhuman beings who are worshipped by the Gentiles are to be described as divine); hence it follows that no distinction is to be hereby indicated in the position of dignity occupied by them as regards the world. Christ is rather the *κύριος* in the specific sense, only because God has transferred to Him, until the completion of

which W. Grimm, as well as E. Harmsen (*Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol.* 1869, 3, 1872, 4), has in vain sought to dispute. On the other hand, the altogether unnatural separation of *Θεός* from *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων* by Gess (p. 208) is owing to the circumstance that he regards *Θεός* as a description of the essence of Christ, whereas the addition clearly enough leads us to think of His position of power and dignity.

the work of salvation, the arrangement, superintendence, and execution of all the measures, which are necessary for the realizing of the salvation which has been procured by Him,' *i.e.*, however, has made Him the Lord, in whom the Christians see the Mediator of their salvation (note *a*). This, however, does not forbid that it is only with free acquiescence in the Father's counsel and will that Christ exercises this sovereignty. For this very reason the Son at last gives back His sovereignty to the Father (xv. 24), and ultimately subjects Himself to Him who had put all things under Him (ver. 28). But it by no means follows from this, that, after the final surrender of His sovereignty (as the Mediator of salvation),[6] He enters into the same position with respect to God, which henceforth belongs to the creature in a manner no longer brought about by Him (R. Schmidt, p. 139; Pfleiderer, p. 270 [E. Tr. i. 273 f.]). It is certainly a mistake to appeal with Gess (p. 130), against this view, to an enduring "cosmical government," seeing that, apart from the work of salvation, Paul nowhere reflects upon such a government (cf. footnote 4). But if the subjection of Himself to the Father has no other aim than to bring about the completion of the sovereignty of God (ver. 28: *ἵνα ᾖ ὁ Θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*), then that subjection of Himself can only be the expression for this, that the final surrender of the sovereignty to the Father (ver. 24), *i.e.*, the cessation of His function as the Mediator of salvation, which has then attained its aim, takes place in dependence upon the divine will, in the same way as He had received His *κυριότης* (as the Mediator of salvation) from that will, and had

[6] It is only a dialectical self-deception on the part of Schmidt that makes him say, p. 138, that, if the cessation of the sovereignty of Christ is represented as a surrender of the kingdom to the Father, then that sovereignty cannot be thought of as that which He had as the Mediator of salvation, since this ceases altogether in the end, and the Father and the Son do not merely change their roles. That Christ has exercised His sovereignty for the purpose of accomplishing the work of salvation, is certainly *not* mentioned in 1 Cor. xv. 24; but *for that very reason* a surrender simply of the sovereignty can be spoken of here, although it is self-evident that, in the completed kingdom, the Father no longer exercises it as mediatorial, as Christ had done during His activity with a view to the bringing about of this kingdom. So certainly as Paul cannot have thought that, previous to this surrender, God had divested Himself entirely of His sovereign activity, so certainly that sovereignty of Christ, and therefore His *κυριότης* in general, can have been thought of only as mediatorial in the sense developed above.

exercised it in accordance therewith. Thereby His divine dignity as regards the world, which has been led by Him to salvation, cannot be affected in any way, since the mediatorial sovereignty which is now ceasing was not its cause, but its consequence (note *b*). To speculate as to the manner in which this shows itself henceforward, or as to how it stands related to the government of God in His completed kingdom, is very far remote from the mind of the apostle.

(*d*) The Christology of the apostle starts from the fact that Jesus is the exalted Lord: as such, however, He had appeared to him in the radiant light of the divine glory, which therefore belongs to Christ as the exalted Lord (1 Cor. ii. 8: *κύριος τῆς δόξης*; cf. 2 Thess. ii. 14). This *δόξα*, which belongs originally to the one true God (Rom. i. 23, v. 2), Paul beheld in the face of Christ (2 Cor. iv. 6; cf. iii. 18); and therefore he now proclaims the Gospel of the glory of Christ, who, for the very reason that, in His exaltation, He has this *δόξα*, is the image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4: *εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ*),[7] as appears from the significance that is given to the relative clause by the context (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 135 [E. Tr. i. 135]). It is now, however, characteristic of the Pauline Christology, that the apostle has transformed this idea of the divine *δόξα*, which Jesus also claims for Himself when He returns (§ 19, *d*), and which the original apostles ascribe to the exalted Christ (§ 50, *a*, 52, *c*), into an altogether concrete notion. He conceives of this *δόξα*, in which God has already made Himself visible to the people of the old covenant (Rom. ix. 4, for which see § 71, *c*), as a heavenly radiant light proceeding from a supermundane substance of light, which forms to him the antithesis of every earthly materiality. Out of it are formed the bodies of the *ἐπουράνιοι*, whose *δόξα* is accordingly of a totally different nature from the glory of all earthly bodies (1 Cor. xv. 40), and even from the radiance of the light-giving

[7] It appears from the whole context, that this is said only of Christ as the exalted Lord, and not of the pre-existent Christ (cf. even Biedermann, p. 236); and just as little can the *κύριος τῆς δόξης* of 1 Cor. ii. 8 be referred, with Baur (p. 188) and Gess (p. 123), to Christ apart from His exaltation, although the use of this expression, where it is His crucifixion upon earth that is spoken of, is meant to awaken the thought, that the crucified One could and should have been recognised as the One whose original essence corresponded with that which He has now become.

heavenly bodies (ver. 41).[8] Such a glorified corporeity Christ bears, now that in consequence of His exaltation He has become an inhabitant of heaven (ver. 48; cf. Phil. iii. 21); and this same δόξα believers will yet bear (Rom. v. 2; cf. 2 Thess. ii. 14) when they are conformed to His image (1 Cor. xv. 49; Rom. viii. 29; cf. 2 Cor. iii. 18). This idea, however, becomes specially significant in consequence of the relation in which it is placed to the idea of the πνεῦμα. That glorified corporeity, a corporeity which is, as it were, woven out of a heavenly radiant light, is also described in 1 Cor. xv. 44 as pneumatic; and from 2 Cor. iii. 18 it also appears that it is to Christ as the κύριος πνεύματος that this δόξα belongs, which passes over from Him to believers. The essence of the Spirit, however, is not on that account conceived of under the idea of a luminous substance, as, after Baur (p. 187), especially Holsten (p. 387) and Pfleiderer (p. 200 f. [E. Tr. i. 200 f.]) assume (cf., on the other hand, Wendt, p. 141–145); but as that supermundane δόξα belongs originally to God, who is raised far above all earthly materiality (Θεὸς ἄφθαρτος: Rom. i. 23), as the organ of His revelation, so it also belongs only to a corporeity which has no longer anything of this earthly materiality, but is altogether under the influence of the higher vital principle of the πνεῦμα, and has altogether become an organ of the Spirit (σῶμα πνευματικόν: 1 Cor. xv. 44). For this very reason this glorified corporeity no longer forms any antithesis to the Spirit; out of that supermundane light-substance the Spirit forms for itself a corporeity which is altogether in keeping with it, and which does not conceal but

[8] From this comparison it appears indubitable how Paul has conceived of that δόξα (cf. also 2 Cor. iii. 7, where the radiance upon the face of Moses is so described). From this technical significance of the word δόξα in Paul we must carefully distinguish the meaning given to it, when it is used in the sense of the common doctrinal language of the New Testament to denote the fulness of the divine glory in general, or His sovereign majesty in particular (1 Cor. xi. 7; Rom. vi. 4, ix. 23; cf. 2 Thess. i. 9). This is only an application, by way of metonymy, of the root idea, according to which δόξα is honour, glory, praise (Rom. ii. 7, 10, iii. 7, iv. 20, xi. 36, xv. 7, xvi. 27, and frequently), that which is praised and praisworthy being itself called by that name; whereas the meaning which is discussed in the text proceeds from the root idea of that which appears, catches the eye, or sparkles (cf. § 50, *c*, footnote 5), only that Paul adheres to the *literal* meaning of radiance. For that, in 1 Cor. xv. 40 f., he takes δόξα only in the sense of "appearance," "aspect" (Wendt, p. 98 ff.), a sense in which it never appears elsewhere, is at least certainly very unlikely.

reveals its nature, for, according to vv. 42, 43, the incorruption and fulness of power, which belong to the Spirit, as well as the heavenly δόξα, come to the light in the resurrection body. In the resurrection, through which Christ received this pneumatic body of light (cf. R. Schmidt, p. 108, 112), He has therefore become altogether πνεῦμα (ver. 45: ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ *scil.* ἐγένετο εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν), and therefore it can be said in 2 Cor. iii. 17: ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν. Thus, although Christ, as the man raised from the dead, bears a corporeity, yet in His heavenly exaltation He no longer finds in it any barrier to the divine activity which is in keeping with His divine dignity, and in which He is engaged.

## § 77. *The Son of God.*

The name, Son of God, is given also by Paul to Christ as the promised Messiah. (*b*) Inasmuch as it was through the resurrection that He first attained to His Messianic sovereignty, it was thereby that He was first invested with the full dignity of Sonship. (*c*) The name, Son of God, however, represents Christ as the elect object of divine love. (*d*) From this point of view the divine glory, which He received on the occasion of His entering upon the full Messianic sovereignty, is only the inheritance which the Father has given Him.

(*a*) Although, according to § 76, the Christology of Paul takes a different starting-point from that of the original apostles, it is nevertheless self-evident that it knows itself to be in thorough agreement with the Messianic idea which was dominant in the latter. Because Paul had seen Jesus as the Lord, who was exalted to divine dignity, in the radiant light of the divine glory, He was no longer, to him, the pseudo-Messiah who had been condemned by the Sanhedrim; He was the true Messiah who had been promised to his people, and whom he had also looked for. Although the name, Christ, which has already become a *nomen proprium*, no longer denotes His Messianic calling, it is nevertheless still plainly used in 2 Cor. i. 21 (ὁ βεβαιῶν ἡμᾶς εἰς Χριστὸν καὶ χρίσας) with a play upon its appellative sense, and probably also in Rom. ix. 5 (cf. Eph. i. 12, ii. 12). This Messiah, who had appeared in conformity with the promise, is now also in

Paul, as in the Old Testament, the Son of God (cf. 1 Thess. i. 10). He is so in Rom. i. 3, where the import of the Gospel, which God has promised afore by His prophets in the Holy Scriptures (ver. 2), is characterized by *περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* (cf. ver. 9: *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, where the genitive is to be taken objectively: *de filio*); the Son spoken of here can only be the Messiah promised in these Scriptures, who is also immediately thereafter described, in agreement with that prophecy, as having been born of the seed of David. So also in 2 Cor. i. 19, where He who is preached by Paul, and in whom all the promises of God are fulfilled (ver. 20), is called the Son of God, and in Gal. i. 16, where Paul characterizes his conversion to faith in Jesus, whom he had previously persecuted in the Churches which believed Him to be the Messiah, as a revelation of the Son of God in him.

(*b*) If Jesus is conceived of in the Old Testament sense as the Son of God called to be the Messiah, then His exaltation to the divine dignity, which is lent Him in order that He may execute His office as the Mediator of the (Messianic) salvation, can only be traced back to this filial relationship. In consequence of the resurrection from the dead, He, of whom the Gospel treats, has first been constituted the Son of God in power (Rom. i. 4). To take *ὁρισθείς*, either directly or indirectly, in the sense of a mere declaration (cf. even Gess, p. 204), is contrary to the *usus loquendi;* it denotes the divine determination, which, just because it is divine, is immediately realized (cf. also Pfleid. p. 199 [E. Tr. 128 f.]). It is therefore through the exaltation, which commenced with His resurrection, that Christ is now also first actually invested with the dignity of Sonship; He has, as it were, become in an operative manner (*ἐν δυνάμει*) what He was previously only according to His essence, just as in Ps. ii. 7, 8, from which the name of Son is derived, he who is made the Son of God is now also invested with full sovereignty over the world. Here we have still simply the original apostolic view (§ 39, *c*, 50, *a*), according to which it was through the resurrection that Christ was first made the Messiah and, therewith, the Son of God in the full sense, inasmuch as it was thereby that the moment of sovereignty, which was so essential to the Messianic idea, was first realized in Him. Quite in keeping with this

view, according to which it is through the resurrection that Christ first enters into the full position of the Son, an interpretation of Ps. ii. 7 is put into the mouth of the apostle in Acts xiii. 33, according to which the begetting of the Messiah to be the Son is made to refer to the resurrection. That in Rom. i. 4, also, the question is as to His installation into the position of sovereign, which R. Schmidt (p. 121) denies, the apposition *Ἰ. Χρ. τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* shows unanswerably. In 1 Cor. xv. 28, also, it is the *Son*, to whom God has made everything subject, and the *Father*, to whom He surrenders His sovereignty (ver. 24); and in 1 Cor. viii. 6 Christ, as the Lord, and therefore in His position as the Messianic sovereign, stands over against God as the Father, whereby that Lord is characterized as the Son of God (cf. Gal. i. 3; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 2). As in the original apostles God is called the Father of Christ in connections where it is His quality as the Messianic sovereign that comes into consideration (§ 39, *b*, footnote 3; § 50, *a*, footnote 1), so also in Paul God is called the Father of *our Lord* Jesus Christ (2 Cor. i. 3, xi. 31; Rom. xv. 6; cf. Col. i. 3, iii. 17; Eph. i. 3, v. 20; Phil. ii. 11), or the name of Father stands with reference to His resurrection, through which He was exalted to this sovereignty (Gal. i. 1; Rom. vi. 4).

(*c*) For Paul also the name, Son of God, is by no means a mere title of the Messiah; it rather denotes, as in the Old Testament and in the discourses of Jesus (§ 17, *c*), a specific personal relation to God, in consequence of which He has received the Messianic sovereignty (note *b*). He is the Son of God as the elect object of divine love (cf. Col. i. 13; Eph. i. 6). When the proof of love, which God has given us by the death of Christ (Rom. v. 8), is more particularly described as consisting in this, that He has reconciled us by the death of *His Son* (ver. 10), it is already indicated that the death of Him, who, as being His Son, was the highest object of His love, was for Him a specially great sacrifice. Similarly, the extraordinary nature of the measure, which God took for the salvation of men, is made evident by its being said that He has sent His *own* Son (viii. 3: *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱόν*). In ver. 32, however, it is said expressly that He spared not His own Son (*τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ*), and so gave men the greatest proof

of His love by sacrificing His dearest for them. Looked at from this point of view, the passages where He who has raised up Christ is called the Father (Gal. i. 1; Rom. vi. 4, for which see note *b*), also receive another significance, inasmuch as herein also the love of the Father to the Son was shown.[1]

(*d*) As from the calling of the Son to the Messianic vocation there follows the exaltation of Christ to divine dignity and sovereignty (note *b*), so there is given in the personal relation to the Father, which the name of Son denotes, a special reason for Christ's attaining to participation in the divine glory in the sense of § 76, *d*. It is characteristic of our apostle, when considering the idea of sonship, to reflect especially upon the hopes which the child may cherish in virtue of his right of inheritance. In consequence of the love of the Father, who has constituted the son His heir, the son has the assurance that he will one day share in his Father's possessions (Gal. iv. 7: εἰ υἱός . . . καὶ κληρονόμος), and that which is true of the sons of God is naturally true also of the

[1] It appears from the consideration of all these passages, in which the idea of the Son occurs, that none of them furnishes even the least occasion to take it in the sense of a metaphysical peculiarity of essence (Pfleid. p. 130 [E. Tr. i. 129]). Only we must not mix up this question with the totally heterogeneous one, whether Paul has attributed to this Son of God an eternal existence or a metaphysical consubstantiality of nature with God; because even though this latter question is answered in the affirmative, it is self-evident that it by no means follows that this is *expressed* by the idea of the Son. Here also (cf. § 17, *b*), therefore, the only question to be considered is, what is the *tert. comp.* in this transference of the human filial relationship to the relation of Christ to God? Of an eternal generation of the Son, which Gess (p. 97, 211) thinks he can simply "take for granted," Paul, however, speaks as little in his Epistles as of the supernatural conception of Jesus (Hofmann, i. p. 116), so that this cannot be that *tert. comp.* And when R. Schmidt (p. 123) applies the idea of the Son to Christ in the metaphorical sense of a similarity of nature with God, according to which it is meant to denote the likeness to God of the person who has become a perfected spiritual being (a view which is substantially that also of Biedermann, p. 36, and Pfleiderer, etc.), the ἐν δυνάμει and the context of Rom. i. 4 (cf. note *b*) oppose this interpretation most decisively. It is only by means of the Old Testament conception of the idea of the Son that we escape the difficulty, which lies for every other conception in the circumstance, that believers also become sons of God, and therefore appear put on a level with Him (and that too without there being any hint, in Paul, of a distinction) in regard to that very designation which, according to the common assumption, is meant to express the uniqueness of the origin or nature of Christ. No more than in the case of the theocratic king does this view forbid Him, through whom God bestows His fatherly love upon all others, from being the object of this love in the specific sense.

Son, whose Spirit it is that, according to ver. 6, makes all the others certain of their sonship. In Rom. viii. 17, it is expressly said that the κληρονόμοι Θεοῦ are at the same time συγκληρονόμοι Χριστοῦ; Christ, therefore, as the Son of God and the elect object of His love, has taken possession of the heritage of the Father; and the context (ἵνα . . . συνδοξασθῶμεν) teaches that this heritage consisted in the heavenly δόξα, which the Son has received after His exaltation. In this respect also, therefore, it is since His resurrection that He has first entered into the full right of the Son (Rom. i. 4), and the many brethren, among whom He is the first-born (cf. Acts xiii. 33, for which see note *b*), are, on that very account, conformed to the image of the *Son* of God (Rom. viii. 29), when they also attain to the heavenly δόξα (ver. 30). Lastly, it is because this glory is His portion as the Son, that the future participation of believers in the glory of Christ is, in 1 Cor. i. 9, expressly called ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ υἱοῦ (Θεοῦ). The highest possession of the Father, His heavenly δόξα, the Son had to inherit, like all the other children of God after Him.[2]

## § 78. *Christ in the Flesh.*

Paul mentions only those points in the historical life of Christ, which are important to him doctrinally: His extraction, the institution of the supper, His death and resurrection. (*b*) In particular, the manner in which he speaks of the sinlessness of the life of Christ, and of its character as a pattern and example, shows that he does not start from a direct perception of this life. (*c*) In consequence of His human extraction Christ pos-

[2] From the circumstance that Christ and believers are put on the same level as regards participation in the divine δόξα (which, according to § 76, *d*, is certainly the form in which a perfected pneumatic being manifests itself), we must by no means argue, with R. Schmidt, for a conception of the Pauline Christology, which makes Him no more than a perfected human being; for, seeing that in Paul the idea of δόξα is strictly limited, the inheritance which was first bestowed upon Christ as the Son, in order that He might then be the means of conferring it upon the other sons of God, is far from expressing the whole of that which has been given to Him in His exaltation. Above all, however, it becomes clear here that Christ is not called the Son of God *because* He has become consubstantial with God through the reception of this δόξα, but that He has received it as an inheritance *because* He was the Son, and therefore that the idea of sonship cannot express the similarity of His nature to that of God (cf. footnote 1).

sessed, on the one side, human flesh with its weakness and susceptibility to death, only that it was not under the dominion of sin. (*d*) On the other side, there was in Him originally a higher divine principle, the Spirit of holiness; but it was through the resurrection that this Spirit was first set free so as to become the sole constitutive principle of His being.

(*a*) Paul did not, like the original apostles, look up from the picture of the earthly life of Jesus, which they themselves had seen, to the divine glory of the exalted Lord; he looked back from the radiant light of this glory, in which Christ had appeared to him, to His earthly life; and whatever he may have seen or heard of that earthly life, it was not it that determined his idea of Christ (cf. § 58, *c*).[1] In his Epistles there is no trace of any details whatever which do not stand in the closest connection with his doctrine of Christ and His work. That Christ was descended from Abraham and the fathers (Gal. iii. 16; Rom. ix. 5), and, in particular, that He was of the seed of David (Rom. i. 3; cf. Acts xiii. 23),—as to these points he possessed historical information (§ 19, *a*, 39, *a*, footnote 1); but as he mentions the latter circumstance for the purpose of proving that the purport of his gospel, *i.e.* Christ, was promised beforehand in the prophetic writings, which prophesied that the Messiah would be of the family of David (§ 77, *a*), so he uses the former for the purpose of justifying the application to Him of the prophecy given to the patriarchs. For the death of Christ and His resurrection on the third day, which form the basis of his preaching regarding Him (ἐν πρώτοις), he appeals to tradition (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4; cf. ver. 11), as well as to the individual appearances of Christ to the original apostles and the first disciples (vv. 5–7).[2] He knew that, at the feast of Passover (v. 7), Jesus was crucified by the Jewish and Gentile rulers (ii. 8; Gal. ii. 20, iii. 13, v. 11, vi. 12, 14; 1 Cor. i. 13, 17,

[1] Paret (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1858, 1) has justly called attention to the fact, that although, as Paul was conscious (Gal. i. 16), his idea of Christ was derived from inspiration, it was by no means impossible that he should also have received information regarding Christ from tradition; but he has certainly exaggerated the extent of that which Paul proclaimed in detail out of the life of Jesus in his first preaching.

[2] That he does not distinguish these from the appearance which was granted to himself (ver. 8), shows clearly that he thinks of Christ as being immediately

18, 23, ii. 2, 8; Rom. vi. 6); but that he had told his Churches all the details of the death of Christ, cannot be concluded, with Paret (p. 13), from Gal. iii. 1. It is true he speaks of the sufferings of Christ (2 Cor. i. 5, 7; cf. Phil. iii. 10; Col. i. 24); but the fact that he pictures these to his readers by means of a reference to Ps. lxix. 9 (Rom. xv. 3), shows how far the details of these sufferings were from standing directly and vividly before his eyes. That he knows that, on the night when He was betrayed into the hands of His enemies, Christ instituted the supper (1 Cor. xi. 23–25), only shows that he found the custom of breaking bread and consecrating the cup already existing in the Church, and inquired into its origin. And he only mentions the story in order that he may attach to it doctrines regarding the significance of this meal; and these doctrines he *himself* traces back to a higher origin (ver. 23).

(*b*) In the preaching of the original apostles it is plainly in consequence of the direct impression made upon them by the life and the suffering of Jesus, that His sinlessness and the character of His life as a pattern and example are brought into prominence (§ 38, *b*, 49, *a*). In the case of Paul it is otherwise. Only once is His sinlessness set forth in a dogmatic manner (2 Cor. v. 21: *τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν*); and Paul has scarcely ever felt the need of proving it historically, since it is self-evident in the case of the Messiah, who is exalted to heaven, and who had, by His death, redeemed the world from sin. Only in 2 Cor. x. 1 are the meekness and gentleness of Christ mentioned, and that quite generally. If, according to 1 Cor. xi. 1, Paul, in his unselfish striving after the salvation of others, is imitating Christ, it is sufficient to think of the proof of love which Christ has given us in His death (2 Cor. v. 14; Gal. ii. 20; cf. Rom. viii. 35), just as in 1 Thess. i. 6 he also points to the exemplary joy of Christ in His suffering. Instead, however, of picturing that unselfish

exalted to heavenly glory by means of the resurrection, and that he does not think of any special intermediate condition between the resurrection and the exaltation to heaven. That he repeatedly lays stress upon the burial of Christ (1 Cor. xv. 4; Rom. vi. 4; cf. Acts xiii. 29; Col. ii. 12), is closely connected with the circumstance, that this guarantees the reality of His death as well as that of His resurrection, and is therefore equally important for both the great saving facts of his system.

surrender of Christ to suffering by any special feature of His life, he appeals to a passage in the Book of Psalms (Rom. xv. 3; cf. note *a*). It is still more significant, however, that, in order to set up the sacrificing love of Christ as a pattern, he contrasts His pre-temporal state of existence with His earthly life (2 Cor. viii. 9, for which see § 79, *e*; cf. Phil. ii. 5 ff.). Whether Paul has considered how this sinlessness of Christ during His earthly life is compatible with his doctrine of the power of sin having, through Adam's transgression, obtained dominion in the whole human race, cannot be ascertained. If he has conceived of this influence of Adam upon his whole race as owing to sexual procreation (§ 67, *d*), then nothing is more obvious here than the exclusion of the male factor by a direct creative act of God in the case of the only sinless one. But since Paul says that Christ was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4), without hinting as to anything uncommon in the occasion of His birth, since he even makes Him be born of the seed of David (Rom. i. 3),[3] and since we must not assume without more ado that the tradition which is found in our later Gospels of a miraculous conception of Jesus had ever reached him, we do not know whither he has drawn this consequence which was certainly almost indispensable to his system.

[3] That Paul herewith denies a supernatural conception of Jesus (Pfleiderer, p. 152 [E. Tr. i. 151]), is certainly to say too much; for even for the consciousness of the evangelists, who relate the miracle of the supernatural conception, the latter did not exclude the extraction of Christ from the fathers (cf. even R. Schmidt, p. 143). If now Paul had not simply adopted his statement regarding the descent of Jesus from the seed of David from tradition, which was altogether unacquainted, at least in wide circles, with the events that took place at His birth, and therefore thought of that descent in the common sense, but had also reflected upon its compatibility with a supernatural conception, it is, of course, self-evident that such a conception was possible only if Christ was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4) who belonged to the seed of David, *i.e.* according to Rom. iv. 13, to the family which was descended, bodily, from David. And even allowing that we had no other indication that Mary was descended from David (which I, for my part, would be disposed to deny), that does not hinder Paul or the evangelists from having in this way reconciled to themselves the traditional descent of Jesus from the family of David with His (presupposed or traditional) supernatural conception. Whether Paul, however, has thought at all upon this question, can no more be determined than whether he has drawn that dogmatical consequence. In his view of Christ as the second Adam there is certainly not yet involved the assumption of a new creative act on the occasion of His conception, for it is not permissible to carry out this typical parallel beyond the *tertium comparationis* which is clearly stated by himself (cf. § 79, *a*).

(*c*) If we inquire as to the idea which Paul has formed to himself of the person of Christ during His earthly life, it appears from Rom. i. 3, ix. 5, that in Him as well as in all men, he regarded the σάρξ as only one side of His being. If Christ is descended κατὰ σάρκα from the fathers, and, more particularly, from the seed of David, it follows that, with the σάρξ, His whole being was not yet exhausted. In both passages, however, the antithesis makes it absolutely impossible to think that the σάρξ means only the body of Christ (Rom. vii. 4), or even only His corporeity as possessed of a soul.[4] It is rather the whole natural human being of Christ that is meant (§ 68, *b*), as distinguished from a higher divine element, which was in Him (i. 4), or from the divine dignity which He now possesses (ix. 5).[5] Now, in all men the σάρξ is the seat of sin, and under the dominion of ἁμαρτία; not, however, because the σάρξ is sinful in itself, but because, with the transgression of Adam, sin has come into the world, and has made the human σάρξ sinful (§ 68, *b*). Although, accordingly, the σάρξ of Christ is not a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, which it cannot be, if He did not know sin (2 Cor. v. 21), He is, nevertheless, man in the full sense (ἄνθρωπος: 1 Cor. xv. 21; Rom. v. 15; cf. Acts xvii. 31), only such as man was, before sin began to dwell and reign in him. This gives us the full explanation of the statement in Rom. viii. 3, that God sent His Son ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. This cannot mean

[4] The strange question, whether Paul has ascribed a human soul to Christ, is neither to be answered in the negative with Zeller (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1842, 1), nor, with R. Schmidt (p. 156), passed by as incapable of being decided. It is owing to a total misconception of the Pauline anthropology, according to which the σάρξ in the living man cannot be thought of otherwise than as possessed of a soul (cf. § 67, *d*), and is therefore to be answered in the affirmative. A question can only arise as to the manner in which Paul has conceived to himself the origin of the soul of Christ, whether by natural propagation, or, as in the case of the first man, by a new creative act of God; but this question is plainly closely connected with the unanswerable question as to his view of the conception of Jesus (footnote 3).

[5] This appears, in particular, also from 2 Cor. v. 16, where the knowing Christ κατὰ σάρκα certainly means more than the knowledge of His bodily nature, and denotes the estimating of Christ according to His whole manifestation upon earth as a man, for it stands parallel with the statement that the apostle will no longer know any one according to what he is in his natural-human character (κατὰ σάρκα), but only according to what he is in his new life which belongs to Christ (ver. 15).

that Jesus had the σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, and therefore sin itself although in Him it did not become παράβασις (cf. Holsten, p. 41), nor does the expression conceal an unsolved antinomy, which leads to Docetism (cf. Baur, p. 191; Pfleiderer, p. 155 [E. Tr. i. 154]). Christ really possessed the human σάρξ, as is immediately presupposed in the ἐν τῇ σαρκί, which can only refer to His σάρξ; but because His σάρξ was not a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, it was only similar to it, *i.e.* to the σάρξ as it is constituted in empirical humanity, without anything being thereby awanting to it, which belongs to the essence of the σάρξ as such (cf. even Biedermann, p. 239).[6] Still it possessed the whole ἀσθένεια of the human σάρξ (2 Cor. xiii. 4: ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἀσθενείας), in particular its susceptibility to death, so that death could obtain power over Him (Rom. vi. 9).

[6] The recent treatises on this passage have only helped to establish the common conception of it. The very confident assertion of Overbeck (*in loco*, 1869, 2; cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 153 f. [E. Tr. i. 152 f.]), that ὁμοίωμα can only denote the homogeneity of the flesh of Christ with sinful flesh, and that it is pure arbitrariness to make the moment of dissimilarity, which even according to him lies in the idea of ὁμοίωμα, refer to the condition of the σάρξ which is indicated by the genitive, Zeller (*ibid.* 1870, 3) has already sufficiently weakened in favour of the current view (cf. § 69, c, footnote 2). If we ask, why then Paul did not simply write ἐν σαρκί, it is clear that that condition of the empirical σάρξ could not but have been expressly mentioned in a connection where the very question considered was the reference of the sending of Jesus to the sin which reigns in it, inasmuch as it was only upon the domain which had up to this time been its own that this sin could be conquered (cf. Wendt, p. 190). As the misinterpretation of that expression, however, is only possible when we understand by the σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας a σάρξ which is sinful *in its essence* (and this no more agrees with the Pauline anthropology than with a correct explanation of the expression; cf. § 68, *d*, footnote 14), so it leads also to the denial of the sinlessness of Christ, which is absolutely indispensable in this very passage, according to which it is through the sending of Him that the conquest of sin was to be effected, and sufficiently guaranteed by 2 Cor. v. 21. The misinterpretation of this latter passage by Holsten, who makes it refer to the sinlessness of Christ in His premundane state of existence, R. Schmidt (p. 99) has completely refuted; and a want of knowledge of the sin which dwelt in His flesh, although it did not manifest itself in παραβάσεις, would not only have been no advantage of Christ, for it was found in the whole of humanity previous to the time of Moses (Rom. v. 13, 14), but would have been only a great lack of self-knowledge. Pfleiderer (*in loc.*) has reverted to Baur's assumption of an unsolved antinomy; but this antinomy they first make themselves by imposing upon the apostle an anthropology which is at least incompatible with his Christology, the assumption, viz., of a sinful constitution of the σάρξ. Such an assumption is, of course, superfluous, if, with Schenkel, we explain the μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτ. to mean that Christ "did no sin knowingly, and therefore remained sinless in the subjective sense" (p. 246)!

(*d*) When Paul describes the πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης as the other side of the being of Christ (Rom. i. 4), he thereby attaches himself to the original apostolic view, according to which Jesus was anointed with the Holy Spirit (§ 38, *b*, 48, *b*). The expression πνεῦμα ἅγιον he probably avoids purposely, in order to distinguish the Spirit, which was originally in Christ, from that which is communicated through Him, and he describes this Spirit—not as one which is the source of holiness for its possessor (R. Schmidt, p. 107), but—as one whose quality is ἁγιωσύνη (*gen. qual.*), because in this way there comes out more clearly than in the term ἅγιος the property of His being, which qualified Christ for the exaltation which is here asserted of Him (§ 77, *b*). More essential is the distinction that this Spirit does not appear as one which Christ has first received (on the occasion of His baptism); but that Paul appears to regard it as a constitutive factor of His being. If, in the natural man, the higher side of human nature is the νοῦς, which is distinguished from the πνεῦμα (§ 68, *c*), and which remains powerless in opposition to the might of sin, in Christ its place is from the first taken by the essentially divine element of the πνεῦμα, which therefore hindered sin from being able to obtain the mastery of His σάρξ (note *c*).[7] Christ is not on this account, however, the pneumatic man from the very first (cf. Baur, p. 191); even in Him rather this higher divine element of His being and the natural human σάρξ still form a relative antithesis (Rom. i. 3, 4). This antithesis, however, can and must be done away with, and this is effected through the resurrection. That Jesus was raised up in virtue of the πνεῦμα which dwelt in Him, Peter also teaches (§ 48, *c*); but Paul draws the further consequence of this doctrine. It is through the resurrection that the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ has first become εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν (1 Cor. xv. 45, for which see § 76, *d*); it

[7] In 1 Cor. ii. 16 the νοῦς Χριστοῦ is spoken of; but we have already seen (§ 68, *c*) that here the expression is simply conditioned by the preceding quotation (Isa. xl. 13: τίς ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου). In Him the πνεῦμα, which all men first receive through Him, is originally present. This significant christological view of the apostle is altogether ignored when, in consequence of a wrong conception of the Pauline anthropology, we see in this πνεῦμα only the principle of life which belongs to all men, and which makes them beings in the image of God (cf. Beyschlag, p. 211, 231).

is through it that that relative antithesis between the σάρξ and the πνεῦμα, which was still also in Him, has been done away with, and His whole being, including His corporeity, has become pneumatic (ver. 46). Now first, therefore, can He become also for other men the author of the resurrection (vv. 20–23), and of an exclusively pneumatic state of existence (ver. 44)—of course, however, not till after that second event also has taken place, for which that original pneumatic property of His being qualified Him, and which was realized in consequence of His resurrection, His elevation, viz., to the full dignity of divine sonship (cf. § 77, *b*).

## § 79. *The Heavenly Origin.*

As the second Adam, who has by His resurrection secured the pneumatic or heavenly corporeity to the human race, Christ Himself must have been of heavenly origin. (*b*) The assumption of such an origin depends also upon an inference from the dignity of the exalted Christ to an original divine state of existence of the Son, from which He had come into the earthly life. (*c*) In consequence of a similar inference from the office of Christ as the Mediator of salvation in His historical life, Paul ascribes to Him in His prehistorical state of existence the mediation of God's creative activity, and of the manifestations of His grace to Israel. (*d*) In His exaltation, however, Christ has, according to Paul, received more than He possessed before His incarnation.

(*a*) Christ is the antitype of Adam (Rom. v. 14: ὁ μέλλων Ἀδάμ), because His influence extends to the whole human race in the same manner as that of Adam.[1] As sin and death came into the world through the latter, so righteous-

[1] It is often wrongly represented that, for Paul, the name of the second Adam was the most expressive designation of the nature of Christ (compare, *e.g.*, Beyschlag, p. 223, 225, and against him R. Schmidt, p. 92). It is only the significance of Christ and Christianity for the whole human race, a significance which comes out so strongly in the teaching of Paul, that this expression primarily characterizes (cf. § 58, *c*, *d*). In Rom. v. 14 the *tertium comparationis* of the comparison which is made there between type and antitype is expressly stated, and we must not go beyond it to further inferences regarding the origin (cf. § 78, *b*, footnote 3) or the nature of Christ. Cf. Pfleiderer, p. 142 [E. Tr. i. 141 f.].

ness and life have come into it through the former. The same *tertium comparationis* lies at the root of the parallel between Adam and Christ in 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47, only that, in conformity with the whole context, the second Adam (ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ or ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, inasmuch as all men who are homogeneous with the first Adam are counted only as one) appears here as the one from whom the pneumatic corporeity of completed humanity is derived, just as the psychical corporeity of earthly humanity, to which Christ also once belonged, is derived from the first Adam in consequence of the manner in which he was formed out of the dust of the earth, and received a soul through the divine breath of life. Already it follows from this that what is spoken of here cannot be the origin of the human personality of Christ (Kübel, p. 221), but only the risen Christ, as is now-a-days being more and more generally acknowledged (cf. R. Schmidt, p. 116; Pfleiderer, p. 132 f. [E. Tr. i. 132 f.]). In this sense, therefore, Christ has become the last Adam, only after He has by death laid aside the fleshly or psychical corporeity, which was borne also by Him upon earth, and has in the resurrection altogether *become* the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, only after His corporeity also has been transformed into the pneumatic (cf. § 76, *d*, 78, *d*). Now in this passage it is said expressly that the second man was ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (the ὁ κύριος of ver. 47 is to be struck out),[2] and this allusion to

[2] R. Schmidt strives in vain to prove that this refers only to the substantial essence of the Risen One, from which His heavenly corporeity, according to him, received its nature (p. 113–117); but only Schenkel, who is bold enough to deny to Paul any doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ, has coincided with him (p. 257). For if the substantial nature of the first man (so far as concerns his corporeity) is accounted for by *his* origin from the earth (ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός), the substantial nature of the second man (as to His corporeity) cannot be explained from the heavenly origin of the substance of this corporeity, but only from the origin of the *person* who has first received such a corporeity, and has thus become the means of securing it to humanity. The apparent incongruity, that the first Adam becomes the author of the psychical corporeity at the commencement of his life, while the second is not so until His resurrection, is sufficiently accounted for by the circumstance that in this connection the point in question is solely as to the bodily condition of *risen* humanity, the author and mediator of which can therefore be also only a risen man (the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων of 1 Cor. xv. 20–22) as its second Adam. On the other hand, the reference of ver. 47 to the Parousia, which is renewed by Gess, p. 127 f., requires arbitrary additions.

His heavenly origin can only involve the thought that He, who has been the means of securing to humanity a corporeity which is in keeping with its heavenly completion, must Himself have been an inhabitant of heaven according to His original nature (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ). Certainly He has not brought this corporeity with Him from heaven,[3] but has Himself first received it on the occasion of His exaltation to heaven after the resurrection. Such an exaltation has never been bestowed upon the men who are derived from the earth, who have an earthly nature, and have been begotten by the first Adam and his descendants; nor could it have been attainable by Him, for He was likewise descended from Adam κατὰ σάρκα, and shared primarily in his bodily condition, if He had not also had another higher origin.[4] If, however, the statement of the apostle, which meets us here for the first time, regarding the heavenly origin of Christ depends upon this consideration, he will have attained to the knowledge of His original being through an inference from that which He has become in His heavenly exaltation. Of course, the point in question here is not as to a logical operation, but as to the knowledge which

[3] Pfleiderer, who (p. 133 [E. Tr. i. p. 133]) gives substantially the same explanation of our passage, deviates from our view in this, that he concludes from it that the man who is of heavenly origin must have already pre-existed there as "a pneumatic man" (p. 140 [E. Tr. 139]); while Biedermann (p. 236) finds in this pre-existence of the "human" image of God the real nerve of the original Christology of Paul. But ver. 46 is directly opposed to this view; there it is stated, with express reference to the distinction between the pneumatic and the psychical corporeity, to be a universal law, that not τὸ πνευματικόν, but τὸ ψυχικόν is that which is first. That being the case, however, Christ cannot have pre-existed in a pneumatic corporeity, and, since a corporeity is an essential part of man, not even as man (cf. Schmidt, p. 118). The assertion, that the point in question here is as to the historical realization of the πνευματικόν in humanity, is of no avail; for precisely as the second man, Christ certainly belongs to humanity, and in the mind of the apostle His premundane life was as concrete a reality as His earthly. As certainly, therefore, as it was the same subject that was derived from heaven, and, as δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, has become the beginner of risen humanity, so certainly it has not pre-existed "in the same form of existence;" for, according to ver. 45, it was in the resurrection that Christ first obtained the pneumatic corporeity which made Him the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, and that, too, as the inheritance of the Son of God (§ 77, *d*); He did not, however, merely receive it *back again*, or return to His original form of existence, which Pfleiderer (p. 159 [E. Tr. i. 158]) can once more only explain on the assumption of an unsolved antinomy.

[4] Upon this passage is based the assumption in which many now believe they have found the real key to the Pauline Christology (cf. Baur, p. 191; Beyschlag,

sprang out of the depth of His consciousness of man's need of redemption, and which matured under the guidance of the Spirit, the knowledge, viz., that He, who has first attained the heavenly goal of humanity, and who was alone qualified and appointed to lead it thither, must have been of a higher origin than it.

(*b*) According to § 77, *d*, the divine glory which was bestowed upon Christ in His pneumatic corporeity, and which He received at His exaltation, was only the inheritance which originally belonged to Him alone as the Son of God. If now the claim that He alone had upon this inheritance depended upon His higher nature (note *a*), it follows that as the Son of God He is of heavenly origin. This, however, appears clearly from Gal. iv. 4, where He is said to have been sent forth by the Father as the Son, in order that He might be the means of securing sonship to all others.[5] If His being born of a woman and His being placed under the law are here set forth as a special divine measure, although the γίνεσθαι ἐκ γυναικός is, *per se*, self-evident for every man, and the γίνεσθαι

p. 225; Holsten, p. 71 ff.; Hilgenfeld, p. 189). In consequence of the explanation which Philo gives to the double account of the creation of man in Genesis, Paul, it is alleged, has seen in Christ the heavenly original man or the type of humanity. Naturally this combination is closely connected with the assumption of a pre-existence of Christ as "the pneumatic man" (cf. footnote 3); but even such a decided defender of the latter assumption as Pfleiderer has declared himself energetically against the former (p. 141 ff. [E. Tr. i. 140 ff.]). In fact, one cannot comprehend how the last Adam has grown out of that first-created Adam, and how that idea of the heavenly man has so completely got rid of the character of the Platonic ideal world (a character which hovers between ideality and reality), from which it is adopted by Philo, and has solidified itself into the full reality of a person that is identical with the historical Christ. The thought of the Logos of Philo, whom earlier writers discovered in the Pauline Christ (cf. Usteri, p. 331; Dähne, p. 114 ff.), is still more foreign to the Pauline circle of ideas. For the *à priori* assumption of such an intermediate being there is not found in him even the slightest point of contact.

[5] This, of course, does not follow from the idea of the sending *per se*, which could equally well denote that He was entrusted with a calling, nor from the compound ἐξαπέστειλεν, which can only be artificially made to refer to a separation of Himself from the Son on the part of the Father; it undoubtedly follows, however, from the participial clauses, which make it impossible to doubt, that the sending is conceived of here as coeval with His entering upon the earthly life (cf. R. Schmidt, p. 144; Pfleiderer, p. 136 f. [E. Tr. i. 136 f.]). See also Gess, p. 95 f., against Hofmann, who makes the passage refer to the supernatural conception, by means of which (according to him) Christ became the Son.

ὑπὸ νόμον for every Jew, it follows that the existence of the Son was not conditioned by His human birth, but that He already existed in a condition from which He could be sent forth, and that He then stood in a filial relationship to God, which in itself excluded the εἶναι ὑπὸ νόμον, just as according to ver. 5 the reception of the υἱοθεσία includes, for Christians, the cessation of that εἶναι ὑπὸ νόμον. It is equally clear in Rom. viii. 3, where God's sending His Son ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας is regarded as an extraordinary measure occasioned by special circumstances, that with the εἶναι ἐν τῇ σαρκί, which began for Christ as for every man with His being born of a woman, He entered into a condition which was not in keeping with His original filial relationship, and that therefore that πέμψας cannot be understood of His historical appearing upon the scene, but only of a sending which made Him exchange His original state of existence for one which was of a totally different nature. Both passages, therefore, show that in the mind of the apostle there is connected with this very position of Christ as the Son the idea of a different kind of existence, which Christ has left for the purpose of carrying out the divine decree of salvation, in order to enter into the earthly-human state of existence. From this, however, it does not by any means follow, that an eternal existence of Christ or a metaphysical origin out of God was implied in the mere idea of the Son of God (cf. § 77, *c*, footnote 1). If, according to Rom. i. 4, it is in consequence of the resurrection that Christ has first been invested with the full dignity of the Son, this does not (according to § 77, *b*) by any means depend upon a reflection upon the nature of divine sonship, which, indeed, all others obtain also through Him; it depends upon this, that it was only in His unique position of dignity that He could fulfil the vocation of the Son of God who was called to be the Messiah. But here also (just as in note *a*) it was for the religious consciousness of the apostle a natural inference, that the elevation to such divine dignity was only possible in the case of Him whose origin and nature qualified Him for an exaltation which far transcended all the bounds of human perfection and all the limits of created beings. The specific divine πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, which belonged to Him alone of all

men as the higher element of His being, and in virtue of which He could also be invested with the full dignity of the Son (§ 78, *d*), already gave intimation of such an one. The Son of God, however, who had found His completion in participation in the divine dignity and sovereignty of the world, could have been from the beginning no human created being, but must have been from all eternity the object of divine love.[6]

(*c*) Beyschlag has attempted to show that Paul has ascribed to the pre-existent Christ only an ideal existence (although in the realistic sense), that according to him Christ has pre-existed, not as a personality, but as the principle of a personality (cf. especially p. 243). In Paul, however, there is not found any hint whatever of this.[7] As, according to note *b*,

[6] According to Pfleiderer (p. 136 [E. Tr. i. 136]), that which had become in time through the exaltation of Christ demanded a deeper ground in the timeless existence of the heavenly world, in order to stand fast to the Christian consciousness as an absolute certainty and necessity, and thus arose the doctrine of His pre-existence. But the heavenly exaltation of Christ was a fact which was borne witness of to the apostle by the manifestation of the exalted One, a fact which demanded no further ground, and which, at least, could certainly not find such a ground in a self-made theorem. Biedermann (p. 236) derives the idea of Christ's pre-existence from the fact that the Son must anticipate the Old Testament theocracy, which negatively prepared the way for His coming; but he has not shown how this line of thought, which for us demands only an ideal pre-existence in the divine decree, demanded for Paul a hypostatic pre-existence. On the other hand, Hofmann traces back the Pauline doctrine of the pre-existence to such sayings of Christ as John xvi. 28, which were altogether foreign to the earliest tradition, at least as known to us; but Gess has already shown (p. 365 f.) that this stands in plain contradiction with Gal. i. 16. Gess himself derives it from a revelation which disclosed to him the depth of the Old Testament promise of the Messiah (p. 369); but Paul has certainly never hinted at such a source, while the manner in which he asserts Christ's heavenly origin on the very occasion of his making mention of the second man, and takes it for granted when he mentions the earthly manifestation of the Son, gives us an adequate idea of the way in which the divine revelation regarding the deepest essence of the Son to which he appeals has come to him.

[7] There is no evidence given that it was the view of Paul that "the actual personality first arises through the implanting of the principle of a personality in the σάρξ" (cf. the excellent remarks of Pfleiderer, p. 137, note [E. Tr. i. 136]), and this assertion is already refuted by his angelology, the conception of which, as developed by Beyschlag (p. 244–246), would lead to a break of the apostle with the Jewish view of the world which cannot be pointed out anywhere. Sabatier, also (p. 290), regards the question as unanswerable, whether Paul has conceived of the pre-existence of Christ as an ideal or a personal one,

the Son of God is the subject who was sent from heaven, and who was therefore already in heaven, so it is Christ Himself, whom it would be an absurdity to bring down from heaven, because He has already come down (Rom. x. 6). In 2 Cor. viii. 9 it is represented as a manifestation of the grace of Christ (*τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*), that He, who was rich there, for our sakes became poor; it is therefore the same subject, who once had the riches of the heavenly life, and, out of love to men and for the sake of their salvation, chose instead the poverty of the earthly life.[8] In 1 Cor. viii. 6, also, Jesus Christ is the one Lord, through whom *τὰ πάντα* are, just as Christians are what they are through Him as the Mediator of salvation.[9] From this passage, however, it is plain that the statement regarding the mediatorial office of

and asserts that in the mind of the apostle the prehistorical activity of Christ melts into that of the Divine Spirit.

[8] This interpretation of the passage does not, as Baur (p. 193) thinks, depend upon our translation of *ἐπτώχευσε*, which is, moreover, thoroughly justifiable grammatically, and necessarily demanded by its correspondence with the *ἵνα πλουτήσητε* as well as by the intended stirring up of the Corinthians to sacrifice their possessions, for it remains substantially the same even though *ἐπτώχευσε* is made to refer to the fact of the earthly life of Christ; but it depends upon this, that the reference to the outward poverty of His earthly life, in which He renounced every claim upon sensuous goods and earthly honours (cf. Beyschlag, p. 237), or even to the lowest stage of human misery, the bearing of the cross (Schenkel, p. 249), is absolutely excluded by the final clause. For, since the riches can be understood here only of the heavenly glory to which the office of Christ as the Mediator of salvation during His earthly existence leads men, so in the antithesis also we can think only of the riches of His previous heavenly existence, which He gave up for their sakes (cf. R. Schmidt, p. 144; Pfleiderer, p. 138 f. [E. Tr. i. 137 f.]).

[9] Baur (p. 193) regards it as impossible that the *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* can be conceived of as the creator of the world, and therefore, by means of the altogether unsuitable comparison with 2 Cor. v. 18, limits the *τὰ πάντα* here also to the work of redemption (cf. Schenkel, p. 259); the work of redemption, however, is absolutely excluded by the appended *καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ* as well as by the parallel *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα*; and it only follows that Paul does not think of the pre-existent Christ as the typical man. Pfleiderer (p. 145, note [E. Tr. i. 144]) is of opinion that these two predicates are quite compatible for a dogmatic thinker like the apostle; but it would require first to be shown, that for an Old Testament consciousness, which throughout connected the notion of creaturely existence with the idea of man, it was possible to think of a man as the means whereby the world was created, while, conversely, the elevation of a man to a position of divine dignity must have led to the recognition that such a subject had originally been of a higher nature, and therefore that his humanity could not have been his original form of existence (cf. note *b*).

Christ on the occasion of the creation of the world depends upon the same kind of an inference as the statements regarding the heavenly existence of Christ in general. If the Mediator of salvation is once recognised to be a pre-existent being, then in that premundane existence of His He can only have had a mediatorial position with respect to the creative activity of God which is analogous to that which He had in His earthly existence with respect to God's gracious activity. Even Pfleiderer (p. 144 [E. Tr. i. 143 f.]) acknowledges that this statement is not derived, *à priori*, from a speculation regarding an intermediate being, by means of whom God had to bring about His activity with respect to the world, and with whom the manifestation of the historical Christ was in some way or other identified, but, *à posteriori*, from the transference of the specific significance of Christ in His historical life to His prehistorical existence. Therein there is, of course, already involved the germ of the knowledge, that even the creative activity of God did not stand out of relation to the goal of the world which was to be realized through Christ (cf. § 103, *a*). And although, in 1 Cor. x. 9, the reading *τὸν Χριστόν* must yield to *τὸν κύριον*, for which there is more authority, and which, according to the context, refers to God, yet it is said in ver. 4 that the water-giving rock, which, according to Rabbinic tradition, accompanied the Israelites in their march through the wilderness, was Christ. Paul does not, as Baur (p. 193) and Schenkel (p. 260) think, make this rock refer typically to Christ, in which case he must have said *ἐστιν*; but, starting from the presupposition that the gracious leading of Israel was a type of the Christian's experiences of salvation (§ 73, *c*), he concludes from the fact that the latter were brought about through the historical Christ that the former also was owing to Him in His prehistorical existence; an idea which there is no need of supposing that he borrowed from the apocryphal doctrine of wisdom, as Köstlin (*Stud. und Krit.* 1866, p. 760) still asserts. If in Peter it was still the pre-existent Spirit of the Messiah that worked in the prophets (§ 48, *b*), here it is the pre-existent Son of God Himself who brought about the revelation of God to Israel as well as the creation of the world. This is the advance of the Pauline Christology.

(*d*) Although it is, accordingly, certainly true, that it is from the view of the exalted Christ and His significance as the Mediator of salvation that Paul has advanced to the statements regarding His premundane existence and His mediatorial position therein, yet it by no means follows that the doctrine of the pre-existence has only a secondary significance for his Christology, as is very emphatically asserted by R. Schmidt (p. 157, 159; cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 270 f. [E. Tr. i. 273 f.]). In that doctrine there is reflected (though still in a direct manner) the consciousness of the eternal ground of salvation, and it is in it that the consciousness of the divine greatness of the Mediator of salvation is first established in such a manner that it cannot be shaken. Paul has, indeed, no more reflected upon the manner in which the incarnation of an already pre-existing eternal being is to be represented, than upon the origin of His earthly life (cf. § 78, *b*), which in His case was coeval with the giving up of His heavenly life. Only it is certain, that the idea of the assumption of a human nature to be united with the divine is as foreign to the apostle as the idea of the pre-existing heavenly man (cf. footnote 3), an idea which does not in any way further the solution of that problem.[10] Regarding the apostle's idea of the mode of existence of the Son of God in His premundane state of being only so much is certain, that he has conceived of it as pneumatic in analogy with the divine, and hence, also, as sharing in the divine δόξα in the sense of § 76, *d*. Only it is self-evident, that no more than God Himself can He be conceived of in a σῶμα τῆς δόξης, for the

[10] The manner in which this solution is being now-a-days sought in that idea, leads altogether astray. Holsten makes the ideal man Χριστός, who pre-existed in the heavenly body of light, unite Himself with the earthly man Jesus (p. 76, 423), and, in support of his view, even appeals to the combination of the name Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, which is common to the whole New Testament. Altogether misconceiving the Pauline anthropology, Hilgenfeld attributes to the apostle a pre-existence of souls, which he finds by means of a very artificial exegesis in Rom. vii. 9, 10, and on the ground of which he seeks to comprehend the incarnation of the pre-existing ideal man (p. 790). Pfleiderer (p. 152[E. Tr. i. 151]), indeed, is of opinion, that the transformation of the psychical body into the pneumatic at the resurrection furnishes an analogy for the transformation of the pneumatic corporeity of the heavenly man into the psychical; but since Christ was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4), His psychical corporeity has not originated by means of a "miraculous metamorphosis," but has been formed in a natural way in His mother's womb, the question as to the manner of His conception being left altogether undecided.

σῶμα (in its earthly-lowly as well as in its heavenly-glorified condition) is one of the conditions of human (or, according to 1 Cor. xv. 40, of all created) existence, into which Christ first entered by His being born of a woman (cf. note *b*). In so far it was no mere return to His pneumatic form of existence, when by the resurrection Christ ἐγένετο εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν (1 Cor. xv. 45), since this presupposes that the πνεῦμα now transformed even His human body into the σῶμα τῆς δόξης, in which He remains henceforth the head of completed humanity. On the other hand, even the divine dignity, to which Christ has attained through His exaltation, nowhere appears in Paul as one which He already possessed, and to which He has merely returned after His resurrection. Only the prerequisite for it was given in His heavenly origin and His eternal essence, as that authenticated itself in the πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης (note *b*); but still His mediatorial office in the creation of the world and in the history of salvation (note *c*) by no means appears as lying on a level with the participation in the divine glory and sovereignty of the world, to which the Son who is seated at God's right hand has attained. But although He has received this position of dignity as regards the world for the purpose of carrying out His work of salvation, we have nevertheless already seen (§ 76, *c*) that it by no means ceases with the completion of the latter, and this is now confirmed to us afresh by the fact, that a position of dignity which was in keeping with the original nature of the Son cannot be confined to the duration of His activity in a special vocation. As the divine eternal existence of Christ in His pre-existence did not forbid His relation to God from being regarded as that of a Son with the subordination which is naturally involved in it, so the eventual subordination of the Son to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 28) by no means excludes the divine dignity of the exalted Christ. For our christological consideration there now comes in, of course, the problem, how we have to conceive of this relation of the divine Son to the Father in His absolute sovereignty over all, apart from His position with respect to the work of redemption, as well as previous to the creation of the world and apart from His mediatorial position in that work. But Paul has not considered this problem, and it remains altogether vain to attempt

to extract from him statements regarding an immanent trinity; in saying which, the question, whether the teaching of the Church has with justice advanced to that doctrine, is naturally in no way prejudiced.

## CHAPTER VI.

### REDEMPTION AND JUSTIFICATION.

### § 80. *The Saving Significance of the Death of Christ.*

Cf. Tischendorf, *doctrina Pauli apostoli de vi mortis Christi satisfactoria*, Leipzig, 1837; A. Schweizer, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1858, 3.

Christ has become the Mediator of salvation by means of His death, inasmuch as it was an appointment of divine grace, to which He submitted Himself in free obedience to God and in free love to men. (*b*) He has, viz., suffered death in behalf of humanity, in order to deliver it from the consequences of sin, *i.e.* from death, and in so doing He has endured it vicariously for all. (*c*) Since God has appointed His blood to be the means of propitiation, He has ransomed men from their guilt. (*d*) By means of His death the world is reconciled with God, who can now no longer condemn those who accept the message regarding it.

(*a*) If we ask, whereby it is that, in His manifestation upon earth, Christ has become the Mediator of salvation, there is only one answer that can be given according to the Pauline view, viz., by His death. Hence this death forms the real central-point of his preaching (1 Cor. i. 17, 18: ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ); he preaches Christ as crucified (Gal. iii. 1; 1 Cor. ii. 2; cf. Phil. iii. 18). To him as well as to his fellow-countrymen this death had once been the greatest obstacle to his believing in the Messiahship of Jesus (Gal. v. 11, vi. 12; 1 Cor. i. 23); nor was it after he had first established for himself the compatibility of this death with faith in the Messiah (Baur, p. 130) that he attained to this faith; it was rather after he had been led by the manifestation of Christ to the immediate assurance of His Messiahship, that he had to recognise that His death upon the cross was also

embraced in the decree relating to the Messianic salvation.[1] Now, since, in consequence of his own experience, Christianity was, to him, a dispensation of grace, which provided salvation for the lost world of sinners (§ 58, *b*, *c*), the death of Him who in His exaltation promised to bring the completion of all the promised salvation, must have been the specific appointment of the grace of God, whereby the basis of this salvation was laid. Of course this presupposes that His death was different from that of all other men. Since, however, it is only because all have sinned that death reigns over all the descendants of Adam (Rom. v. 12), Christ, who knew not sin, was by no means rendered subject to the dominion of death in consequence, simply, of His belonging by birth to the human race. No doubt the weakness of His flesh made Him susceptible to death (§ 78, *c*), and He could not, with this flesh, have been exalted to His heavenly glory; but from this it no more follows in His case than in the case of the first man (cf. § 67, *c*), that He had to pass through death in order to attain to the heavenly life; indeed, even the believers, who live to see the Parousia, enter into His glory without dying. It is only in this way that we can understand how the delivering up of the Son to death (Rom. viii. 32: *παρέδωκεν*; cf. iv. 25),—a surrender which, because prophesied in Scripture (1 Cor. xv. 3), was owing to a special decree of God,—can be regarded as a proof of God's love (cf. also Rom. v. 8); even for the incarnate Son of God death was by no means a necessity of nature, not to speak of the shameful and painful death upon the cross (*σταυρός*), when His blood was shed (cf. footnote 9). Neither, looked at from the other side, was death ordained for Christ in such a sense, that He had to suffer it as a fate appointed Him by God. It was an act of

[1] Even for the original apostles this was an inevitable conclusion (cf. § 38, *d*, 49, and the discourses of Jesus, § 22, *c*). Accordingly, it is a radical error in Baur's representation, that, according to it, Paul has, as it were, first discovered this significance of the death of Christ, and has then, in consequence of this discovery, recognised the imperfection of the Old Testament dispensation (p. 130). Among the articles which he has delivered as he received them by tradition, Paul counts his proclamation that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures (1 Cor. xv. 3); he was therefore conscious of being in full agreement with the preaching of the original apostles, when he declared that the death of Jesus was an essential moment of the decree of salvation which was prophesied in the Old Testament, and gave it a special reference to the sin of men.

free obedience, an act in which He submitted Himself to the Father's purpose; and hence this act of obedience, upon which the obtaining of salvation for men depended, is contrasted with the transgression of Adam, with which destruction has come upon men (Rom. v. 19; cf. Phil. ii. 8). He gave Himself according to the will of God (Gal. i. 4); but since the design of this self-sacrifice was men's salvation, it is also a proof of His love to men (Gal. ii. 20: *τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτόν*; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; cf. Eph. v. 2, 25).

(*b*) Whether the death of Christ is regarded as a sacrifice of love on the part of God or on the part of Christ (note *a*), it took place in behalf of men (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*:[2] 1 Cor. xi. 24; 2 Cor. v. 15; cf. 1 Thess. v. 10). How this is to be understood appears from Rom. v. 8, according to which Christ has died for us, inasmuch as we were sinners (*ἁμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν*; cf. ver. 6: *ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν*), or on account of our sins (Rom. iv. 25: *διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*; Gal. i. 4: *περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*; 1 Cor. xv. 3: *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*). Now, since the evil which sin has brought upon men is death (§ 66, *d*), the death of Christ, which was suffered for the salvation of men, and also because of sin, can only have had the design of removing from them the miserable consequences of sin, *i.e.* the punishment of sin, which consists in death.[3] If He, however, who did not *per se* need to die the death (note *a*), dies, in order to free sinners from death, His death is a vicarious one. Paul has first formulated in a strict dogmatic manner the idea of substitution without any reference to the Old Testament prophecy of the sin-bearing of the servant of God (like Peter, § 49, *b*), and connected it with the working

[2] That the primary meaning of this *ὑπέρ* is only that the death of Christ was suffered on men's account, in their behalf, is evident from the circumstance that, in an altogether parallel passage (1 Cor. viii. 11), the *ὑπὲρ οὗ* of Rom. xiv. 15 is supplied by *δι' ὅν*. Even in 2 Cor. v. 21 there is not only no necessity to take it as equivalent to *ἀντί*, as Pfleiderer does (p. 102 [E. Tr. i. 101]), but this sense is not even suitable, for, seeing that we were actually sinners, God did not need first of all to make us such.

[3] The only statement on the subject in the Epistles to the Thessalonians says nothing more specific than this regarding the saving significance of the death of Christ (1, v. 10; cf. § 61, *d*); for if it is the design of the death which He suffered for us that we should live with Him, then with that death of His the death, which excludes the sinner from the highest salvation which is given in eternal life (§ 65, *d*), is removed from the latter.

out of our righteousness. God has made Him, who did not know sin, to be sin in our behalf, has looked upon Him and treated Him as if He were a sinner, in order that we might become the righteousness of God in Him, *i.e.*, that, on the ground of that which happened to Him, we could be looked upon and treated as such as God declares to be righteous (2 Cor. v. 21). Here it is expressly asserted that the treatment of the sinless One as a sinner was the means whereby the treatment of sinners as sinless was rendered possible, and so the new righteousness, upon which the salvation of man depended, was wrought out.[4] The specific fate of the sinner, however, is death, and therefore the apostle accounts for the constraining power, which the love of Christ has over us (ver. 14), by the judgment that, if one has died for all, then all have died (ver. 15). Accordingly, the death of Christ, which was suffered for the salvation of men, stands vicariously for the death of all, His being treated as a sinner makes it possible that they should be treated as righteous, so that they need no longer die the death which He has died in their stead, and it is in this supreme act of kindness which He has shown them that the constraining power of His love towards them lies.[5]

[4] Holsten understands this passage as meaning that, by causing Him to appear in the σάρξ, which is sinful in its essence, God made Him who was sinless in His premundane existence to be actually sin (cf. § 78, *c*, footnote 6); but against this view R. Schmidt (p. 100) has satisfactorily proved that the subjective negation already shows that the antithesis of the sinlessness of Christ, which is noted as being present to the consciousness of God, cannot be the working of anything actual, but only an ideal act, and that it is only in this sense that the ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖν answers to the δικαιοσύνη γενέσθαι, which likewise denotes no actual transformation of our subjective condition, but only the imputation of an ideal character which contradicts the actual reality (cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 101 [E. Tr. i. 100]). He himself, however, understands this ideal equalization of Jesus with a sinner (p. 59) to mean that, in the attribute of a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, which is communicated to it, the impersonal outward side of His being mediatorially represents the principle of sin itself, and that the consequent connection of Jesus with sin is dissolved by the death of His material body (p. 63); but here the principal matter, the reference, viz., to the σάρξ, and the doing away of sin, which commences with its destruction (which is not even mentioned here!), is simply dragged in. Although Ritschl appears to have given up the explanation of ἁμαρτίαν which makes it refer to the "sin-offering," he nevertheless (ii. p. 174f.) declares that the sacrificial idea is the necessary presupposition of this statement; but the statement itself, at least, does not furnish the slightest support to this view.

[5] That what is spoken of here cannot be the ethical dying with Christ, appears from the fact that this is by no means the consequence of the death of Christ *in itself*, but of the fellowship of His death, which is involved in the living

If we start from this strictly dogmatic passage, we have no right whatever to assume that the Pauline idea of substitution depends upon the presupposition of an abiding claim of the law, which must first be discharged by the death of Christ, in order to make room for the new dispensation of grace (Pfleiderer, p. 103 ff. [E. Tr. i. 102 ff.]), and even to limit this effect of it to the Jews (Schenkel, p. 229). For death was not first ordained by the law, but has been ever since Adam the punishment of sin (Rom. v. 12; cf. § 67, *c*), and a substitution of the innocent for the guilty is altogether foreign to the law. Nor, when interpreted according to the context, is the design of the peculiar statement of substitution in Gal. iii. 13 to show that the law has demanded it, but to show that the way of salvation, which was already presignified for the Gentiles in the history of Abraham (vv. 8, 9), is confirmed. For if those who stood under the law were so far from attaining salvation by means of it, that they rather drew upon themselves its curse (vv. 10–12; cf. § 66, *b*), from which they could only be freed by Christ's becoming a curse in their behalf, it was certainly only in Him that the blessing of Abraham could become the portion of the Gentiles, and so Jews and Gentiles receive the promise through faith in Him (vv. 13, 14). In this line of thought the painful and shameful death which Christ suffered on the cross, in order that sinners might not die the death, is represented as the curse

fellowship with Him, the basis of which is laid in baptism (cf. § 84), nor by any means the consequence of His death *for all*, since only believers enter into living fellowship with Christ, whereas His death has certainly taken place for all, and in itself stands for the death of all, whether or not they appropriate the salvation which is thereby provided. The second half of the verse gives no support to the ethical interpretation, but plainly the contrary; for the no longer living to ourselves (which is identical with that ethical dying) is here connected with the death of Christ as a *demand*, and is therefore not already in itself a consequence of it. A distinction is evidently made between that which His mediatorial death has provided for us, and that to which it constrains us, for the very judgment of the apostle regarding the greatness of that deed of kindness and the duty which grows out of it for us keeps him within the bounds of a behaviour which is in keeping with the love of Christ, which was shown in that death (cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 110 [E. Tr. i. 109 f.]). Still less can it be implied in ver. 15, that the dying of Christ has brought to the light the fact that all are forfeited to death (Gess, p. 135 f.), which is simply contrary to the meaning of the words. Schenkel, however, imports the thought of the ethical appropriation of the death of Christ even into ver. 21 (p. 247).

which was pronounced by the law against its transgressors (ver. 10; cf. Deut. xxvii. 26), and which now rests upon Him who is hanging upon the cross (ver. 13; cf. Deut. xxi. 23).[6] The passage, accordingly, does not assert that the curse pronounced by the law must necessarily have been carried out, even though upon one who was innocent, but that it was Christ who, by His suffering such a death as the curse of the law decrees against its transgressors, has redeemed the latter from it. Hence it is as vain to seek to extract a theory as to the reason *why* Christ had to die, in order to redeem us from death, from this passage as from that in the Epistle to the Corinthians; they both only state the *fact*, that the death of Christ, which was suffered in behalf of sinners, redeemed them from death, the specific punishment of sin, and was in so far vicarious.

(*c*) When the freedom from the curse of the law is represented as a redemption from it in Gal. iii. 13, the death of Christ, by means of which this freedom was secured, or His assumption of the curse of the law, is conceived of as the price which was paid for this redemption, and similarly it is said in 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23 that we have been bought with an actual redemption-price (τιμή).[7] In i. 30 also Christ appears

[6] Ritschl (ii. p. 245) urges, with Hofmann, that it is not said ἐπικατάρατος ὑπὸ θεοῦ, and therefore that it is not a curse of God which is spoken of; but this argument stands or falls with his erroneous view, that the law meant here is only an ordinance of angels (§ 71, *c*, footnote 2). Apart from that, the curse which the law of God decrees, is self-evidently a curse of God; and it is not our passage, but only Hofmann himself, that speaks of that which men did to Him as a carrying out of the curse of the law which He did not deserve. If Christ has become a curse according to the will of God (note *a*), in order to redeem us from this curse, then the passage says, only in a form which is conditioned by the context, exactly the same as 2 Cor. v. 21, that God has treated the sinless One as a sinner, in order that He need not treat sinners as such. On the other hand, even here R. Schmidt (p. 83) altogether arbitrarily substitutes *the sin* for *the sinner*: sin was condemned in the flesh of Christ, being done away with in the destruction of His flesh.

[7] According to the context the question here, it is true, is as to something acquired by God, whose possession believers have become; but this also was only possible if they were redeemed from the guilt which stained them and made them altogether unfit to become His possession. There is no reason whatever to desist, with Ritschl (ii. p. 253 f.), from explaining this expression by means of Gal. iii. 13, for the curse of the law is also only a concrete expression for the guilt of its transgressors. If, however, in these passages it remains doubtful who has paid this price, the active ἐξηγόρασεν in the passage in Galatians shows

as the author of our redemption, the underlying thought being that guilt holds man captive (in prison, as it were), until he is absolved from it by the forgiveness of sins (cf. Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14). For if the redemption which is found in Christ is the means whereby justification by grace was rendered possible (Rom. iii. 24), it must be thought of as a redemption from the state of guilt, for it is the guilt which rests upon the sinner that hinders his justification.[8] Now it is in this passage that Paul states more particularly in how far this redemption from the state of guilt rests in Christ. In ver. 25, viz., it is said that God has openly set Him forth in His blood as a means of propitiation (*ἱλαστήριον*) through faith. Here too, accordingly, just as in Gal. iii. 13, His death, and that, too, the violent bloody death, which He suffered on the cross, is thought of as the redemption-price, only that it has first acquired the efficacy of such a price from the circumstance that God has bestowed upon it the significance of a means of propitiation.[9] Although even here Paul

that Christ is thought of as the one, who has done so by His surrendering Himself to death (in which He became a curse); and thus it is evident that the point in question there is not merely "as to the equivalence of Christ's *suffering* of the curse with that which was remitted to the Jews," but as to a performance of Christ which was full of value in itself, and which can be regarded as a redemption-price. The *ἐξαγοράζειν* is thought of in a totally different manner in Gal. iv. 5, where, however, it is not His death that is the means. On the other hand, Gal. i. 4 amounts substantially to the same thing (although without the image of a redemption-price); there it is stated to be the design of the death of Christ, that He might deliver us (*ἵνα ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς*) out of the present age, which is evil in its character (67, *α*), and therefore exposed to the judgment of God. Nothing is said here as to a moral effect of the death of Christ (Schenkel, p. 230). He, who has got rid of his guilt, no longer belongs to this age, and is no longer exposed to its destruction.

[8] Ritschl (ii. p. 221) maintains erroneously that, in consequence of the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament, Paul must have taken *ἀπολύτρωσις* in the sense of "setting free," without any reference to the idea of a redemption-price, which lies originally in the word; for the only passage in which *ἀπολυτροῦν* occurs in the Old Testament (Ex. xxi. 8) plainly presupposes such a price. That it is also found in him in that wider sense proves nothing, for in such cases a genitive stands along with it (Rom. viii. 23; Eph. i. 14). On the other hand, the *ἀπολύτρωσις* follows *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἁγιασμός* in 1 Cor. i. 30, only because both these do not exclude the possibility of man's ever anew incurring fresh guilt, and the definitive redemption from the state of guilt, which Christ has secured by means of His death, takes place first in the final judgment (cf. Eph. iv. 30).

[9] The explanation of *ἱλαστήριον* as referring to the mercy-seat (Ex. xxv. 17 ff.; Heb. ix. 5), according to which Christ is regarded as the bearer of God's

does not seem to intend to directly represent the death of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice,[10] yet it is self-evident that he has formed the idea of a means of propitiation after the analogy of the means of propitiation which was current in the Old Testament cultus. Now, however, the point in question in the Old Testament institution for propitiation is as to an arrangement of grace, according to which God has given His people the blood of animals as a means of propitiation (Lev.

gracious presence, and the sprinkling of which with His blood in the manner appointed for the sacrifice of the great day of atonement becomes efficacious for the forgiveness of the sins of the Church (Ritschl, ii. p. 171 ff.), breaks down upon the circumstance, that, as the name of a concrete instrument and without the article, *ἱλαστήριον* cannot have "the value of a special idea," and that in this sense it could not be made operative through faith. In general, however, the allusion to that particular legal custom, an allusion which occurs nowhere else, and was, therefore, certainly unfamiliar to the readers, would have been far too vaguely expressed, especially as the designation of the death of Christ as *αἷμα*, a designation which, apart from the references to the supper (1 Cor. x. 16, xi. 27), is found only in v. 9 in a connection which by no means makes it natural to think that there is a reference to a sacrifice (cf. Col. i. 20; Eph. i. 7, ii. 13), is very far from necessarily indicating His quality as a sacrifice, as Ritschl (p. 162) maintains, but only characterizes His death as a violent one, although this certainly does not depend upon His having "bled to death" (cf. *e.g.* Matt. xxiii. 30, 35, xxvii. 4, 24, 25; Acts v. 28, xx. 28; Heb. xii. 4).

[10] Else he would not have chosen this word, which is not the common word in the LXX. for the propitiatory sacrifices. From this, however, we only see that Paul has not worked out his idea of the saving significance of the death of Christ by transferring to Christian circumstances the sacrificial institute of the Old Testament, which is altogether insufficient for the purpose that he has in view (cf. footnote 11), but by considering man's need of salvation in its relation to the demand of divine righteousness. Neither the *ἁμαρτίαν* of 2 Cor. v. 21 (Ritschl, *Jahrb.* 1863, 2, p. 249), nor the *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* of Rom. viii. 3 (Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift*, 1871, 2, p. 186), denotes the sacrifice for sin. If Christ is represented in 1 Cor. v. 7 as our paschal lamb, the occasion was furnished by the circumstance that He was put to death at the feast of Passover, but it does not appear from the context that a saving significance of the death of Christ is grounded upon this designation, and the "fundamental conception of this primitive Semitic *ver sacrum*" (Pfleiderer, p. 98 [E. Tr. i. 97]) is naturally no more regulative for Paul than that of a covenant sacrifice supplied by Schenkel (p. 244) in his sense. Nay, although Paul quotes the words used at the institution of the supper in 1 Cor. xi. 25, he has, nevertheless, nowhere independently employed the idea of the blood of the covenant contained in them, as Peter has done (§ 49, *c*). The idea of a new covenant, which is a covenant of forgiveness, appears in him only in Rom. xi. 27 in an Old Testament quotation from Jer. xxxi. 33, 34. Where he speaks independently of a new covenant, it is the covenant of the Spirit (2 Cor. iii. 6: *καινὴ διαθήκη*) in contrast with the covenant of the law (ver. 14: *παλαιὰ διαθήκη*). So also in Gal. iv. 24.

xvii. 11), in order that, notwithstanding their ever recurring sins, they may be able to maintain their covenant fellowship with Him.[11] God has, therefore, likewise appointed the blood which was shed in the death of Christ to be the means of propitiation, which makes atonement for the sins of men, and therefore renders their redemption from the state of guilt possible. This He did in order to show His righteousness; and Paul himself explains this by stating that He had hitherto allowed the sins which were committed in His forbearance to pass by unpunished, and therefore it might seem as if He had desisted from dealing with sinners in conformity with their doing, and was no more δίκαιος. Indeed, it was a matter of fact that the Jews misinterpreted this ἀνοχή of God as if they could make themselves sure of salvation notwithstanding their transgression of the law (Rom. ii. 4). Now, however, there were two ways in which His righteousness could be shown. According to the original rule of His righteousness, He must, of course, have delivered over all sinners to the death which they deserved; in that case no salvation and no

[11] Where Paul speaks of the destruction to which man was forfeited on account of his transgression of the law, he never thinks of this means of escape. The reason of this is to be found, not in the circumstance that he regarded the precepts relating to sacrifices rather as a demand of human performances (Riehm, *Lehrb. d. Hebräerbr.* p. 228), or as a typical prophecy of a perfect atonement, but simply in this, that the sacrifices were only for sins of ignorance, whereas, in consequence of his deep sense of the corruption, and the irremediable condition of the natural man, Paul plainly regards *all* sin as sin which is worthy of death (§ 66, *d*), for which there was no propitiatory sacrifice even in the old covenant, against which statement Rom. i. 21, 22, vii. 7–11 (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 243) can prove nothing, because in the context of these very passages the capital nature of the sin is asserted most distinctly (i. 32, viii. 2). Therein also lies the impossibility of finding the meaning of sacrifice in this, that the souls which were forfeited to the punitive justice of God were atoned for by the substitutionary offering up of an animal soul, or made free from the liability to be punished by the vicarious death of the sacrificial animal (cf. even Pfleiderer, p. 96 f. [E. Tr. i. 95 f.]); for within the dispensation of the law there was no sacrifice which could make atonement for one who was forfeited to death, and deliver him from the liability to be punished. On the other hand, it is a no less serious misunderstanding of the Old Testament idea of propitiation which lies at the basis of the subject we are now considering, when R. Schmidt (p. 89) finds the atoning moment in this, that in the flesh of His Son God actually pronounced the condemnation of sin itself, and abolished it as a power which objectively dominates humanity, for nowhere in the biblical sphere of thought does the extirpation of the principle of sin appear as a means of propitiation for sin that has been committed.

righteousness would be worked out. Now, however, God willed to show His righteousness in the present time of salvation (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ) in such a manner that He might be at once righteous and yet able to justify the believer (iii. 26). Accordingly, in the blood of Christ He set forth to the world a means of propitiation through faith.[12] Wherefore it pleased Him to appoint this means of propitiation,—our passage no more reflects upon this question than the Old Testament reflects upon the question, wherefore God appointed the blood of animals to be the means of propitiation. Yet it is worthy of note that, in v. 19, Paul represents the death of Christ, inasmuch as it is the means for securing the justification of the sinner, as an act of obedience, and also points to the value of the self-surrender of Christ to death by the idea of a redemption-price, which he combines with the idea of the means of propitiation, an idea which is originally of a totally different kind, and not so explained in the law (iii. 24 f.).

(*d*) The significance of the death of Christ with respect to the world is ultimately summed up, for Paul, in the idea of reconciliation. So long as the wrath of God rests upon man, man is, as it were, at enmity with Him, His ἐχθρός (Rom. v. 10), because continually threatened with His punitive judgment.[13]

[12] There is not only no reason to explain the term δικαιοσύνη here, with Ritschl (ii. p. 117), so as to make it mean the consistent behaviour of God with a view to the salvation of believers, but this explanation is even excluded, partly by its being contrasted with the previous πάρεσις of sins, which cannot be set over against their forgiveness (p. 216 f.), but only over against their punishment *or* cancelling by a means of propitiation, partly by the express distinction between the δίκαιος and δικαιῶν, which is done away with by that misinterpretation of the δικαιοσύνη. On the other hand, Ritschl is perfectly right in refusing to it here the meaning of punitive righteousness. For the appointment of a means of propitiation is the very opposite of an execution of the punishment; and as in the Old Testament institution for propitiation an execution of the punishment deserved by the sinner in the person of the sacrificial animal was never thought of, so neither here are we to conceive that God has shown His righteousness by executing the punishment demanded by the law in the person of Christ. He evinced His righteousness, however, by the setting forth of the means of propitiation, inasmuch as He showed that sin could no longer remain unpunished, unless it was done away with by a means of propitiation appointed by Himself. Schenkel (p. 226) thinks that God "exercises grace in the spirit of true righteousness(?)," and so returns substantially to the view of Ritschl, notwithstanding his correct translation of ἱλαστήριον (p. 265 f.)

[13] Accordingly, this enmity is not the hostile disposition of man towards God (Baur, p. 157). According to Rom. viii. 7 the φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἔχθρα εἰς Θεόν;

But since this enmity of God is only directed against man as a sinner, it naturally does not exclude grace, which seeks to remove the cause of this enmity, and thereby to render reconciliation possible. This, however, God has done by reconciling the world to Himself in Christ (2 Cor. v. 19; cf. ver. 18, from which it follows that ἐν Χριστῷ = διὰ Χριστοῦ in the sense of § 75, *d*); nay, the initiative must have proceeded from Him, since men could not of themselves have done away with the guilt of sin, which made them enemies of God. In this matter men are purely passive, they are reconciled to God (2 Cor. v. 20: καταλλάγητε τῷ Θεῷ), they receive the reconciliation (Rom. v. 11) which the Gospel proclaims (2 Cor. v. 19: ὁ λόγος τῆς καταλλαγῆς; cf. ver. 18: ἡ διακονία τῆς καταλλαγῆς), and that, too, through the death of His Son (Rom. v. 10; cf. Col. i. 21, 22; Eph. ii. 16).[14] Above all, however, it is to be noted that, in the principal passage which treats of reconciliation, the saving value of the death of Christ is *not* limited to the Church, as Ritschl (p. 215, 230) maintains, but is expressly extended to the world as such. In consequence of the death of Christ, or rather in consequence of the obedience of Christ which was

but, since φρόνημα denotes the object that is striven after, ἔχθρα is here, as an *abstr. pro concr.*, the sum-total of what is hostile to God as contrasted with that which is pleasing to Him (§ 68, *b*), and not a hostile disposition towards God. Such a passage as Col. i. 21, where τῇ διανοίᾳ expressly stands along with ἐχθροί, can naturally prove nothing against this assertion; on the other hand, Ritschl (ii. p. 228 f.) has in vain disputed the force of the evidence given by Rom. xi. 28 for the objective meaning of ἔχθρα; for there the two halves of the verse are really quite parallel, since the Jews are, in conformity with his gospel (which proclaims their temporary exclusion from salvation), the object of the enmity of God for the sake of the Gentiles (who would otherwise not have attained to salvation), just as, in conformity with their election (which guarantees salvation to them), they remain the object of His love for the fathers' sake (to whom God would, otherwise, not have kept the promise that was given to their seed).

[14] From this it is already evident that the reconciliation cannot consist in this, that man gives up his hostile disposition towards God (Baur, p. 157; Ritschl, ii. p. 227), not even on the one side (Reuss, ii. p. 176 [E. Tr. ii. 160]). The reconciliation is not something mutual, as if man gives up his enmity and God consequently gives up His ὀργή (Biedermann, p. 245); by not reckoning unto them their trespasses (2 Cor. v. 19), God gives up His enmity to men, which is, as it were, forced upon Him by the sin which rouses His wrath; it is He alone that changes His hostile disposition into a gracious one, after He has treated the sinless One as a sinner in behalf of sinners (ver. 21), which Schenkel (p. 267), notwithstanding His recognition of the objectivity of the ἔχθρα and the καταλλαγή, yet knows how to twist round again into an "eminent proof of divine grace."

shown therein, and which has, therefore, a significance with respect to the world similar to that of the fall of Adam, God has assumed a different attitude to it, inasmuch as now no one is any longer forfeited to death on account of his sin, since the death of Christ stands for the death of all (2 Cor. v. 15; cf. note *b*), save only those who reject the message regarding the reconciliation. As a matter of fact, indeed, only those accordingly receive the *καταλλαγή* (Rom. v. 11), who in faith in that significance of the death of Christ comply with the summons of the glad tidings, for it is to faith that God has attached the significance of His death as a means of propitiation (iii. 25). They have now peace with God (v. 1), seeing that they are no longer the objects of His enmity, but are reconciled to Him, and therefore know themselves to be saved from His wrath (vv. 9, 10; cf. the excellent exposition of Pfleiderer, p. 99 [E. Tr. i. 97 f.]). God can no longer condemn them before the judgment, because Christ who died for them, and who is exalted by the resurrection to His right hand, intercedes for them, by continually asserting before God and in their behalf the propitiation which was rendered by His death (viii. 34). Now the antithesis of condemnation is justification. If the former is rendered impossible by the blood of Christ, the latter is rendered possible by it (v. 9: *δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ*); the righteousness, which could not be provided by the law, is provided by the death of Christ (Gal. ii. 21). Not, however, directly; for, according to Rom. v. 16, 18, the gift which Christ has made us with the demonstration of favour furnished in His death (ver. 15), is not directly salvation-bringing, but first becomes so through God's justifying judgment (*δικαίωμα*), which determines to whom righteousness is to be imputed on the ground of the death of Christ. But *δικαιοσύνη* is already rendered possible, and therefore objectively worked out in the death of Christ; and accordingly that death is the starting-point of the salvation which is given in Christianity (note *a*).

### § 81. *The Death and Resurrection of Christ.*

The annihilation, in principle, of the power of sin is not traced back by Paul to the death of Christ, but to His sinless

life. (*b*) No doubt the new life of Christians, a life which is devoted to Christ alone, is also a consequence of His death and resurrection, not, however, in the dogmatic sense of a saving effect, but in the practical hortatory sense of a demand which is grounded upon these. (*c*) On the other hand, the death of Christ is the exclusive means of the working out of salvation. (*d*) The resurrection of Christ is only the proof of His Messiahship, and, in particular, of that saving significance of His death which has made Him the Mediator of salvation.

(*a*) Baur has recently sought the saving significance of the death of Christ also in this, that in it the *σάρξ* was destroyed, and therewith the right and sovereignty of sin, which is essentially identical with it, were extinguished (p. 161). This view has been first carried out consequently by Holsten (p. 440 ff.) and Pfleiderer (p. 117 [E. Tr. i. 116]), seeing that they conceive of the *σάρξ* in itself, and therefore also in Christ, as the principle of sin (cf., on the other hand, § 68, 78).[1] The main support of this view is Rom. viii. 3, a passage which certainly speaks of an annihilation, in principle, of the power of sin; for when this annihilation is represented here as a condemning of sin (*κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*), the expression is chosen with an allusion to the *κατάκριμα* in ver. 1. Sin, which always drew a *κατάκριμα* upon men by the dominion which it had over them, has now received a *κατάκριμα* itself, by being robbed of its power and dominion. The expression was so much the more suitable, as it could not be said of God that He has conquered sin; He has only condemned it to be

[1] After he has reduced the apostle's conception of the death of Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice to a mere concession to the legal standpoint (p. 105 f. [E. Tr. i. 104 f.]), it is in this that Pfleiderer finds his real view regarding the significance of that death. So also Biedermann, who makes the apostle's use of the Old Testament idea of sacrifice a merely secondary matter (p. 244). R. Schmidt has first attempted, with great ingenuity, to carry this out as the only view (cf. § 80, footnotes 4, 6, 11), although he controverts its anthropological and christological presuppositions (which even Biedermann does not recognise), and thereby makes it altogether incomprehensible. That it is incomprehensible even when carried out most consequently, Wendt (p. 185 ff.) has conclusively shown. In reality, Pfleiderer (p. 115–118 [E. Tr. i. 114 f.]) also acknowledges this; only he seeks the solution of its difficulties in the psychological genesis of this idea, which he regards as the dogmatic formalization and externalization of a fact of religious experience (viz. the dying with Christ) which is of psychological origin (p. 113 [E. Tr. i. 112]).

conquered by Christ. This conquest, however, is not at all traced back in our passage to the death of Christ, but to the sending of the Son ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας; for that it is His death alone that emphasis is usually laid upon, when the point in question is as to the removal of the *guilt* of sin, does not prove that it must be thought of here also, where what is spoken of is the removal of its *power*.[2] That the point in question now is as to a removal of this dominion by the annihilation of the σάρξ *as such*—for this assertion an appeal is made to the ἐν τῇ σαρκί. But in a connection, where the participation of Christ in the human σάρξ has been explicitly and purposely set forth, that which is said regarding the condemnation of sin ἐν τῇ σαρκί in consequence of His having been sent can refer only to *His* σάρξ. For, inasmuch as Christ had appeared in the same flesh, which had hitherto made it impossible to the law to work its fulfilment, seeing that it was, empirically, everywhere under the dominion of sin, He could fight out the battle with sin ἐν τῇ σαρκί, *i.e.*, upon the domain which had up to this time belonged to it alone; and inasmuch as sin did not succeed in obtaining the mastery of His σάρξ, it was overcome and therefore condemned to powerlessness. Of course the dominion of sin was thereby broken only at one point within the human race; it was broken, however, at the decisive point, in the earthly (fleshly) life of the Mediator of salvation.[3] That this took place in the death of Jesus, R. Schmidt (p. 56) and Pfleiderer (p. 114 f. [E. Tr. i. 113 f.]) think they can prove also by means of

[2] The only argument adduced by Pfleiderer (p. 116 f. [E. Tr. i. 115 f.]) in support of this view is, that κατέκρινεν denotes an individual judicial act, which he then, without more ado, takes to be a "judicial execution" or capital punishment. But does κατακρίνειν ever denote "to execute"? And can that which God did, when He sent His Son, of whom He knew that He would conquer sin, not be represented as an individual act, in which He condemned sin to be overcome? This is far from being "dragged in in an altogether arbitrary manner;" for, according to the context, that which was impossible to the law was just the conquest of sin. That, according to our explanation of the passage, the σάρξ in ἐν τῇ σαρκί is not taken in another sense than in διὰ τῆς σαρκός and σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, is shown in the text. That what is spoken of in this passage, however, is not "the judgment of God against sin which was due to us according to the law," and which Christ bore (Kübel, p. 278), ought now-a-days to be generally acknowledged.

[3] This, of course, we must not take, as if the new life of believers (a life which is delivered from the power of sin) were conceived of as a fellowship

Rom. vi. 10, because what is spoken of there is His dying to sin, which must be taken as analogous with ours. But apart from the fact that even they are not able to bring out a full analogy, since in Christ's case there was required the death of the body, which is not at all the case with us, neither Schmidt nor Pfleiderer assumes a real connection of Jesus with sin; for, according to the former, the *σάρξ* of Christ was only ideally made a *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*; and, according to the latter, Christ, notwithstanding His sinful *σάρξ*, did not know sin. Accordingly, the real connection with sin, which was dissolved in the case of Christ by His death, can only have been that of suffering, inasmuch as even over Him, who had no sin, sin ruled in death (v. 21), when He took it upon Himself in the stead of sinners. Lastly, the explanation of *ἀπέθανεν* in 2 Cor. v. 15, as referring to a dying, which is analogous with our dying to sin (R. Schmidt, p. 55), presupposes the misinterpretation of this passage which is refuted in § 80, footnote 5.

(*b*) It might rather seem from two other passages, as if the death of Christ were directly connected with the new life of believers. When, however, it is stated in 2 Cor. v. 15 to have been the design of the death of Christ, who died for us in order that we might not die (§ 80, *b*), that we should henceforth no longer live unto ourselves, but unto Him who died for us, the connection with ver. 14 (*ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Χριστοῦ συνέχει ἡμᾶς*) already shows that the intermediate thought is the thankfulness, to which this evidence of the love of Christ obliges us, and therefore that the point in question here is not as to a necessary consequence of His death, but as to a

with this typical earthly life of Jesus, a view which Schmidt rightly rejects as involving a contradiction with other clear statements of the apostle (p. 51), since it is by participating in the Spirit of the exalted Christ that believers first share in that victory of His over sin. But, on that account, to find here with Gess (p. 183), that "sin was condemned in the flesh, because, through the dying of Christ, there was brought about the pouring out of the Spirit," drags in altogether foreign thoughts. Nor can that victory over sin be yet called mediatorial in the literal sense; and, accordingly, as Schmidt urges so sharply with perfect justice, it is not the whole earthly (sinless) life of Christ, or His *obedientia activa*, but only His death, that is conceived of by Paul as the ground of salvation (p. 90). For even although this, as contrasted with the *παράπτωμα* of Adam, were regarded as the *δικαίωμα* (Rom. v. 18), His obedience unto death (*ὑπακοή*: ver. 19) is, nevertheless, not thought of in connection with the obedience of His whole life, but only as the obedient carrying out of the arrangement appointed by God for the salvation of men (cf. § 80, *a*).

demand which results from it for us (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 111 [E. Tr. i. 110], who only, in an unjustifiable manner, already mixes up with this thought that of fellowship with the death of Christ). When, further, He, unto whom we are henceforth to live, is represented not only as the one who died for us, but also as the one who rose again, this was required in order to set forth that He has become alive again by means of the resurrection; for it is only as a living one that we could serve Him and belong to Him (Rom. vii. 4). This appears still more plainly in xiv. 9, where it is said that Christ died and became alive (read: ἔζησεν) in order that He might be Lord (κυριεύσῃ) over the dead and the living, which, according to ver. 8, is as much as to say, that they belong to Him, are serviceable to Him in their living and dying. Here the purely formal correspondence between death and resurrection on the one hand, as well as that between the dead and the living on the other, shows that the point in question is not as to a dogmatic statement regarding the significance of the death or the resurrection, but that it is merely intended to point out that the Christ, who has entered into His κυριότης (§ 76, *a*) by means of His death and resurrection, can now claim the adherence and service of Christians. Although this life which is devoted to Christ is the antithesis of the former life which was dominated by sin, yet it is only represented as a demand which follows from the death and resurrection, not as a saving effect of the death of Christ (cf. Col. i. 22; Eph. v. 26; Acts xx. 28). So we have already found it in Peter (§ 49, *d*).

(*c*) The effect of the death of Christ which is described in § 80 is, accordingly, its only one; but this effect is also owing to it alone. It is only the death of Christ that brings about the redemption of man from the guilt of sin, and therefore forms the basis of His work as the Mediator of salvation. It is altogether erroneous to co-ordinate the resurrection with the death of Christ as the second fundamental saving fact (cf. *e.g.* Reuss, ii. p. 82 [E. Tr. ii. 73]); His resurrection has not, like His death, a significance as being the means of procuring salvation, more especially as it is not a work of Christ, but a work of God, which He has wrought upon Christ (§ 77, *b*, *c*), and in which a subjective acquiescence on the part of the Mediator of salvation in the divine saving purpose is by no

means necessary or even conceivable, as in the case of His surrendering Himself to death (§ 80, *a*). One cannot even say that a salvation-grounding value belongs to the resurrection, inasmuch as it is indissolubly connected with the death of Christ (cf. R. Schmidt, p. 90; Gess, p. 186 ff.; Kübel, p. 285 f.). This view is commonly supported by means of Rom. vi., where Paul developes the doctrine of the fellowship of believers with the death and resurrection of Christ. But in this doctrine the point in question is not as to an objective effect of the death of Christ in the work of the grounding of salvation, but as to a consequence of baptism and a resulting subjective relation of the believer to the death and resurrection of Christ, as Ritschl (ii. p. 224) and Pfleiderer (p. 122 [E. Tr. i. 121]) both acknowledge. The passage does not speak of the death of Christ, but of a ὁμοίωμα τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ (ver. 5), *i.e.* a (subjective) occurrence which is similar to the death of Christ, although it is brought about by means of the living (spiritual) fellowship with the dead and risen Christ which is grounded in baptism (cf. § 84). This, however, applies also to the resurrection, which must naturally be mentioned in this connection, because it is only with the dead *and risen* Christ that one can stand in living (spiritual) fellowship. But neither does it come under consideration here according to its objective significance, since the point in question is only as to a ὁμοίωμα τῆς ἀναστάσεως of Christ; and, in general, what is spoken of is not the grounding of salvation, but the consequence for the subjective life of the individual of the appropriated salvation. A significance of the resurrection as a ground of salvation could be spoken of, only in so far as it is the presupposition of our resurrection. But this significance of it refers, not to the procuring, but to the completion of salvation, and therefore belongs to the province of the doctrine of hope. Even in that doctrine, however, as we shall see, the resurrection of believers is not the immediate effect of the resurrection of Christ in the same sense as the providing of an atonement, which renders redemption and reconciliation possible, is the immediate effect of the vicarious death of Christ (cf. § 97).

(*d*) Notwithstanding that the resurrection by no means stands on the same footing with the death of Christ in the

work of procuring salvation, it is nevertheless, according to 1 Cor. xv. 3 f., one of the principal articles of the evangelical tradition. In the elementary preaching of Paul as an apostle to the Gentiles it was already mentioned as that which should lead them to believe in Jesus as the Messiah (Acts xvii. 31; cf. § 61, *a*), and, according to 1 Cor. xv. 11, the faith of Christians rests upon the proclamation of His resurrection; for by means of the resurrection He is exalted to His Messianic sovereignty at God's right hand (Rom. viii. 34, i. 4),[4] in consequence of which sovereignty He has first become for the Christians the Mediator of salvation (§ 76, *a*). This function of His as the Mediator of the Messianic salvation is grounded, however, solely upon His death. For Paul, accordingly, the specific significance of the resurrection must be this, that it proves that the death of Christ was not the death of a sinner, who must have remained in death, if he was forfeited to it on account of his own sin, but the vicarious death of the sinless Mediator of salvation who is exalted to Messianic sovereignty, and which is therefore the ground of our redemption and reconciliation. If Christ has not risen, our faith is vain, we are yet in our sins (1 Cor. xv. 17); if that were the case, there would be no reason to assume that His death was not the death of a sinner, but that of the Redeemer, by means of which the guilt of our sin is taken away from us. Here also, accordingly, we see that it was from the certainty of the exaltation of Christ to Messianic sovereignty, an exaltation which was brought about by the resurrection, that Paul has attained to faith in the saving significance of His death, and not conversely (cf. § 80, *a*). Accordingly, the assurance that God cannot condemn us is owing, primarily, it is true, to the death of Christ, but still more to His resurrection and exaltation to God's right hand (Rom. viii. 34), inasmuch as these first prove that His death was the death of the Mediator of salvation, who has redeemed us from condemnation (§ 80, *d*). Hence the righteousness which is of faith bids us, not first of all seek to bring up Christ from the dead, but believe that

[4] According to § 77, *b*, this passage does not, indeed, say that He was proved to be the Son of God by the resurrection; but seeing that since it He is installed into the full position of Son, He can now be perceived by all to be the Messianic Son of God.

God has raised Him up, and therefore made Him Lord and the Mediator of salvation (x. 7, 9). It is in iv. 25 that the apostle gives the clearest expression to this relation of the death and the resurrection, according to which the former is the means of procuring salvation, the latter the means of appropriating it. Christ was delivered up (to death) for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification. The objective atonement was accomplished by means of the death of Christ; but the appropriation of it in justification is only possible, if we believe in this saving significance of His death, and we can attain to faith in that, only if it is sealed by means of the resurrection (cf. Phil. iii. 10).[5] This consideration of itself leads us over to the doctrine of justification.

## § 82. *Justification by Faith.*

Cf. Lipsius, *die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre*, Leipzig, 1853.

The new righteousness which the Gospel proclaims is a gift of God, who justifies man by grace, by not imputing to him his sins on the ground of the redemption wrought out by Christ. (*b*) As the condition, however, under which alone He can justify the sinner, God demands faith, inasmuch as He counts this as righteousness, as is already typically pre-signified in the history of Abraham. (*c*) The faith, which is the condition of justification, is the very antithesis of all the works demanded by the law; it is no human performance, but rather the renunciation of all our own doing, absolute reliance upon God who justifies, or upon Christ as the Mediator of salvation. (*d*) Faith, however, as the specific

[5] Every attempt to make justification *directly* dependent upon the resurrection (as distinguished from the death, upon which it is expressly based in v. 9) leads to a misunderstanding of that doctrine, according to which it is based, in an altogether un-Pauline manner, somehow or other upon the principle of a new life, a principle which is given in the resurrection of Christ, or is made to refer to men's entrance into a new condition of life, which is no longer conditioned by the flesh. Gess (pp. 189, 192) draws this consequence in the most naive manner, while R. Schmidt (p. 75) seeks in vain to avoid it. Compare, on the other hand, Pfleiderer (p. 120 [E. Tr. i. 119]) and Ritschl (ii. p. 159), who in particular shows how forgiveness of sins and justification, which are explicitly identified in iv. 6–8, cannot possibly be really distinguished here. Schenkel (p. 269), however, simply asserts that it is senseless to translate δικαίωσις with "justification"!

mark of the Christian, is also often the confident conviction of the truth of the Gospel as regards what it proclaims with reference to salvation.

(*a*) Since man could not attain to the righteousness, upon which his salvation wholly depends, by means of the way that had hitherto been pointed out (§ 66), if the grace of God was to redeem humanity it had to appoint a new arrangement, according to which righteousness is attained (Rom. ix. 31: *νόμος δικαιοσύνης*); only then could the preaching of the Gospel be a *διακονία δικαιοσύνης*, whereas that of Moses had been a *διακονία κατακρίσεως*, or had become so in consequence of sin (2 Cor. iii. 9). If, now, the way upon which righteousness was previously to be attained was that of earning it by our own doing, there was only *one* other way, righteousness must be given freely (Rom. iii. 24: *δωρεάν*), and received as a gift (v. 17: *ἡ δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης*). That being the case, it was no longer a righteousness of our own, and which we had earned ourselves, but a righteousness which is God's, because He alone bestows it (*δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, x. 3); and such a righteousness is now proclaimed in the Gospel (i. 17) as being brought about by means of the death of Christ (2 Cor. v. 21). If the righteousness which was earned by ourselves was brought about by means of the law, which makes known to men the will of God, which they had to fulfil in order to become righteous (Rom. x. 5), the righteousness of God is manifested apart from the law (iii. 21), unless we should call the new rule, according to which righteousness is now attained in conformity with the will of God, a *νόμος δικαιοσύνης* (ix. 31).[1]

[1] In a certain sense, it is true, righteousness is always brought about by means of God; for even the righteousness which is acquired by means of the law first obtains its salvation-bringing significance for men when God acknowledges it, and declares that men are righteous, or justifies them on the ground of it (§ 65, *c*). If, accordingly, it sometimes seems as if the *δικαιοῦν* (1 Cor. vi. 11; Rom. viii. 30, 33) or the *δικαίωσις* (Rom. iv. 25, v. 18) is found only in the case of Christians, the reason is that, as a matter of fact, there is no self-acquired righteousness. If there were such a righteousness, one could be justified even without Christ; justification would be a simple act of divine righteousness. The gift of righteousness, accordingly, does not consist in this, that God justifies at all, but that He justifies by grace (Rom. iii. 24: *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*); for grace forms an absolute antithesis to all human doing and desert (Rom. xi. 6, iv. 4, for which see § 75, *b*).

Now, since the fulfilling of the law of itself puts man into the condition in which God must justify him in conformity with His righteousness, while the righteousness that is presented excludes every doing of man, the new rule, according to which righteousness is attained, can consist only in this, that God justifies, not the doer of the law, who would be already righteous in himself, but the godless, who is nevertheless not righteous in reality (*δικαιοῖ τὸν ἀσεβῆ*, iv. 5). That, therefore, which is frequently represented in the Old Testament as the mark of an unrighteous judge, viz., that he justifies the ungodly (Isa. v. 23; Prov. xvii. 15; cf. Ex. xxiii. 7), God does, not, however, out of partiality, but out of grace (iii. 24). Now, since it is in consequence of sin that man becomes unrighteous, God can justify him who is not righteous in himself only by not reckoning unto him his sin (2 Cor. v. 19; cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 5: [*ἡ ἀγάπη*] *οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν*), or by forgiving him his sin (Rom. iv. 7; cf. Acts xiii. 38 f.). Expressed positively, this means that God reckons unto him the righteousness, which he does not possess in himself, as if he possessed it (ver. 11). In Ps. xxxii. 1 f., where David calls him blessed to whom the Lord pardons and does not reckon sin (vv. 7, 8), Paul, accordingly, finds a celebration of the blessedness of him to whom the Lord reckons righteousness without the works which actually bring forth righteousness (ver. 6). Whom God thus justifies no one can any more accuse; for He has therewith declared that He will not reckon the sins on account of which one could have been accused. This non-reckoning of sin, however, is rendered possible by the propitiation provided by Christ in His death, a propitiation which has redeemed man from the guilt of sin, and reconciled him with God (§ 80). In so far our righteousness or justification rests in Christ (Gal. ii. 17; 1 Cor. vi. 11; 2 Cor. v. 21), He is the author of it (1 Cor. i. 30), through Him we have access to justifying grace (Rom. v. 2). Through the obedience (shown in His death) of the one the many have been constituted righteous (ver. 19); not, indeed, directly, but inasmuch as God by His justifying judgment (*δικαίωμα*, ver. 16; cf. § 80, *d*) has, on the ground of this act of obedience, effected the justification of men (ver. 18: *δι' ἑνὸς δικαιώματος . . . εἰς δικαίωσιν*). While

Pfleiderer (p. 166 ff. [E. Tr. i. 165 ff.]) and Ritschl (p. 318 ff.) maintain this declaratory idea of justification in its strict objectivity, justification is again being confused from various sides with making righteous (cf. Biedermann, p. 277; Kübel, p. 405), and thereby the most characteristic Pauline doctrine is misconceived in its central point.

(*b*) Since the justification of the sinner still depends upon a particular justifying judgment of God, every sinner is not justified, God reserves it to Himself to appoint a condition under which He justifies the sinner. This condition is faith. His righteousness is revealed only unto believers (Rom. iii. 22: *εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας*; cf. x. 4: *τῷ πιστεύοντι*); every one who believes is justified (Acts xiii. 39). Accordingly, man is justified by faith (Rom. iii. 28: *πίστει*; ver. 30: *διὰ πίστεως*), the righteousness of God is *διὰ πίστεως* (ver. 22; cf. Phil. iii. 9), as is also the atoning significance of the death of Christ (ver. 25), upon which it depends. To speak more accurately, faith is the condition of justification, *δικαιοσύνη* (ix. 30, x. 6), the *δικαιοῦν* of God (Gal. iii. 8; Rom. iii. 30; cf. ver. 26), or the *δικαιοῦσθαι* of man (Gal. ii. 16, iii. 24; Rom. v. 1) is derived from faith (*ἐκ πίστεως*), is attained upon the occasion of faith, the new righteousness is a righteousness which is of faith (iv. 11, 13: *ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς πίστεως*; cf. x. 10: *πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην*). Accordingly, the act of justification can also be so described as that faith is reckoned by God as righteousness (iv. 5, 24).[2] This is a pure act of divine grace; for whatever faith may be, it is by no means righteousness in the original sense (in the sense of the fulfilling of the law), and God, accordingly, out of grace reckons something for righteousness which is not righteousness in itself, and on the ground of which He did not therefore need to justify.[3] This act of divine grace, however, is

[2] On the other hand, the idea that God reckons the righteousness of Christ unto man is not Pauline; it is not contained even in Rom. v. 19 (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 322 f.). For the right idea of the reckoning of faith, cf. Rom. ii. 26, according to which God, under certain circumstances, reckons uncircumcision for circumcision, or ix. 8, He reckons the *τέκνα ἐπαγγελίας* alone as a *σπέρμα*.

[3] Naturally this does not exclude the possibility that, as Paul conceives of faith (note *c*), it really involves a restoration in principle of the right religious relation of man to God, a restoration which guarantees a fulfilment of his religious-moral task, and is therefore the deepest germ of the full *δικαιοσύνη*. But

accomplished immediately and at once, as soon as the condition demanded by Him, viz. faith, is given; it is not a gradual process in which there could be stages, or something to be hoped for in the future; believers *are* justified (1 Cor. vi. 11; Rom. v. 1, 9).[4] This procedure of God in the matter of justification is by no means an absolutely new one. It is not only borne witness to prophetically in Scripture, it has already found its typical precedent in the history of Abraham (§ 73, *b*, *c*). Hence Paul is convinced that by his doctrine of justification he is really establishing the authority of the Thora, by maintaining the same kind of justification as appears in it as the original one (Rom. iii. 31). According to Gen. xv. 6 Abraham believed, and this faith of his was reckoned unto him for righteousness (Gal. iii. 6; Rom. iv. 3).[5]

Paul certainly does not reflect upon this; he regards the reckoning of faith as a pure act of grace; and he must do so, because he does not make the real δικαιοσύνη develope itself from faith by means of a psychological process, but makes it be brought about by means of a new act of divine grace, which is connected throughout with faith, and also demands it as an indispensable condition (cf. § 84, *b*).

[4] Since it is in the judgment, indeed, that the definitive decision as to the fate of man takes place, and this depends upon his being justified, the δικαίωσις, as well as the ἀπολύτρωσις (§ 80, *c*, footnote 8), could easily be conceived of as taking place in the judgment; but in Gal. v. 5 (ἐλπὶς δικαιοσύνης) the genitive can also denote the righteousness which is of faith, which has already been obtained, and to which hope (*i.e.* the hoped-for completion of salvation which is promised to the righteous) belongs, and this explanation is demanded by the connection with what goes before. When Ritschl (ii. p. 280 f.) concludes from the connection with ver. 6 that the point in question is as to the divine recognition of the active righteousness of their life, for which Christians hope, he seems to me to do away with the argumentative force of ver. 5 in relation to ver. 4, for a recognition of the δικαιοσύνη brought about by means of the "peculiar power of faith" would no longer be an act of grace in the Pauline sense (cf. § 86, *d*).

[5] We have seen how James explains this saying in the sense of his doctrine of justification (§ 53, *d*); for Paul it directly contains, as to its language, the formula which expresses his doctrine of justification. Something was already reckoned unto Abraham for righteousness, which was not really such (Rom. iv. 9, 22, 23), as even James could not conceal from himself. But while he, therefore, conceived of that word of Scripture as a prophecy, which was first fulfilled when the faith of Abraham was really perfected into righteousness, Paul finds in it the proof that the promise, which was given unto Abraham on the ground of this righteousness (ver. 13), was given κατὰ χάριν (ver. 16), for justification already appears here, not as an act of divine righteousness, as James regards it, but as an act of grace. In the history of Abraham, therefore, the economy of grace which is characteristic of Christianity is typically presignified (ver. 24).

Further, this typical parallel already shows plainly that it is not the Church (Ritschl, ii. p. 160, 214) but the individual that Paul thinks of as the object of justification, which Ritschl seeks in vain to dispute in opposition to the clear δικαιῶν τὸν ἐκ πίστεως of iii. 26. So certainly as the saving effect of the death of Christ is throughout made to refer to the world as a whole, or at least to the totality of believers (cf. § 80, *d*), so certainly is justification, the individual appropriation of this saving effect, an appropriation which depends upon the subjective condition of faith (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 184 [E. Tr. i. 183]).

(*c*) In order to obtain a correct notion of the Pauline idea of faith, we must start from the fact, that the righteousness which is of faith forms the antithesis of the righteousness which is of the law (Gal. iii. 11; Rom. x. 5, 6), that law and faith are mutually exclusive opposites (Gal. iii. 23, 25, v. 4, 5; Rom. iv. 13, 14). In this antithesis, however, the law comes into consideration, inasmuch as it demands a doing (x. 5); the real antithesis of faith is this ποιεῖν demanded by the law (Gal. iii. 12), or the works of the law (iii. 2, 5; Rom. ix. 32; cf. Eph. ii. 8, 9).[6] He, who is justified πίστει, is justified χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου (Rom. iii. 28); for the ἐργαζόμενος receives the reward

[6] How fundamentally and with what logical precision Paul regards this antithesis appears especially from Gal. ii. 16, if we do not, as is usual, assume that there is here a grammatical incorrectness and a tautological fulness of words. Paul speaks hypothetically of a being justified by works of the law, which is brought about by means of faith in Christ, inasmuch as faith renders possible a fulfilling of the law which the natural man could not perform. In this sense James could speak of the believer being justified by works of the law (cf. § 53). But if it was thereby granted that faith was indispensable to justification, and if the Christian was certain that even his fulfilling of the law, which was brought about by its means, always remained an imperfect one, this must of itself have led him to ground his justification *exclusively* upon faith *in opposition* to the works of the law. Since we knew that no man is justified by works of the law, unless this should take place by means of faith in Christ, even we (although we were not sinners of the Gentiles, who, it is self-evident, could have no righteousness of the law, but Jews, who could seek for it with the fulfilling of the law) have turned ourselves to faith *in Christ Jesus* (whom we, indeed, could not do without as the Mediator of salvation, *i.e.* as the one who works the right fulfilling of the law), in order that we might be justified upon occasion of faith in Him, *and not* upon occasion of works of the law, because no flesh will ever be perfectly justified by these. If we cannot be justified by works of the law *alone*, we must allow that these do *not* in the last analysis help us to become righteous; and if we cannot become righteous *without* faith in the Mediator of salvation, faith is ultimately the *decisive* condition of justification, and, accordingly, *excludes* every other condition of salvation.

(here, justification) in consequence of his merit, while the believer is justified, according to note *a*, by grace (iv. 4).[7] It is not, however, hereby asserted that, instead of the many works of the law, God now demands only one work, viz. faith, so that even this faith would be again ultimately only a doing, and would fall under the category of the ἔργα (Baur, p. 180). Thereby the real nerve of the Pauline doctrine of justification is cut through; for the meaning of these antitheses, which set forth the Pauline idea most precisely, is, that faith *as such* is the antithesis of the works of the law. But neither, by these works, must we think again of any outward performances, over against which there stands the demand of faith as a demand of the disposition (cf. § 66, *b*); faith rather forms the antithesis of *all* doing by means of human strength, of *all* fulfilling of the law, which God once demanded, and since His demand in the law by no means referred to outward performances, but likewise to the disposition, faith also excludes every disposition demanded in the law. It is no kind of human performance, by means of which man could procure or deserve anything of himself, or attain to any glory (iii. 27); it is rather the antithesis of *all* human performances, it is a renunciation of all our own doing and acquiring, a reliance upon something else, a trust (cf. the excellent exposition by Pfleiderer, p. 166 [E. Tr. i. 165]). Thus, in iv. 5, the πιστεύων ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ stands over against the ἐργαζόμενος, the exclusive trust in Him who reckons righteousness to the ungodly, *i.e.*, to him who can least of all claim it, over against our own working with a view to the acquisition of righteousness; and in ver. 4 absolute trust in divine grace stands over against trust in our own merit. It is in this absolute trust that there lies the identity of justifying faith with that of Abraham.[8] Abraham trusted in the divine

[7] No doubt a νόμος πίστεως is spoken of also in Rom. iii. 27; but, like νόμος δικαιοσύνης (Rom. ix. 31; cf. note *a*), this only denotes the norm, according to which faith instead of works, which here again form its antithesis, is made the condition of justification. Inasmuch as God appoints this new condition of salvation, He must, naturally, demand its fulfilment; we must subject ourselves to the new rule of the righteousness of God (Rom. x. 3), which is connected, not with works, but with faith.

[8] Since Christian faith is plainly thought of in Gal. iii. 23 as first coming in with the new era of salvation, Paul has by no means directly identified the faith

promise under circumstances, under which it contradicted all human expectation (Rom. iv. 18: παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν), and did not allow himself to be perplexed in his trust by these circumstances (vv. 19, 20). The faith of Christians is a similar absolute trust; and, accordingly, it is characterized in ver. 24 as a trust in Him who has raised up Christ (cf. Col. ii. 12), in so far, however, as is more particularly explained in ver. 25, as this raising up is only the seal put upon the redeeming death, in which our justification is grounded (§ 81, *d*). Now, since justification is brought about by means of the atoning work of Christ (note *a*), faith can equally well be described as a faith which is grounded upon Christ (πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστόν: Rom. x. 14; cf. Col. ii. 5; Phil. i. 29; Acts xx. 21, xxvi. 18), or as a faith which rests in Christ (πίστις ἐν Χριστῷ: Gal. iii. 26; cf. Col. i. 4; Eph. i. 15); or, lastly, even as a trust in Christ (πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ: Rom. iii. 22, 26; Gal. ii. 16, iii. 22; cf. Eph. iii. 12; Phil. iii. 9).[9] This trust is evinced by their calling upon His name (1 Cor. i. 2) as the Mediator of salvation (Rom. x. 14); and hence this calling can also be represented as a condition of salvation (vv. 12, 13, where this ἐπικαλεῖσθαι takes up the πιστεύειν of ver. 11).[10]

of Abraham with Christian faith. It is only according to its formal nature, not according to its material object, that it is the same.

[9] Among these passages we should also have to reckon Gal. ii. 20, where Christ is represented as the Son of God, who has loved us and given Himself for us, if we had not to read: τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ, which appears so much the more suitable, as the grace of God *and* the death of Christ are spoken of immediately thereafter (ver. 21), and therefore saving faith can very easily be represented as a trust which is grounded upon both. It is only in Rom. ix. 33, x. 11, in a quotation from Isa. xxviii. 16 (LXX.), that πιστεύειν ἐπ' αὐτῷ occurs.

[10] At the root of the technical term πίστις, as it is found in Paul in connection with his doctrine of justification, there lies the meaning, trust. So we found it already in Peter (§ 44, *a*, footnote 2), but, while there this trust was essentially in the future completion of salvation, here it is in the salvation which is already given in the present time in Christ; and while there faith was still, quite in the Old Testament sense, an act of obedience towards God, Paul has conceived of it in its antithesis to all human doing, and has thereby made it the expression of his doctrine of grace, which forms the sharpest antithesis to the Old Testament way of salvation. This fundamental meaning of the word is often found in Paul, even where it occurs outside of the connection of his doctrine of justification. Thus, it stands in 1 Cor. xiii. 7 for the trust with which love, far from

(*d*) We have already seen in the discourses of Jesus how the fundamental idea of trusting, which lies in πιστεύειν, can be made to refer specially to the trust which we show one, when we receive his word as true (§ 29, *c*), and how, in the original apostolic type of doctrine, πιστεύειν therefore denoted the trustful acceptance of a message, the confident assurance of the truth of its import (§ 40, *c*, 52, *c*). It was *exclusively* in this sense that we found πίστις in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 61, *c*). From this it appears, that it was along with his doctrine of justification that Paul first conceived the technical meaning, which faith receives in connection with that doctrine (note *c*). It may, however, be *à priori* assumed that he has not given up that other meaning of πίστις;[11] nay, we may say that, wherever faith is spoken of outside of the connection of the doctrine of justification, it is the prevalent meaning. So, *e.g.*, when what is spoken of is the Christians

mistrust and suspicion, always believes the best with respect to one's neighbour. This same meaning also lies at the root of the use of the word in Rom. xiv. 1, 2, 22, 23. There it denotes trust in the possession of salvation which is given in Christ. In proportion to the strength or weakness of faith in this sense, one will believe his possession of salvation hardly or easily exposed to danger, and will therefore with little or much anxiety and painfulness avoid and perform many things, in order that he may not lose it. Rom. xii. 3, 6, according to which the measure of faith conditions the bestowal of the various gifts, probably proceeds from the same idea of faith, inasmuch as this faith can be conceived of as having different degrees, not only of energy, but also of receptivity. Lastly, in 1 Cor. xii. 9, xiii. 2, faith is the gift of the trust in God which works miracles, just as in § 29, *c*, 40, *c*, footnote 2, 52, *c*, and in 2 Cor. iv. 13 it is the Spirit's gift of the joyous trust in God from which the fearless proclamation of the Gospel proceeds.

[11] Thus, in 1 Cor. xi. 18 πιστεύειν undoubtedly denotes the conviction of the truth of a (non-religious) fact, in Rom. x. 16 (in a quotation from Isa. liii. 1) the trustful acceptance of the message of the Gospel (τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; cf. vv. 14, 17: πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς), in x. 8, 9 the confident assurance of the actuality of the resurrection (πιστ., ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν; cf. 1 Thess. v. 14), and in vi. 8 the confident assurance of the necessary consequence with which the συζῆν Χριστῷ follows the ἀποθανεῖν σὺν Χριστῷ (πιστεύομεν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). The antithesis of the διὰ πίστεως to διὰ εἴδους in 2 Cor. v. 7 is probably to be traced back also to this same meaning, inasmuch as the point in question here is as to the firm conviction of the real life of Christ in His exaltation, although He is still invisible to us. It is different in Gal. iii. 2, 5, where ἀκοὴ πίστεως denotes the preaching of faith in the specific sense, as the antithesis of the ἔργα νόμου shows, a circumstance which Baur, p. 154, has overlooked. It is probably also of faith in the specific sense that the πίστις τοῦ εὐαγγελίου of Phil. i. 27 is to be understood, inasmuch as the question here is as to the purport of the message of salvation, which is the salvation given in Christ.

having become believers (Gal. ii. 16;[12] 1 Cor. iii. 5, xv. 2, 11; Rom. xiii. 11), when they are represented as believers and contrasted with the unbelieving (1 Cor. xiv. 24, vii. 14; 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15; cf. Eph. i. 13, 19), when their faith is spoken of simply as that which makes them Christians (Gal. i. 23, vi. 10; 1 Cor. ii. 5; 2 Cor. i. 24, viii. 7; Rom. i. 8, xi. 20; cf. Eph. iv. 5; Phil. ii. 17). In all these passages faith is the firm conviction of the truth of the purport of the Gospel, which conviction, however, is based upon the trust with which one regards God as the author of this message. In the very same manner as in the Epistles to the Thessalonians, faith in this sense (1 Cor. i. 21; Rom. i. 16), or the consequent confession of the κυριότης of Jesus (1 Cor. xii. 3), is made the condition of salvation (Rom. x. 9). Now, since God demands and has the right to demand that we receive His message of salvation, a ὑπακοὴ πίστεως in this sense can be spoken of (Rom. i. 5, xvi. 26; cf. vi. 17, xvi. 19; 2 Cor. x. 5: ὑπακοὴ Χριστοῦ); obedience towards the Gospel (Rom. x. 16 = πιστεύειν τῇ ἀκοῇ; cf. Gal. v. 7; 2 Cor. ix. 13; 2 Thess. i. 8) consists in this, that one receives it trustfully and is firmly convinced of the truth of its purport. Now, of course, the purport of this message is the salvation which is given in Christ, and the new rule of justification which is based upon that salvation, and in which alone we are to put our trust; accordingly, the trustful acceptance of the Gospel cannot be conceived of at all without trust in the salvation proclaimed in it, nor can the firm conviction of its truth be at all conceived of without firm reliance upon this salvation.[13] Rom. i. 17 shows best of all the passing over of this idea of faith into that of the doctrine of justification; there it is said that, on the ground of faith, the righteousness of God is revealed in the Gospel in order to awaken faith (ἐκ πίστεως

[12] In this passage ἐπιστεύσαμεν (we have attained to faith) is even connected with εἰς Χριστόν, as in note c (cf. the πίστις ἐν Χρ. of Col. i. 4, Eph. i. 15, and the similar connection with πιστός in Col. i. 2; Eph. i. 1).

[13] Even Abraham's faith was primarily a πιστεύειν τῷ Θεῷ (Gal. iii. 6; Rom. iv. 3, 17), a trust in God, in accordance with which he received the word of the promise as true, which presupposed the full conviction that God could also fulfil it (Rom. iv. 21); and from this trust there was then developed that unlimited trust in the divine promise (note b) which is the type of justifying faith (cf. also Gal. iii. 9, where Abraham is called πιστός in the specific sense).

εἰς πίστιν). For the faith, on the ground of which the Gospel reveals the new righteousness, is the firm conviction of its divine truth, while the faith, which is awakened by its revelation, is the saving trust, on the ground of which one is justified (cf. the immediately following: δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως). For Paul, accordingly, there was no difficulty in using the term in the sense we have just developed, and immediately thereafter in the technical sense discussed in note *c* (Gal. ii. 16; 1 Cor. xv. 11, cf. vv. 14, 17; Rom. x. 6, 10, 14, cf. vv. 8, 9, 14). Nay, it is often difficult to determine, and was probably not always consciously determined by the apostle himself, whether, when the faith of Christians is spoken of, it is the idea of trust or that of conviction that lies at the root of the statement, for a growth, a strengthening, etc., can be asserted of the latter as well as of the former (1 Cor. xvi. 13; 2 Cor. x. 15, xiii. 5; Rom. i. 12; cf. Col. i. 23, ii. 7; Eph. iv. 13, vi. 23).[14]

## § 83. *Sonship.*

By means of justification God has manifested His love to the believer in a manner which makes him certain of it for all time coming; he has entered into the relation of sonship to God. (*b*) The possession of all salvation, which is given therewith, works in the believer the inner peace of soul and the joy which no sorrow can any longer destroy. (*c*) The inner assurance, however, of this new state of salvation only God Himself can give to the believer by means of His Spirit. (*d*) On the other hand, it is altogether un-Pauline to see the essence of sonship first in the possession of this Spirit, and in the new life of believers, which is grounded by means of it.

(*a*) If man has entered into the state of peace with God by means of the justification which is accomplished on the

[14] It must be decidedly denied that in Paul πίστις and πιστεύειν ever have a signification, which may not be traced back to one or other of these two ideas, as Baur (p. 154) and Reuss (ii. p. 99–106 [E. Tr. ii. 85 ff.]) assume, and, in particular, that they have the objective meaning of doctrine of faith. Naturally, we do not at all take into account the passages in which πίστις means faithfulness (Gal. v. 22; Rom. iii. 3), πιστός faithful, said of God (1 Cor. i. 9, x. 13; 2 Cor. i. 18; cf. 1 Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 3) or of men (1 Cor. iv. 2, 17; cf. Col. i. 7, iv. 7, 9; Eph. vi. 21), and πιστεύεσθαί τι (Gal. ii. 7; 1 Cor. ix. 17; Rom. iii. 2; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 4) to be entrusted with something.

ground of the atoning death of Christ (Rom. v. 1), he can now be certain of the love of God as far as regards the objective matter of fact (ver. 5). God, who has given him the greatest proof of His love in the delivering up of His Son at a time when he was still His enemy on account of his sin, can now, when He is reconciled to him, and has justified him, no longer be angry with him for all time to come (vv. 6–9), but can only show him His love more and more richly (ver. 10), so that, as the Israelites had once done (cf. ii. 17), he can glory in Him as his God (ver. 11: *καυχώμενοι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ*; 1 Cor. i. 4, vi. 11; Rom. i. 8: *ὁ Θεός μου*; cf. Phil. i. 3, iv. 19; 1 Thess. ii. 2; 2 Thess. i. 12). The same proof (Rom. viii. 32) leads to the same result, that nothing can any longer separate the Christian from the love of God, which is bestowed upon him in Christ Jesus (ver. 38 f.). The Christian is beloved of God (Rom. i. 7: *ἀγαπητοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*; 2 Cor. xiii. 13: *ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ*; cf. Col. iii. 12 and 1 Thess. i. 4, for which see § 61, *b*), and on the part of man the trust which we can have through Christ towards God corresponds to this love (2 Cor. iii. 4; cf. Eph. iii. 12). Like the relation of love, in which Israel stood to God (§ 71, *a*), and like Christ's relation of love to Him (§ 77, *c*), this new relation to God is represented as the relation of a son; Paul himself makes the prophecy, according to which God will be the Father of His people, and its members shall be His sons and daughters, refer to the Christian Church (2 Cor. vi. 18; cf. ver. 16), just as, according to Rom. ix. 26, those who are called the "children of God" are His people. That which Christ proclaims as being given directly with the coming of the kingdom of God (§ 20, *b*; cf. also in Peter, § 45, *d*) appears here as being brought about in its completion by means of the Pauline doctrine of salvation. As in this doctrine salvation is first brought about through the judicial act of justification (§ 82), so the new state of salvation, into which that act translates the justified, is also represented as depending upon a juridical act, viz. upon adoption (*υἱοθεσία*: Eph. i. 5), by means of which man is put into a relation to God which is opposed to his previous servile relation (§ 70, *b*, 72, *c*). As man becomes righteous through God's declaration, so he is received as a child through His declaration. Here too, of course, the

juridical element is only the form, materially each is an act of grace. Man is no more in himself a child of God than he is righteous in himself; it is a deed of His grace through which God adopts him as His child; but, nevertheless, it is to the apostle a legally valid relation, into which man is translated by means of this adoption, inasmuch as it becomes the basis of his future participation in the rights of a child.[1] Believers, indeed, already possess a part of these rights of children. As sons of God they can call upon Him as their Father with a childlike trust, which excludes all fear (Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15; cf. Eph. ii. 18).[2]

(*b*) The sum of all the blessings which the believer has received through grace in his new filial relationship, the apostle describes, in the usual salutation with which he commences his Epistles, according to a common Christian *usus loquendi*, as εἰρήνη, and therefore this is derived throughout from God *our Father*.[3] Peculiar to the apostle, however, is the richer import

[1] Although, accordingly, adoption, like justification, takes place immediately in consequence of faith (Gal. iii. 26), yet it appears in Rom. viii. 23 as something which believers have still to wait for, seeing that, like Christ Himself (i. 4, for which see § 77, *b*), it is not till after their earthly life that they enter into the full rights of children, and therewith into that position in which their sonship is perfectly revealed (viii. 19). It is on this account probably that the prophecy in 2 Cor. vi. 18 is still counted among the promises which Christians have (vii. 1).

[2] Paul, moreover, calls God our Father comparatively less frequently than in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 61, *b*), viz., only in the salutations with which he commences his Epistles (Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. i. 3; 2 Cor. i. 2; Rom. i. 7; cf. Col. i. 2; Eph. i. 2; Phil. i. 2). Here, too, Christians are addressed (cf. § 62, *b*) and described as brethren; but although Rom. viii. 29 shows that this designation is based upon their divine sonship, yet it is for the most part only used in order to lay emphasis upon their obligation to love one another (1 Cor. vi. 5 f., 8, viii. 11 ff.; Rom. xiv. 10, 13, 15, 21).

[3] The Old Testament שָׁלוֹם literally denotes a state of wellbeing which is free from trouble, strife, and danger, and satisfied in itself. So εἰρήνη occurs also in Paul, in contrast with the θλῖψις which is threatened the ungodly (Rom. ii. 10; cf. with ver. 9), as that which first gives to the life which is promised in ver. 7 its full value (cf. viii. 6: ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη), in contrast with outer or inner danger (xvi. 20, xv. 33, compared with ver. 31; cf. 1 Thess. v. 3), and it also stands for the harmony which excludes all strife and discord (1 Cor. vii. 15, xiv. 33, xvi. 11; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Rom. xiv. 19; cf. 1 Thess. v. 13; Col. iii. 15; Eph. ii. 14–17, iv. 3). But already in the prophecy in Isa. lii. 7, εἰρήνη denotes the import of the Messianic glad tidings (Rom. x. 15; cf. Eph. vi. 15: τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς εἰρήνης). So the Jewish salutation (εἰρήνη ὑμῖν: Luke x. 5; Mark v. 34; John xx. 19, 21, 26; Jas. ii. 16) could also be retained in a higher sense in Christianity (1 Pet. v. 14; 3 John 15; Eph. vi. 23), or, as in Paul, be combined with

which this term has received in the connection of his system, as well as the manner in which he gives it a subjective turn. In the latter case it stands for the inner feeling of this well-being, for the inner satisfaction which this possession of salvation begets, and which the Christian accordingly possesses in faith (Gal. v. 22; Rom. xv. 13; cf. Phil. iv. 7, 9; 1 Thess. v. 23; 2 Thess. iii. 16). The common assumption that, in Paul, *εἰρήνη* denotes peace with God, cannot be proved by means of Rom. v. 1, where the addition *πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* gives it that meaning. Peace with God is the ground of this inner peace of soul, not that itself. In this sense *εἰρήνη*, along with *δικαιοσύνη*, characterizes the Christian's new state of salvation (Rom. xiv. 17). Along with these there stands here, as in Gal. v. 22, Rom. xv. 13, joy (*χαρά*); it is self-evident that this is to be found wherever, along with every inner disquietude, there also ceases to be any good reason for pain and sorrow, and accordingly it appears also in 2 Cor. i. 24 as given immediately with faith (cf. Phil. i. 25). Outward afflictions cannot do away with this joy (2 Cor. vi. 10, viii. 2; cf. 1 Thess. i. 6), and therefore the apostle repeatedly stirs up the Christians to it (2 Cor. xiii. 11; Rom. xii. 12; cf. Phil. iii. 1, iv. 4; 1 Thess. v. 16).

(*c*) In itself adoption is an altogether objective transaction, a pure act of God, which can first receive its significance for our consciousness, when the inner assurance of it is worked in us. This, however, can only take place by God Himself giving us the Spirit of *υἱοθεσία* (Rom. viii. 15), which testifies to us that we are God's children (ver. 16), by teaching us to call upon the Father with childlike confidence (Gal. iv. 6; cf. Eph. ii. 18). Through this Spirit the love of God has been shed abroad in our hearts (Rom. v. 5), *i.e.*, has become an object of our consciousness, and this assurance of the love of God is identical with the consciousness of adoption. The fruit of the Spirit is, accordingly, also the joy and the peace, which we found in note *b* to be the consequence of the

the wishing of grace (cf. 1 Pet. i. 2; 2 Pet. i. 2; Apoc. i. 4), or mercy (Gal. vi. 16; cf. Jude 2), or both (1 Tim. i. 2; 2 Tim. i. 2; 2 John 3). Here we have undoubtedly to do with a general Christian terminology. This would be still more evident if what Otto (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1867, 4) seeks to prove should turn out to be correct, that these formulae of blessing are Christianized transformations of the Aaronitic blessing (Num. vi. 24–26).

new state of salvation (Gal. v. 22), and which can naturally only be found when we have become certain of our state of grace. The peace is a peace of God (Phil. iv. 7; cf. ver. 9; 1 Thess. v. 23), which God gives (through His Spirit), and the joy is a joy in the Holy Ghost (Rom. xiv. 17, xv. 13; cf. 1 Thess. i. 6). This Spirit, in which God has, as it were, put His seal upon our assurance of salvation, is itself the earnest of all the completion of salvation which is still to be looked for (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5: ἀρραβών; Rom. viii. 23: ἀπαρχή; cf. Eph. i. 13, iv. 30); through it we expect the salvation, which we have to hope for in consequence of the righteousness which has been presented to us ἐκ πίστεως (Gal. v. 5, for which see § 82, *b*, footnote 4). From this it is already evident that the objective act of grace performed by God in justification cannot be thought of at all without another corresponding act, which makes a direct impression upon the subjective life of the individual, and which consists in the communication of the Spirit, for the objective salvation remains worthless for the individual if unaccompanied by the subjective assurance of it.[4] The διακονία τῆς δικαιοσύνης must also be a διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος (2 Cor. iii. 8, 9). The other side of the Pauline doctrine of salvation attaches itself to this second gracious act of God, which, equally with the first, is naturally brought about objectively through Christ and subjectively through faith (Gal. iii. 2, 5, 14).

(*d*) It is of the utmost importance for the comprehension of the Pauline doctrine of salvation to distinguish the act of God's grace, through which man is justified and translated into the new filial relation, very precisely from the second act of grace, which consists in the communication of the Spirit and its saving operations, although the first of these

[4] Not as if his justification remained a merely ideal one, which first becomes a truly real δικαιοῦσθαι through the operation of the Spirit, as Baur (p. 175) thinks. Justification is altogether complete on God's part, and is nowhere made dependent upon the operation of the Spirit and the actual δικαιοσύνη which is brought about by means of it, a view which would break up the whole of the apostle's doctrine of justification as rightly understood. Only the subjective assurance of justification and its consequences is given us through the Spirit; but this assurance is not required for the perfection of the process of justification as such, as Baur thinks, but only for the completion of the salvation which is intended for man, and which commences with justification.

is the certification of our state of grace. This distinction, however, is immediately obliterated if, in keeping with the misconception of the sonship of Christ considered in § 77, *c*, footnote 1, we see the sonship of believers essentially, or at least partly (Biedermann, p. 276; Kübel, p. 406), based in the possession of the Spirit, and in the pneumatic godlike life of Christians which that implies. Gal. iv. 6 decides against this view as clearly as possible. Because we are already actually sons of God (note the expressly emphasized ἐστε), God has sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts. This second act of God is purposely described in its perfect objectivity, and even in the expression employed, as quite analogous with the sending of the Son (ver. 4), which has brought about our adoption (ver. 5). What the Son possessed had also to be bestowed upon the sons of God. If, however, the Spirit comes, in order to make believers certain of their adoption (ver. 6), the latter must already be accomplished, it cannot be owing to the communication of the Spirit. According to the context, Rom. viii. 14 also merely asserts that the believer recognises his filial relationship by the effects of the Spirit. This recognition, it is true, depends upon the fact that, because the child resembles the father, he who is led by the Spirit of God must also be His child, *i.e.*, it depends upon the metaphorical idea of sonship, which we found in the discourses of Jesus (§ 21, *c*, footnote 1). But it by no means follows from this that this likeness makes the child a child, and therefore that man is made a child of God by the operation of the Spirit (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 353). Rather, he does not receive the Spirit, which makes him like God, until after God has adopted him as His child, although it is naturally by the possession of this Spirit itself, which is a Spirit of the Son, and teaches him to cry, Abba, Father (Gal. iv. 6), and by its effects (Rom. viii. 14) that he recognises his filial relationship.[5] In viii. 16 both are expressly put alongside of each

[5] The earlier interpretation of the passage in Galatians, which simply inverts the order of the thoughts, even Beyschlag (p. 223) no longer ventures to maintain; on the other hand, he assumes that Paul represents different acts of God as υἱοθεσία, and for this assertion appeals particularly to Rom. viii. 14, where Immer (p. 298) also finds a representation which is the very opposite of that in Galatians (cf. the correct view in Pfleiderer, p. 188 [E. Tr. i. 187]). The πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας (ver. 15), however, cannot grammatically denote the Spirit, which works

other as a double testimony to our sonship. For Paul it is of decisive importance that the gracious acceptance of us as His children on the part of God, of which we are made assured through the Spirit, is the indispensable presupposition of every further successful operation of the Spirit in us, just as, in the teaching of Jesus, it is only the members of the kingdom, who call upon God as their Father, that can become children of God in the sense of moral likeness to Him (§ 21, *c*).[6]

# CHAPTER VII.

## THE NEW LIFE.

### § 84. *Baptism.*

Baptism into the name of Christ, which presupposes faith in Him, and binds the believer to belong to Him exclusively,

the υἱοθεσία (R. Schmidt, p. 122), but only the Spirit, which belongs to the condition of sonship. For that υἱοθεσία, which, it is true, primarily denotes the act of adoption, here stands metonymically for the condition of sonship which is brought about by means of that act, appears indubitable from the parallel δουλεία (cf. also Gal. iv. 5, Rom. ix. 4, where the reference to the act of adoption is altogether inapplicable). Schmidt (p. 121) appeals further to Gal. iii. 27, to show that the filial relationship is first constituted by incorporation with Christ; but this is owing to a misconception of the context, in which the apostle by no means seeks to prove that in Christ they are all sons of God, but that through faith in Christ they have become sons of God, who have to look for the inheritance, *i.e.*, the completed possession of salvation (ver. 29). Since believers (ver. 26) as such have been baptized and incorporated with Christ (ver. 27), so that they have now become one with Christ (ver. 28), they belong to the seed of Abraham, to whom, according to ver. 16, the promise of the κληρονομία was given (ver. 29). The common misinterpretation of the passage overlooks the fact that, according to the context, in which the question is throughout as to the condition of the obtaining of the promised *completion of salvation*, the establishment of ver. 26 can lie, not in ver. 27 alone, but only in vv. 27–29, which even Pfleiderer (p. 198 [E. Tr. i. 198]) does not perceive.

[6] R. Schmidt (p. 122) attempts to reconcile his distortion of the idea of sonship with the objective conception of it in Paul, which is also admitted by him, by means of the assertion that the objective filial relationship first attains to subjective reality (instead of: to consciousness) in the possession of the Spirit; but this is the same error as when Baur maintains that the process of justification first becomes perfect through the operation of the Spirit (cf. footnote 4). And here also we see how this error immediately leads to a misconception of justification, upon which adoption depends. For, as already shown, this by no means consists in this, that God regards believers, on the ground of their being incorporated with Christ, who is the Spirit, as already ideally ἐν πνεύματι ὄντες, and therefore as δίκαιοι, as Schmidt represents it.

can be regarded primarily as a washing away of the stain of guilt; in it, however, the Holy Spirit of God, which is the principle of the new life in the believer, is also bestowed. (*b*) Through this Spirit, which is the Spirit of Christ, the believer enters into a living fellowship with Christ, in virtue of which Christ lives in him and he in Christ. (*c*) In this living fellowship with the Christ who died and rose again, the believer dies as to his old nature and begins a new life. (*d*) Thus in baptism there is accomplished in him a new creation, through which holiness and righteousness are, in principle, realized in him.

(*a*) In the Pauline Churches, as well as in the mother Church (§ 41, *a*), reception into the Christian Church took place through baptism into the name of Christ (1 Cor. i. 13–16). Baptism therefore presupposes faith in Him as the one whom the Christian Church designates with the name of their Lord (§ 76, *a*),[1] and also binds to an adherence to Him (ver. 12), which excludes every dependence upon any other (cf. iii. 23: ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ), inasmuch as He has acquired a claim upon their devotion by the saving deed of His self-surrender on the cross (§ 81, *b*). Now, seeing that the death of Christ has rendered forgiveness of sin possible, baptism can be regarded (as in Peter, § 44, *b*; cf. already § 41, *a*) as a washing away of the stain of guilt (1 Cor. vi. 11: ἀπελούσασθε; cf. Acts xxii. 16; Eph. v. 26). Inasmuch as he who has attained to faith confesses it by the reception of baptism, he receives in the latter the symbolical pledge of the forgiveness of sins or the justification which is conditioned by faith (§ 82, *a*). But, according to § 21, *b*, the original symbolism of the rite of baptism pointed to the complete putting away of the previous disposition and the renewal of the whole mind and life. From this point the apostle has worked out his peculiar doctrine of baptism.[2] Here too, indeed, he

[1] Because this faith always involves at the same time a trust in Him as the Mediator of salvation (ver. 13: ἐσταυρώθη ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν; cf. § 82, *d*), the apostle speaks in 1 Cor. x. 2 of the Israelites having been baptized into Moses, inasmuch as, in consequence of the grace they experienced at the Red Sea, they learned to trust in him as the divinely sent saviour (Ex. xiv. 31).

[2] In Rom. vi. Paul will show that his doctrine of justification by no means leads to a moral lethargy, which suffers an ἐπιμένειν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ (ver. 1), but that the person who is justified has rather died, in principle, to sin (ver. 2); and in

attaches himself to the original apostolic idea, according to which Christian baptism is the Messianic baptism of the Spirit (cf. § 41, *a*, 44, *b*). The communication of the Spirit, which first makes the believer assured of his justification, and must therefore be directly connected with the bestowal of forgiveness of sins in baptism (§ 83, *c*), takes place also according to him in baptism, in which we are baptized with one Spirit (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, after the original form of the rite of baptism) into one body (1 Cor. xii. 13), which is immediately afterwards represented in another way as a having been made to drink of one Spirit. And, indeed, it is the *Holy* Spirit which is then poured out into the heart (Rom. v. 5; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 6, xiii. 14; Rom. ix. 1, xiv. 17, xv. 13, 16, 19), or, what is, according to 1 Cor. xii. 3, identical therewith, the Spirit of *God* (1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 11, vii. 40; 2 Cor. iii. 3; Rom. viii. 11, 14). But it is altogether peculiar to our apostle, that this Spirit is now the principle of a new life in the Christian, as we already found in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 62, *d*).[3] The children of God know their sonship by this, that they are led by the Spirit of God (Rom. viii. 14; cf. § 83, *d*), and this ἄγεσθαι πνεύματι (Gal. v. 18)

order to prove this, he now goes back, not upon the act of justification itself, which the context would have made most natural, but upon baptism (ver. 3). From this, therefore, it follows, first, that according to him the new life of the Christian is not developed through a psychological process from the consciousness of justification (cf. the excellent exposition by Ritschl, ii. p. 339, 354 f.), and, secondly, that in baptism the point in question is not merely as to a symbolical certification of justification, but that something else must also be given with it, whereby a renewal, in principle, is accomplished in man.

[3] As in the preaching of the original apostles (§ 40, *a*, footnote 1; cf. § 62, *d*), the Spirit is, naturally, also the principle of the gifts of grace, with which God equips believers for His service in the Church (1 Cor. xii. 4), wherefore these are also called πνευματικά (1 Cor. xii. 1, xiv. 1; cf. ver. 37). It is closely connected with the idea, according to which this Spirit works the assurance of salvation in the believer, that no one (on the ground of that assurance) can confess Jesus as Lord (and Mediator of salvation), εἰ μὴ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ (1 Cor. xii. 3). But, elsewhere also, everything which is required for the continuance or furtherance of the Christian life is something worked by the Spirit, a πνευματικόν (1 Cor. ix. 11; cf. ii. 13; Rom. i. 11, xv. 27). The significance of this peculiar conception of the πνεῦμα as an immanent religious-moral principle of life Pfleiderer especially has set forth in a very able manner (p. 20 f., 200 [E. Tr. i. 20 f., 199]), although he too narrowly represents the conception of the Messianic πνεῦμα, which is found elsewhere in the New Testament, as ecstatic-apocalyptic.

expressly denotes that this Spirit is the moving principle of their life. The norm-giving power (*νόμος*) of this Spirit has made them free from the norm-giving power (*νόμος*) of sin (Rom. viii. 2), and the new condition of the life of the Christian is an effect of the Spirit (vii. 6: *καινότης πνεύματος*; cf. Gal. v. 25: *ζῶμεν πνεύματι*). All Christian virtues are fruits of the Spirit (Gal. v. 22 f.); love is owing to the Spirit (Rom. xv. 30); the Spirit is a *πνεῦμα πραότητος* (Gal. vi. 1; 1 Cor. iv. 21). It is through an operation of this Spirit, therefore, that there is brought about that perfect renewal, which was indicated in the symbolism of the rite of baptism by the disappearing and emerging of the person baptized.[4]

(*b*) Like every gracious operation, the communication of the Spirit is naturally brought about by Christ as the exalted Lord, who is therefore also called *κύριος πνεύματος* in 2 Cor. iii. 18. The Church is an epistle, which Christ has composed, inasmuch as He has written it with the Spirit of the living God upon the tables of the hearts (iii. 3). Yea, the Spirit of

[4] Here the Spirit is throughout evidently conceived of as a divine energy (cf. 2 Cor. vi. 7), from which there goes forth a definite power (cf. Eph. iii. 20 with ver. 16), just as *δύναμις* specifically belongs to everything that is *πνευματικόν* (1 Cor. xv. 43 f.). Paul speaks of the demonstration which the Spirit of God gives by means of the power that goes forth specifically from it (1 Cor. ii. 4; cf. 1 Thess. i. 5), or even of the *δύναμις πνεύματος ἁγίου* (Rom. xv. 13, 19). And like every divine gift, it is an energy derived from God (1 Cor. ii. 12: *τὸ πν. τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*), which God gives (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Rom. v. 5; cf. 1 Thess. iv. 8; Eph. i. 17) and supplies (Gal. iii. 5), which Christians receive (Gal. iii. 2, 14; 2 Cor. xi. 4; Rom. viii. 15) and possess (1 Cor. vi. 19. Cf. Sabatier, p. 293). Accordingly, the Spirit cannot possibly be conceived of as an independent personality, as Hahn still maintains (p. 118; cf. also Immer, p. 298 f.). When the communication of the Spirit is represented, for a rhetorical purpose (cf. § 83, *d*), as a sending altogether analogous with that of the Son (Gal. iv. 6; cf. ver. 4), when the Spirit is represented as dwelling (*i.e.* having its abiding place of abode) in us (Rom. viii. 9, 11), when the Spirit, which urges us to pray and groan and is still to be distinguished as an altogether objectively operative power in us from our subjective spiritual life which is brought about by it, itself appears as crying Abba in us (Gal. iv. 6) and as successfully interceding for us with its groaning (Rom. viii. 26 f.), as Christ elsewhere intercedes for us (Rom. viii. 34), it is only by means of an altogether unhermeneutical foreing of the expression that its personality can be deduced from these statements. Still less does this follow from the circumstance that, in 1 Cor. ii. 10, a searching of the deep things of God is ascribed to it, for in what follows this is expressly explained by the analogy of man's self-consciousness (cf. § 68, *c*, footnote 9), so that the Spirit really appears as the principle of the self-consciousness of God

God, which is communicated to Christians in baptism, is, according to the change of the expressions in Rom. viii. 9, none other than the Spirit of Christ (Gal. iv. 6; 1 Cor. ii. 16; 2 Cor. iii. 17; cf. Phil. i. 19), and, seeing that the exalted Christ has altogether become πνεῦμα (1 Cor. xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii. 17: ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν),[5] the statements: πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν and Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν in Rom. viii. 9, 10 seem altogether synonymous; Christ is in man through His Spirit, or as the Spirit that maketh alive Himself, just as God also Himself in His Spirit dwells in man (1 Cor. iii. 16). We recognise the true Christian by Christ being in Him (2 Cor. xiii. 5). Paul confesses of himself that he no longer lives, but Christ lives in him (Gal. ii. 20; cf. Col. iii. 11; Eph. iii. 17; Phil. i. 8, 21). A man does not become a true Christian until Christ is formed in him, like the embryo in its mother's womb (Gal. iv. 19); as husband and wife become one flesh (1 Cor. vi. 16), so in this most intimate living fellowship Christ and the believer become one spirit (ver. 17), because His Spirit becomes our spirit. This living fellowship

(ver. 11). If that which is said of it as such be, nevertheless, applied to the Spirit which is communicated to us, then in this energy which goes forth from Him *God Himself* must be conceived of as present and operative with His self-consciousness, and in iii. 16 it is undoubtedly God Himself that makes His abode in us through His Spirit. Accordingly, the activity in the distribution of the gifts of grace can be traced back to the *willing* of the Spirit (xii. 11: καθὼς βούλεται), although in ver. 6 f. it is evidently God Himself that works them in due measure. The spiritual energy that goes forth from God, and is meant to work upon the knowing and willing of man, cannot but naturally be thought of as knowing and willing; but as in ii. 11 the divine self-consciousness is the ground of this knowing, so here the divine gracious will is the ground of this willing, while the knowing and willing of a subject distinct from God are nowhere thought of. And although the Holy Ghost is named in 2 Cor. xiii. 14 along with God and Christ as a third independent subject (cf. Eph. ii. 18, 22, iv. 4–6), yet here the very idea of a participation in it (cf. Phil. ii. 1) points as plainly as possible to a real possession. Cf. Pfleiderer, p. 201 f. [E. Tr. i. 200 f.], who, however, assumes a certain wavering between real existence and personification.

[5] From the manner in which the Spirit that is communicated to Christians is now represented as a Spirit of God, and now as a Spirit of Christ, *i.e.* as a divine spiritual energy that belongs to both in the same manner, it also undoubtedly follows that, unless we drag in modes of thinking altogether foreign to the apostle for the purpose of explaining this, the Spirit cannot be thought of as personal. Such an identification, however, of Christ and the πνεῦμα, as occurs in 2 Cor. iii. 17, is quite inconceivable on the assumption that Paul reflected upon an immanent trinity (cf. Schmidt, p. 152).

with Christ commences in baptism, when His Spirit is communicated to us, so that the condition of belonging to Christ, which is established in baptism (1 Cor. i. 12 f.; cf. note *a*), is, according to Rom. viii. 9, recognised by the having of His Spirit.[6] For this fellowship of life with Christ, Paul, however, has now coined another form of expression. As he, who has the Spirit of God, is now in the vital element of this Spirit (viii. 9), so every one, who has the Spirit of Christ or Christ in himself, is now also in Him. In this fellowship of life with Christ (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ) the Spirit unfolds its activity which frees us from the power of sin (viii. 2; cf. note *a*), as appears plainly from the connection with the τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ in ver. 1.[7] For this idea the form of the rite of

[6] Although Pfleiderer (p. 203 [E. Tr. i. 203]) will not deny that Paul has also accepted the traditional doctrine of the reception of the Spirit in baptism, yet he does not attach to it any central significance for the Pauline doctrine of salvation, and expressly denies (p. 198 f. [E. Tr. i. 198 f.]) that the reception of the Spirit is the ground of the fellowship with Christ, because not a syllable is spoken regarding the πνεῦμα in Rom. vi. The reason of this, however, is to be found simply in the plan of the Epistle to the Romans, according to which the new principle of the πνεῦμα, which overcomes the σάρξ, is considered first of all in chap. viii., after it has been shown in chap. vii. that the inability of the law to realize the righteousness of life has had its ground in the σάρξ. If baptism (as the externally accomplished entrance into the union of faith with Christ) were to the apostle only "the ground of recognition" of the existing fellowship with Christ, of which faith is the real ground, it would remain incomprehensible, why he starts in Rom. vi., not from faith, but from baptism (cf. footnote 2), and "not a single syllable is uttered" regarding πίστις in the whole chapter. For Paul "the fellowship with Christ of which faith is the ground" cannot possibly be "the logical *prius* of the reception of the Spirit of sonship," for, according to 2 Cor. iii. 17, 1 Cor. vi. 17, Rom. viii. 9, 10, the existence of Christ in man cannot be even conceived of without an existence of the Spirit of Christ in him, but is rather brought about only by the existence of the Spirit in him. So certainly, however, as the latter is conceived of as the existence and operation of an objective divine power in man, so certainly the former cannot be regarded, with Pfleiderer (p. 185 f. [E. Tr. i. 184 f.]), as the merely subjective apprehension of the principle of reconciliation which is beheld in the person of the Mediator of salvation.

[7] This condition of being in Christ, accordingly, does not merely denote an outward union with Him, as the οἱ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ (Rom. iii. 19; cf. ii. 12) represents the condition within the law; it denotes the condition of being incorporated with Christ which is involved in the commencement of the Christian life (1 Cor. i. 30: ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ; 2 Cor. xii. 2: ἄνθρωπος ἐν Χρ.; Rom. xvi. 7: οἱ πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγόνασιν ἐν Χρ.; cf. ver. 11). In this living fellowship with Christ the distinctions of the pre-Christian life are no longer valid (Gal. v. 6); in it Christians are what they are, rich (1 Cor. i. 5), wise (iv. 10), under certain circumstances even weak (2 Cor. xiii. 4). In this new relation Timothy

baptism offered the apostle another express point of contact. In Rom. vi. 3 he plainly takes the formula *βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς Χριστόν*, not in its original sense of a being baptized unto Christ (= *εἰς ὄνομα Χριστοῦ*; cf. note *a*), but, in conformity with the strict meaning of *εἰς*, in the sense of a being baptized into Him, whereby one is put into a real fellowship of life with Him. As many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ (Gal. iii. 27). As one is in a garment, which one has put on, so the consequence of their having put on Christ is that they are now in Him (ver. 28: *πάντες ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστὲ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*). Here, too, the condition of belonging to Christ which is established in baptism (ver. 29: *εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ*) appears as synonymous with this state of being in Christ (cf. also the *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ* of 1 Cor. xv. 23, referring to the *ἐν Χριστῷ* of ver. 22); and if it is said of baptism in xii. 13: *ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν*, yet Christians have attained to this unity of the body by their being all in the same manner *ἐν Χριστῷ* (Rom. xii. 5: *οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ*).[8] And as baptism presupposes faith, so the communication of the Spirit, which puts men into the living fellowship with Christ, is expressly made dependent upon faith. It is only on occasion of the message of faith (accepted and obeyed in the faith, which it demands) that the Christian has received the

is his child (1 Cor. iv. 17), others are his fellow-workers (Rom. xvi. 3, 9). Although Paul has therefore first put a deeper significance in the sense of his peculiar theology into a formula which had originally a more general meaning (cf. § 62, *c*, footnote 4), yet that original meaning is occasionally found also in him. In the same connection Christians are represented as approved and eminent in Christ (Rom. xvi. 10, 13), and in 1 Cor. iv. 15 (*ἐὰν μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς ἔχητε ἐν Χριστῷ*), xi. 11, the expression *ἐν Χριστῷ* seems simply to denote the Christian state as such. The formula *ἐκκλησίαι ἐν Χριστῷ* (Gal. i. 22; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 14) also still occurs.

[8] Here, accordingly, it is absolutely impossible to deny that the condition of being in Christ is established by means of baptism, and when Pfleiderer (p. 198 [E. Tr. i. 198]) seeks to prove from Gal. iii. 26 f. that baptism is nothing different from faith, this is owing to the false conception of the argument of this passage considered in § 83, *d*, footnote 5. Although it might seem in 2 Cor. i. 21 as if the condition of being in Christ, which is enduringly secured through the *βεβαιοῦν εἰς Χριστόν*, is the presupposition of the anointing with the Spirit, yet it is only the intended play upon the appellative meaning of the *Χριστός* (cf. § 77, *a*) that is the reason why the communication of the Spirit, which, as a matter of fact, is the presupposition of any one's being in Christ, is here mentioned last.

Spirit with its gifts (Gal. iii. 2, 5); it is only through faith that he receives the promised Spirit (*τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος*, ver. 14). From this it is self-evident that the so widely prevalent idea that the fellowship of life with Christ belongs to the essence of faith (cf. *e.g.* Lechler, p. 115; Messner, p. 265; Reuss, ii. p. 102 f. [E. Tr. ii. 89 f.]; Baur, p. 176 f.) is not Pauline.[9] Faith is the presupposition of this union with Christ; but this union itself can never be brought about by an attitude of man, but only by Christ Himself entering into this fellowship of life with him through the communication of His Spirit. By means of that imaginary deeper and richer conception of the idea of faith it is generally sought to obtain the point of contact for the origin of the new life, which undoubtedly proceeds from the fellowship of life with Christ,[10] while the circumstance is overlooked that therewith the nerve of the Pauline doctrine of grace is injured. The new life of the

[9] It is in vain that an appeal is made in opposition to the so evident connection of the Pauline system and in favour of the common view to 2 Cor. xiii. 5, where it is only in appearance that the *ἐστὲ ἐν τῇ πίστει* and the *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν* are synonymous expressions, whereas in reality the question as to the former can be decided only by observing whether the latter is found, and the latter is, therefore, the necessary consequence of the former. Nor can Gal. ii. 20 be adduced in support of that view; for there the *ζῇ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός* by no means stands parallel with the *ζῶ ἐν πίστει*; that which is still in him of his own life during his life in the flesh, which is now, however, altogether a *ζῆν ἐν πίστει*, is rather set over against the new life of the apostle, which Christ, who lives in him (through His Spirit), alone lives, so that the *πίστις* is really named as that which belongs to himself in contrast with that which is not at all his own, but simply Christ's. Although Pfleiderer (p. 169 [E. Tr. i. 168]) has disputed this very energetically, yet he has only opposed general considerations to the undoubted exegetical matter of fact; for that, notwithstanding the *συνεσταύρωμαι* and *ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ*, a life which belongs to the apostle himself is spoken of in the second half of the verse, appears from the antithetical *ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν τῇ σαρκί*. And when he appeals to Gal. ii. 17 and 2 Cor. v. 21, in order to prove that justifying faith and fellowship with Christ are identical (p. 186 [E. Tr. i. 185 f.]), he overlooks the fact that, in a connection where it is the state of being objectively justified that is spoken of, the *ἐν Χριστῷ* can only denote that the objective ground of this state is found in Christ in the sense of § 75, *d* (cf. Rom. v. 9; 1 Cor. vi. 11).

[10] Thereby the Pauline idea of faith is altered; for what is characteristic of that idea is this, that it is purely religious trust in divine grace, apart altogether, in principle, from every moral action. His doctrine of justification is also altered; for in that case it is no longer really an act of grace, seeing that it does not take place contrary to fact, but corresponds with a fact that is recognised by God, even although as yet it exists only in germ. This objection, however, does not at all apply to Pfleiderer, who will have even this incorporation with

Christian does not develope itself from faith (any more than from justification; cf. note *a*, footnote 2) by means of a purely psychological process, whereby some human factor or other would still be demanded for its origin; but as justification is a pure act of divine grace, so the communication of a new principle of life is a second act of divine grace, to which the doctrine of justification itself already pointed us as one that was absolutely necessary (§ 83, *c*).[11]

(*c*) To the Christian, Christ is primarily necessarily the one that died; for as such He is to him the Mediator of salvation (§ 80, *a*). If, therefore, the Christian feels himself in a real fellowship with this Christ, he has been crucified with Him (Gal. ii. 20; cf. vi. 14; Rom. vi. 6),[12] and has died with Him (ver. 8; cf. Gal. ii. 20). Baptism, which has translated him into this fellowship (note *b*), is, accordingly, not only a being baptized into Him (*βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς Χριστόν*), but, in parti-

Christ in faith regarded, not as a moral disposition or as a surrender to the new direction of life represented in Christ, but as the purely religious act of laying hold of Christ as the Mediator of reconciliation (p. 186 [E. Tr. i. 185]). But it is so much the more inadmissible in him to take up the fellowship with Christ, in which Christ is at any rate the determining element, and therefore meets receptive faith with His gifts, into the idea of faith itself (p. 168 [E. Tr. i. 167]). Nor can I perceive how the correct distinction of these moments should "transform them into a dead juxtaposition of scholastic doctrines;" for the only point in question is this, whether, according to the Pauline view, the initiative in that living fellowship proceeds from Christ or from the believing subject, whether, in that fellowship, Christ is conceived of as a living person or merely as a spiritual principle (of reconciliation). The fact that this living fellowship is brought about by His Spirit (cf. footnote 6) decides for the first of these alternatives, and is also the reason why I avoid the misleading designation of it as mystical (§ 149, *d*, footnote 12), although I will not deny that, owing to this intervention of the Spirit not being always present to his consciousness, many Pauline statements already receive a mystical colouring.

[11] For the idea that faith as such is the operative principle of the new life, no evidence is furnished even by the *only* passage which is being continually adduced in its support, because it speaks of faith, which is operative through love (Gal. v. 6: *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*). But we need only refer to Gal. v. 22 and Rom. xv. 30, according to which love is a fruit and effect of the Spirit, in order to see that this activity of faith is conceived of as owing to the fact that each believer as such receives the Spirit; and even here that is implied in the context, inasmuch as what is spoken of is the faith of those who are *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, and in whom, therefore, the Spirit of Christ is operative. Even Pfleiderer acknowledges (p. 219 [E. Tr. i. 220]) that faith is spoken of here only *in so far* as it makes us one Spirit with Christ.

[12] It is only in appearance that it seems, according to Gal. v. 24 (*οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐσταύρωσαν τὴν σάρκα*), as if man accomplishes this mortification himself; he is

cular, a being baptized into His death (*βάπτισμα εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ*); and as the certainty of the death of Christ is sealed by His burial (§ 78, *a*, footnote 2), so the submersion of the person who is being baptized is, as it were, a being buried, by means of which the fact that he has died with Christ is also sealed (Rom. vi. 4; cf. Col. ii. 12). Thus Paul now first altogether reaches that symbolical idea of the rite of baptism, according to which it represents *μετάνοια* (note *a*); for the dying with Christ, which is symbolically sealed in it, is a dying of the old man, a destroying of the body (in so far as it was previously a body ruled by sin, ver. 6), whereby man dies unto sin (vv. 2, 11), is made free from its dominion (vv. 6, 18, 22), and therefore puts away his whole previous disposition and direction of life. But this naturally involves the positive renewal of these; and this renewal is also now accomplished by this, that in baptism man is put into real fellowship with Christ. If we have become united with Him (*σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν*), *i.e.* have entered into a real fellowship with Him, by this likeness of His death, *i.e.*, by this death of His being copied in our inner life, this fellowship must also show itself in respect of the resurrection (ver. 5), which immediately followed the death of Christ, and without which He would not have been the Mediator of our salvation (§ 81, *d*). It can only be owing to accident that the term *συνεγείρεσθαι* (Col. ii. 12, iii. 1; Eph. ii. 6) does not occur in our Epistles, and that the obvious analogy of this resurrection with the rising up out of the grave of the baptismal water is not drawn. In substance it is implied in the statements, that, according to a logical necessity, living with Christ follows upon dying with Him (Rom. vi. 8), and that the end of being buried with Him in baptism is newness of life (ver. 4), which henceforth does not belong to sin, to which we have died, but to God (vv. 11, 13). This life, however, is a living in fellowship with Christ (ver. 11: *ζῶντας τῷ Θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*), who also as the risen One lives altogether unto God (ver. 10). We can live in Christ,

self-active in it only inasmuch as he comes voluntarily to baptism, in which this mortification is performed upon him by his being translated into fellowship with Christ, just as the *βαπτίζεσθαι* itself is also performed upon him, although only with his free will. Moreover, this passage also shows that that *σταυροῦν* takes place in baptism, in which one becomes an adherent of Christ (*τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; cf. 1 Cor. i. 12, 13, for which see note *a*).

however, only if He lives in us; and therefore it appears in Gal. ii. 20 as the consequence of our being crucified with Christ, that He lives in us, His spiritual holy life takes the place of our natural sinful life, by His receiving us into the fellowship of His resurrection life. Accordingly, that which is salvation-bringing in this dying and rising up again with Christ in baptism does not consist in the saving efficacy of His death and resurrection being thereby appropriated by us (which takes place only through faith), but it consists in this, that it realizes the fellowship of life with the exalted Christ, in which there are simultaneously given the annihilation of our natural sinful life and the commencement of a new God-pleasing life.[13]

(*d*) If in the communication of the Spirit in baptism (note *a*) the believer experiences a dying and a resurrection (note *c*) through his being translated into the fellowship of life with Christ (note *c*), then nothing less has happened to him than a new creation (cf. the new birth by means of the word in Peter and James, § 46, *a*, 52, *b*). If any one is in Christ, he is a new creation (an ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ, Rom. xiv. 20); the old has passed away; behold, everything has become new (2 Cor. v. 17; cf. Eph. ii. 10). It appears also from the connection of Gal. vi. 14, 15 that with the σταυρωθῆναι τῷ

[13] From this it now becomes quite clear that, in this particular doctrine, the death and resurrection of Christ are looked at only as events, which His life in His state of exaltation presupposes, and not in their saving significance, as R. Schmidt attempts to show (cf. § 81, *c*), and that, accordingly, we cannot conclude from the circumstance, that the dying with Christ is a dying unto sin, that the death of Christ must also be taken in some sense or other as a dying unto sin (cf. § 80, *b*, footnote 5). Pfleiderer (p. 196 [E. Tr. i. 196]) regards the living with Christ as being primarily eschatological, so that here the apostle transforms the physical life beyond the grave into an ethical life on this side of it; but this view rests upon the erroneous presupposition that the ἰσόμεθα of Rom. vi. 5 must be a temporal future, although, according to the context, it is necessarily a logical one (cf. the conclusive exposition by Ritschl, ii. p. 324), and that in ver. 8 it must be a future object of our believing expectation that is named, whereas what is expressed is only the conviction of the necessity with which the living with Christ must follow the dying with Him. For the only point upon which stress is laid in the context is that, in baptism, we become assured of the beginning, in principle, of a new life. No more does 2 Cor. iv. 10 speak of the life of Christ being made manifest in our resurrection (p. 205 [E. Tr. i. 205]); as ver. 11 shows, what it states is, that, in rescuing us from the danger of death, the life of Christ who was rescued from death becomes operative in us (in virtue of our fellowship of life with Him. Cf. § 86, *c*, footnote 8).

κόσμῳ the Christian has become a new creation. And as in James the end of the new birth was the consecration of Christians to God (§ 54, *b*), and as in Peter Christians have by baptism become the holy people of God's possession (§ 45, *a*, *c*), so in Paul also all baptized Christians are ἅγιοι (1 Cor. i. 2, vi. 1, 2, xiv. 33, xvi. 1, 15; 2 Cor. i. 1, viii. 4, ix. 1, 12, xiii. 12; Rom. i. 7, viii. 27, xii. 13, xv. 25, 26, 31, xvi. 2, 15);[14] for they belong neither to any other man (1 Cor. vii. 23), nor to themselves, but to God alone, who has bought them (vi. 19, 20; cf. § 80, *c*), and thereby made them His exclusive possession.[15] This consecration of Christians to God is now, however, specially traced back by Paul to the Holy Ghost, which they have received in baptism. As those whose body God has made the temple of His Spirit, Christians belong not to themselves, but to God (ver. 19); as those in whom the Spirit of God dwells (iii. 16), they are ἅγιοι (ver. 17; cf. Eph. ii. 21 f.).[16] Through the Spirit, however, the quality, which is necessary in order that they may

[14] Everything is holy which originates with God in the narrower sense (Rom. i. 2: γραφαὶ ἁγίαι; vii. 12: νόμος ἅγιος; v. 5: πνεῦμα ἅγιον; cf. Luke i. 72: διαθήκη ἁγία; 2 Tim. i. 9: κλῆσις ἁγία), or, following the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament (Ex. xiii. 2; cf. Luke ii. 23), has been specially devoted to Him as His possession (Rom. xi. 16: ἀπαρχή; xii. 1: θυσία; 1 Cor. iii. 17: ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ; cf. Eph. ii. 21). From this use of ἅγιος we must distinguish the use of ἁγνός with its derivatives; it stands exclusively for moral purity (2 Cor. vii. 11; cf. Phil. iv. 8) and sincerity (Phil. i. 17; cf. Jas. iii. 17), particularly when used with respect to the sexes (2 Cor. xi. 2, vi. 6; cf. 1 Pet. iii. 2). It is usually different in Peter (§ 46, *b*) and James (§ 55, *b*).

[15] This consecration to God on the part of those who belong to Him is conceived of as so real that the unbelieving husband becomes ἅγιος through his fellowship with the believing wife, and the unbaptized child through its fellowship with its Christian parents (vii. 14). According to the principle that that which is holy sanctifies everything which belongs to it (Matt. xxiii. 17, 19; Rom. xi. 16), this consecration to God extends even to everything which belongs to Christians as Christians; hence the Christian kiss of love (1 Pet. v. 14) is represented as a φίλημα ἅγιον (1 Cor. xvi. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; Rom. xvi. 16; cf. 1 Thess. v. 26).

[16] Similarly the earliest tradition already made Jesus be anointed or consecrated to be the Messiah by the communication of the Spirit in baptism (§ 18, *a*, 38, *b*; cf. 2 Cor. i. 21, for which see § 77, *a*), and Peter made the holiness of the members of the completed theocracy be brought about by the consecration of the Spirit in baptism (§ 44, *b*), although the Spirit was not yet regarded as the principle of the new life. According to Paul, on the other hand, the Spirit, which leads Christians to become like to their Father (Rom. viii. 14; cf. § 83, *d*), is already given with the state of belonging to God which is constituted in adoption (§ 83, *a*).

truly belong to God, is in principle worked in them, inasmuch as it bestows its own *ἁγιότης* upon those who possess it. The *προσφορὰ εὐπρόσδεκτος*, which is offered up to God in the Gentile churches, is *ἡγιασμένη ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* (Rom. xv. 16; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11: *ἡγιάσθητε . . . ἐν πνεύματι Θεοῦ*, for which see Ritschl, ii. p. 331 f.; 2 Thess. ii. 13: *ἁγιασμὸς πνεύματος*); Christians are *ἄζυμοι, i.e.* purged of all the leaven of their sinful nature (1 Cor. v. 7). Only in consequence of the Spirit, which works this consecration to God, being conceived of by Paul as the positive principle of the new life (note *a*), the idea of holiness receives in him the positive import of a moral perfection, such as belongs to this new life.[17] Inasmuch, now, as the setting up of true consecration to God or holiness is already in the Old Testament the highest end, which the will of God revealed in the law aims at (Lev. xi. 44), *ἁγιασμός* forms the antithesis of *ἀνομία* (Rom. vi. 19); in it there is realized the normal condition of man, *δικαιοσύνη*, which is in keeping with the will of God. He who has died unto sin in baptism is freed from the dominion of sin, and therewith made a bond-servant to righteousness or to God Himself (vv. 18, 22), an expression which Paul, indeed, expressly excuses in ver. 19, inasmuch as this servitude, in which man can only realize the will of God, is true freedom; he has been made really righteous, seeing that, in his dying with Christ, his ego has been set free from the sin that enslaved it, and so hindered it from attaining to actual *δικαιοσύνη* (ver. 7: *ὁ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*). For them that are in Christ there is therefore now *no* (note the emphatic position of the *οὐδέν*) condemnation (viii. 1), because they are not only justified in faith, but have also, in the fellowship of life with Christ, been made free from the

[17] Since the communication of the Spirit brings about the fellowship of life with Christ (note *b*), sanctification can also be traced back to the latter. Christians form a Church which belongs to God (*ἐκκλησία Θεοῦ*), inasmuch as they are *ἡγιασμένοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* (1 Cor. i. 2; cf. Phil. i. 1); Christ Himself (like the Holy Ghost) can be represented as the author of their *ἁγιασμός* (1 Cor. i. 30). And since the grounding of the fellowship of life with Christ, as well as the communication of the Spirit, which has brought it about, has taken place in baptism, the *ἁγιασμός* of Christians dates also from it (1 Thess. iv. 7; cf. § 61, *c*), just as in 1 Cor. vi. 11 the *ἡγιάσθητε* is immediately connected with the *ἀπελούσασθε* which is accomplished in baptism (note *a*).

sin whose dominion would ever anew bring upon them a condemnation of God. The real aim of the dispensation of grace which is found in Christianity was to work out the righteousness of man; God, however, works it out in two ways, by justification, viz., and the new creation, and therefore also by two different modes. It is of decisive importance for the comprehension of the Pauline system not to mix up those two divine saving deeds (cf. § 83, *d*), and therefore also these two results of them (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 368).[18] For both, however, faith is the condition. So certainly as every one that believes and is justified on the ground of his faith allows himself to be baptized, so certainly does he experience also the baptism of the Spirit, which puts him in principle into the state of holiness, and therewith into that of actual righteousness. But whereas justification is an individual, completed act, sanctification, from the nature of the case, can only take place by a commencement being made in principle of a new life, a commencement which is both capable of development and requires it. The manner in which Paul puts the Lord's Supper alongside of baptism, in which that commencement is made, already points to the necessity of such a development, which requires a continual support in keeping with its divinely made commencement.

[18] As justification does not presuppose holiness, which is nothing else than δικαιοσύνη really restored, so neither is the latter the necessary consequence of the former, a consequence which would in some manner or other spontaneously develope itself from it in a psychological way (cf. note *a*, footnote 2). If in 1 Cor. i. 30 ἁγιασμός follows δικαιοσύνη, by which we are certainly not, with Ritschl (ii. p. 285), to understand active righteousness, ἡγιάσθητε stands before ἐδικαιώθητε in vi. 11 (cf. Eph. ii. 15, 16). And although this diversity is conditioned both times by the context, yet it could not be found if these two gracious deeds of God stood in a causal *nexus*. Accordingly, ἁγιασμός is by no means omitted after δικαίωσις in Rom. viii. 30; for the former does not follow from or after the latter, but takes place at the same time with it. Pfleiderer (p. 210 f. [E. Tr. i. 211 f.]) shows in an excellent manner that the ideal righteousness which is of faith, and the real righteousness which is brought about by the πνεῦμα must be strictly distinguished from one another, and that they necessarily mutually demand each other; only he should not have found a wavering between the two ideas in Rom. vi., for there it is only active righteousness that is spoken of (cf. Ritschl, ii. p. 283).

## § 85. *The Lord's Supper.*

If the ground of the new life of the Christian is laid in baptism, the Lord's Supper serves to its further nourishment. (*b*) From Paul we have the earliest tradition regarding the institution of the supper; for his statements regarding its significance he appeals to a revelation received from Christ. (*c*) By our partaking of His body which was slain for us, and of His blood which was shed for us, the Lord's Supper strengthens the living fellowship with the Christ who died for us, the ground of which is laid in baptism. (*d*) Even those who partake unworthily receive the body and blood of the Lord, but they make themselves guilty of these, for which they are punished.

(*a*) In 1 Cor. x. 1–4 Paul gives us an undoubted right to put together baptism and the Lord's Supper as the means of grace, which serve to the grounding and nourishment of the higher life in the Christian. He there represents Israel's experiences of grace in the wilderness as types of the experiences of grace, which Christians have had (§ 73, *c*), and, indeed, expressly describes the passage through the Red Sea as a baptism (vv. 1, 2, for which see § 84, *a*, footnote 1). As that baptism in principle brought about the deliverance of Israel, so Christian baptism is to be looked upon antitypically as the fundamental experience of grace, which Christians have had. When, now, the manna and the water that issued from the rock are regarded as a spiritual food and a spiritual drink (vv. 3, 4), it is clear that they are regarded as types of the Lord's Supper, and that, as these gifts supported redeemed Israel during its journey through the wilderness, so it is to be regarded as the Church's means of spiritual nourishment.[1] It

[1] From this we also perceive why the doctrine of the supper can be introduced at this place into the representation of the Pauline system of doctrine. When it is treated of in the doctrine of the Church (cf. *e.g.* v. Oosterzee, § 41; Pfleiderer, p. 236 ff. [E. Tr. i. 238 ff.]; Immer, p. 329), it is presupposed that the sacraments have a constitutive significance for the nature of the Church, for which assumption there is but little support to be found in Paul (cf. § 92, *a*, footnote 3). Moreover, Paul has certainly not transferred to the supper a traditional notion of Jewish theology regarding the manna and the water from the rock (Rückert, p. 215 f.), but, as is undoubtedly the case when he looks upon the passage through the Red Sea as a baptism, has worked out the typical view of these experiences of salvation on the part of Israel in conformity with his idea of the nature and meaning of the supper.

is altogether impossible that the *πνευματικόν* can merely denote that bread, drink, and rock are to be taken allegorically (Baur, p. 201), for that pneumatic rock *was* Christ (cf. § 79, *c*), and not only according to the interpretation of the apostle; but it can hardly represent that nourishment as supersensuous (Rückert, p. 213), or as brought forth by a supernatural operation of God (v. Hofmann *in loco*). It was a nourishment for the body; but because, as manna, it came from heaven, or, as water from the rock, was furnished by Christ, it derived a spiritual nature from this its origin, and therefore had also a spiritual effect, inasmuch as it strengthened the faith of the Israelites (cf. also R. Schmidt, p. 147). For his conception of the supper, however, we can primarily conclude from this only in general, that Paul here also ascribed a pneumatic effect to the physical eating and drinking.

(*b*) The Lord's Supper is a *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*, a meal originating with the Lord, instituted by Him (1 Cor. xi. 20), at which He Himself is the host, for His cup and His table are spoken of in x. 21 (cf. xi. 27). When Paul appeals in xi. 23 to a communication which had been made to him personally (note the emphatic position of the *ἐγώ*) by the Lord, this cannot refer to the tradition regarding the institution of the supper, which had been delivered by the original apostles to all in the same manner; it can only refer to the intimations given in what follows as to the design of this institution, and the consequent demands that are made upon those who celebrate it, especially as these demands alone form the real moment that gives ground (*γάρ*) for his censure (ver. 22). He has the history of the institution of the supper directly or indirectly out of the tradition of the original apostles (§ 78, *a*). That being the case, we have here at least the earliest form of this tradition, a circumstance which Rückert (p. 209), Immer (p. 329), and others overlook; for even the tradition contained in Mark's Gospel (xiv. 22–24) is only a report at second hand, and one that is much later.[2]

[2] Besides, the most important deviation in Mark xiv. 24 is so plainly owing to conformation with the words used at the giving of the bread (ver. 22), and with the words employed when the Old Testament covenant was concluded, to which they allude (Ex. xxiv. 8), that the greater brevity and clearness cannot decide in its favour.

This does not make it impossible that Paul, to whom not the exact language, but only the essential import of the words of institution was important, by way of explanation represented the body as the body which was given (in its death) for our salvation (1 Cor. xi. 24: *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*), and the covenant which was established by means of the blood as the new covenant (ver. 25). He has likewise added the express demand to repeat the breaking of bread and the consecration of the cup *with the accompaniment* of the words of explanation spoken by Christ (vv. 24, 25), a demand which those who first partook of the supper did not think of and did not require (§ 31, *b*), deriving it from the intimation given him by the Lord regarding the design and meaning of this institution. Paul also lays a particular stress upon the symbolical act of the breaking of the bread (cf. xi. 24), and upon the blessing of the cup (x. 16), without there being implied in the latter a *consecratio* transcending the original institution, as Rückert thinks (p. 220), since the *εὐλογία* is certainly to be thought of as consisting in the prayer of thanksgiving (xi. 25: *ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον scil. ἔλαβεν εὐχαριστήσας*, after vv. 23, 24), which in the Church probably referred to the reconciliation which was accomplished by means of the blood of Christ.[3]

(*c*) The essential significance of the Lord's Supper is, that it brings into a real fellowship with Christ, and therefore supports and strengthens (although from a peculiar side) the fellowship which is established in baptism, and which is the ground of the new life. Since the mention made of the Lord's Supper (1 Cor. x. 16, 17) is meant to show that the sacrificial meal of the heathen brings into a real (naturally polluting) fellowship with the demons (ver. 20, for which see § 70, *c*), just as the Jewish sacrificial meal

[3] As it by no means follows from the symbolism which lies in the action that it is *only* as symbols that bread and wine have a meaning, since that action itself expressly serves to the comprehension of that which is partaken of in the supper, so neither does it follow from the *ἀνάμνησις*, which is aimed at by the repetition of the words of explanation, that the whole design of the celebration lies in it, for, according to ver. 26, that *ἀνάμνησις* is attained by the proclamation of the death of Jesus, which is continually repeated in the recitation of the words of institution, and only then follows the partaking of the supper, which has, according to note *a*, a pneumatic effect.

brings into a real (naturally blessed) fellowship with the altar, the place of divine blessing (ver. 18, for which see § 71, *c*), Paul can only have thought of the pneumatic effect of the Lord's Supper (note *a*) as a union with Christ which is equally real.[4] In conformity, however, with the meaning which Christ Himself had given to the bread and the wine in the supper, to him the real fellowship with Christ, which the supper specifically brings about, is owing to the participation (*κοινωνία*) in His body and in His blood, which is produced, according to ver. 16, by the broken bread and the consecrated cup.[5] By this body we cannot, indeed, think of the glorified body of Christ (Rückert, p. 226), for the symbolism of breaking, as well as the explanation, *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, which is expressly added in xi. 24, points undoubtedly to the body of Christ that was put to death for us (Rom. vii. 4). Similarly, the blood of Christ can neither be merely an expression for the reconciliation which it provided (Reuss, ii. p. 192 [E. Tr. ii. 174], and probably also Pfleiderer, p. 238 [E. Tr. i. 240 f.]), and in which the believer participates directly in faith (Rom. iii. 25), nor His glorified blood (Rückert, p. 224; Gess, p. 112 f.), which would be to the apostle a

[4] According to the idea which is peculiar to him, such a union had been brought about through the communication of the Spirit (as a new principle of life) in baptism (§ 84, *b*), and therefore he could also have conceived of the Lord's Supper as a continual drinking of this Spirit (cf. 1 Thess. iv. 8, for which see § 62, *d*). But this idea is not at all in keeping with the symbolism of the supper as set forth also by him (note *b*), and leaves the one half of it, which is very specially set forth in 1 Cor. x. 17, xi. 29, altogether out of account, so that the explanation of xii. 13 (cf. § 84, *a*) as referring to the supper cannot be carried out.

[5] The participation in His body cannot possibly merely denote that they belong to the Church (cf. Baur, p. 291; Reuss, ii. p. 192 [E. Tr. ii. 174]), for ver. 17, which establishes the previous statement, expressly adduces the union of the many into an organic unity, which is brought about by the one bread, as an evidence that the broken bread is not common bread, the partaking of which in common by no means produces such a unity, but is such a bread as brings about participation in a third person, who can become a bond of such a unity (cf. Gess, p. 110 f.). If now, according to Rom. xii. 4, this third person is Christ Himself, then here it is the body of Christ that is received in the supper. For I cannot perceive how the fellowship of Christians with one another, which is manifested in their fellowship at table, should prove that the eating of the sacramental bread is an act of uniting with Christ (Pfleiderer, p. 238 [E. Tr. i. 241]), for this fellowship at table is as such by no means necessarily of a religious nature, and can by no means "have its real ground only in Christ."

*contradictio in adjecto* (1 Cor. xv. 50); it can only be the blood that was shed in the violent death which Christ suffered for us (cf. § 80, *c*, footnote 9), and to which it is owing, according to xi. 25, that the sacramental cup is a symbol of the new covenant, inasmuch as this covenant of grace and forgiveness was rendered possible by the blood of Christ (contained in the cup). As to the manner in which Christ can make us partake of His body that was given up to death for us, and of His blood that was then shed, Paul has certainly not speculated; he confined himself to the words of institution, and, although to him the bread was a symbol of the body, and the (red) wine a symbol of the blood, yet he found in these words the certification that that which they symbolized is really supplied in the supper as spiritual food (note *a*). How he could conceive, however, that the fellowship with Christ was brought about by partaking of the supper, appears from this, that this fellowship was to him essentially a fellowship with the Christ who had been put to death (§ 84, *c*). If, now, it is because of the saving significance of the death of Christ (cf. the τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν of xi. 24) that this fellowship comes into consideration in the supper, it is once more evident that the fellowship which was already grounded in baptism cannot refer to this significance of it, and that the matter in question here is rather as to an establishing of fellowship with Christ from a new side, which can only have in view a nourishing and strengthening of faith in Him as the Mediator of salvation.

(*d*) In Corinth abuses had crept in in connection with the celebration of the love feasts, with which they were wont to connect the celebration of the breaking of bread instituted by the Lord (§ 41, *b*). The rich separated themselves from the poor and revelled in the abundance they had brought with them (1 Cor. xi. 21, 22); the desecration of the meal, which thus became a profane feast, made a real celebration of the Lord's Supper impossible (ver. 20). If one partook of the bread or[6] the cup of the Lord in this mood, one did so unworthily, and became guilty (ἔνοχος) of the body and blood

[6] The ἤ has no difficulty whatever, for Paul will set forth that it is an unworthy partaking, whether one has in view the partaking of the bread or the cup. Moreover, that the separate mention made of the blood was only owing to

of the Lord which were thereby profaned (ver. 27), *i.e.*, became, as it were, bound to render satisfaction to them. Even the unworthy partaker has therefore partaken of the body and blood of the Lord; but he has sinned against them, because he has not discriminated the body in which he has participated through the supper, *i.e.*, has not appreciated it in its significance as bringing a blessing (ver. 29). No doubt one could sin against sacred symbols, without that being present to which they point (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 239 [E. Tr. i. 242]); but if that were meant here, it would have to be said that the unworthy partaker has sinned against the bread, inasmuch as he has not discriminated it, *i.e.*, appreciated it in its symbolical meaning. By this sin man brings upon himself a judgment of God (ver. 29: *κρίμα ἑαυτῷ ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει*), which can naturally be thought of only as penal (cf. ver. 34), just as Paul saw in the numerous cases of sickness and death, which had at that time befallen the Church, a divine punishment of that profanation of the sacred meal (ver. 30). Accordingly, he demands earnest self-examination before partaking of the supper (ver. 28), in order that they should become, not worse by the misuse of this means of grace, but better by the right use of it (*εἰς τὸ κρεῖσσον, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἧσσον*; cf. ver. 17), by being strengthened and furthered by it in their faith in the atoning efficacy of the death of Christ (note *c*). How this is required for a healthy development of the Christian life, we shall have to show forthwith in what follows.

### § 86. *The Process of the Development of the New Life.*

The more the Spirit that is bestowed in baptism becomes the determining rule of the whole of the Christian life, so much the more the antagonistic power of the flesh and of sin is broken, and righteousness and holiness are realized in man. (*b*) Thus there originates in him a new spiritual life, which Paul does not regard merely as a remodelling of the natural life, and which must always remain under the influence of the Spirit bestowed upon us. (*c*) The fellowship of life with Christ

this symbolism, and not an indication that there was a second gift in addition to that of the body which was slain for us, appears clearly from the circumstance that in x. 17, xi. 29 mention is made of the latter alone.

which is grounded in baptism must now likewise realize itself more and more completely, and in particular it must show itself in participation in the sufferings of Christ. (*d*) Although the Christian is and remains responsible for the normal course of this process, yet it is from first to last a work of divine grace, which, of course, throughout presupposes faith.

(*a*) If the divine Spirit bestowed in baptism has become the impelling power of a new life (which it was appointed to be, according to § 84, *a*), the Christian becomes a *πνευματικός*, one who is determined by the Spirit in his whole being and character (1 Cor. ii. 15, iii. 1), one who does, what he does, *ἐν πνεύματι* (Gal. vi. 1), because he moves throughout only in the vital element of this *πνεῦμα*; this *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* characterizes his speaking and confessing (1 Cor. xii. 3), his praying and his joy (Rom. viii. 15, xiv. 17). His whole walk is determined by the rule of the *πνεῦμα*, which leads him to strive only after that which is of the Spirit (viii. 4, 5); fervent in the Spirit, he suffers himself to be led by it to the fulfilling of every duty (xii. 11). But although the walking according to the rule of the Spirit (2 Cor. xii. 18: *πνεύματι περιπατεῖν*) is something altogether self-evident, seeing that it is possessed of an impelling divine energy, yet we must always be stirred up afresh to such a walk (Gal. v. 16, 25). For although from the ideal standpoint every believer has died with Christ, and the *σάρξ*, *i.e.*, the whole natural being in him along with the sin, which dwells therein, is mortified (§ 84, *c*), yet it is manifest in the concrete reality of the Christian life that it is still alive. Looked at from the empirical standpoint, the annihilation in principle of its dominion by no means prevents it from continually endeavouring to regain it, and the Christian life, accordingly, appears to be a continual conflict between these two principles, each of which seeks to hinder the Christian from obeying the other (ver. 17).[1] According as the Christian

[1] Here we have by no means simply a theoretical proposition regarding the antithesis of these two principles (R. Schmidt, p. 31), but, seeing that the exhortation to a Christian Church is supported by it, a statement regarding the concrete condition of the Christian life, which is nevertheless a condition totally different from that of the natural life. For whereas in the latter the *σάρξ* has an uncontested and unconquerable dominion in man, there is now in the Christian a new principle of life, in virtue of which he can overcome the *σάρξ* (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 225 [E. Tr. i. 226]). Here, however, we only see once more,

surrenders himself to the determining influence of the one or the other, he will *τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονεῖν, κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* or *κατὰ πνεῦμα* (Rom. viii. 4, 5), will fulfil the lusts of the flesh (Gal. v. 16), and therefore sow unto the flesh or unto the Spirit (vi. 8). If he still walks after the manner of the natural man, he is still *σαρκικός* (1 Cor. iii. 3).[2] The apostle must therefore continually remind us that we owe no thanks to the flesh, and are therefore under no obligation to *κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν* (Rom. viii. 12); but it is evident from the parallelism, that the negation of the *κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν* is identical with our surrendering ourselves to the activity of the Spirit, which overcomes the dominion of sin in us (ver. 13: *πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν*). Sin, it is true, with its dominion is accordingly thrust back mainly upon the outer sphere of the sensuous corporeity, but for that very reason Christians must still be admonished not to let sin reign in their body, so that they should obey the lusts of the body (Rom. vi. 12),—not to put their members at the disposal of sin (ver. 13). In those, however, who walk after the Spirit and not after the flesh, the requirement of the law is, in fact, realized (Rom. viii. 4), and therewith the quality of the life which is well-pleasing to God is, in fact, restored (*δικαιοσύνη*: viii. 10; cf. 2 Cor. vi. 14, ix. 10; Eph. iv. 24, v. 9; Phil. i. 11). Their members enter into the service of righteousness (as weapons of righteousness in the service of God: vi. 13), so that sanctification is now brought about in them (ver. 19: *εἰς ἁγιασμόν*), to the furthering of which every fruit of their servitude to God (§ 84, *d*) must minister (ver. 22). From the

that the *σάρξ* was by no means destroyed once and for ever (Baur, p. 161) and robbed of all its power over believers in the death of Christ (cf. § 81, *a*).

[2] In 1 Cor. iii. 1 the apostle represents even the *νήπιοι ἐν Χριστῷ*, who nevertheless still have the Spirit, because without it they could not be *ἐν Χριστῷ* (§ 84, *b*), as still *σάρκινοι* (or *ψυχικοί*, ii. 14), just as he represents the man who is altogether natural in Rom. vii. 14, because the old nature still forms, as it were, their whole being, and the Spirit has as yet but an insignificant, vanishing activity in them. But even where the Spirit has gradually obtained a greater dominion, relapses may still take place. That which is begun in the Spirit may be perfected in the flesh (Gal. iii. 3), the natural and necessary *πρόνοια τῆς σαρκός* may be such that the lusts of the flesh are thereby restored to sovereignty (Rom. xiii. 13 f.); Christian freedom, if it is misused, may give occasion to the flesh to regain dominion (Gal. v. 13). Because of this weakness of the flesh (Rom. vi. 19), the apostle represents this very dominion as the real servitude (ver. 18; cf. § 84, *d*).

fact that the process of sanctification is furthered by the practice of righteousness in subjection to God (cf. Ritschl, ii. p., 284), it is evident that in the putting to death of the machinations of the body (viii. 13) the point in question is not as to a negative asceticism, which consists in the mortification of its natural needs and functions (cf. against Holsten, p. 443, the excellent statements by Biedermann, p. 280; Pfleiderer, p. 215 [E. Tr. i. 217]; Ritschl, p. 286), but as to the cleansing from every sinful defilement,[3] in which the ἁγιωσύνη (cf. § 78, *d*) is made perfect (2 Cor. vii. 1), as to a walking in godlike holiness (ἐν ἁγιότητι Θεοῦ) and sincerity (i. 12). Paul sees the sanctification of the body in a positive surrender to the service of God (1 Cor. vii. 34), whereby the body becomes a sacrifice well-pleasing to Him (Rom. xii. 1), so that the completion of sanctification leads to the restoration of the condition of being perfectly well-pleasing to Him (δικαιοσύνη; cf. § 84, *d*).

(*b*) Since the νοῦς (or ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) is already in the natural man a godlike element (§ 86, *c*, *d*), it is natural so to conceive of the Christian process of renewal, whereby the καινὴ κτίσις, which is in principle constituted in baptism (§ 84, *d*), is being more and more completely realized, as that the νοῦς is restored by the divine energy of the πνεῦμα to its true (pneumatic and therefore energetic) nature (Rom. xii. 2; 2 Cor. iv. 16; cf. Eph. iv. 23; Col. iii. 10), is strengthened to resist the σάρξ (Eph. iii. 16), and so the new spiritual life is begotten in us, which Paul represents as τὸ πνεῦμα ἡμῶν.[4] But in many passages, at least, the νοῦς (like the σάρξ, according

[3] Although Christians have in principle become ἄζυμοι (§ 84, *d*), yet the old leaven of the sinful nature must be continually purged out (1 Cor. v. 7), nay, it is only *because* they are the former that they can do the latter. Not until the power of sin is in principle broken can the principle of freedom from sin be progressively realized in them (Rom. vi. 13, 14).

[4] Even according to this view these passages should by no means be used, with R. Schmidt (p. 32-34) and Wendt (p. 120 ff.), to prove that Paul takes πνεῦμα in the common anthropological sense. In such passages as 1 Cor. xvi. 18, 2 Cor. vii. 13, nay, even in 2 Cor. ii. 13, the apostle is by no means speaking of conditions and moods of the natural life of the spirit, but of such as belong to the persons in question simply within the province of their Christian life as such (cf. also Gal. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 23; Philem. 25). That this is specially the case in 1 Cor. v. 4 and Rom. i. 9, one may assert without thinking of "a special spirit belonging to his office." On the other hand, in such passages as 2 Cor. xii. 18 and Rom. xii. 11, or in the πνεῦμα πραΰτητος of 1 Cor.

to note *a*) is also conceived of as continuing to exist in the Christian as the sphere of purely human judgments and opinions (1 Cor. i. 10; Rom. xiv. 5; cf. 2 Thess. ii. 2), in contrast with the knowledge and certainty in matters relating to salvation which are brought about by the Spirit, or as the sphere of the intelligently reflecting consciousness in contrast with the higher inspiration or the immediate religious experience which are brought about by the Spirit (1 Cor. xiv. 14–16, 19; cf. ver. 2; Phil. iv. 7). Nor is there *per se* any difficulty in thinking of the spiritual life of the Christian, which is begotten by the objective Spirit of God, and which is unique both as to its import and its functions, as an essentially new one, alongside of which the natural spiritual life, purified and strengthened by the Spirit, discharges its functions, which are in many respects full of value even for the religious life.[5] As the νοῦς with its νοήματα can be corrupted again (1 Cor. xi. 3; cf. Phil. iv. 7), and must therefore be continually brought afresh into captivity to the obedience of Christ (x. 5), so long as during the empirical course of the Christian life sin is ever reasserting its influence, so the new pneumatic life can also be stained again by sin, and consequently be exposed to corruption. There is, accordingly, no difficulty whatever in speaking of a sanctifying, a cleansing and preserving of it (1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; cf. 1 Thess. v. 23), and in representing its salvation under certain circumstances as still problematical (1 Cor. v. 5). But from this it is evident that

iv. 21 and Gal. vi. 1, it is the objective Spirit of God that is spoken of (cf. § 68, *c*, footnote 11).

[5] Inasmuch as the συνείδησις, which is throughout active as such in the Christian (1 Cor. viii. 7, 10, 12, x. 25–29; 2 Cor. i. 12, iv. 2, v. 11; Rom. xiii. 5), also appertains to the natural life of the spirit (Rom. ii. 15), it follows that that natural spiritual life is continued in the Christian, only the conscience now likewise performs its functions in the element of life furnished by the πνεῦμα (Rom. ix. 1). In Rom. xii. 2 also the special function of the νοῦς is thought of, according to which it distinguishes good and evil, and is therefore the original subject of the moral consciousness (cf. § 68, *c*); and since it is as such corrupted by sin in the natural man (Rom. i. 28), it must be renewed in the Christian, in order that he may always find the right form for the transformation of his walk which is well-pleasing to God. In 2 Cor. iv. 16, however, it is not the natural man, but the inner life in general of the Christian that is thought of; because of the elements of the old nature that are ever reintroducing themselves, it must be renewed day by day, *i.e.*, it must be restored to the nature which was given it in principle in baptism (cf. § 68, *d*, footnote 11).

the objective Holy Spirit bestowed upon the Christian by no means passes over into this subjective new life of the spirit; even after it has brought forth a new spiritual life in the Christian, it rather continues to carry on its sanctifying influence as a divine energy, which is distinguished in full objectivity from that spiritual life, and is operative in it (§ 84, *a*). And although, in accordance with the parallel passage (Rom. viii. 15), we could take the crying of the Spirit in us (Gal. iv. 6) to be that which is brought about in us by the Spirit, or which proceeds from us ἐν πνεύματι (cf. note *a*), yet Paul expressly distinguishes (Rom. viii. 16) between our spirit, *i.e.* the new spiritual life which is brought about by the πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας, to which this childlike trust specifically belongs, and the Spirit itself, which leads us, according to ver. 14, and thereby also gives us from another side the assurance of our divine sonship (§ 83, *d*, 84, *a*). He likewise distinguishes (vv. 26, 27) between us, who do not know what we ought to pray for under the given circumstances, and the Spirit, that comes to the assistance of our weakness and intercedes for us with its unutterable groaning, which God nevertheless understands, because it intercedes for the saints according to His will (cf. Eph. iv. 30).[6]

(*c*) If through the communication of the Spirit in baptism the Christian has been put into a fellowship of life with Christ

[6] As soon as, with R. Schmidt (p. 35), we take the τὸ πνεῦμα ἡμῶν of Rom. viii. 16 to be the inner life of man in general, in contrast with the πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας, there results a direct contradiction with the Pauline doctrine of the υἱοθεσία, if the former already in itself bears witness to us of our divine sonship. In ver. 26, however, it is evident a longing is spoken of, which is brought about by the objective Spirit of God, a longing of which we ourselves are not clearly conscious, and which, therefore, does not enter into our subjective spiritual life, but is conceived of as a groaning of that Spirit of God itself in us. Pfleiderer (p. 214 [E. Tr. i. 215]) declares this distinction to be a scholastic abstraction; he himself, nevertheless, allows that, in the process of the continually progressive union of the divine and human spirits, both substances are still different in a certain respect, and are related to one another as the active and giving to the passive and receptive. This is exactly what is meant with that distinction, wherein Paul has only given the most precise expression to the truth that the whole of the new life in us is continually and exclusively an effect of divine grace, a truth which is not adequately stated, when Biedermann (p. 278) says: what is now in the ego (viz., after it has become *real* spirit by the operation of God's Spirit) is, when looked at as to its ground, God's Spirit; when looked at as to its subjective reality, its own spirit.

(§ 84, *b*), the new life, which is therewith constituted in principle, can be realized only by that living fellowship being now also continually and completely realized in the further life of man. Although the believer has put on Christ in baptism (Gal. iii. 27), he must nevertheless be ever exhorted anew to put on Christ (Rom. xiii. 14). He is still a *νήπιος ἐν Χριστῷ* (1 Cor. iii. 1), and he can become a full-grown man in Christ (cf. Col. i. 28) only by gradually learning to perform all the functions of his life in Christ, by all his ways becoming *ὁδοὶ ἐν Χριστῷ* (1 Cor. iv. 17).[7] This living fellowship with Christ, however, shows itself in its progressive realization, not only by the overcoming of the whole of one's old life, but also by this, that, as the believer has died and risen again with Christ (§ 84, *c*), so he now also suffers with Him (Rom. viii. 17). In the constant danger of death, which Paul represents in 1 Cor. xv. 31 as a continual dying, he is ever bearing about in his body the dying of Jesus (*νέκρωσις*: 2 Cor. iv. 10), which is expressly represented in ver. 11 as a continual *εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόσθαι διὰ Ἰησοῦν*. The sufferings which befell Christ must also be shared in by him in an abundant measure (2 Cor. i. 5; cf. Phil. iii. 10; Col. i. 24); and in the scars, which he bears as the consequence of the maltreatment he had received, the apostle sees the marks (*στίγματα*) that show that he belongs to Christ (Gal. vi. 17).[8]

[7] When that is the case they ground their conviction (Rom. xiv. 14) and confidence (Gal. v. 10) on the fellowship of life with Christ, speak in Christ (2 Cor. ii. 17, xii. 19; Rom. ix. 1), labour in Him (Rom. xvi. 12; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 15. *ἐγέννησα ὑμᾶς ἐν Χριστῷ*; 1 Cor. ix. 1, 2: *τὸ ἔργον μου ἐστὲ ἐν κυρίῳ*), love one another (Rom. xvi. 8; 1 Cor. xvi. 24), receive one another (Rom. xvi. 2), greet one another (Rom. xvi. 22; 1 Cor. xvi. 19), marry one another (1 Cor. vii. 39), and at last fall asleep in Christ (1 Cor. xv. 18). For this reason also the character of Christ as an example, upon which such stress is laid in the preaching of the original apostles, is kept so much in the background in Paul (§ 78, *b*); that which was striven after there by the imitating of His example is attained in a fuller and deeper sense by the realizing of this fellowship of life with Him. In 2 Cor. iii. 18 the place of His example is taken even by the image of the exalted Christ in the perfected glory of His Spirit, in the beholding of which the believer is transformed into the same image, because this exalted Lord is the Lord of the Spirit, and bestows it upon him, in order by means of it to produce in him meanwhile a pneumatic likeness, till He can make this likeness complete even to His pneumatic bodily form.

[8] In the turn given to it here this view has the most affinity with the participation in the sufferings of Christ, which Peter demands (§ 46, *d*); but even here it is evident that what appears there rather as a following of His example,

As in § 62 *b*, the specific characteristic of such suffering as appertains to fellowship with Christ is the patience (2 Cor. vi. 4, xii. 12; Rom. viii. 25: *ὑπομονή*) with which it is borne (xii. 12). In the believer tribulation worketh patience (v. 3), which for its part works the probation of the Christian (ver. 4). Here, accordingly, it is not that the Christian should become patient, but in the fellowship of life with Christ patience is being continually worked in him. It is the God, from whom all patience and comfort come (Rom. xv. 5; cf. 2 Cor. i. 4, vii. 6), and that too through Christ (i. 5), who works patience (cf. Col. i. 11) by means of the comfort which His word contained in the Holy Scriptures bestows (Rom. xv. 4), or by means of the comfort which he enables the apostle to bestow in consequence of the consolation he had himself received (2 Cor. i. 5, 6). Hence the apostle can stir up Christians to rejoice even under all the afflictions of the present (2 Cor. iv. 17, vi. 4; Rom. viii. 18; cf. § 83, *b*). For this, it is true, there is required a special strength (1 Cor. xvi. 16: *ἀνδρίζεσθε, κραταιοῦσθε*), but this God is able to give (Rom. xvi. 25); for such a strengthening (*στηρίζεσθαι*) is a consequence of the imparting of every spiritual gift (i. 11), and this imparting he cannot lack who stands in the fellowship of Christ and His Spirit.

(*d*) In all the exhortations, which we have met in so many forms in this paragraph, the apostle is labouring at the edifying of the Christian man, as he represents the furthering of the Christian life in the normal process of its development with a figurative term, of the figurativeness of which he is himself scarcely any longer conscious (2 Cor. xii. 19: *οἰκοδομή*), and he binds Christians to assist one another in this work (1 Cor. xiv.; Rom. xiv. 19, xv. 2), seeing that they are, or at least must be, able to exhort and admonish one another

is apprehended more deeply here as the necessary consequence of the self-manifestation of the fellowship of life with Christ. Here there is also found another kind of daily dying with Him. As Christ has become alive again through the power of God (2 Cor. xiii. 4), so in the deliverances, which the apostle experiences through the same power of God, the life of Christ becomes manifest in his body (2 Cor. iv. 10, 11; cf. i. 9, 10, vi. 9). In the Epistles to the Thessalonians Paul already lays great stress upon the necessity of suffering for the Christian life, without its being already traced back there, as it is here, to its deepest ground (§ 62, *b*).

(Gal. vi. 1; Rom. xv. 14).[9] Such exhortation presupposes throughout that that process is not accomplished, as it were, by a necessity of nature, but demands a definite attitude of man, to whose free will it is addressed. And yet it is only the popular form of the exhortation, which does not in each concrete individual case keep in view the more precise means, whereby alone the desired result is to be reached, that makes it seem as if man himself could do aught in order to attain to it. If faith is the sole condition of the divine act of grace which makes the beginning of the new life (§ 84, *b*), then it alone can be also the condition of every furthering of that life. Accordingly, the ultimate aim of every exhortation can only be to strengthen faith, *i.e.*, absolute trust in divine grace, which can and will do everything itself in man; its ultimate aim can only be to lead man to give up his own working and willing, and allow grace to work in him (cf. Phil. ii. 12, 13), because it is in this way alone that he becomes susceptible to the operation of grace, which God or Christ is carrying on by His Spirit in them, with whom He has entered into a living fellowship through the communication of the Spirit.[10] The apostle, accordingly, calls upon his readers to try themselves whether they are in the faith, and whether in consequence of it Christ is working in them (2 Cor. xiii. 5; cf. § 84, *b*, footnote 9), in order that they may not be found unapproved, or to stand fast in the faith (1 Cor. xvi. 13; cf.

[9] It is needful to exhort them, now to perform that which the Christian life in general demands, now to guard themselves against false security, in order that they may not fall (1 Cor. x. 12), or to awake out of sleep, *i.e.* from all moral lethargy (Rom. xiii. 11), and to remain watchful (1 Cor. xvi. 13; cf. Col. iv. 2, and already § 62, *b*), now, if they have fallen into sin, to let themselves be led by real sorrow on account of it to repentance, which alone makes salvation possible (2 Cor. vii. 10, xii. 21).

[10] That which Christians are able to do in order to escape from the death into which the walking after the flesh brings them, they accomplish only through the Spirit, which has been given them (Rom. viii. 13), or through Christ (viii. 37) in virtue of their fellowship of life with Him (cf. Phil. iv. 13), in which alone they can glory in having accomplished anything whatever (1 Cor. xv. 31; Rom. xv. 17). The reason why the Christian looks also for the completion of salvation only on the ground of his faith, and not on the ground of any activity whatever, is because he knows that in the fellowship of life with Christ the faith is alone of importance, which is able to work in it, but also only through it, everything (Gal. v. 5, 6; cf. § 82, *b*, footnote 4, § 84, *b*, footnote 11) whic the law demands and which human activity would fain accomplish by itself.

2 Cor. i. 24), and makes their definitive salvation dependent upon their holding fast by the proclamation of the Gospel which they received in faith (1 Cor. xv. 2), or upon their continuing in the goodness of God, which they have laid hold of in faith, threatening them otherwise with being cut off from participation in salvation (Rom. xi. 20–22; cf. Col. i. 23). One has received the grace of God in vain (2 Cor. vi. 1), has fallen away from it again, as soon as one seeks salvation in another way than through faith (Gal. v. 5; cf. ver. 2), which must therefore be continually strengthened afresh in the Lord's Supper (§ 85, *c*). Throughout the whole course of his Christian life, the Christian is directed to the grace of God. That which applies to his work as an apostle applies, essentially, to every activity of the Christian; it is not *he* that does what he does, but the grace of God does it in operative helping fellowship with him (1 Cor. xv. 10: ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ σὺν ἐμοί). Only in the power of divine grace, which makes him capable of it, can the Christian walk as he ought to walk (2 Cor. i. 12).[11]

## § 87. *Freedom from the Law.*

In order to attain to the filial relationship, Christians have been redeemed by Christ from the bondage of the law, in the place of which the Spirit urges them from within to fulfil the will of God, after they have died with Christ unto the law. (*b*) The whole of the rule of life laid down by the Mosaic law remains, it is true, as binding upon those who had been Jews, as it is absolutely of no binding force upon the Gentiles; but

[11] Paul regards the liberality of the Churches as a grace of God (2 Cor. viii. 1, ix. 14), which He has lent them (cf. viii. 5: διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ), as a fruit of righteousness (ix. 10), which His grace causes to increase (ver. 8). For everything which he finds praiseworthy in the condition of his churches, he gives God thanks (1 Cor. i. 4; Rom. i. 8, vi. 17; cf. 2 Cor. viii. 16), and in his salutations and prayers looks for everything, which he desires for their prosperous development, from Him (2 Cor. xiii. 7, 9; Rom. xv. 5, 13), as in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 62, c). Accordingly, God is called the God of patience and hope (Rom. xv. 5, 13), of peace (xv. 33, xvi. 20; cf. 1 Thess. v. 23; Phil. iv. 9) and love (2 Cor. xiii. 11). He refers them to Him with their prayer (Rom. xii. 12; cf. 1 Thess. v. 17; Col. iv. 2; Eph. iii. 20, vi. 18; Phil. iv. 6), which is only the expression of faith, which alone will and can receive that which is wrought by divine grace.

it is fulfilled in Christian freedom, and under certain circumstances must yield to higher duties. (*c*) The Spirit teaches Christians what they have to do according to the will of Christ; but Paul furthers the knowledge of that will by pointing them to his own example and that of the maturer Christians, as well as to the word and example of Christ, and by his own precepts. (*d*) Above all, the revelation of God contained in the Old Testament, and even in the Mosaic law, as well as the experience of salvation they have had in Christ with its binding character, remains regulative of the knowledge of the divine will.

(*a*) According to § 72, *c*, the condition under the law was in keeping with the immature childhood of humanity, during which it had still to be kept in a state of servile dependence (Gal. iv. 1–3). If, therefore, a real filial relationship was to be brought about (§ 83, *a*), there must first be deliverance from this bondage. Accordingly, this deliverance has already taken place through the appearing of Christ. When the time appointed by the Father (ver. 2) for the declaration of their majority had come, God sent His Son, who, by voluntarily subjecting Himself to the law, redeemed those who stood under the law from this bondage, in order to make them capable of receiving the adoption (vv. 4, 5).[1] Thus Christ has set us free from the law (v. 1) for the freedom unto which we were called (ver. 13), for the old covenant pre-

[1] Here too, therefore, there was required a substitution similar to that which took place when they were redeemed from the curse of the law (§ 80, *b*), although Paul no more reflects here than there upon the question, how Christ's obedience to the law could have the effect of releasing us from it. He confines himself to the fact of which he was certain *à priori*, that with the sonship brought through Christ the bondage of the law has ceased, and that, if Christ, who as the Son of God did not stand under the law (§ 79, *b*), was nevertheless made subject to it during His earthly life (as a Jew), this could only have a vicarious significance, in the same manner as the death as a sinner of Him who was sinless. In this sense we can and must, according to the Pauline view, speak of a vicarious fulfilling of the law (or *obedientia activa*) on the part of Christ, which R. Schmidt (p. 78) in vain disputes; but this fulfilment refers solely to the validity of the Mosaic law, and that, too, for Jews *and* Gentiles, for the law given primarily to Israel as an expression of the will of God would have been binding also upon all the Gentiles, if it had not been abrogated through Christ. Rom. x. 4 cannot be taken into consideration here, because what is spoken of in it is only that with Christ the law has ceased to be the means of attaining unto righteousness and life.

signified by Hagar bears unto bondage (iv. 24), but Christians, as children of the Jerusalem that is above (ver. 26), are presignified by the son of the free woman (vv. 22, 31), who, like them, was born on the ground of promise (vv. 23, 28). Of course, it is in His state of exaltation, in which He, become altogether *πνεῦμα* Himself, bestows His Spirit upon believers, that Christ can first make the abrogation of the law for them that believe in Him operative. For him who turns to the exalted Lord, there falls the veil which hitherto concealed the transitory significance of the law. For, on turning to Him, he receives the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor. iii. 16, 17). Those who are led by the Spirit are, viz., no longer under the law (Gal. v. 18); for what the law with its requirement strove after, and yet could not reach (Rom. viii. 3), that the Spirit really attains to, inasmuch as at its instigation the requirement of the law (*τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*) is fulfilled in them who walk *κατὰ πνεῦμα* (ver. 4; cf. § 86, *a*). The power of the Spirit, which is operative within man, has taken the place of the law, which is outwardly fixed in the letter (ii. 29: *γράμμα*). Accordingly, the new covenant, which dissolves the covenant of bondage, is a covenant of the Spirit in contrast with the covenant of the letter (2 Cor. iii. 6); through our redemption from the law the old condition of the letter has given place to the new condition of the Spirit (Rom. vii. 6).[2] But although the will of God revealed in the law has thus first really obtained the guarantee of its fulfilment, the apostle nevertheless raises the question, how the emancipation of the individual from the law is to be legally justified. He starts from the fact that death looses the bond of every legal obligation (ver. 1), taking as an example the marriage bond (vv. 2, 3).

[2] Freedom from the law is, accordingly, not a licence to sin (Rom. vi. 15); we were freed from the law, not that we might hand over the sovereignty to the flesh (Gal. v. 13), but that we might henceforth live unto God (ii. 19; Rom. vii. 4), and fulfil His will, only no longer on the ground of the outer requirement of the law, but at the inner instigation of the Spirit. Materially, nothing else is to be aimed at by means of the latter than by the former; for the love, which the Spirit works (§ 84, *a*), is the fulfilling of the law (Gal. v. 13, 14; Rom. xiii. 8–10). Here also, however, it is evident that, in the dispensation of grace characteristic of Christianity, actual righteousness no less than justification is brought about in a way which is altogether new and totally different from that of the Old Testament.

Although man in his pre-Christian condition stood under the dominion of the law, the old man has, according to § 84, *c*, died with Christ, the Christian ego is an altogether new subject, which is no longer bound by the obligations of the old ego, but can rather choose for itself a new Lord. This, however, will self-evidently be none other than Christ, through whose death he has been made dead to the law (ver. 4), after he has entered into real fellowship of life with Him; for to reduce this thought to that of xiv. 8 f. (Gess, p. 176), is out of keeping with the whole context. As being dead we have been discharged from the law, in whose power we were hitherto held (ver. 6; cf. Col. ii. 20); and since this dying is brought about by the fellowship of life with Him, we have freedom from the law ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (Gal. ii. 4). Similarly, according to Gal. ii. 20, the consequence of his having been crucified with Christ is that the Christian has through the law died unto the law, in order to live henceforth unto God (ver. 19), only that here the death of that old ego is represented as a death to which it was condemned by the law itself.

(*b*) For Paul the doctrine of the freedom of Christians from the law had the special interest of being a hindrance to the extreme Judaistic party in their efforts to compel the Gentile Churches planted by him to be circumcised (Gal. ii. 3, 4; cf. 1 Cor. vii. 18), and to adopt the whole of the Jewish rule of life (Gal. ii. 14: ἰουδαΐζειν), in which efforts the underlying thought was continually insinuating itself that salvation was earned by such a fulfilling of the law.[3] On the other hand, even Paul firmly maintains that every one who has once been circumcised is also bound to fulfil the whole law (Gal. v. 3), and it was only from this point of view that it could

[3] According to § 43, *c*, the original apostles had expressly recognised this freedom of the Gentile Churches, and the reservation attached to that recognition by them out of regard to the Jews of the dispersion had no fundamental importance, and was, as we saw, by no means laid upon Paul in his independent activity as a missionary to the Gentiles. It is, however, an erroneous though very common opinion, that Paul differed from the original apostles *in this*, that, while they believed that the Jewish Christians were still bound to observe the rule of life laid down in the Mosaic law (§ 43, *d*), he discharged these too from it; the only difference was this, that, on the presupposition of the abrogation in principle of the law (note *a*), an abrogation which the original apostles certainly did not acknowledge (cf. Pfleiderer, p. 283 [E. Tr. ii. 9]), he had to assign a reason for that obligation which was different from theirs.

have an interest for him to enjoin that he who had been circumcised should not give up his circumcision (1 Cor. vii. 18), but should fulfil the will of God as a circumcised person, *i.e.*, in the rule of life that was implied in circumcision (ver. 19). It is true that as this fulfilling of the law is by no means in his eyes the ground of his salvation, so neither is it demanded in his case by the law *as such*, for the law has lost its binding power in the case of *all* Christians; the obligation to this fulfilment rests rather simply upon the general Christian principle, that every one should remain in the station in which the calling has reached him (vv. 17, 20). The Jewish Christians were also free from the law; but the Spirit of God led them to accommodate themselves voluntarily to the rule of life which the circumstance that they were circumcised rendered necessary, and which their past made them recognise as the special requirement of God with respect to their walk.[4] In mixed churches, of course, Paul will have required that the Jewish Christians should grant unlimited brotherly fellowship to the Gentile Christians, and therefore that, where the custom of the fathers came into conflict with their duty as Christian brethren, the former must unconditionally yield to the latter; and here his fundamental position with respect to the law made such a wavering as we found in Peter (§ 43, *d*) impossible to him, and at once solved all the difficulties which the mother Church had found it so hard to surmount. If the observance of the law on the part of the Jewish Christians no longer rested upon the binding character of the

[4] Pfleiderer (p. 298 [E. Tr. ii. 25]) looks upon this as an extraordinary notion, because this principle (according to him) refers only to the different stations in social life and not to the Jewish legal rule of life; but the very fact that Paul adduces the commandment, not to give up their circumcision, as the first illustration of that principle, proves the contrary, and shows, besides, that the ground of that commandment is not that this sign "was perfectly indifferent," because, if that were the case, that commandment would have been very unnecessary. According to Acts xx. 6, xxiv. 11 (probably also xviii. 21), Paul himself also keeps the Jewish feasts, and according to xviii. 18 and xxi. 26 takes Jewish vows upon himself. With greater impartiality than the most of critics, Pfleiderer himself has granted that these facts are historical (p. 508 f. [E. Tr. ii. 242 f.]); and in fact, according to what is said above, Paul could very easily have represented himself as τὸν νόμον φυλάσσων (xxi. 24), and have shown that it was a slander that he taught the Jews of the dispersion not to circumcise their children and not to walk after the laws of Moses (xxi. 21), which Pfleiderer also admits, although for a different reason (p. 510 [E. Tr. ii. 244]).

law in itself, but upon the principle which is valid for all the natural relationships of life, that one should not arbitrarily shun the duties, which these relationships involve in accordance with the divine ordinance which is discoverable also in them, then it is self-evident that this principle found its limit in the higher duties of Christian social life, among the chief of which was that brotherly fellowship. Moreover, if that requirement, according to which no one should arbitrarily break the social bond that united him with his previous religious society (ver. 18), had plainly the end in view of fitting him for activity among his religious associates (cf. § 42, *c*), then, conversely, it must have been specially a duty for the apostle, who, although a Jew, was to work among the Gentiles, to live ὡς ἄνομος for the sake of the Gentiles (1 Cor. ix. 21; cf. Gal. iv. 12). Wherever, on the other hand, he had to come into contact with Jews, there, although like all Christians no longer in principle under the law, he had nevertheless to feel himself bound to live ὡς Ἰουδαῖος for the sake of the Jews (ver. 20). If, accordingly, he circumcises the son of a Jewish mother on account of the Jews (Acts xvi. 3), this is not at variance with his principles (cf. even Pfleiderer, p. 508 [E. Tr. ii. 242]), and Gal. v. 11 appears to me undoubtedly to involve an allusion to such an occurrence, according to which he himself under certain circumstances (cf. Acts xxi. 21) demanded the circumcision, which he had not permitted for fundamental reasons in the case of believers from among the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 3–5).[5] It was not, therefore, the letter of the law in itself, but the consideration of that which the duty involved in his calling demanded in the concrete circumstances, under which he had to work, that was regulative of the manner in which he followed that general Christian principle.

[5] With the exception, naturally, that they should abstain from πορνία, Paul, on the other hand, has not introduced into the Gentile Churches planted independently by himself the restrictions imposed by the apostolic council (§ 43, *c*), because he no longer hoped for a conversion of the whole of Israel (before the coming in of the fulness of the Gentiles), and had therefore no longer any reason to limit the freedom of the Gentile Churches out of regard to the synagogue, which remained obdurate as a whole. When he demands that, because of their weaker *fellow-Christians*, they should impose certain restrictions upon themselves in regard to the use of flesh offered to idols (cf. § 93), as well as in respect of other adiaphora, that is something totally different.

(*c*) If the Spirit instead of the law impels Christians to do that which is good (note *a*), then it must also provide that they know what is good. It is true the natural man also possesses in his *νοῦς* a moral consciousness, but seeing that that is in many respects dimmed and corrupted by sin, the *νοῦς* must also be renewed (by the Spirit), in order that it may again prove in every case what the will of God is (Rom. xii. 2, for which see § 86, *b*, footnote 5; cf. Eph. v. 10; Phil. i. 10). Thus the apostle counted upon the growth of a Christian custom, to which he repeatedly expressly refers (1 Cor. xi. 16, xiv. 33), because it must be normative for the individuals, whose moral consciousness was not yet sufficiently clarified and established. In the same interest he appeals to his own example (Gal. iv. 12; 1 Cor. iv. 16, 17, xi. 1; cf. Phil. iii. 17, iv. 9), not as if he would thereby assert that his own life was an absolute pattern, but because in the life of every Christian who is already somewhat mature there is visibly represented what the form of life is which the Spirit demands and works. Accordingly, he also goes back in 1 Cor. xi. 1 (cf. Eph. v. 2) from his own example to the absolute example of Christ, by the imitation of which his own first becomes normative; yet we saw in § 78, *b*, and § 86, *c*, footnote 7, for what reasons the example of Christ is on the whole kept in the background by him. Now, as a *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος* is spoken of in Rom. viii. 2, inasmuch as the Spirit is the normative power in the life of the Christian, this law can also be called the *νόμος Χριστοῦ*, inasmuch as that Spirit is the Spirit of Christ and therefore makes known His will, which the Christian is bound to obey (§ 76, *a*), and in this sense Paul calls himself an *ἔννομος Χριστοῦ* (1 Cor. ix. 21; cf. Rom. xii. 11: *τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες*; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. v. 9: *φιλοτιμούμεθα . . . εὐάρεστοι αὐτῷ εἶναι*). It is possible that in Gal. vi. 2, where he is considering the law of love, Paul thinks also of the sayings of Christ bearing upon that subject, and with which he was certainly acquainted from tradition (v. 14; Rom. xiii. 8, 9; cf. § 25); yet it is only in 1 Cor. vii. 10, ix. 14, that he appeals to enactments of Christ, and that, too, rather with regard to outward circumstances of life. As in the Epistles to the Thessalonians (§ 62, *a*), he claims the right as His apostle to make enactments in the name of

Christ (v. 4), and repeatedly appeals to the precepts which he had given to the Churches (vii. 17: *οὕτως ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πάσαις διατάσσομαι*; cf. xi. 34, xvi. 1, xi. 2: *καθὼς παρέδωκα ὑμῖν τὰς παραδόσεις*. Cf. Phil. ii. 12).

(*d*) There is no doubt that the Old Testament was read in the assemblies of the Gentile-Christian Churches for the purpose of worshipping God.[6] This was so much the more necessary, as, according to § 73, *a*, everything in Scripture had been written for the instruction and admonition of Christians (1 Cor. x. 11; Rom. xv. 4). This, however, does not apply merely to the passages which, because they refer directly to the Messianic time, give precepts for men's behaviour in that time (2 Cor. vi. 2; cf. Eph. v. 14). For as a revelation of God (§ 71, *b*) Scripture in all its parts must make known His will, and must in so far even now still instruct Christians as to that will.[7] But Scripture, which on one side has a thoroughly legal character (§ 71, *c*), is not thereby revived as law, but an admonition, of the value of which the Christian consciousness is in itself convinced, is supported by its being also shown from Scripture that it is in keeping with the will of God revealed there (cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 34: *καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει*); and naturally this is particularly the case, where even the law in the narrower sense is used in a similar manner.[8] Of course, if the Christian stood from the very beginning under the exclusive dominion of the Spirit, he would no more

[6] It is true that in his Epistles to the purely Gentile-Christian Churches the apostle appeals to Scripture only where, as in Galatia, it was used by the Jewish-Christian agitation in a manner which made the statement of its right meaning necessary (Gal. iv. 21). Yet the manner in which those agitators attached themselves to Scripture as an authority that was valid also for these Churches, shows that it was regarded as such an authority also in the Gentile Churches. That being the case, however, it is self-evident that they must also have been made acquainted with Scripture (cf. Rom. vii. 1).

[7] Thus it already appears from the historical part of the Thora (Gen. iii. 16), that God requires the subjection of the wife to her husband (1 Cor. xiv. 34), and an exhortation to benevolence (2 Cor. ix. 9; cf. Ps. cxii. 9) or a warning against self-glorification (1 Cor. i. 31; 2 Cor. x. 17; cf. Jer. ix. 23) can be incidentally supported by statements of the Psalms or prophets.

[8] This does not only happen where, by means of an allegorical interpretation of a requirement of the law, an express reference to the circumstances of the Messianic time is vindicated (1 Cor. ix. 9, 10, for which see § 73, *a*, footnote 1, *d*), or where, on the presupposition of a typical character of the institutions of the Old Testament (§ 73, *c*), it is asserted that Christians also must bring a sacrifice

stand in need of being referred in this way to the revelation of the will of God in the Old Testament Scriptures than he would require to be exhorted by the apostle; the Spirit would enlighten him sufficiently as to that which is the will of God, as well as impel him to fulfil it. Seeing, however, that in the empirical reality of the Christian life the influence of the Spirit upon the individual is by no means throughout the same and unhindered (§ 86, *a*), the knowledge as to that which is the will of God must in many ways be first brought to him by means of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, as well as in the ways indicated in note *c*. For this knowledge there is required, indeed, not so much a special doctrine of duties, as rather a reference to the whole character of the Christian moral life, and this is seen most clearly in the revelation of God in Christ. Accordingly, the motives which Paul uses in his exhortations are in many ways drawn directly from his doctrine of salvation.[9] In doing so it is of course presupposed, as in the apostolic exhortation itself (cf. § 86), that the Christian finds himself in the state of salvation and has experienced in himself the saving deeds of God, to which the apostle appeals, as it is also only in that case that he can be assured of the gracious assistance of God, which enables him to accomplish that which his experiences of salvation lay him under an obligation to perform. This assurance, however, is grounded upon the consciousness of his divine election and calling.

to God (Rom. xii. 1), and, after the ritual of the feast of Passover, put away the leaven and live ἐν ἀζύμοις (1 Cor. v. 7, 8), or that the ordinances of the law relating to the priests apply to the circumstances of the Christian Church (ix. 13). In Gal. v. 14 the requirement of Christian love (ver. 13) is rather supported by its being said that the whole law is fulfilled in the commandment of love to one's neighbours (Lev. xix. 18), and in Rom. xiii. 8–10 this is expressly pointed out in an enumeration of the several commandments of the decalogue (ver. 9). Cf. Eph. vi. 2.

[9] It is with an allusion to the mercy of God, which demands our thanks, that Paul passes over, in Rom. xii. 1, from the doctrinal statement of the salvation given in Christ to practical exhortation. How he sets forth the obligation that is implied for us in the manifestation of love given by Christ in His death, we saw in § 81, *b*; in Rom. xv. 30 and 1 Cor. i. 10 the common Lord and His name which they all call upon are the motives of his exhortation. When he warns against fornication, he points to God, whom we should glorify for our redemption (1 Cor. vi. 20), to the Spirit, whose temple He has made our body (ver. 19), and to the fellowship of life with Christ (vv. 15–17), with which the living in fellowship with harlots is incompatible.

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